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Abstract
Th is  the s is  exp lo res  the  UK gove rnm en t’s use o f an ti-te rro rism  con tro l o rde rs  unde r the  
P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  A c t (PTA ) 2005  be tw een  M arch 2005  and D ecem be r 2011 . C on tro l 
o rders, a  fo rm  o f p reven tive  c iv il o rder, w e re  used to  im pose  a range  o f o ften  s tr in gen t 
‘o b lig a tio n s ’ on in d iv idua ls  w ho  w e re  suspec ted  o f in vo lvem en t in te r ro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity  
bu t who, fo r e ith e r lega l o r p rac tica l reasons, cou ld  no t be  p rosecu ted  o r  depo rted . T he  s tudy  
exam ines the  cen tra l fea tu re s  o f th e  PTA ’s s ta tu to ry  schem e and p rov ides  a de ta iled  
ana lys is  o f the  con tro l o rde r reg im e ’s con fo rm ity , in p rinc ip le  and in p rac tice , w ith  the  righ ts 
ensh rin ed  in th e  E uropean  C onven tio n  on  H um an R igh ts  and inco rpo ra ted  in to  UK  law  
th rough  the  Hum an R igh ts A ct 1998. In add ition  to  c ritiqu ing  the  ope ra tion  o f the  reg im e  from  
a hum an righ ts pe rspec tive , a consequen tia lis t ana lys is  is em p loyed  in o rde r to  eva lua te  th e  
p rac tica l e ffica cy  o f con tro l o rde rs  as a m echan ism  fo r  ‘p ro tec ting  m em be rs  o f the  pub lic  
from  a risk o f te rro r ism ’.1
Fo llow ing  the  change  o f gove rnm en t in 2010, con tro l o rde rs w ere  rep laced  by the  new , 
a lth ough  in m any  w ays s im ilar, T e rro rism  P reven tion  and Inves tiga tion  M easures  (TP IM s) 
under the  T e rro rism  P reven tion  and Investiga tion  M easu res  A c t 2011. W he th e r th e  trans ition  
from  con tro l o rde rs  to  TP IM s  can, from  a human righ ts  and /o r secu rity  po in t o f v iew , be 
deem ed a pos itive  deve lopm en t is cons ide red . In add ition , the  cu rren t and  p rospec tive  fu tu re  
u tility  o f TP IM s  as a  com ponen t o f th e  U n ited  K ingdom ’s lega l re sponse  to  th e  th rea t o f 
te rro rism  is assessed .
1 Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 005 , s 1 (1 ).
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
[W [e  m ust ac t aga ins t [te rro rism ] w ith  all the  powers  w e  have. O f cou rse  tha t 
m igh t invo lve  m easures  w h ich  re s tric t c iv il libe rty  in a w ay  wh ich  m ay  
o the rw ise  be repugnan t. H oweve r, if w e  go beyond  w ha t is necessa ry  to  
com ba t te rro rism  e ffec tive ly , if w e  c ra ven ly  a ccep t th a t any A ct in troduced  by 
the  G ove rnm en t and  en titled  "P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  Act" m ust be suppo rted  
in its en tire ty  w itho u t ques tion  ... w e do  no t s treng then  the  fig h t aga ins t 
te rro rism : we w eaken  it.1
(Tony  B la ir, 1993)
‘[0 ]n  11 S e p te m b e r ... te rro ris ts  rew ro te  th e ir ru le  book. W e  the re fo re  need to  
do  the  sam e .’2
(Lord  Rooker, 2001 )
The  hum an righ ts  d im ens ion  o f dem oc ra tic  s ta te s ’ re sponses  to  te rro rism  com p rises  som e  o f 
th e  m ost com p le x  and im po rtan t m a tte rs  encoun te red  w ith in  con tem po ra ry  lega l d isco u rse .3 
W h ils t th e  tens ion  be tween  an ti-te rro rism  law  and hum an righ ts  long p reda te s  the  
ca ta c lysm ic  even ts  o f S ep tem be r 11, 2001 ,4 the  na tu re  and unpreceden ted  sca le  o f th e se  
a ttacks  ‘changed  the  la ndscape  o f te rro rism  fo re ve r ’ ,5 and gave  rise to  ‘a new  se t o f  secu rity  
conce rns  a ffec ting  all c iv ilized  na tio n s .’6 A lthough  m any  coun tries  had e xpe rienced  te rro rism
1 HC  Deb 10 March  1993 , vol 2 20 , col 9 76  (Tony  Blair). This comment was  m ade  by Blair, who  w as  at  
the  tim e Shadow  Hom e Secretary, during the  debates  on the draft Prevention of Terrorism  
(Tem porary  Provisions) Act 1989  (Continuance O rder) 1993 .
HL  Deb  2 7  Novem ber, vol 629 , col 143 . Following the attacks  of 7  July 2 0 0 5  in the  UK , it w as  
sim ilarly stated by Prim e M inis ter Tony  Blair, ‘let no -one  be in any  doubt ... the rules o f the  gam e  
have  changed ’: ‘Prim e M in ister’s Press C on ference ’ (London, 5 August 2 0 0 5 )
< http ://webarchive .national a rch ives .gov .u k /20060715135117 /num ber10 .gov .u k /p age8041> accessed  
13 O ctober 2 014 .
3 S ee  M ary  Arden, ‘Hum an  Rights in the Age  of Terro rism ’ (2 0 05 ) 121 LQR  604 ; H e lena  Kennedy , 
J u s t  L a w  (V in tage 2005 ) 31 -66 ; Lord Falconer, ‘Hum an  R ights and Terro rism ’ (Royal United Serv ices  
Institute, London, 14 February  2 0 0 7 ) <www .rus i.o rg /even ts /re f:E 45740BC85792E /in fo :pub lic /in fo lD : 
E 45D 309 3 43 3F 9 2 /# .V G I0 1 8 IIQ 5g > accessed  1 O ctober 2 014 .
4 As Leigh and M aste rm an  note, ‘it is an eas ily overlooked point that, for the United K ingdom , human  
rights concerns over anti-terrorist powers did not begin with the response to the attacks  o f 9 /1 1 ’: Ian  
Leigh and Roger M aste rm an , M a k in g  R ig h t s  R e a l :  T h e  H u m a n  R ig h t s  A c t  in  i t s  F i r s t  D e c a d e  (H art  
Publishing 2 008 ) 201 .
5 Lord Goldsm ith (A ttorney G enera l, 2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 7 ), ‘UK  Terro rism  Legislation in an International 
Context’ (R US I International Hom eland  Security Conference , London, 10 M ay  2 0 0 6 )  
<www .rus i.o rg /even ts /www .rus i.o rg /even ts /re f:E 446B 4C0722082 /in fo :pub lic /in fo lD :E446B 4DD1CCDE  
C /# .VG L9V c llQ 5g> accessed  1 O ctober 2 014 .
6 Yonah  A lexander (ed ), C o m b a t in g  T e r r o r is m :  S t r a t e g ie s  o f  T e n  C o u n t r ie s  (University of M ichigan  
Press 2 0 0 2 ) 2. As Chom sky states, ‘the horrifying atrocities o f S ep tem ber 11 [were] som eth ing  quite  
new  in world affairs: Noam  Chomsky, 9 -1 1  (S even  Stories Press  2001 ) 11.
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p rio r to  9 /11 , s ince  the  a tro c itie s  o f th a t day, th e  p reven tion  o f te rro ris t v io lence  has becom e  
a  c ritica l cha lle nge  fo r dom es tic  gove rnm en ts7 and fo r the  in te rna tiona l com m un ity  as a 
w ho le .8
I. UK Anti-Terrorism  Legislation
The  Un ited  K ingdom  has a long h is to ry  o f com ba tin g  a th rea t of te rro rism  o rig ina ting  from  a 
va rie ty  o f d iffe ren t g roups and sou rces .9 O ve r the  cou rse  o f the  p reced ing  cen tu ry , an a rray  
o f lega l m easures  w e re  in troduced  to  address th rea ts  bo th a t home, pa rticu la rly  tho se  
spaw ned  by  ‘the  T ro ub le s ’ in N orthe rn  Ire land ,10 and a lso  ab road , in B rita in ’s fo rm e r co lon ia l 
em p ire .11 In consequence , as W a lke r obse rves , ‘spec ia l laws aga ins t te rro rism  have 
prov ided  a cons tan t fe a tu re  o f po litica l and lega l life w ith in  the  UK  fo r  m any  ye a rs .’12
The  UK ’s co re  an ti-te rro rism  s ta tu te ,13 the  T e rro rism  A c t 2000 , sec tion  1 o f w h ich  con ta ins  
the  lega l d e fin ition  o f ‘te r ro rism ’,14 cam e  into fo rce  on 19 Feb rua ry  2 0 0 1 .15 D esp ite  it be ing
7 The  sta te ’s duty to protect its citizenry from  the th reat of terrorism  is exam ined  in chap ter 2 of this  
thesis (pp 18 -23 ).
8 S ee  International Comm ission  of Jurists, A s s e s s in g  D a m a g e ,  U r g in g  A c t io n :  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  E m in e n t  
J u r is t s  P a n e l  o n  T e r r o r is m ,  C o u n te r - t e r r o r is m  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (2 009 ) v; Kent Roach  and  others, 
‘In troduction’ in V ictor V  Ram ra j and others, G lo b a l  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L a w  a n d  P o l i c y  (2 nd edn, 
Cam bridge University P ress 2 012 ) 1; Paul W ilkinson, T e r r o r is m  V e r s u s  D e m o c r a c y :  T h e  L ib e r a l  S t a t e  
R e s p o n s e  (3 rd edn, Routledge 2 011 ) 1.
9 S ee  Andrew  Staniforth , T h e  R o u t le d g e  C o m p a n io n  to  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (Rou tledge  2 013 ).
10 S ee  Laura K Donohue, C o u n te r - T e r r o r is t  L a w  a n d  E m e r g e n c y  P o w e r s  in  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  
1 9 2 2 - 2 0 0 0  (Irish A cadem ic  Press 2001 ); G erard  Hogan  and  C live W a lke r, P o l i t i c a l  V io le n c e  a n d  th e  
L a w  in  I r e la n d  (M anches te r University Press 1989); David  Bonner, E x e c u t iv e  M e a s u r e s ,  T e r r o r is m  
a n d  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y :  H a v e  th e  R u le s  o f  t h e  G a m e  C h a n g e d ?  (A shgate  2 0 07 ) 6 9 -1 01 . S ee  chap ter 2  
{pp 4 1 -4 5 ) of this thesis.
1 S ee  AW  Brian S im pson, H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  th e  E n d  o f  E m p i r e :  B r i t a in  a n d  th e  G e n e s is  o f  th e  
E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o f  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (O UP  2001 ); Bonner, E x e c u t iv e  M e a s u r e s  (n 10) 1 3 5 -200 .
12 C live W a lker, B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  to  th e  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L e g is la t io n  (2 nd edn, O U P  2 009 ) 23 .
13 As W a lke r notes, the TA  2000 , 'rem ains  the [UK ’s] forem ost code ’: ibid 24.
14 TA  2000 , s 1, as  am ended  by TA  2006 , s 34 , and C TA  2 008 , s 7 5 (1 ) provides:
(1 ) In this Act “terrorism ” m eans the use or th reat o f action w here  -
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threa t is designed  to influence the governm en t or an international governm en ta l 
organisation or to intim idate the public or a  section of the public, and
(c) the use or threa t is m ade for the purpose of advancing a  political, religious, racial or 
ideological cause.
(2 ) Action falls within this subsection if it—
(a ) involves serious vio lence against a  person,
(b) involves serious d am age  to property,
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asse rted  a t th e  tim e  tha t th is  A c t w ou ld  p rov ide  the  powers  necessary  to  dea l w ith  te rro rism  
‘fo r  the  fo re seeab le  fu tu re ’,16 the  adven t o f 9/11 - invo lv ing  coo rd ina ted  su ic ide  a ttacks  by  A l- 
Q aeda -a ffilia ted  Is lam is t te r ro ris ts 17 w h ich  resu lted  in the  dea ths  o f 2 ,973  pe op le 18 - 
p rovoked  the  G ove rnm en t to  hastily  re -e va lua te  its  c la im .19 T h e  im m ed ia te  a fte rm a th  of 
* S ep tem be r 11 w itnessed  the  UK  a lign  itse lf w ith  th e  US in a ‘w a r on  te r ro r’ ,20 the  firs t 
leg is la tive  m an ifes ta tion  o f w h ich  w as  the  con trove rs ia l A n ti-te rro rism , C rim e  and S ecu rity
(c) endangers a person ’s life, other than that o f the person committing the action,
(d) c rea tes a  serious risk to the health  or sa fe ty  of the public or a  section of the public, or
(e) is des igned seriously to interfere with or seriously to d isrupt an electronic system .
(3) T h e  use or th reat of action falling within subsection (2 ) which involves the use of firearm s  
or explos ives  is terrorism  whether or not subsection (1 )(b ) is satisfied.
(4) In this section—
(a ) “action” includes action outside the United K ingdom,
(b) a  reference  to any  person or to property is a  re ference  to any  person, or to property, 
wherever situated,
(c) a  reference  to the public includes a  re fe rence  to the public of a  country other than the  
United K ingdom , and
(d) “the governm ent” m eans  the governm en t of the United K ingdom, of a Part of the United  
Kingdom or of a  country other than the United K ingdom .
Whilst it is acknow ledged  that this definition is ‘striking . ..  in its bread th ’ (R  v  F [ 2007 ] EW CA  Crim  2 4 3  
[27] (S ir Igor Judge)), and that formulating a  satisfactory legal definition constitutes an important, yet 
notoriously difficult, task, detailed discussion of the legal definition of terrorism  falls outside the  scope  
of this thesis. For further discussion of the  TA  2000 , s 1 definition see: Lord Carlile , T h e  D e f in i t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7052 , 2 0 05 ); David  Anderson , T h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t s  in  2 0 1 3 :  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  
R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 0  a n d  P a r t  1 o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 6  (2 014 )  
paras 4 .1 -4 .2 3 , 1 0 .1 -10 .7 0 ; C live W a lke r, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (O UP  2 011 ) 3 4 -4 7 . O n  the  
difficulties associa ted with defining terrorism  for political and legal purposes, see: A lex  P Schm id  and  
Albert J Jongman , P o l i t i c a l  T e r r o r is m :  A  N e w  G u id e  to  A c to r s ,  A u th o r s ,  C o n c e p ts ,  D a ta  B a s e s ,  
T h e o r ie s ,  &  L i t e r a t u r e  (T ransaction  Publishers 2 0 06 ) 1-38 ; Ben Sau l, D e f in in g  T e r r o r is m  in  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  L a w  (O U P  2 006 ).
15 The  TA  2 000  received the  Royal Assen t on 2 0  July 2 0 00 , and cam e  into force on 19  Feb ruary
2001.
16 HC  D eb  15  March 2 0 0 0 , vol 3 46 , col 3 6 3  (Charles  C la rke ).
17 On the morning of S ep tem ber 11, 2 001 , four commercia l airliners w ere  h ijacked by 19 terrorists. 
Two  of the  p lanes w ere  flown into the Tw in  Tow ers  of the W orld  T rade  C en te r in N ew  York . T h e  third  
plane w as  flown into the Pen tagon  building in V irgin ia. The  fourth, United A irlines Flight 93 , which w as  
believed to be on route to the W h ite  House, crashed in an em pty  field in Shanksv ille , Pennsy lvania . 
See  National Comm ission on Terroris t A ttacks Upon the United Sta tes , T h e  9 /1 1  C o m m is s io n  R e p o r t :  
F in a l  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  T e r r o r is t  A t t a c k s  U p o n  th e  U n i t e d  S ta t e s  (Norton 2 004 ).
18 ibid 5 5 2  (footnote 188 ). Th is  figure exc ludes  terrorist deaths. 6 7  of those killed w ere  British.
19 The  Exp lanato ry No tes to the Anti-terrorism , C rim e and Security Act 2 0 01 , for exam ple , stated  that  
the purpose o f the Act w as  to ‘build on legislation in a num ber o f a reas  to ensure  tha t the  
Governm en t, in light o f the new  situation arising from  the S ep tem ber 11 terrorist attacks . ..  have  the  
necessary  powers to coun ter the th reat to the UK ’ (para 3).
20 S ee  HC  Deb  4  O ctober 2 0 01 , vol 372 , cols 6 7 3 -6 7 5  (Tony Blair, Prim e M inister). In his s ta tem en t to  
the nation on 11 S ep tem ber 2 001 , B lair stated, ‘w e  . ..  here in Britain stand shou lder to shou lder with  
our American  friends in this hour of tragedy  and w e like them  will not rest until this evil is driven from  
our world ’: Tony  Blair, ‘S ta tem en t to the N ation ’ (London, S ep tem ber 11 2 0 0 1 ) < h ttp ://n ews.bbc .co .uk / 
1/h i/uk_po litics/1538551  .s tm > accessed  1 O ctober 2 014 .
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Act 2001 ,21 Part 4  o f w h ich  pe rm itte d  the  inde fin ite  de ten tion  w ithou t tria l o f suspec ted  
in te rna tiona l te rro ris ts .22 A lth ough  B la ir ’s Labou r gove rnm en t23 w as in itia lly  a ffo rded  
subs tan tia l la titude  due  to  the  pe rce ived  necess ity  o f re spond ing  to  the  ‘n ew ’24 and ‘m ore  
le tha l’25 th rea t of in te rna tiona l te rro rism , th e  d racon ian  cha ra c te r of th is  leg is la tion  led to  the  
ques tion ing  o f the  ve ra c ity  o f the  U K ’s comm itm en t to  the  p ro tec tion  o f hum an rig h ts .26 
Indeed, as is d iscussed  in cha p te r 3 27 it w as u ltim a te ly  th e  House  o f Lo rds ’ ru ling  tha t the  
Part 4  de ten tion  schem e  w as incom pa tib le  w ith  A rtic le s  5 and  14 o f the  ECHR  in the  
landm a rk  case o f A  a n d  O th e rs  v  S e c re ta r y  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  D e p a r tm e n t8 th a t 
p rec ip ita ted  the  in troduction  o f th e  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  A c t 2005.
W h ils t th e  cen tra l fo c i o f th is  th e s is  a re  the  sys tem  o f con tro l o rde rs  con ta ined  in the  PTA , 
w h ich  ope ra ted  from  M arch 2005  until D ecem be r 2011 (see  chap te rs  3 and 4), and  the  
TP IM s  reg ime, w h ich  w as  in troduced  by the  Coa lition  gove rnm en t unde r the  T e rro rism
21 S ee  chap ter 3  (pp 4 6 -4 8 ) of this thesis.
22ATCSA , ss 2 1 -23 .
23 Tony  B lair w as  Prim e M inister of the ‘N ew  Labour’ governm en t from  2 M ay  1997  to 2 7  June  2007 ,  
when he was replaced  by Gordon Brown, who was  Prim e M inis ter from  27  June  2 0 0 7  to 11 M ay  
2010 .
24 Tony  Blair, ‘Speech  to Sedgefield  Constituency’ (Sedgefie ld , 5  M arch  2 0 0 4 ) <www .theguard ian . 
com /po litics /2004 /m ar/05 /iraq .iraq>  accessed  1 O ctober 2014 ; Gordon Brown, ‘Fo reword ’ to H om e  
Office, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e ;  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  
T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7547 , 2 0 0 9 ) 4; H om e O ffice , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o w e r s :  R e c o n c i l in g  S e c u r i t y  a n d  
L ib e r t y  in  a n  O p e n  S o c ie t y :  A  D is c u s s io n  P a p e r  (Cm  6147 , 2 0 0 4 ) para 5. S e e  also Johnny Burnett 
and D ave  W h ite , ‘Em bedded  Expertise and the N ew  Terro rism ’ (2 0 05 ) 1 (4 ) Journal for C rim e, Conflict 
and the M ed ia  1; P e te r N eum ann , O ld  a n d  N e w  T e r r o r is m  (Polity Press  2009 ); S teven  G reer, ‘Hum an  
Rights and the S truggle Against Terro rism  in the United K ingdom ’ (2 0 0 8 ) 2 European  Hum an  R ights  
Law  R ev iew  163 . W he th e r post-9/11 terrorism  warrants  the ‘new ’ appellation  has  been vigorously  
contested by som e, see: Isabelle  Duyvesteyn, ‘How  N ew  is the N ew  Terro rism ? ’ (2 0 04 ) 2 7  S tudies in 
Conflict and Terrorism  439 ; A lexander Spencer, ‘Question ing  the Concep t o f the “N ew  Terro rism ’” 
(2006 ) 8 Peace , Conflict and Deve lopm en t 1; R ichard Ashby W ilson  ,‘Hum an R ights in the ‘W a r  on  
Terro r’ in R ichard Ashby W ilson (ed ), H u m a n  R ig h t s  in  th e  ‘W a r  o n  T e r r o r ’ (C am bridge  University  
Press 2 005 ) 31.
25 W ilkinson (n 8) 184 . As S ir David  Om and  explains, ‘the characteristics of jihad ist terrorism  with its 
vaulting ambitions, strident ideology and disregard for civilian casualties  -  indeed  for all hum an  life, 
with adherents  prepared  to g ive their lives in their attacks -  represented very  new  cha llenges  for  
Parliam ent and public, governm en t and law  en fo rcem ent alike: S ir David  Om and , ‘Fo reword ’ in 
Staniforth (n 9) xxi. S ee  also: B ruce Hoffm an, I n s id e  T e r r o r is m  (Co lum bia  University Press  2 0 0 6 ) 88;  
Clive W a lke r, Terro rism  and Crim inal Justice: Past, P resent and Futu re ’ [2004] C rim inal Law  R ev iew  
311 , 314 .
26 S ee , for exam p le , JC H R , A n t i - t e r r o r is m ,  C r im e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  A c t  2 0 0 1 :  S t a t u t o r y  R e v ie w  a n d  
C o n t in u a n c e  o f  P a r t  4  (2 0 0 3 -0 4 , HL  38 , HC  381 ); Am nesty  International, J u s t ic e  P e r v e r t e d  U n d e r  t h e  
A n t i - t e r r o r is m ,  C r im e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  A c t  2 0 0 1  (2 003 ); Council of Europe, Comm iss ioner for Hum an  
Rights, R e p o r t  b y  M r  A lv a r o  G il - R o b le s ,  C o m m is s io n e r  f o r  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  o n  h is  V is i t  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  
K in g d o m  4 - 1 2?h N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 4  (C ommDH , 2 005 ) pa ras  5 -8 .
27 S ee  pp 47 -50 .
28 [2004] UKHL  56 . S ee  pp 4 7 -4 8  of this thesis.
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P reven tion  and Inves tiga tion  M easures  A c t 2011 (see  chap te r 5), the re  have  been  a num be r 
o f o th e r s ign ifican t add ition s  to  th e  UK ’s in ven to ry  o f coun te r-te rro rism  laws s ince  2001. 
Fo llow ing  the  te rro ris t a ttacks  o f 7 Ju ly  2005  - w h ich  invo lved  coo rd ina ted  su ic id e  bom b ings  
ca rr ied  ou t by fo u r ‘hom e-g rown  jih a d is ’29 on the  London transpo rt n e tw o rk30 - th e  T e rro rism  
A c t 2006  w as  enac ted  in o rde r to  c rea te  o ffences  ‘to  pena lize  conduc t w h ich  [fe ll] ou ts ide  
ex is ting  s ta tu tes  and the  comm on  law .’31 T he  fina l m a jo r p iece  of a n ti-te rro rism  leg is la tion  
p roduced  by New  Labou r’s ‘h ype rac tive  law  m ak ing ’32 w as the  C oun te r-T e rro rism  A c t 2008, 
w h ich  ex tended  po lice  powers  to  ga the r and sha re  in fo rm a tion , inc lud ing  docum ents , 
fin ge rp rin ts  and DNA  sam p le s ,33 and  a lso  p rov ided  fo r  th e  pos t-cha rge  questio n ing  of 
te rro ris t suspec ts .34
/. P re v e n t iv e  C o u n te r -T e rro r ism  M e a s u re s
W h ils t the  ‘o ffic ia l m an tra ’35 p roc la im s  tha t p rosecu tion  is the  gove rnm en t’s p re fe rred  
approach  fo r dea ling  w ith  te rro ris t su spec ts ,36 as d iscussed  in chap te r 2, p re ven tive37
29 C live W a lke r and Javaid  R ehm an , ‘“P reven t” R esponses to Jihadi Extrem ism ’ in Kent Roach  and  
others, ‘Introduction’ in V ictor V  Ram ra j and others, G lo b a l  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L a w  a n d  P o l i c y  (2 nd edn, 
Cam bridge  University P ress 2 012 ) 2 4 5 . T h e  suicide bombers, who w ere  killed in the  a ttack , w e re  
Mohamm ed  S iddeque Khan, Hasib  Hussein , S hazad  Tanw eer, who w ere  British nationals of 
Pakistani origin, and Jerm aine  Lindsay, who w as  a  British national of W es t Indian origin. S ee  
In telligence and Security Comm ittee , R e p o r t  in t o  t h e  L o n d o n  T e r r o r is t  A t t a c k s  o n  J u l y  7  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
6785 , 2006 ); Hom e O ffice, R e p o r t  o f  th e  O f f i c ia l  A c c o u n t  o f  th e  B o m b in g s  in  L o n d o n  o n  7  J u l y  2 0 0 5  
(H C  2 0 05 -0 6 , 1097); In telligence and Security Comm ittee , C o u ld  7 / 7  H a v e  B e e n  P r e v e n t e d ? :  R e v ie w  
o f  t h e  In t e l l ig e n c e  o n  L o n d o n  T e r r o r is t  A t t a c k s  o n  J u l y  7 2 0 0 5  (Cm  7617 , 2 009 ).
30 The  terrorists de tona ted  hom e-m ade  organ ic -peroxide-based  explosives, which had been  packed  
into rucksacks, on the C ircle and P iccadilly  lines of the London Underground, and on the  upper deck  
of a  London bus in Tav is tock  Square. T h e  attacks resulted in the deaths of 5 2  peop le, w ith hundreds  
more being injured.
31 Alun Jones Q C , Rupert Bowers and Hugo Lodge, B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  to  t h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 6  
(O UP , 2 0 06 ) 1. S ee  chap te r 2 (p 31 ) of this thesis.
2 Chris Huhne, the L iberal D em ocrat Shadow  Hom e Secretary, stated  in a  letter to the Labour Justice  
Secretary, Jack  Straw , that ‘the legacy of Labour is hyperactive law  making that has sp read  confusion  
among police officers, judges  and every  other [affected] p ro fess iona l’: BBC  News, ‘Jack  S traw  
Rejects  Calls to R epea l T riv ia l Laws” (22  January  2 0 1 0 ) < http ://news.bbc.co .Uk/1/h i/uk_po litics/ 
84737 63 .s tm > accessed  1 O ctober 2 014 .
33 C TA  2008 , Part 1. S ee  W a lke r, B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  to  t h e  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L e g is la t io n  (n 12 ) 3 2 .
34 C TA  2 008 , Part 2. O ther notable anti-terrorism  statu tes passed  since 2001  include the  Terro rism  
(Northern Ireland) Act 2 006 , the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2 0 07 , and the  Terro rism  
Asset-F reezing  etc Act 2 010 .
35 David  Bonner, ‘Counter-Terro rism  and European  Hum an  Rights since 9 /11 : T h e  Un ited  K ingdom  
Experience ’ (2 0 13 ) 1 9 (1 ) European Public Law  97 , 98 .
36 S ee  chap ter 2  (pp 3 0 -3 4 ) of this thesis.
5
execu tive  m easu res  have  long been  a fea tu re  o f th e  UK ’s ‘va ria b le  m ixed  e conom y  o f 
re sponses ’38 to  the  th rea t o f te rro rism .39 Be long ing  to  th is  lineage  o f ‘p re ven ta tive ’40 
m easures , con tro l o rde rs  w e re  a fo rm  o f ‘c iv il’41 o rde r w h ich  w ere  in tended  to  p ro tec t 
m em bers  of the  pub lic  from  a r isk  o f te rro rism  by im pos ing  a range  o f res tric tive  
‘o b lig a tio n s ’42 on ind iv idua ls  w ho  w e re  suspec ted  of invo lvem en t in te r ro rism -re la ted  activ ity .
In the  con tex t o f an opera tive  libera l d em oc racy , it m ay  leg itim a te ly  be con tended  tha t ‘any  
p roposa l fo r  c iv il o rde rs  res tric ting  libe rty  can on ly  be ju s tifie d  as a spec ific  ... re sponse  to  a 
pa rticu la r s itua tion  tha t canno t be addre ssed  in any  o th e r app rop ria te  w a y .’43 Pu rsuan t to  
th is, chap te r 2 o f th is  th e s is  exam ines  the  ra tiona le  fo r  the  use o f con tro l o rde rs, and 
cons ide rs  the  va lid ity  o f the  con ten tion  tha t p reven tive  m easu res  con s titu te  a ‘n e cessa ry  
a lte rna tive ’44 fo r  dea ling  w ith  a  spec ific  c lass  o f te rro ris t suspec ts  in re spec t o f w hom  the  
gove rnm en t is unab le  to  pu rsue  its ‘firs t o p tio n ’45 o f p ro s e c u tio n 46
W ith in  th e  pa ram e te rs  es tab lished  by law , w he the r a  pa rticu la r m easure , p re ven tive  o r 
o the rw ise , can  be rega rded  as ju s tifie d  subs tan tia lly  depends  upon the  na tu re  o f the  p rob lem
37 In this context, the term s ‘p reventive ’ and ‘preven ta tive ’ m ay  be used in terchangeab ly. Unless  
appearing  in a quotation, the term  ‘p reven tive ’ is used for the purposes of this thesis.
3 Bonner (n 35 ) 97 .
39 S ee  chap ter 2  (pp 4 1 -4 5 ) of this thesis. For discussion of other s ta tes ’ use o f ‘p reventive  
mechan ism s’ - including ‘control o rders’ and other sim ilar m easu res  - for combating  terrorism  post- 
9 /1 1, see  International Comm ission of Jurists, A s s e s s in g  D a m a g e , U r g in g  A c t io n  (n 8 ) 9 1 -122 ; Dav id  
Anderson, C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  in  2 0 1 1 :  F in a l  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 012 ) para 2 .1 4 -2 .1 9 ; Susan  Donkin, P r e v e n t in g  T e r r o r is m  a n d  C o n t r o l l in g  R is k :  
A  C o m p a r a t iv e  A n a ly s is  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  in  t h e  U K  a n d  A u s t r a l ia  (Springer 2 0 1 4 ).
40 Hom e O ffice, M e m o r a n d u m  to  t h e  H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m it t e e  P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  7797 , 2 0 10 ) para  2. It w as  exp la ined  by Charles  C la rke  a t the  
tim e of the Prevention of Terrorism  Bill’s introduction in the House  of Commons that the  purpose of 
the orders w as  ‘to p r e v e n t  an individual from  continuing to carry  out terrorist-rela ted activities’: HC  
Deb  22  February  2 005 , vol 431 , col 153 . As W a lk e r  notes, T P IM s  also ‘remain firm ly situated in the  
genus ’ o f ‘p reventa tive’ execu tive interventions: C live W a lke r, Te rro ris t on Trial: An Open  or C losed  
Case? ’ in David  Co le, Federico  Fabbrin i and A rianna Vedasch i (eds), S e c r e c y ,  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  a n d  
th e  V in d ic a t io n  o f  C o n s t i t u t io n a l  L a w  (Edward  E lgar Publishing 2 013 ) 211 . S ee  also Lucia Zedner, 
'P reventive Justice or Pre-pun ishment?  T h e  C ase  of Control O rders ' (2 0 07 ) 6 0  Curren t Legal 
Problems 174 .
41 On the ‘civil’ designation of control orders, see  chap ter 4  (pp 145 -1 47 ) of this thesis.
42 PTA , s 1 (4). S ee  chap te r 3  (pp 56 -5 8 ) of this thesis.
43 Roger Sm ith , ‘G lobal T h rea t? ’ (2 0 0 5 ) 1 4 9 (5 ) Solicitors Journal 128 , 128.
44 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  R e v ie w  F in d in g s  a n d  
R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  (Cm  8004 , 2 011 ) 40 .
45 HC  D eb  22  Feb ruary 2 0 0 5 , vol 4 31 , col 151 (Charles  C la rke).
46 S ee  chap ter 2  (pp 3 3 -4 1 ) of this thesis.
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to  w h ich  it is th e  in tended  so lu tion . Indeed, as d iscussed  in chap te rs  3 and  4 o f th is  thes is , 
th e  issue  o f ‘p ropo rtio na lity ’ cons titu te s  a cruc ia l de te rm ina te  o f the  lega lity  o f a s ta te ’s 
coun te r-te rro rism  ac tiv itie s . C onsequen tly , fo r a s ta te ’s  re sponse  to  te rro rism  to  be deem ed 
p ropo rtiona te , it m ust be seen  to  em body  an appos ite  ‘b a lance ’ be tw een  p ro tec ting  ind iv idua l 
righ ts  and libe rties  and  sa feguard ing  secu rity .47 T he  the s is ’s a im  o f assess ing  w he the r 
con tro l o rde rs  w ere , and TP IM s  are, an ‘e ffe c tive ’ and ‘p ropo rtio na te ’ m eans o f p ro tec ting  
the  pub lic , th u s  requ ire s  cons ide ra tion  to  be g iven  to  the  type  of te rro ris t suspect, and  the  
na tu re  o f th e  te rro rism -re la ted  activ ity , th e se  m easu res  a re  used to  ‘con tro l’.48
II. Thesis Aims and Objectives
The  p rinc ipa l a im s  and  ob jec tives  o f th is  th e s is  are:
■  T o  conduc t a de ta iled  lega l ana lys is  o f th e  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  A c t 2005  and  
e xam ine  the  UK  go ve rnm en t’s use o f con tro l o rde rs  be tw een  March 2005  and 
D ecem be r 2011 .
■  T o  unde rtake  a hum an righ ts  aud it o f th e  PTA  and a ssess  the  con tro l o rde r re g im e ’s 
con fo rm ity , in p rin c ip le  and in p rac tice , w ith  the  righ ts  ensh rin ed  in th e  European  
C onven tion  on  Hum an R igh ts  and ‘in co rpo ra ted ’ in to  UK law  th rough  the  H um an 
R igh ts  A c t 1998.49
47 Th e  contention that, in countering terrorism , it is necessary  for states to ba lance  'liberty' and
 
‘security’ is d iscussed is chap ter 2  (pp 2 3 -2 9 ).
48 S ee  chap ter 6 (pp 1 88 -190 ) of this thesis.
49 The  HRA , which cam e  into force on 2 O ctober 2 000 , g ives ‘further effec t’ to certain of the  rights and  
freedom s guaran teed  under the ECHR . Th e  E CHR  rights ‘incorporated ’ into UK  law  by the  Act a re  
Articles 2  to 12  and 14  of the Convention; A rticles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol; and Article 1 of the  
Thirteen th  Protocol (HRA , s 1 (1 ), sch 1). For d iscussion of the background to, and schem e of rights 
protection under, the HRA , see: S ecre tary  of S ta te  for the H om e Departm en t, R ig h t s  B r o u g h t  H o m e :  
T h e  H u m a n  R ig h t s  B i l l  (W hite Paper, Cm  3782 , 1997); H elen  Fenw ick, C iv i l  R ig h ts :  N e w  L a b o u r ,  
F r e e d o m  a n d  th e  H u m a n  R ig h t s  A c t  (Longman 2 0 0 0 ) 1 -59 ; S teve  Foster, H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  C iv i l  
L ib e r t ie s  (3 rd edn, Longman 2 011 ) 116 -179 ; John W adham  and others, B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  t o  t h e  
H u m a n  R ig h t s  A c t  1 9 9 8  (6 th edn, O U P  2 011 )
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■  T o  u tilise  a  consequen tia lis t a na lys is  in o rde r to  eva lua te  the  e ffec tiveness  of con tro l 
o rde rs  as m echan ism  fo r ‘p ro tec ting  m em be rs  o f the  pub lic  from  a r isk  o f te rro r ism ’.50
■  T o  c ritica lly  re flec t upon the  le ssons  tha t can  be g leaned  from  the  ope ra tion  o f the  
con tro l o rde r schem e, and app ly  any pe rtin en t conc lus ions to  an eva lua tio n  of the  
cu rren t and  p ro spective  fu tu re  u tility  o f TP IM s  as a com ponen t o f the  UK ’s legal 
response to  th e  th rea t o f te rro rism .
III. Research Methodology
The  s tudy  o f te rro rism , and o f s ta te s ’ re sponses  to  th e  th rea t o f te rro ris t v io lence , rep resen ts  
a re la tive ly  new  academ ic  d isc ip lin e .51 T he  com para tive  nove lty  o f th e  d isc ip line  m an ifes ts  
itse lf in a  num be r o f w ays wh ich  can  be cons ide red  s ign ifican t from  a resea rch  pe rspective . 
F irstly, th e re  is th e  vexed , and, as ye t un reso lved , p rob lem  o f fo rm u la tin g  a  de fin ition  of 
‘te rro r ism ’ capab le  o f a ttrac ting  in te rna tiona l consensus . Second, as W ilk in son  obse rves, 
‘the re  is no un ive rsa lly  a ccep ted  gene ra l soc ia l sc ien tific  th eo ry  o f te rro rism , o r  o f co u n te r ­
te rro r ism .’52 Fu rthe rm ore , the  d ram a tic  inc rease  in in te re s t in issues re la ting  to  te rro rism  
fo llow ing  the  a ttacks  o f S ep tem be r 11, 2001 , has m ean t tha t the  fie ld  o f s tudy  has been  
flo oded  w ith  con tr ibu tio ns  from  scho la rs  from  a  d ive rse  range  of d isc ip lines . T h is , in tu rn , has 
m ean t th a t no t on ly  has the re  been an e xponen tia l g row th  in the  lite ra tu re  on the  top ic ,53 bu t 
a lso  tha t the  s tudy  of te rro rism  has evo lved  a  tru ly  m u ltid isc ip lina ry  cha ra c te r .54 Indeed , as
50 PTA , s 1 (1 ).
51 Indeed , Lacquer suggests that, ‘the discipline ...  goes back no further than the early  1 9 7 0 s ’: W a lte r  
Lacquer, N o  E n d  to  W a r :  T e r r o r is m  in  t h e  T w e n t y - F i r s t  C e n t u r y  (Continuum  2003 ) 138 . S ee  also  
Schm id  and Jongman  (n 14) 177 .
52 Paul W ilkinson, ‘In troduction’ in Paul W ilkinson  (ed ), H o m e la n d  S e c u r i t y  in  t h e  U K :  F u tu r e  
P r e p a r e d n e s s  f o r  T e r r o r is t  A t t a c k  S in c e  9 /1 1  (Rou tledge 2 007 ) 8.
53 According to research  by Silke, be tw een  S ep tem ber 2001  and June 2 008 , 2 ,281  non-fiction books  
on terrorism  were  published, in comparison to 1 ,310  in total prior to S ep tem ber 2001 : A nd rew  S ilke, 
‘Con tem porary  Terro rism  Studies: Issues in R esearch ’ in R ichard Jackson, M arie  B reen -Sm yth  and  
Jeroen  Gunning (eds), C r i t i c a l  T e r r o r is m  S tu d ie s :  A  N e w  R e s e a r c h  A g e n d a  (Routledge 2 0 0 9 ) 3 4 . S ee  
also R ichard Jackson, T h e  Study o f Terro rism  afte r 11 S ep tem ber 2001 : Problems, C ha llenges  and  
Future D eve lopm en ts ’ (2 0 0 9 ) 7 Political S tudies  R ev iew  171, 171; F rank Furedi, I n v i t a t io n  to  T e r r o r :  
T h e  E x p a n d in g  E m p ir e  o f  t h e  U n k n o w n  (Continuum  2007 ) xix.
54 S ilke, fo r exam ple , identifies that important contributions have  com e from  ‘researchers from  fields  
such as political science, crim inology, psychology, socio logy, history, law, m ilitary and communication  
sc iences’. ‘P re face ’ in A ndrew  S ilke (ed ) T e r r o r is ts ,  V ic t im s  a n d  S o c ie t y :  P s y c h o lo g ic a l  P e r s p e c t iv e s
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Roach observes, ‘one  o f the  g rea t cha lle nges  o f s tudy ing  coun te r-te rro rism  laws and  po lic ies  
is th a t th e y  c ro ss  trad itiona l b oundarie s  w ith in  a cadem e and even  w ith in  law .’55
W h ils t the  p ro fus ion  o f p ub lica tions  in re cen t yea rs  has resu lted  in a  va s t lite ra tu re  on bo th 
te rro ris ts  and coun te r-te rro rism ,56 it is n one the le ss  the  case  tha t, in som e  respects , te rro rism  
rem a ins  ‘an unusua lly  d ifficu lt sub je c t fo r  a cadem ic  re sea rch .’57 A s ide  from  the  c landes tin e  
na tu re  o f te rro rism  itse lf, and the  consequen t cha lle nges  assoc ia ted  w ith  ob ta in ing  re liab le , 
em p irica lly  ve rifia b le  in fo rm a tion  abou t te rro ris ts  and the ir ac tiv ities , th e  fie ld  o f cou n te r ­
te rro rism  is one  w h ich  is a lso  gene ra lly  cha ra c te rised  by secrecy . Due to  th is , m uch o f the  
in fo rm a tion  ge rm ane  to  th e  ana lys is  o f the  cu rren t te rro ris t th rea t, and  gove rnm en ta l 
re sponses  to  con tem po ra ry  sub -s ta te  te rro rism , is c lass ified , and the re fo re  no t access ib le  to  
a cadem ic  re sea rche rs .58 Indeed, sec recy , and  the  ex tens ive  use o f c losed  ev idence  de rived  
from  in te lligence , w e re  p rom inen t fea tu re s  o f the  con tro l o rde r reg im e from  its in ce p tio n .59 
However, a lth ough  a  subs tan tia l am oun t o f the  m a te ria l conce rn ing  the  con tro lees  is 
con ta ined  in c losed  sou rces , th e re  rem a ins  a  su ffic ie n t range  o f open  sou rce  docum en ts  to  
pe rm it a de ta iled  a ssessm en t o f th e  ope ra tion  o f the  P TA  and the  UK go ve rnm en t’s use  o f 
con tro l orders.
T h e  in he ren tly  po litica l n a tu re  o f te rro rism , and o f s ta te  re sponses  to  it, ine v ita b ly  m eans  tha t 
th is  is an a rea  w he re  d ispass iona te  and e ven -handed  ana lys is  is som e tim es  lack ing , and  the  
re lia b ility  o f sou rces  occas iona lly  ques tionab le . Indeed, as Schm id  h igh ligh ts  in h is 2011
o n  T e r r o r is m  a n d  i t s  C o n s e q u e n c e s  (W iley-B lackwell 2 0 0 3 ) xvi. S ee  also Schm id  and Jongm an , (n 
14) 177 -178 .
55 Roach  goes on to state that, ‘to begin to understand the g lobal response to 9 /1 1 , it is n ecessary  to  
understand  how international law , constitutional law , m ilitary and w ar law , crim inal law  and p rocedure, 
evidence  law, imm igration law, and various forms o f adm inistrative law  ... have  been  used to com bat  
terrorism ’: Kent Roach , T h e  9 /1 1  E f f e c t :  C o m p a r a t iv e  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (C am bridge  Un iversity  P ress  
2011 ) 6 .
56 Th e  ‘B ib liography of Terro rism ’ compiled by Duncan  and Schm id in 2 011 , fo r exam p le , contains  
details  o f 4 ,6 0 0  publications. G illian Duncan and A lex  P Schm id, ‘B ib liography of T e rro rism ’ in A lex  P  
Schm id  (ed ), T h e  R o u t le d g e  H a n d b o o k  o f  T e r r o r is m  R e s e a r c h  (Routledge 2 011 ).
57 Ariel Merari, ‘A cadem ic  Research  and Governm en t Policy on Terro rism ’, in C la rk  M cC au ley  (ed ),  
T e r r o r is m  R e s e a r c h  a n d  P u b l ic  P o l i c y  (F rank  Cass  1991 ) 89 .
58 S ee  ibid 88 -89 ; Je roen  Gunning, T h e  C ase  for Critical Terro rism  S tud ies? ’ (2 0 0 7 ) 4 2 (3 )  
G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  O p p o s i t io n  3 63 , 369 .
59 S ee  chap ter 4  of this thesis.
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rev iew  o f th e  lite ra tu re , fo r  re sea rche rs  w o rk ing  w ith  open  sou rces, ‘d is in fo rm a tion  and 
d is to rtio n s  from  both the  te rro ris ts  and th e ir o pponen ts  a re  an add itiona l p ro b lem ’.60 W hen  
using  and assess ing  m a te ria l on th is  em o tive  and po litica lly  loaded  top ic , it is th e re fo re  
necessary  to  be consc ious  o f its p rovenance , and  cogn izan t o f th e  po ten tia l fo r  sub jec tiv ity  
and pa rtisan  agendas  to  co lo u r repo rting , d iscou rse  and comm en ta ry . Thus , as S ilke  
counse ls , ‘in th e  in te res ts  o f a rriv ing  a t co rre c t and re liab le  ins igh ts  ... a deg ree  o f hea lthy  
rese rva tion  is a good  tra it in any  a ttem p t to  read resea rch  on te rro rism  and te rro ris ts .’61
In te rm s o f m e thodo logy, th is  the s is  uses doc trina l lega l a na lys is .62 In conduc ting  th is  s tudy, 
use is m ade  o f a  w ide  va r ie ty  o f sou rces , inc lud ing  dom es tic  leg is la tion  and  o th e r re levan t 
lega l ins trum ents , case  law  em ana tin g  from  the  UK  cou rts  and the  Spec ia l Imm ig ra tion  
A ppea ls  C omm iss ion , pe rtinen t E uropean  C ou rt o f H um an R igh ts ’ ju r isp rudence , 
pa rliam en ta ry  deba tes , o ffic ia l repo rts  and  rev iew  docum ents . T h is  is a ccom pan ied  by 
re fe rence  to  the  bu rgeon ing  a cadem ic  lite ra tu re  on te rro rism , repo rts  pub lished  by  NGOs, 
in te rne t sou rces , news repo rts  and  o th e r p rin t m edia.
S ince  its enac tm en t, the  2005  A c t has becom e  the  sub je c t o f a  subs tan tia l b ody  o f a cadem ic  
comm en ta ry . T he  m ost th o rough  and  frequen tly  re fe renced  w o rks  on the  sub je c t a re  those  
p roduced  by B onner63 and W a lke r,64 bo th  pub lished  in 2007 . In add ition , a  num be r o f 
ins igh tfu l a rtic le s  on con tro l o rde rs  and the  e x tens ive  body  o f ca se  law  to  w h ich  th ey  have
60 A lex P Schm id, T h e  L iterature on Terro rism ’ in Schm id, H a n d b o o k  o f  T e r r o r is m  R e s e a r c h  (n 56 )  
460 .
61 Andre S ilke, ‘An Introduction to Terro rism  R esearch ’ in Andrew  S ilke (ed ), R e s e a r c h  o n  T e r r o r is m :  
T r e n d s , A c h ie v e m e n t s  a n d  F a i lu r e s  (F rank  Cass  2 0 0 4 ) 19. A  sim ilarly critical approach is advoca ted  
by Ranstrop in his rev iew  of terrorism  research  post-9 /11 : M agnus Ranstrop, 'M apping Terro rism  
Studies A fter 9 /11 : An Academ ic  Field of Old Problem s and N ew  Prospects’ in R ichard Jackson , 
Marie -B reen  Smyth and Jeroen  Gunn ing (eds), C r i t i c a l  T e r r o r is m  S tu d ie s :  A  N e w  R e s e a r c h  A g e n d a  
(Routledge  2 009 ).
2 Doctrinal legal research is often also referred to as the ‘b lack-le tte r’ or ‘exposito ry’ approach . S ee  
Christopher M cC rudden , ‘Legal R esearch  and the Socia l Sc iences ’ (2 0 0 6 ) 122 (O c t) L a w  Q u a r t e r ly  
R e v ie w  6 32 , 632 -635 ; M ike  McConville  and W ing  H Chui, ‘Introduction and O verv iew  in M ike  
McConville  and W ing  H Chui (eds), R e s e a r c h  M e t h o d s  f o r  L a w  (Edinburgh University P ress  2 0 0 7 ) 3 -  
4; Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal R esea rch ’ in M ike  M cConville  and W ing  H Chui 
(eds), R e s e a r c h  M e th o d s  f o r  L a w  (Edinburgh University Press 2 007 ) 18 -32 .
3 Bonner, E x e c u t iv e  M e a s u r e s  (n 10).
64 C live W a lke r, ‘Keeping Control of Terrorists W ithout Losing Control of Constitu tionalism ’ (2 0 0 7 ) 59  
Stanford Law  Rev iew  1395 . S ee  also B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  to  t h e  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L e g is la t io n  (n 12); 
T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (n 14) 301 -340 .
10
g iven  rise have  been pub lished , inc lud ing  those  by Ba tes ,65 F enw ick ,66 Foste r,67 
M cG o ld rick ,68 M idd le ton ,69 and  Z edne r.70
Th is  s tudy  the re fo re  seeks  to  bu ild  upon the  e x is tin g  a cadem ic  co rpus  in o rde r to  p roduce a 
de ta iled  lega l a na lys is  o f th e  ope ra tion  o f the  con tro l o rde r reg im e from  its in troduction  in 
M arch 2005 , to  the  repea l o f the  PTA  in D ecem be r 2011 .71 Using p rim ary  and  seconda ry  
sou rces, th e  P TA ’s leg is la tive  schem e  is e xam ined  and exp la ined , and the  ope ra tion  o f the  
con tro l o rde r reg im e is ana lysed  from  a hum an righ ts  pe rspective . In conduc tin g  a human 
righ ts  aud it72 o f con tro l o rde rs, the  app licab le  ECHR  righ ts  a re  e luc ida ted , and the  re g im e ’s 
com p liance , in p rin c ip le  and  in p rac tice , w ith  th e  re levan t p rin c ip les  and s tanda rd s  is c ritica lly  
a ssessed .73 T he  e ffe c tiveness  o f con tro l o rde rs  as a m eans o f res tric ting  o r p reven ting  
in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  activ ity , and the reb y  enhanc ing  na tiona l secu rity , is then  
eva lua ted , and a num be r o f conc lus ions  a re  fo rm ed  rega rd ing  the  use  o f p re ven tive  
leg is la tive  m easures  as a re sponse  to  the  con tem po ra ry  te rro ris t th rea t.
IV. Assessing Effectiveness: A Consequentialist Analysis
Cen tra l to  assess ing  w he the r a pa rticu la r po licy  o r m easure  can be deem ed app rop ria te  fo r 
coun te ring  the  th rea t th a t te rro rism  poses  to  a s ta te ’s na tiona l secu rity  is th e  issue  o f
65 Ed Bates, ‘Anti-terrorism  Control O rders: L iberty and Security Still in the B a lance ’ (2 0 0 9 ) 2 9 (1 )  
Legal S tudies 99.
66 S ee , am ongst others, H elen  Fenw ick  ‘Proactive Counter-terrorist S trateg ies in Conflict w ith Hum an  
Rights’ (2 0 08 ) 2 2 (3 ) International R ev iew  of Law, Computers  and Techno logy 259 ; ‘Recalibrating  
ECHR  Rights and the  Ro le  of the Hum an  R ights Act post 9 /11 : R easserting  International H um an  
Rights Norm s in the “W a r  on Terro r”? (2 010 ) 63  Curren t Legal Problem s 153 .
67 S teve  Foster, T h e  F ight Against Terrorism , Detention W ithout Trial and Hum an  R ights’ (2 0 0 9 ) 14 (1 )  
Coventry  Law  Journal 4; ‘Control O rders, Hum an  R ights and the House o f Lords’ (2 0 0 7 ) 1 2 (2 )  
Coventry  Law  Journal 27 .
68 Dom inic McGoldrick , ‘Security Detention: United K ingdom  P rac tice’ (2 0 0 8 ) 4 0 (3 )  C ase  W es te rn  
Reserve  Journal of In ternational Law  507 .
69 S ee , am ongst others: Ben M iddleton, ‘Control O rders: Out of Control? (2 007 ) 173  Crim inal Law yer  
3; Ben M iddleton, ‘Control O rder Hearings: Compliance  with Article 6 E C H R ’ (2 0 0 9 ) 7 3 (1 )  Journal of 
Crim inal Law  21; ‘D raw ing a (Not-so-bright) Line Under Control O rder L iberty C ha llenges ’ (2 0 1 0 )  
74 (5 ) Journal of C rim inal Law  405 .
70 S ee  Zedner, 'P reven tive  Justice or Pre -pun ishm ent? ’ (n 4 0 ).
71 Th e  PTA  was  repea led  by s 1 of T P IM A . S ee  chap te r 5  (p 162) of this thesis.
72 Jonathan H Marks, ‘9 /11 + 3 /1 1  + 7 /7  =? W ha t Counts in Counterterro rism ?’ 3 7  Co lum bia  H um an  
Rights Law  R ev iew  559 , 6 1 2 -6 13 .
73 S ee  Chap te r 4: T h e  Control O rder R eg im e and Hum an  Rights.
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e ffec tiveness. Indeed, as the  P rivy  C ounse llo rs  R ev iew  C omm ittee  asse rted  in th e ir 2004  
rev iew  o f the  ATCSA :
E xtens ions  to  th e  pow ers  o f th e  s ta te  in secu rin g  the  sa fe ty  o f its  peop le  
shou ld  a lw ays  be  te s ted  r igo rous ly  fo r bo th  necess ity  (wh ich  encom passes  
p ropo rtiona lity ) and  e ffe c t iv e n e s s .
However, de sp ite  the  cogency  o f the  p ropos ition  tha t e ffec tiveness  is cruc ia l to  ju s tify in g  the  
ex is tence  o f coun te r-te rro r m easu re s ,75 w h ich  a re  o ften  coe rc ive  and righ ts -ab ridg ing  in 
na ture , th e re  a re  a num be r o f in he ren t d ifficu ltie s  in de te rm in ing  w he the r such  m easures  can 
be ad judged  e ffec tive .
Log ica lly , the  firs t s tep  in appra is ing  any m easu re ’s e ffec tiveness  lies in id en tify ing  the  
pu rpose  fo r w h ich  it w as  in troduced . T h e  p rim a ry  ra tiona le  fo r the  in troduction  o f m ost an ti ­
te rro rism  laws is th a t th e y  a re  cons ide red  necessary  by  the  gove rnm en t in o rde r to  im p rove  
the  s ta te ’s ab ility  to  p ro te c t itse lf aga ins t te rro ris t v io lence  and to  de te r engagem en t in 
assoc ia ted  a c tiv itie s .76 The  fundam en ta l a im  o f the  UK go ve rnm en t’s coun te r-te rro rism  
s tra tegy, is, acco rd ing ly , ‘to  reduce  the  risk from  in te rna tiona l te rro rism , so  tha t peop le  can 
go  abou t th e ir d a ily  lives  fre e ly  and w ith  con fid en ce .’77 P u rsuan t to  th is  ob jec tive , th e  PTA  
was enacted :
74 Privy Counsellor R ev iew  Comm ittee, A n t i - t e r r o r is m ,  C r im e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  A c t  2 0 0 1  R e v ie w :  R e p o r t  
(HC  2 0 03 -0 4 , 100) para  89  (em phasis added).
5 Harcourt, for exam ple , posits that in relation to security m easures , the issue of effec tiveness should  
be regarded as a ‘ t h r e s h o ld  question’, arguing tha t ‘if m easures  are  not credib ly effective, there  is 
nothing fu rther to d iscuss’: Bernard Harcourt, ‘Muslim  Profiles Post-9 /11 : Is Racia l Profiling an  
Effective Counter-terroris t M easure  and Does it V io la te  the R ight to be F ree  From  D iscrim ination? ’ in 
Benjam in J Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), S e c u r i t y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (H art Publishing 2 0 0 7 ) 76 .
76 Berthold M eyer, ‘Fighting Terro rism  by T ightening Laws: A  T ightrope W a lk  Betw een  Protecting  
Security and Losing L iberty’, in Sam uel Peleg and W ilhelm  Kem pf (eds), F ig h t in g  T e r r o r is m  in  t h e  
L ib e r a l  S ta te :  A n  I n t e g r a t e d  M o d e l  o f  R e s e a r c h ,  N A TO  Security Through Sc ience  Se ries , E: H um an  
and Socie tal Dynam ics - Vo l.9 : Intelligence and International Law  (IO S  Press, 2 0 06 ) 88 .
77 Hom e O ffice, C O N T E S T :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  8123 ,  
2 011 ) para 1.2. S ee  also H om e O ffice, C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  
S t r a t e g y  (Cm  6888 , 2 0 0 6 ) para  5; Hom e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e ;  T h e  U n i t e d  
K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7547 , 2 009 ) 8; H om e O ffice , P u r s u e ,  
P re v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e ;  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m :  
A n n u a l  R e p o r t  (Cm  7833 , 2 0 1 0 ) 4.
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[T ]o  p rov ide  fo r the  m ak ing  aga in s t ind iv idua ls  invo lved  in te rro rism -re la ted  
a c tiv ity  o f o rde rs  im pos ing  ob liga tio ns  on them  fo r pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  
p reven ting  o r res tric ting  the ir fu r the r invo lvem en t in such  ac tiv ity .78
W h ils t the  A c t’s ra is o n  d ’e tre  is the re fo re  c lea r, the  ques tion  o f w he the r con tro l o rders , o r any  
o the r such  coun te r-te rro rism  m easures , can  be sa id  to  be e ffec tive  in fu lfillin g  th e ir pu rpose , 
is an issue  tha t is fra ugh t w ith  com p le x ity .79
W ith in  the  lite ra tu re , a  num be r o f em inen t comm en ta to rs  have  p ropounded  va rio u s  m e thods 
fo r eva lua ting  the  e fficacy o f cou n te r-te rro r m easures . W a lke r, in exam in ing  the  ope ra tion  of 
th e  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  (T em po ra ry  P rov is ions) A cts  1974-1989 , sugges ts  th a t one, 
adm itte d ly  crude , m e thod  fo r  de te rm in ing  e ffec tiveness, ‘w ou ld  be to  sea rch  fo r  any  inc rease  
o r  decrease  in te rro ris t a c tiv ity .’80 T h is  quan tita tive  approach  is la rge ly  con sonan t w ith  th a t 
p roposed  by A lexande r, who, however, re comm ends tha t the  success  o f s ta te s ’ coun te r ­
te rro rism  po lic ies  be m easured  aga ins t a m ore  ex tens ive  range  o f c rite ria , com pris ing :
- reduction  in th e  num be r o f te rro ris t inc iden ts ;
- reduction  in the  num be r o f casua lties  in te rro ris t inc iden ts ;
- reduction  in th e  m one ta ry  cos t in flic ted  by te rro ris t inc iden ts ; 
reduction  in the  s ize  o f te rro ris t g roups  ope ra ting  in a coun try ;
- n um be r o f te rro ris t k illed , cap tu red , and /o r conv ic ted ;
- p ro tec tion  o f na tiona l in fra s tru c tu re .81
In add ition , A le xande r subm its  th a t the  a ssessm en t shou ld  invo lve  e s tab lish ing  a m easu re ’s 
im pact in re la tion  to  the  ‘p reserva tion  o f bas ic  na tiona l s tru c tu re s  and po lic ies  (e .g . th e  ru le  
o f law , dem ocracy , and civil righ ts  and lib e rtie s ).’82 Th is  re la tive ly  expans ive  c rite rion  
s tre sses  tha t m easu res  shou ld  no t on ly  be  assessed  w ith  re fe rence  to  num erica l ind ica to rs ,
78 Long title to the PTA .
79 On  the difficulties assoc iated  with measuring  the  effectiveness of counter-terrorism  m easures , see:  
Dan iel Byman, ‘M easuring the W a r  on Terrorism : A  First Appra isal’ (2 0 03 ) 1 0 2 (6 6 8 ) Curren t H istory  
411 ; C  Lum, LW  Kennedy and A  Sherley, ‘A re  Counter-Terro rism  Strateg ies  E ffective? T h e  Results of 
the C ampbell System atic R ev iew  on Counter-Terro rism  Evaluation R esea rch ’ (2 0 0 6 ) 2 Journal of 
Experimenta l C rim inology 489; R aphae l Perl, C o m b a t in g  T e r r o r is m :  T h e  C h a l le n g e  o f  M e a s u r in g  
E f fe c t iv e n e s s ,  C R S  Report for Congress  (2007 ); A lexander Spencer, T h e  Prob lem s of Evaluating  
Counter-Terro rism ’ (2 0 06 ) 12 U N ISC I Discussion P aper 179  < w w w .u c m .e s / in f o / u n is c i / r e v is t a s /  
U N IS C I  S p e n c e r l 2 . p d f >  accessed  30  D ecem ber 2012 .
80 C live W a lke r, T h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  in  B r i t is h  L a w  (2 nd edn , M anches te r University P ress  
1992 ) 244 .
81 Yonah  A lexander, ‘In troduction’ in Yonah  A lexander (ed ), ‘ C o u n te r t e r r o r is m  S t r a t e g ie s :  S u c c e s s e s  
a n d  F a i lu r e s  o f  S ix  N a t io n s  (Po tom ac Books 2 006 ) 7 -8 .
82 ibid.
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but th a t it is a lso  c ruc ia l th a t qua lita tive  fa c to rs  a re  taken  in to  accoun t. T he  ‘con se rva tive ’83 
and ‘e ffe c tiveness ’ te s ts  advanced  b y  Igna tie ff84 a re  a lso  em pha tica lly  qua lita tive  in 
o rie n ta tion .85 Igna tie ff u rges tha t the  e ffe c tiveness  o f coun te r-te rro r m easures  shou ld  be 
gauged  no t on ly  in te rm s  o f sho rt-te rm  ga ins  in secu rity , bu t a lso  on the  bas is  o f th e ir lo n g ­
te rm  po litica l im p lica tions , and w he the r th e y  dam age  a na tio n ’s ins titu tiona l in he ritance  by, 
fo r exam p le , necess ita tin g  the  inde fin ite  suspens ion  o f h a b e a s  c o r p u s 86
D raw ing  upon the  app roaches advoca ted  by W a lke r, A le xande r and Igna tie ff, it is subm itted  
tha t an a ssessm en t o f e ffec tiveness  shou ld  p rin c ipa lly  be p rem ised  upon a consequen tia lis t 
inqu iry  in to  w he the r a  g iven  coun te r-te rro r m easure  p roduces  a d im inu tion  in th e  te rro ris t 
th rea t and co rre la tive  inc rease  in na tiona l secu rity . W he th e r te rro ris t ac tiv ity  has e sca la ted  o r 
dec lined  fo llow ing  a pa rticu la r m easu re ’s in troduction  may, to  som e ex ten t, be e s tab lished  
by re fe rence  to  open  sou rce  s ta tis tica l d a ta  re la ting  to  th e  frequency  and  sca le87 o f te rro ris t 
v io lence  encoun te red  by the  re levan t na tion . H owever, fo r  a num be r o f reasons  th is  
in fo rm a tion , in iso la tion , is rega rded  as p rov id ing  an unaccep tab ly  incom p le te  p ic tu re  in 
re la tion  to  assess ing  the  e ffica cy  o f coun te r-te rro r m easu re s .88
F irstly, w h ils t fa ilu re s  in th e  fie ld  of coun te r-te rro rism  are  h igh ly  v is ib le , as s ta rk ly  m an ife s t by 
ca ta s troph ic  a ttacks  such  as 9 /11, M adrid ,89 and the  London  7 /7  bom b ings , su ccesses  a re  
frequen tly  m uch  less  ev iden t. Indeed, un less  de ta ils  o f a  thw a rted  p lo t a re  pub lic ised , w h ich  
the y  a re  o ften  not, fo r fe a r o f endange ring  sou rces  o r p re jud ic ing  ongo ing  ope ra tions , 
exam p les  o f e ffec tiveness  rem a in  known on ly  to  th o se  d ire c tly  invo lved  in fro n t- lin e
83
Which  involves asking the question, ‘are  departu res from  existing due process standards really  
necessary? ’: M ichae l Ignatieff, T h e  L e s s e r  E v i l :  P o l i t i c a l  E t h ic s  in  a n  A g e  o f  T e r r o r  (Edinburgh  
University Press 2 004 ) 24 .
84 Ignatieff also suggests that, coercive m easures  should be subjected to tests of ‘d ignity’ and ‘last 
resort’, the fo rm er involving the question ‘do [the m easures] vio late  individual d ignity?’, whilst the latte r 
requires analysis of w hether ‘less coercive m easures  have  been tried and fa iled ’: ibid 2 3 -2 4 .
85 ibid 24 .
86 ibid. Centra l to this tes t is w hether a  g iven anti-terror m easure  will strengthen or w eaken  political 
support for the  state undertaking them .
87 ‘S ca le ’ being determ ined  by reference  to the number of dea ths and injuries, and the  quantum  of
econom ic  loss, caused  by an attack .
88
A lexander Spencer, T h e  Problem s of Evaluating Coun ter-Terro rism ’ (2 006 ) 12 U N ISC I D iscussion  
Paper 179  < w w w .u c m .e s / in f o / u n is c i / r e v is t a s /U N IS C IS p e n c e r 1 2 .p d f>  accessed  3 0  D ecem ber 2 0 1 1 .
8911 M arch 2004 .
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opera tion s .90 Second , cou n te r-te rro r m easu re s  a re  o ften  in tended  to  have  a  de te rren t e ffect, 
w he reby  the  sanction  a ttached  to  the  p roscribed  ac t ope ra tes  as su ffic ie n t d is incen tive  to  
de te r the  p rospective  te rro ris t from  comm itting  the  con tem p la ted  o ffe nce .91 Thus, th e  a im  of 
m uch  an ti-te rro rism  law  is to  p roduce  inac tion , w h ich , un like  action , is no t read ily  am enab le  
to  em p irica l m easurem en t. By ex tens ion , it is a lso  c lea rly  d ifficu lt to  a ttr ibu te  de te rrence  
resu lting  in inac tion  to  one  pa rticu la r an ti- te rro r m easure  ra the r than  ano the r, o r to  the  
regu la r c rim ina l law, w ith  w h ich  an ti-te rro rism  law  ove rlaps subs tan tia lly  in ce rta in  a reas , or, 
fo r th a t m a tte r, to  o the r e xogenous  fa c to rs .92
The  im pact th a t a spec ific  m easu re  has upon  the  c itizen ry ’s sense  o f secu rity , fe a r leve ls  
rega rd ing  the  th rea t o f te rro rism ,93 pub lic  suppo rt fo r  the  gove rnm en t re spons ib le  fo r its 
in troduction  and im p lem en ta tio n ,94 the  m easu re ’s im pact on hum an righ ts  and civ il libe rties , 
a long  w ith  any  co lla te ra l consequences , such  as  the  po ten tia lly  rad ica liz ing  e ffe c t o f ce rta in  
m easures , all cons titu te  issues wh ich  a re  c ruc ia l to  a ho lis tic  eva lua tion  o f e ffe c tiveness . 
None o f the se  fac to rs , however, a re  suscep tib le  to  easy  o r p rec ise  m easurem ent.
In re la tion  to  con tro l o rde rs, th e  d ifficu lty  o f assess ing  th e ir e ffe c tiveness  is fu rthe r 
com pounded  by the  fa c t th a t th e y  w ere  p reven tive  in na ture , be ing  des igned  to  d im in ish  an
90 S ee  the comments  of D am e  E liza  M ann ingham -Bulle r, D irector G enera l of the  UK  Security Se rv ice , 
‘G lobal terrorism : are  w e  meeting the cha llenge? ’ (Jam es  Sm art Lecture a t C ity o f London Police  
Headquarters , 16 O ctober 2 0 03 ) < www .m i5 .gov .uk /hom e/abou t-us /w ho -w e-a re /s ta ff-and - 
managem ent/d irec to r-genera l/speeches-by-the-d irec to r-genera l.h tm l> accessed  5  January  2 0 1 2 . S ee  
also C  Lum, LW  Kennedy and A  Sherley , ‘A re  Counter-Terro rism  Strateg ies  E ffective? T h e  Results of 
the C ampbell System atic  R ev iew  on Counter-Terrorism  Evaluation R esearch ’ (2 0 0 6 ) 2  Journal of 
Experimental C rim inology 489 , 511 .
91 For discussion of the concept of de terrence  see  Andrew  Ashworth, P r in c ip le s  o f  C r im in a l  L a w  (7 th 
edn, O U P  2 0 1 1 ) 17.
92 S ee  Andrew  S ilke, T h e  Psychology of Counter-terrorism : Critical Issues and C ha llenges ’ in Andrew  
Silke (ed ), T h e  P s y c h o lo g y  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (Rou tledge  2 011 ) 11; Eric van  Urn and D an ie la  
Pisoiu, ‘E ffective Counterterrorism : W ha t H ave  W e  Learned  So  Far? ’ Econom ics o f S ecu rity  W orking  
Paper 2 5  (2 011 ) 12 <www .d iw .de /docum en ts /publikationen /73/d iw _01  .c .386651  .de /d iw econsec  
0055 .pd f> accessed  5  January  2 012 .
93 S ee  A lexander Spencer, T h e  Prob lems of Evaluating Coun te r-Terro rism ’ (2 0 0 6 ) 12 U N ISC I  
Discussion Paper 179, 1 8 8 -1 96  < w w w .u c m .e s / in f o / u n is c i / r e v is t a s /U N IS C IS p e n c e r 1 2 .p d f>  accessed  
30  D ecem ber 2011 .
94 Teun  van Dongen , for instance, describes public support, both domestic and international, as the  
‘ s in e  q u a  n o n  o f success’ in relation to counterterrorism : Teun  van Dongen , ‘B reaking it Down: An  
Alternative  Approach to M easuring Effectiveness  in Counterterro rism ’ Econom ics of Security W ork ing  
Paper 2 3  (2 009 ), 6  < www .d iw .de /docum en ts /pub likationen/73 /d iw _01  .c .3 5 4 1 61 .d e /d iw _
econsec0023 .pd f>  accessed  5 D ecem ber 2011 , Political support is also a  key  com ponen t of 
Igantieff’s ‘effectiveness tes t’: Ignatieff (n 83 ) 24.
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in d iv id ua l’s ab ility  to  engage  in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity . Indeed, as undersco red  by  the  
Home O ffice  in its 2010  M em o ra n d um  to  th e  H om e  A f fa irs  C om m itte e :
T he  key  te s t o f the  e ffe c tiveness  o f th e  2005  A c t is w he the r con tro l o rde rs  
p re ven t o r re s tric t con tro lled  in d iv id ua ls  from  invo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  
a c tiv ity .95
E stab lish ing  the  e ffec tiveness  o f p rophy lac tic  m easures  such  as con tro l o rde rs  is th e re fo re  
espec ia lly  d ifficu lt, as  it requ ires  p roo f o f an om iss ion . In add ition , th e re  is a lso  an 
unavo idab ly  specu la tive  e lem en t invo lved  in assess ing  the  e ffec t o f p re ven tive  m easu re s  as 
it is c lea rly  im poss ib le  to  p red ic t w ith  any deg ree  of e xac titude  w ha t type  o f te r ro rism -re la ted  
ac tiv ity  the  con tro lle d  ind iv idua l m ay  have  engaged  in had they  no t been  sub je c t to  a  con tro l 
o rder.
D esp ite  the se  cha llenges , and  m ind fu l th a t a  deg ree  o f con trove rsy  a ttaches  to  such  an 
unde rtak ing ,96 th is  th e s is  seeks  to  assess the  e ffec tiveness  o f con tro l o rde rs  as a  m eans o f 
‘p ro tec ting  m em be rs  o f th e  pub lic  from  a risk o f te rro r ism .’97 U tilis ing  a p rim a rily  
consequen tia lis t ana lys is , fo cus  w ill be p laced  upon ‘im pact e ffe c tiveness ’98 by  exam in ing  
w he the r, and  if so, to  w ha t ex ten t, con tro l o rde rs  can  be deem ed to  have  been  e ffe c tive  in 
res tric ting  or p reven ting  in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  by  con tro lle d  ind iv id ua ls  
be tween  2005  and 2011 .
In eva lua tin g  the  reg ime, key  issues such as the  hum an  righ ts  im p lica tions  o f con tro l o rde rs, 
the  na tu re  and  seve rity  o f the  ob lig a tio ns  im posed  on con tro lees , and th e ir im pact upon  bo th
95 Hom e O ffice, M e m o r a n d u m  to  H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m it t e e ,  P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  7797 , 2 010 ) para  54.
96 Lazarus, for exam ple , suggests that, T h e re  is alw ays the danger that by accep ting that
effectiveness matters, w e  m ight be forced to concede that som e new  security m easu res  that 
underm ine rights ... actually work and cannot therefo re  be res isted’: Liora Lazarus  and Ben jam in  J 
Goold, ‘Security and Hum an  Rights: T h e  Search  fo r a Language  of Reconcilia tion ’, in Goold and  
Lazarus  (n 75 ) 11.
98 PTA, s 1(1)-
‘Impact effec tiveness’, according to van  Urn and P isoui’s exposition of the concept, ‘depends  on the  
behaviour of the  ta rgeted  aud ience  alone in relation to the long-term  objective of the  [coun ter ­
terrorism ] policy, nam ely  that o f reducing or stopping terrorism ’: Eric van  Urn and  Dan ie lla  P isoiu , 
‘E ffective Counterterrorism : W ha t H ave  W e  Learned So  Fa r? ’ Econom ics of Security W ork ing  Paper  
25  2011 , 3 <www .d iw .de /docum ents /pub lika tionen /73 /d iw _01 .c .386651  .d e /d iw _econsec0055 . pdf>  
accessed  5  January  2012 .
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the  con tro lle d  pe rson  and the ir im m ed ia te  fam ily , w ill be exam ined . In add ition , in fo rm a tion  
rega rd ing  the  type  o f te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv itie s  th o se  ind iv idua ls  w ho  have  been  m ade 
sub je c t to  con tro l o rde rs  have  been suspec ted  of, de ta ils  conce rn ing  absconds and  the  
frequency  and  se rio usness  o f lesse r b reaches, and  any ev idence re la ting  to  con tin ued  
engagem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  w h ils t u nder a con tro l o rder, w ill a lso  be  cons ide red  
in assess ing  the  ove ra ll e ffec tiveness  and p ropo rtiona lity  o f the  reg ime.
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Chapter 2 
State Responses to  Terrorism
I. The S tate’s Duty to Protect
One o f the  s ta te ’s p rinc ipa l fu nc tion s, indeed , a cruc ia l a spect o f its ra is o n  d ’e tre , is to  
gua ran tee  the  na tion ’s secu rity  and sa feguard  its c itizen ry  aga ins t in te rna l and ex te rna l 
th rea ts .1 W ith in  a m odern libera l d em oc racy  such  as the  UK, p rim ary  re spons ib ility  fo r 
ensuring  pub lic  sa fe ty  is ves ted  in the  coun try ’s e lec ted  gove rnm en t. T ha t secu ring  the  
sa fe ty  o f the  na tion  and its pub lic  is T h e  F irs t p rio rity  o f an y G ove rnm en t’ ,2 is exp lic itly  
a cknow ledged  in the  coun te r-te rro rism  and na tiona l secu rity  s tra teg ie s  o f bo th  the  Labou r3 
and C oa litio n4 gove rnm en ts , and has a lso  been re ite ra ted  by success ive  Home S ec re ta rie s .5 
T h rea ts  to  a na tio n ’s secu rity  m ay  em ana te  from  a range  o f d ive rse  sou rces , inc lud ing  
in te rna tiona l con flic ts , fa iled  s ta tes , w eapons  o f m ass des truc tion , tra n s -na tio na l c rim e , 
e conom ic  ins tab ility , and civ il em ergenc ies , such  as pandem ics  and flo o d in g .6 P rom inen t
1 Bianchi and Keller, for exam p le , assert that, ‘security is thought to be a t the core o f the social 
compact that lies a t the basis o f modern s ta tes ’: A ndrea  Bianchi and A lexis Keller, ‘P re face ’ in A ndrea  
Bianchi and A lexis Ke lle r (eds), C o u n te r t e r r o r is m :  D e m o c r a c y ’s  C h a l le n g e  (H art Publishing 2 0 0 8 ) vii. 
S ee  also Ian Loader and Neil W a lke r, C iv i l i z in g  S e c u r i t y  (C am bridge  University Press  2007 ); David  
Om and , S e c u r in g  th e  S ta t e  (Hurs t and C om pany  2 0 1 0 ) 9 -20 ; Schlom it W alle rs te in , T h e  S ta te ’s Duty  
of Se lf-defence : Justifying the Expansion o f C rim inal Law ’ in Ben jam in J Goold and Liora Lazarus  
(eds ), S e c u r i t y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (H art Publishing 2 007 ).
H om e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7457 , 2 0 09 ) 6.
3 C ab ine t O ffice, T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  S e c u r i t y  in  a n  I n t e r d e p e n d e n t  
W o r ld  (Cm  7291 , 2 0 0 8 ) para 1.1: ‘Providing security for the nation and for its citizens rem ains the  
most important responsibility o f the governm ent.’ S ee  also, C ab ine t O ffice, T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  
S t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  U p d a te  2 0 0 9 :  S e c u r i t y  f o r  t h e  N e x t  G e n e r a t io n  (Cm  7590 , 2 0 0 9 ) 3.
4 C ab inet O ffice, A  S t r o n g  B r i t a in  in  a n  A g e  o f  U n c e r t a in t y :  T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  (Cm  7953 ,  
2010 ) 9; H om e O ffice, C O N T E S T :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  
8123 , 2 0 1 1 )7 .
5 Jack  S traw  (Hom e Secretary : M ay  1997 -June  2 001 ), Hansard  HC  D eb  13 M arch  2 001 , vol 3 6 4 , cols  
945 -946 ; David  B lunkett (H om e  Secretary: June 2 001 -D ecem be r 2 0 04 ), HC  D eb  15 O ctober 2 0 0 1 ,  
vol 372 , col 923; Charles  C larke  (H om e Secretary: D ecem ber 2 0 0 4 -M a y  2 006 ), HC  D eb  16  
Decem ber 2 004 , col 4 2 8 , col 151W S ; John Reid (M ay  2 006 -Jun e  2 007 ), HC  Deb  7  June  2 0 0 7 , vol 
461 , cols 4 2 1 -423 ; Jacqui Sm ith  (June 2007 -Jun e  2 009 ), H om e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  
P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7457 , 2 0 0 9 ) 7; 
Alan Johnson (H om e  Secretary: June 2 0 0 9 -M a y  2 010 ), H om e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  
P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m :  A n n u a l  U p d a te  (Cm  
7 8 3 3 , 2 0 10 ) 4: T h e resa  M ay  (H om e  Secretary: M ay  2 0 1 0  - ) ,  H C  Deb  13 July 2 0 1 0 , vol 5 13 , col 7 9 7 .
6 C ab ine t O ffice, T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  S e c u r i t y  in  a n  I n t e r d e p e n d e n t  
W o r ld  (Cm  7291 , 2 008 ) paras  1.3, 3 .1 -3 .5 6 ; C ab inet O ffice, T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  o f  th e  
U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  U p d a te  2 0 0 9 :  S e c u r i t y  f o r  th e  N e x t  G e n e r a t io n  (Cm  7590 , 2 0 0 9 ) paras 5, 2 .2 0 -2 .3 8 ;
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am ong  the  secu rity  cha lle nges  fac ing  m any  s ta tes  today, inc lud ing  the  UK ,7 is the  real and 
sus ta ined  th re a t from  te rro rism .8
It is now  w id e ly  accep ted  th a t an im po rtan t fa ce t o f a dem oc ra tic  s ta te ’s re spons ib ility  fo r  
sa feguard ing  secu rity  is the  du ty  to  p ro tec t its c itizens from  te rro ris t v io lence . T he  
In te rna tiona l C omm iss ion  on Ju ris ts , in th e ir ex tens ive  su rvey  o f post-9 /11 coun te r-te rro rism  
m easures , fo r  exam p le , obse rve  tha t, ‘S ta tes  have a pos itive  ob liga tion  to  p ro tec t peop le  
unde r th e ir ju r isd ic tio n  aga ins t te rro ris t a c ts ’ ,9 a v iew  w h ich  is echoed  by bo th  th e  fo rm e r,10 
and cu rre n t,11 UN Spec ia l R appo rteu rs  on C oun te r-te rro rism  and Hum an R ights. T h is  
ob lig a tion  has a lso  been  recogn ised  by the  EC tHR , as in M u rra y  v  U n ite d  K in g d om ,12 w he re  
the  C ou rt no ted  tha t it is th e  ‘respons ib ility  o f an e lec ted  gove rnm en t in a dem oc ra tic  soc ie ty  
to  p ro tec t its c itizens and in s titu tions  aga in s t the  th rea ts  posed  by o rgan ised  te rro rism .’13 
W ith  spec ific  re fe rence  to  th e  UK, in R  v  F 14 th e  need  to  p ro tec t th e  pub lic  from  th rea ts  such  
as those  posed  by te rro rism  w as  describ ed  by S ir Igo r Judge  as ‘one  o f the  firs t g rea t 
re spons ib ilit ies  o f g ove rnm en t’ ,15 w h ils t in A  v  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  D e p a r tm e n t ,16 
Baroness Ha le dec la red  tha t, ‘P ro tec ting  the  life o f the  na tion  is one  o f the  firs t tasks  o f a 
G ove rnm en t in a  w o rld  o f na tion  s ta te s .’17 T he  UK gove rnm en t’s du ty  to  p ro te c t se cu rity  
th rough  tak ing  s teps to  add ress the  th rea t o f te rro rism  has a lso  been em phas ised  by  the
Cab inet O ffice , A  S t r o n g  B r i t a in  in  a n  A g e  o f  U n c e r t a in t y :  T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  (Cm  7953 ,
2 0 1 0 )2 7 .
7 C ab inet O ffice , T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  S e c u r i t y  in  a n  I n t e r d e p e n d e n t  
W o r ld  (Cm  7291 , 2 008 ) paras  1.3, 3 .2 -3 .9 ; C ab ine t O ffice, T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  o f  th e  
U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  U p d a te  2 0 0 9 :  S e c u r i t y  f o r  t h e  N e x t  G e n e r a t io n  (Cm  7590 , 2 0 0 9 ) paras  2 .2 1 -2 .2 4 ;  
Cab inet O ffice , A  S t r o n g  B r i t a in  in  a n  A g e  o f  U n c e r t a in t y :  T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  (Cm  7953 ,
2 010 ) paras 1.2, 3 .1 9 -3 .2 6 .
8 International Comm iss ion  of Jurists, A s s e s s in g  D a m a g e ,  U r g in g  A c t io n : R e p o r t  o f  t h e  E m in e n t  
J u r is t s  P a n e l  o n  T e r r o r is m ,  C o u n te r - t e r r o r is m  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (2 009 ) v.
9 ibid 16.
10 Martin  Schein in , R e p o r t  o f  th e  S p e c ia l  R a p p o r t e u r  o n  th e  p r o m o t io n  a n d  p r o t e c t io n  o f  h u m a n  r ig h t s  
a n d  f u n d a m e n ta l  f r e e d o m s  w h i le  c o u n te r in g  te r r o r is m  (A /H R C /16 /51 , 2 0 10 ) para  12.
11 Ben Emmerson , P r o m o t io n  a n d  p r o t e c t io n  o f  h u m a n  r ig h t s  a n d  f u n d a m e n ta l  f r e e d o m s  w h i le  
c o u n te r in g  te r r o r is m  (A /66 /310 , 2 0 11 ) para 20 .
12 (1 994 ) 19 E HRR  193 .
13 ibid para  91 .
14 [2007] EW CA  Crim  243 .
15 ibid [7].
16 [2004] UKHL  56.
17 ibid [226 ]. S ee  also Lord Nicholls [79]; Lord Hoffm ann [95]; Lord Hope [99].
19
Independen t R ev iew er o f te rro rism  leg is la tio n ,18 and  cons is ten tly  a cknow ledged  by the  
JC H R 19 and key  hum an  righ ts  NGO s.20
The  s ta te ’s pa ram oun t du ty  to  p ro tec t its c itizen ry  is, as  B indm an iden tifies , ‘roo ted  in anc ien t 
p rinc ip le  and m odern  conven tion  a like ’,21 and  is encapsu la ted  by the  La tin  m axim  s a lu s  
p o p u l i  s u p re m a  le x  (the good  o f the  peop le  is th e  sup rem e  law ).22 In re la tion  to  th e  UK, the  
ob lig a tio n  to  ta ke  m easu res  to  coun te r te rro rism  is im posed  by va rio us  in te rna tio na l and 
European  lega l ins trum ents . T he  U n ited  N a tions  has adop ted  a  num be r o f conven tio n s ,23 
and issued  an a rray  o f reso lu tions , u rg ing  s ta te s  to  com ba t in te rna tiona l te rro r ism .24 In 
add ition , th e  UN S ecurity  C ounc il has im posed  a  range  o f ob lig a tions  upon s ta te s  requ iring  
them  to  take  ac tion  aga ins t te rro rism .25 O f pa rticu la r im po rtance  is R eso lu tion  1373 ,26 
enac ted  in the  imm ed ia te  a fte rm a th  o f 9 /11 , w h ich  requ ires  s ta tes  to  T a k e  the  necessa ry
18 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 006 ) para  24; David  Anderson, C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  in  2 0 1 1 :  F in a l  R e p o r t  o f  th e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 012 ) para  6 .3 6 . S e e  also Privy  
Counsello r R ev iew  Comm ittee, A n t i - t e r r o r is m ,  C r im e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  A c t  2 0 0 1  R e v ie w :  R e p o r t  (2 0 0 4 -0 4  
HC  100 ) paras  81 -83 ; Lord Lloyd, I n q u i r y  in t o  L e g is la t io n  A g a in s t  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  3420 , 1 996 ) para  30 .
19 JCHR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  P r o s e c u t io n  a n d  P r e - C h a r g e  D e t e n t io n  (2 0 0 5 -  
06 , HL 240 , HC  1576 ) para  15; C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  
O rd e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 0 8  (2 0 07 -0 8 , HL  57 , HC  356 ) para  13; C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  
A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 0 9  (2 0 08 -0 9 , HL  37 , HC  2 8 2 ) para  9; C o u n te r -  
T e r r o r is m  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 1 0  (2 0 0 9 -1 0 , HL  64 , 
HC  395 ) para  7; C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  ( S e v e n te e n th  R e p o r t ) :  B r in g in g  H u m a n  
R ig h t s  B a c k  In  (2 0 09 -1 0 , H L  86 , HC  111 ) para  5.
20 S ee , for exam p le , Am nesty International, U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  A  B r o k e n  P r o m is e
(2006 ) 7; Hum an  Rights W atch , H e a r t s  a n d  M in d s :  P u t t in g  H u m a n  R ig h t s  a t  t h e  C e n t e r  o f  U n i t e d  
K in g d o m  C o u n te r t e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  (2007 ); Liberty, F r o m  W a r  to  L a w :  L ib e r t y 's  R e s p o n s e  to  t h e  
C o a l i t io n  G o v e r n m e n t ’s  R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - t e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (2 010 ) 3.
21 G eo ffrey  B indman , ‘Civil Liberties and the ‘W a r  on Te rro r’ (2 0 04 ) O pen  D em ocracy  
<www .opendem ocracy .ne t/node /1888> accessed  14  June  2012 .
22 ibid. S ee  also Anne Peters, ‘Hum an ity as the A  and Q of Sovere ignty ’ (2 0 0 9 ) 2 0 (3 )  European  
Journal of In ternational Law  513 .
23 S ee  International Conven tion for the Suppression  of Terrorist Bombing adop ted on 15  D ecem be r  
1997 ; International Convention for the Suppression of F inancing of Terrorism  adopted  on 9 D ecem be r  
1999; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of N uc lear Terro rism  adop ted on 13  April 
2005 .
24 S ee  Un ited  Nations G enera l Assembly  Resolutions A /R es /3 1 /1 0 2  of 17 D ecem ber 1976 ; 
A /R es /40 /61  of 9 D ecem ber 1985 ; A /R es /4 9 /6 0  of 17 Feb ruary 1995 ; A /R es /5 6 /8 8  of 2 4  January
2002 . T h e  full list of G enera l A ssem bly  Resolutions can be accessed  at
<www.un.org/terro rism /resolu tions.sh tm l> accessed  14  June 2 012 .
25 U N SCR  1269  of 19 O ctober 1999 ; U N SC R  1368  of 12 Sep tem ber 2 001 . S ee  A nd rea  B ianchi, 
‘Security Council’s Anti-terror Resolutions and their Imp lem entation by M em be r S tates: An  O ve rv iew ’ 
(2 004 ) 4  Journal of In ternational C rim inal Justice 1044 .
6 U N SCR  of 2 8  S ep tem ber 2001 (U N SC R  2001 ). S ee  Kent Roach , T h e  9 /1 1  E f f e c t :  C o m p a r a t iv e  
C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (C am bridge  University Press  2001 ) 31 -51 .
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s teps  to  p reven t the  comm iss ion  o f te rro r is t a c ts ’ ,27 and ensu re  tha t, ‘te r ro ris t ac ts  are 
e s tab lished  as se rio us  c rim ina l o ffe nces  in dom estic  law s and  regu la tions  and tha t the  
pun ishm en t du ly  re flec ts  th e  se rio u sness  o f such te rro ris t a c ts .’28
Tha t s ta tes  have an ‘im pe ra tive  du ty  ... to  p ro te c t th e ir p opu la tions  aga in s t te rro r is t a c ts ’ ,29 
and m us t ta ke  m easu res  ‘to  p ro te c t the  fundam en ta l righ ts  o f e ve ryone  w ith in  th e ir 
ju r isd ic tio n ’30 aga ins t te rro rism , is unequ ivoca lly  a ffirm ed  in the  C ounc il o f E u rope ’s 
G u ide line s  on H um an  R igh ts  and the  F igh t A ga in s t Te rro rism . T he  E uropean  Un ion  C oun te r- 
T e rro rism  S tra tegy, m eanwh ile , re qu ire s  m em be r s ta tes  to  com ba t te rro rism  so  as to  enab le  
th e ir c itizens to  ‘live  in an a rea  o f fre edom , secu rity  and ju s tic e ’,31 w h ils t th e  E u ro pe a n  
U n ion  C ounc il F ram ewo rk  D ec is ion  on C om ba ting  T e rro rism  p rov ides  tha t s ta te s  m ust 
ensure  tha t te rro ris t ac ts  a re  p rosc ribed  unde r th e ir d om estic  law .32 In add ition , ano the r 
s ign ifican t sou rce  o f the  s ta te ’s du ty  to  p ro te c t its c itizens from  te rro ris t ac ts  is hum an  righ ts  
law . Indeed, as is fo rce fu lly  a sse rted  by W ilk inson , ‘ If libera l d em oc rac ie s  fa ile d  to  a c t firm ly  
and  cou rageous ly  aga ins t te rro ris ts  w ho  a re  e xp lic itly  com m itted  to  th e  m ass  k illing  o f 
c iv ilians  th e y  w ou ld  be gu ilty  o f  fa iling  to  upho ld  the  m ost bas ic  righ t o f all, the  r ig h t to  life .’33
The  righ t to  life, w h ich  is enshrin ed  unde r A rtic le  2 o f th e  ECHR ,34 rep re sen ts  th e  m os t 
fu ndam en ta l o f hum an righ ts, be ing  one  upon wh ich  all o th e r righ ts  and  libe rtie s  a re
27U N SCR  2001 , para 2 (b ).
28 ibid para  2 (e ).
29 Council of Europe, G u id e l in e s  o f  t h e  C o m m it t e e  o f  M in is t e r s  o f  th e  C o u n c i l  o f  E u r o p e  o n  H u m a n  
R ig h t s  a n d  th e  F ig h t  A g a in s t  T e r r o r is m  (Council of Europe, 2 0 02 ) 1.
30 ibid Gu ideline I (p 2).
31 European  Union, Coun ter Terro rism  Strategy, 30  N ovem ber 2 0 05  (1 4 4 6 9 /4 /0 5 ) 3. S e e  Ian Tu rner,  
T h e  Prevention o f Terrorism : In Support of Control O rders, and Beyond ’ (2 0 0 4 ) 6 2 (3 )  Northern  
Ire land Legal Q uarterly  3 35 , 335 .
32 European Union, Council F ram ework Decision 2 002 /4 7 5 /JH A  of 13 June 2 0 0 2  on Com bating  
Terrorism , Article 1 (1 ). S ee  also Council Common Position 2 0 0 1 /9 3 0 /C F S P  on Com bating  Terror; 
Maria  O ’Neill, ‘A  Critical Analysis of the EU  Legal Provisions on Terro rism ’ (2 0 0 8 ) 20  Terro rism  and  
Political V io lence 26 .
33 Paul W ilkinson, T e r r o r is m  v e r s u s  D e m o c r a c y :  T h e  L ib e r a l  S ta te  R e s p o n s e  (3 rd edn, Rou tledge
2011 ) ix.
34 Th e  right to life is also protected under Article 3  of the Universal Declara tion of Hum an  R ights 1 948 , 
which provides that ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security o f person ’, and under A rticle  
6 (1 ) of In ternational C ovenan t on Civil and Political R ights 1966 , which states , ‘Every  hum an  being  
has the inherent right to life. Th is right shall be protected by law. No one shall be  arb itrarily  deprived  
of his life .’
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con tin gen t.35 A rtic le  2, w h ich  is pa rt o f UK  law  unde r the  HRA  1998 ,36 p rov ides  tha t, 
‘E ve ryone 's  r igh t to  life  sha ll be p ro tec ted  by law . No one  sha ll be dep rived  o f h is life 
in ten tiona lly  save  in th e  e xecu tion  o f a  sen tence  o f a  cou rt fo llow ing  his conv ic tion  o f a c rim e  
fo r  w h ich  th is  pena lty  is p rov ided  by law .’37 T h is  p rov is ion  im poses  bo th  a  nega tive  ob liga tio n  
upon the  s ta te , en ta iling  ‘the  du ty, by its agen ts, to  re fra in  from  k illin g ’ ,38 and  a pos itive  
ob liga tio n  to  p ro te c t life .39 Thus, as the  EC tHR  e lu c ida ted  in LC B  v  U n ite d  K in g d om ,40 ‘A rtic le  
2 (1) en jo ins  th e  S ta te  no t on ly  to  re fra in  from  the  in ten tiona l and  un law fu l ta k ing  o f life, bu t 
a lso  ta ke  app rop ria te  s teps  to  sa fegua rd  the  lives o f th o se  w ith in  its ju r is d ic tio n .’41 Fu rthe r, 
as w as  exp la ined  by the  C ou rt in the  case  o f O sm a n  v  U K ,42 th e  pos itive  ob liga tio n  
em bod ied  in A rtic le  2  inc ludes a duty:
T o  secu re  the  righ t to  life  by  pu tting  in p lace  e ffec tive  c rim in a l- law  sanc tion s  
to  de te r the  comm iss ion  o f o ffences  aga ins t the  pe rson  backed  up by  law - 
en fo rcem en t m ach ine ry  fo r th e  p reven tion , suppress ion  and sanc tio n ing  of 
b reaches  of such  p rov is ions  43
In O sm a n , it w as a lso  e s tab lished  tha t A rtic le  2 can  be seen  to  im p ly  a subs tan tive  ob liga tio n  
requ iring  the  s ta te  to  ‘ta ke  p reven tive  ope ra tio na l m easures  to  p ro tec t an in d iv id ua l w hose  
life  is a t risk from  the  c rim ina l ac ts  o f a n o the r.’44 H owever, th is pa rticu la r a spect o f th e  A rtic le  
2  du ty  is sub je c t to  s tr in gen t qua lifica tions , and w ill o n ly  a rise  in ‘ce rta in  w e ll-d e fin ed  
c ircum s tances .’45 It is th e re fo re  un like ly  th a t th is  pa rticu la r ob liga tion  w ill be rega rded  as
35 S ee , for exam p le , M c C a n n  a n d  O th e r s  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 995 ) 21 EHRR , para  147 . S e e  also  
Am itai Etzioni, ‘Life: T h e  Most Basic R ight’ (2 0 1 0 ) 9 Journal of Hum an  R ights 100 , 105; D ouw e  Korff, 
T h e  R ig h t  to  L i f e :  A  G u id e  to  th e  Im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  A r t i c le  2  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o n  H u m a n  
R ig h t s  (H um an  rights handbooks, No .8 ) (Council of Europe, S trasbourg 2 006 ) 6.
36 HRA, s 1(1 )(a ), Sch 1.
37 European  Conven tion  on Human  Rights, Article 2 (1 ).
38 Robin CA  W h ite  and C la re  O vey, J a c o b s ,  W h i te  &  O v e y :  T h e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o n  H u m a n  
R ig h t s  (5 th edn, O U P  2 010 ) 141 .
39 S ee  S teve  Foster, H u m a n  R ig h t s  &  C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  (3 rd edn, Longman 2011 ) 1 9 0 -1 95 , 7 5 8 -7 6 1 .
40 (1998 ) 2 7  EHRR  212 .
41 ibid, para  36.
42 (2000 ) 29  E HRR  245 .
43 ibid, para  6.
44 ibid. S ee  also O p u z  v  T u r k e y  (2 010 ) 50  EHRR  28 , para  128.
45 O s m a n  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 000 ) 29  E H RR  245 , para 6. T h e  Court w en t on to clarify that, ‘not eve ry  
claimed risk to life can entail ... a requirem ent to take  operational m easures  to prevent tha t risk from  
materialis ing,’ and that in order for this obligation to arise it must there fore ‘be es tab lished that the  
authorities knew  or ought to have  known at the tim e  of the ex istence of a  real and imm ed ia te  risk to  
the life of an identified individual or individuals from  the crim inal acts o f a third party ’ (para  116 ). T h e
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app ly ing  in re spec t o f a s ta te ’s du ty  to  p ro tec t c itizens aga ins t te rro rism  un less  a c lea r and 
reasonab ly  im m inen t th rea t to  spec ific  po ten tia l v ic tim s is id en tified .46
As e s tab lished  by the  fo rego ing  d iscuss ion , it is in cum ben t upon s ta tes  to  p ro te c t na tiona l 
secu rity  and  sa fegua rd  the  lives o f the  popu la tion  by tak ing  pos itive  s teps  to  com ba t 
te rro rism . In add ition , m odern  libera l s ta te s  a re  requ ired  to  secu re  the  en jo ym en t o f the  
righ ts and  freedom s  o f th e ir c itizens, an ob liga tion  w h ich , in re la tion  to  the  UK, is im posed  by 
A rtic le  1 ECHR47 and em bod ied  in the  H RA .48 W h ils t te rro rism  poses a d ire c t th rea t to  
secu rity  and  fundam en ta l hum an  righ ts, in respond ing  to  th is  th rea t, s ta tes  m ust seek  to  
ensu re  tha t the  m easures  they  in troduce  do no t undu ly  cu rta il ind iv idua l righ ts  o r  libe rties , o r 
serve  to  unde rm ine  the  dem oc ra tic  va lues  they  a re  in tended  to  p ro tect. In th e  co u n te r ­
te rro rism  con tex t, it is o ften  c la im ed  tha t ‘se cu rity ’ and ‘libe rty ’ m ust con sequen tly  be 
ba lanced , go ve rnm en ts ’ asse rting  tha t in o rde r to  inc rease  the  fo rm e r it is n ecessa ry  to  
reduce  the  la tte r. T he  nex t sec tion  w ill the re fo re  exam ine  the  concep t o f ‘se cu rity ’ and a lso  
con s ide r th e  com p le x  in te rp la y  be tween  the  tw in  im pe ra tive s o f ‘libe rty ’ and ‘se cu rity ’ , the  
tra de -o ff be tw een  w h ich  has becom e  the  ‘d om inan t pa rad igm  tha t shapes  how  w e th in k  
abou t coun te rte rro ris t law .’49
II. Liberty v Security
The  p rov is ion  o f secu rity  and com ba tin g  te rro rism  a re  key  p rio ritie s  on the  po litica l a gendas  
o f m any  W es te rn  s ta te s .50 In ligh t o f even ts  such  as 9 /11 , the  2004  M adrid  tra in  bom b ings ,
stringency of the tes t which applies in respect of this obligation was  noted by the  House  of Lords in 
V a n  C o l le  v  C h ie f  C o n s ta b le  o f  t h e  H e r t f o r d s h i r e  P o l ic e  [2009] 1 AC  225 , Lord Brown commenting  
that it is such that it ‘will not eas ily be satisfied’ [115].
46 Ian Turner, T h e  Prevention of Terrorism : In Support of Control O rders, and Beyond ’ (2 0 0 4 ) 6 2 (3 )  
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly  335 , 3 5 2 -3 5 4
47 Article 1 E CHR  provides: The  High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone  within their  
jurisdiction the rights and freedom s defined in Section I of this Conven tion .
48 Hum an  Rights Act 1998 . S ee  Privy Counsellor R ev iew  Comm ittee , A n t i - t e r r o r is m ,  C r im e  a n d  
S e c u r i t y  A c t  2 0 0 1  R e v ie w :  R e p o r t  (2 0 0 4 -0 4  HC  100 ) para  81.
49 Laura  K Donohue, T h e  C o s t  o f  C o u n te r t e r r o r is m :  P o w e r ,  P o l i t ic s ,  a n d  L ib e r t y  (C am bridge  
University Press  2 0 0 8 ) 2.
50 In relation to the UK, see  Cab inet O ffice, T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  
S e c u r i t y  in  a n  I n t e r d e p e n d e n t  W o r ld  (Cm  7291 , 2 0 08 ) paras 3 .2 -3 .9 ; L a b o u r  P a r t y  M a n i f e s t o  2 0 1 0 :  A  
F u tu r e  F a i r  F o r  A l l ,  p ara  5 .5 ; Cab inet O ffice, T h e  C o a l i t io n :  O u r  P r o g r a m m e  f o r  G o v e r n m e n t  (2 010 )
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and the  7 /7  a ttacks , few  w ou ld  con tes t th a t it is leg itim a te  fo r  gove rnm en ts  to  take  robust 
action  in o rde r to  sa feguard  na tiona l se cu rity  and p ro tec t the  pub lic  aga in s t the  th rea t of 
te rro ris t v io lence. Indeed, a lth ough  they  m ust s trive  to  upho ld  hum an  righ ts  and m a in ta in  
th e ir fid e lity  to  the  ru le  o f law  w h ils t fig h tin g  te rro rism , as G ea rty  and  K im be ll em phas ise , 
T h e re  is no ob liga tion  on a dem oc ra tic  s ta te  to  p rove  its libera l b o n a  f id e s  by  a llow ing  itse lf 
to  be destroyed  by its en em ies .’51 T he  ta sk  o f respond ing  e ffec tive ly  to  th e  th rea t te rro ris t 
a c tiv ity  poses  to  na tiona l se cu rity  w h ils t p ro tec tin g  ind iv idua l righ ts  and  libe rties  thus 
rep resen ts  a com p lex , ye t v ita l cha lle nge  fo r m odern  libera l dem ocrac ies .
T he  no tion  o f ‘se cu rity ’ , and the  pu rpo rted  need to  ‘b a lance ’ libe rty  and  secu rity , have 
becom e  ub iqu ito us  fea tu re s  o f po litica l and  academ ic  d iscou rse  on  cou n te r-te rro rism .52 T he  
ba lance  m e taphor, w h ich  is p rem ised  on the  idea  tha t coun te ring  te rro rism  m ay necess ita te  
trade -o ffs  be tween ind iv idua l ‘lib e rty ’53 (o r c ivil libe rties) and co llec tive  secu rity , is one  tha t 
w as fre quen tly  invoked  by the  Labou r gove rnm en t be tween  1997-2010 . T he  2004  H om e 
O ffice  d iscuss ion  paper, C o u n te r -T e r ro r ism  P ow e rs : R e c o n c il in g  S e c u r ity  a n d  L ib e r ty  in  a n  
O p e n  S o c ie ty ,54 fo r exam p le , s ta ted :
The re  is no th ing  new  abou t th e  d ilem m a  o f how  best to  ensu re  the  secu rity  o f 
a  soc ie ty , w h ile  p ro tec tin g  the  ind iv idua l righ ts  o f its c itizens. D em ocra tic  
gove rnm en ts  have  a lw ays  had to  s trike  a  ba lance  be tw een  the  pow ers  o f th e  
s ta te  and the  righ ts  o f ind iv idua ls . ... It is the  G ove rnm en t’s  u ltim a te  
re spons ib ility  to  fin d  a  fa ir  and e ffe c tive  ba lance  be tw een  secu rity  and  
libe rty .55
24; C ab ine t O ffice, A  S t r o n g  B r i t a in  in  a n  A g e  o f  U n c e r t a in t y :  T h e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  (Cm  
7953 , 2 0 10 ) paras  0 .7 , 1 .2.
51 Conor A  G earty  and John A  K imbell, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  R u le  o f  L a w  (Civil L iberties R esearch  Unit, 
London 1995 ) 16. S ee  also H e lena  Kennedy, J u s t  L a w :  T h e  C h a n g in g  F a c e  o f  J u s t i c e  -  a n d  W h y  i t  
M a t te r s  t o  U s  A l l  (V in tage 2 005 ) 33 .
52 S ee  W a lke r, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (O U P  2011 ) 19 -20 ; Lucia Zedner, S e c u r i t y  (R ou tledge  2 0 0 9 )  
135.
53 H ere, the term  ‘liberty’ is used in an expansive  sense  to cover the collection of rights and liberties  
guaran teed  by such legal instruments as  the Eu ropean  Convention on Hum an  Rights. T h e  concep t of 
‘liberty’ is exam ined  in detail in chap ter 4  (pp 100 -104 ) of this thesis.
54 Hom e O ffice, C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o w e r s :  R e c o n c i l in g  S e c u r i t y  a n d  L ib e r t y  in  a n  O p e n  S o c ie t y :  A  
D is c u s s io n  P a p e r  (Cm  6147 , 2 004 ).
55 ibid David  B lunkett (H om e  Secre tary), Foreword, i-iii. S ee  also Charles  C la rke  (H om e  S ecre ta ry ), 
‘L iberty and Security: Striking the R ight Balance  (Speech  to the European  Parliam en t, O c tober 2 0 0 5 )  
< http ://p ress .hom eoffice .gov .uk /Speeches /speeches-arch ive /speuro -
pa rliam en t-1005>  accessed  15 January  2009 .
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It w as a lso  a sse rted  in the  Labou r gove rnm en t’s coun te r-te rro rism  s tra tegy  tha t, ‘A  
fundam en ta l cha llenge  fac ing  any gove rnm en t is to  ba lance  m easures  in tended  to  p ro tec t 
secu rity  and the  righ t to  life w ith  th e  im pact th ey  m ay have on the  o the r righ ts  th a t we che rish  
and w h ich  fo rm  the  bas is fo r  ou r so c ie ty .’56 W h ils t ‘se cu rity ’ has becom e  a c ritica l te rm  in 
post-9 /11 coun te r-te rro rism  rhe to ric ,57 and T a lk  o f a lib e rty -se cu rity  ba lance  has becom e  so 
comm on  tha t m any  v iew  it as ju s t an am b ien t fe a tu re  o f o u r po litica l e n v ironm en t’,58 the  
scope  and m ean ing  o f ‘secu rity ’ , and w he th e r it is app rop ria te  to  fram e  the  coun te r-te rro rism  
en te rp rise  in te rm s  o f ‘b a lance ’, a re  issues wh ich  have  gene ra ted  cons ide rab le  deba te .
W ith  th e  excep tion  o f certa in  abso lu te  righ ts ,59 the  righ ts  and libe rties  enshrin ed  in th e  ECHR  
are  cond itio na l.60 M ost o f the  righ ts  gua ran teed  by  the  ECHR  m ay the re fo re  be res tr ic ted  in 
pa rticu la r c ircum s tances ,61 such  as w he re  it is n ecessa ry  in the  in te re s ts  o f na tiona l secu rity  
o r pub lic  sa fe ty ,62 o r de roga ted  from  in tim es  o f w a r o r o the r pub lic  em e rgency  th rea ten ing  
the  life  o f th e  na tio n .63 T he  ECHR ’s qua lifica tio n  and de roga tion  c lauses  thus  pe rm it s ta tes  to  
lim it ind iv idua l righ ts  fo r pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p ro tec ting  the  na tio n ’s  secu rity . Indeed, 
th a t th e  C onven tio n ’s p rov is ions  a llow  s ta te s  to  s tr ike  a ‘b a lance ’ be tw een  ‘d e fend ing  the  
in s titu tions  o f d em ocracy  in th e  comm on  in te res t and the  p ro tec tion  o f ind iv idua l r ig h ts ’ w hen  
com ba tin g  te rro rism  w as  unam b iguous ly  recogn ised  by the  EC tHR  in th e  cases  o f B ro g a n  v  
U n ite d  K in g d om 64 and F o x , C am p b e ll a n d  H a r t le y  v  U n ite d  K in g d o m 65
56 Hom e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7457 , 2 009 ) para  7 .0 6 . Fo r use of the balance  m etaphor by the  Coalition  
governm ent, see  Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  R e v ie w  F in d in g s  
a n d  R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  (Cm  8004 , 2 0 11 ) 3; HC  D eb  13  July 2 010 , vol 513 , col 8 0 0  (Th e resa  M ay).
57 Loader and W a lke r suggest that ‘Security has becom e th e  political vernacu la r o f our tim es ’: Ian  
Loader and  Neil W a lke r, C iv i l iz in g  S e c u r i t y  (C am bridge  University Press 2 007 ) 9. S ee  also M ichae l 
Dumper and Esther D  Reed , ‘In troduction’ in Esther D R eed  and M ichae l D um per (eds), C iv i l  
L ib e r t ie s ,  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  a n d  P r o s p e c t s  f o r  C o n s e n s u s :  L e g a l ,  P h i lo s o p h ic a l  a n d  R e l ig io u s  
P e r s p e c t iv e s  (C am bridge  University Press 2 012 ) 2.
58 Jerem y W ald ron , ‘S a fe ty  and Security’ (2 0 06 ) 85  N ebraska  Law  R ev iew  4 54 , 4 5 5 .
59 In relation to the ECHR , the following rights enjoy absolute status: A rticle 3, the  prohibition of torture  
or inhuman or degrad ing  trea tm ent or punishment; Article 4 (1 ), the prohibition of slavery; Article 7 (1 ),  
the  prohibition of retrospective crim inal law.
60 S ee  Foster (n 39 ) 61 -69 .
61 S ee  Article 5 (1 )(a )-(f)  ECHR .
62 S ee  Articles 6 (1 ), 8 (2 ), 9 (2 ), 10 (2 ), and 11 (2 ) of the ECHR .
63 S ee  Article 15 ECHR .
64 (1989 ) 11 EHRR  117, para 48 .
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The  ba lanc ing  app roach , a lth ough  endo rsed  by m any  po litic ians , the  S trasbou rg  Court, and 
such  comm en ta to rs  as P osne r,66 and G o lde r and W illiam s ,67 has been  in c reas ing ly  
ques tioned  by academ ics  and hum an righ ts  advoca tes . D e ta iled  c ritiq ues  o f the  ba lanc ing  
m ode l - o r  ‘tra de -o ff th e s is ’ - a re , fo r exam p le , p rov ided  by W a ld ron , w ho  subm its  th a t th e  
rhe to ric  o f ba lance  m ust be  sub jec ted  to  ‘ca re fu l ana ly tica l sc ru tin y ’,68 and M acdona ld , w ho  
a rgues tha t, T h e  ba lance  m e taphor's  im age o f a  se t o f sca les  fa ils  to  cap tu re  the  com p le x ity  
o f the  ta sk  o f ana lys ing  coun te rte rro rism  po licy .’69 Fu rthe r, the  idea o f ‘b a lanc ing ’ libe rty  and 
secu rity  has been  described  by o the rs  as ‘p rob lem a tic ’ ,70 ‘tro ub lin g ’ ,71 and ‘based  on a 
m is taken  ra tio na le ’.72
A  range  o f conce rns  a re  assoc ia ted  w ith  us ing  the  concep t o f ‘b a lance ’ in re spec t o f s ta te s ’ 
coun te r-te rro rism  po lic ies . F irstly, the  ba lanc ing  approach  invo lves  d icho tom is ing  secu rity  
and libe rty  in a m anne r w h ich  sugges ts  tha t th e y  a re  inhe ren tly  con flic ting  va lues  w h ich  a re  
locked  in a ze ro -sum  con tes t - or, as A shwo rth  pu ts  it, a ‘hyd rau lic  re la tio n sh ip ’73 - w he reby  
an inc rease  in one  necessa rily  invo lves  a reduction  in the  o the r.74 S econd , p resen ting  
secu rity  and libe rty  as be ing  in b ina ry  oppos ition  fa ils  to  a cknow ledge  the  ‘o sm o tic  lin k s ’75 
tha t ex is t be tw een  the  tw o  va lues , an issue  cons ide red  in m ore  de ta il be low . Th ird ly , th e re  is
65 (1991 ) 13 E HRR  157 , para  15.
66 R ichard A  Posner, N o t  a  S u ic id e  P a c t :  T h e  C o n s t i t u t io n  in  a  T im e  o f  N a t io n a l  E m e r g e n c y  (O U P  
2 006 ) 148.
67 Go lder and W illiam s argue  that, ‘the proper method for assessing ...  counter-terrorism  laws, from  a  
human rights perspective, is to adopt a “balancing app roach ’”: Ben G o lder and G eo rge  W illiam s , 
‘Balancing National Security and Hum an  Rights: Assess ing the Legal R esponse  o f Common Law  
Nations to the Th rea t o f Terro rism ’ (2 0 06 ) 8 (1 ) Journal of Comparative  Policy Analys is 4 3 , 4 4 .
68 Jerem y W ald ron , ‘Security and Liberty: Th e  Im age  of B a lance ’ (2 0 0 3 ) 11 (2 ) T h e  J o u r n a l  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
P h i lo s o p h y  191, 194 . S ee  also Jerem y W aldron , ‘S a fe ty  and Security ’ (2 0 0 6 ) 85  N eb raska  Law  
Review  454 .
69 S tuart M acdonald , ‘W hy  W e  Should Abandon  the Balance  Metaphor: A  N ew  Approach  to 
Counterterrorism  Policy’ (2 0 0 8 ) 15 (1 ) Journal of International and Com parative  Law  96, 143 . S ee  also  
Stuart Macdonald , T h e  Unba lanced  Im agery  of Anti-Terrorism  Policy’ (2 009 ) 18 (2 ) Cornell Journal of 
Law  and Public Policy 519 .
70 Lucia Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face  of Terror: Reflections from Crim inal Justice ’ (2 0 0 5 )  
32 (4 ) Journal of Law  and Socie ty 507 , 532 .
71 Donohue  (n 49 ) 3.
72 R ene  van Swaan ingen , ‘Fear and the T rade -o ff B etween  Security and Liberty’ in M ireille  
H ildebrandt, Abio la M ak inw a  and Anna O ehm ichen  (eds), C o n t r o l l in g  S e c u r i t y  in  a  C u l t u r e  o f  F e a r  
(Boom Legal Publishers 2 0 0 9 ) 51.
3 Andrew  Ashworth, ‘Security, Terrorism  and the Va lue  of Hum an  R ights’ in Benjam in J Goold and  
Liora Lazarus (eds ), S e c u r i t y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h ts  (H art 2 0 07 ) 208 .
74 M acdonald, ‘W hy  W e  Should Abandon the Balance  M etaphor’ (n 6 9 )  96 .
75 M ichael D um per and Esther D Reed , ‘In troduction’ in R eed  and Dum per (n 57 ) 3.
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th e  poss ib ility  th a t by a llow ing  libe rties  to  be res tric ted  in o rde r to  p ro tec t aga in s t te rro rism , 
th is  w ill d im in ish  secu rity  aga ins t the  s ta te , c rea ting  the  po ten tia l fo r abuses  o f power, and 
inc reas ing  the  p ro spect o f e n c roachm en ts  upon ind iv idua l righ ts  by the  gove rnm en t and its 
agen ts .76 A no the r c ritic ism  o f the  ba lanc ing  approach  is th a t the  enhancem en ts  in secu rity  
and  reduc tions  in libe rty  it en ta ils  a re  o ften  uneven ly  d is tr ib u ted  am ongst th e  po pu la tio n .77 
W h ils t the  m a jo rity  m ay  no t su ffe r any no ticeab le  d im inu tio n  in the  p ro tec tion  o f th e ir  righ ts, 
p o s t-9 /1 1, it is the  libe rties  o f res iden t a liens, e thn ic  m ino rities , and m em be rs  o f th e  M uslim  
comm un ity , th a t a re  m ost like ly  to  be ‘tra d e d -o ff fo r  the  secu rity  ga ins  p rom ised  by cou n te r ­
te rro rism  m easures . Indeed, in re la tion  to  the  UK, th is  is e xem p lified  by the  A TCSA , Part 4  
de ten tion  reg ime, w h ich  app lied  e xc lu s ive ly  to  non -na tio na ls .78
O ne  o f the  p rim a ry  c ritic ism s  o f the  ‘b a lanc ing ’ a pproach , as no ted  above , is th a t it assum es 
a po la rity  be tween  ‘lib e rty ’ and ‘se cu rity ’ , and in do ing  so, pays insu ffic ien t rega rd  to  the  
re la tion sh ip  be tw een  the  tw o  va lues . T h is  p resum ed  d icho tom y the re fo re  obscu re s  the  fa c t 
tha t, in m any  w ays, ‘se cu rity ’ and ‘lib e rty ’ a re  com p lem en ta ry , ra the r than  an tith e tica l. In 
o rde r to  beg in to  apprec ia te  th e ir in te rre la tion sh ip , it is necessa ry  to  de te rm ine  the  m ean ings  
a ttribu ted  to  th e se  concep ts . Both  ‘lib e rty ’, the  na tu re  and scope  o f w h ich  is cons ide red  
e lsew he re  in th is  th e s is ,79 and ‘se cu rity ’, as used in con tem po ra ry  po litica l d iscou rse , can, 
however, be  som ew ha t opaque  te rm s.
W h ils t som e  concep tions  o f ‘se cu rity ’ p lace  em phas is  upon  th rea ts  to  in d iv idua l lib e rty  
em ana ting  from  the  s ta te  itse lf,80 in th e  coun te r-te rro rism  con tex t the  fo cus  is in s tead  upon  
the  secu rity  o f th e  s ta te , o r  ‘na tiona l se cu rity ’ , as  it is com m on ly  re fe rred  to . ‘N a tiona l
76 David Luban, ‘Eight Fa llacies About L iberty and Security ’ in R ichard A  W ilson  (ed ), H u m a n  R ig h t s  
in  t h e  ‘W a r  o n  T e r r o r ’ (C am bridge  University Press 2 0 0 5 ) 245 . S ee  also John G ardner, ‘W ha t Security  
is The re  Against A rbitrary Governm en t’ (2 0 0 6 ) 2 8 (5 ) London R ev iew  o f Books 19.
77 S ee  Je rem y  W ald ron , ‘S a fe ty  and Security’ (2 0 0 6 ) 85  N eb raska  Law  R ev iew  4 54 , 465 ; Philip A  
Thom as, ‘Em ergency  and Anti-Terrorist Powers -  9 /11 : U SA  and UK  (2 003 ) 2 6  Fordham  International 
Law  Journal 1 1 9 3 ,1 2 0 8 ;  Ronald Dworkin , T h e  Th rea t to Patrio tism ’ (2 0 02 ) 4 9 (3 )  N ew  Yo rk  R ev iew  of 
Books <www .nybooks .com /artic les /a rch ives /2002 /feb /28 /the-th reat-to -patrio tism /> accessed  2 6  June  
2012.
78 A TCSA , ss 2 1 -2 3 . S ee  chap ter 3  (pp 4 6 -4 8 ) of this thesis.
79 S ee  chap ter 4  (pp 100 -104 ).
80 S ee  Lucia Zedner, S e c u r i t y  (Rou tledge, London 2 009 ).
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secu r ity ’ is unde rs tood  to  conce rn  bo th  the  p rese rva tion  o f th e  s ta te , its te rr ito ry , and the  
in s titu tions  o f gove rnm en t, and a lso  the  p ro tec tion  o f the  s ta te ’s c itizen ry  from  in te rna l and 
ex te rna l th rea ts .81 The  ‘se cu rity ’ fo r  w h ich  the  ba lanc ing  approach  p roposes  trad ing -o ff 
ce rta in  libe rties  is a m u ltiface ted  concep t. In bas ic  te rm s, as W a ld ron  exp la ins , ‘S ecu rity  is ... 
a bou t e lem en ta ry  m a tte rs  o f harm  and su rv iva l.’82 More  nuanced  e xp lana tion s , however, 
s tre ss  tha t ‘se cu r ity ’ has bo th ob jec tive  and  sub jec tive  d im ens ions .83 S ecu rity  as  an ob jec tive  
cond ition  p rim a rily  conce rn s  phys ica l sa fe ty  and  the  absence  o f th rea ts  to  bod ily  in teg rity , 
a lthough  a r iche r no tion  o f ob je c tive  secu rity , it is subm itted , m ay  a lso  en ta il th e  p ro tec tion  of 
p eop le ’s m a te ria l w e ll-b e ing  and w ay  o f life .84 T he  sub jec tive  concep tion , m eanwh ile , 
fo cu ses  upon  the  p sycho log ica l aspec ts  o f ‘se cu rity ’ . A s  Z edne r e labo ra tes , sub jec tive  
secu rity  invo lves  ‘the  pos itive  cond ition  o f fee ling  sa fe , and freedom  from  anx ie ty  o r 
app rehens ion  de fined  nega tive ly  by  re fe rence  to  insecu rity .’85 It shou ld  be no ted , however, 
th a t a lth ough  the re  is unden iab ly  a s trong  link  be tw een  ob jec tive  and  sub je c tive  secu rity , due 
to  th e  fe a r gene ra ted  by te rro rism , and  the  e xagge ra ted  pe rcep tion  o f r isk  th a t te rro ris t 
v io lence  can engende r, th e re  is no t a lw ays  a ra tiona l re la tion sh ip  be tw een  pe op le ’s 
sub jec tive  fee lin gs  o f fe a r and insecu rity  and  the  ac tua l th rea t o f ha rm  from  te rro ris t 
ac tiv ity .86
In re la tion  to  po litica l p ronouncem en ts  on coun te r-te rro rism , appea ls  to  ob je c tive  secu rity , in 
the  fo rm  o f p ro tec tion  from  loss o f life and phys ica l ha rm  from  te rro ris t v io lence , have  
trad itio na lly  been  the  norm . However, the  no tion  o f sub je c tive  secu rity , and  its  im po rtance  as 
a  soc ia l va lue , is now  a lso  inc reas ing ly  a cknow ledged . Fo r exam p le , fo llow ing  9 /11 , in 
d iscuss ing  the  need to  sa feguard  the  na tio n ’s secu rity  aga ins t te rro ris t a troc ities , th e  then
81 S ee  Eric M etcalfe , T e rro r , R eason  and R ights’ in R eed  and Dumper (n 5 7 ) 1 5 4 -1 60 ; Julian  
Richards, A  G u id e  to  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y :  T h r e a ts ,  R e s p o n s e s ,  a n d  S t r a t e g ie s  (O U P  2 0 1 2 ) 7 -1 7 .
82 Jerem y W ald ron , ‘S a fe ty  and Security ’ in R eed  and Dum per (n 57 ) 31.
83 M acdonald, ‘W h y  W e  Should Abandon  the B alance  M etaphor’ (n 6 9 ) 99.
84 S ee  Jerem y W ald ron , ‘S a fe ty  and Security’ in R eed  and Dum per (n 57 ) (eds) 18.
85 Lucia Zedner, T h e  Concep t of Security: An Agenda  for Comparative Analysis (2 0 0 3 ) 2 3 (1 )  Legal 
Stud ies 153 , 155 . S ee  also Ian Loader and Neil W a lke r, C iv i l i z in g  S e c u r i t y  (C am bridge  University  
Press  2007 ) 157.
86 Macdonald , ‘W h y  W e  Should Abandon the Balance  M e taphor’ (n 6 9 ) 108.
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prim e m in is te r, T o ny  B la ir, p roc la im ed , ‘th e  m ost bas ic  libe rty  o f all is th e  r igh t o f the  o rd ina ry  
c itizen  to  go  abou t th e ir bus iness free  from  fe a r o r  te r ro r .’87 In add ition , th e  cen tra l a im  o f the  
CO NTEST  coun te r-te rro rism  s tra tegy  is exp re ssed  as be ing  to  reduce  the  r isk  from  
te rro rism , ‘so  th a t peop le  can go  abou t th e ir d a ily  lives fre e ly  and w ith  co n fid e nce .’88
‘S ecu rity ’ , then , is conce ived  o f as a pub lic  good .89 R a the r th an  be ing  irre conc ila b le  w ith  
liberty , however, secu rity  a rguab ly  cons titu te s  ‘the  s in e  q u a  n o n '90 fo r c itizens to  be  ab le  to  
e xe rc ise  the ir righ ts  and libe rties . Thus, as  W a lke r succ in c tly  obse rves , ‘se cu rity  is a va lue  
fo r  liberty , and libe rty  is a va lue  fo r  se cu rity .’91 N e ithe r abso lu te  secu rity  no r abso lu te  libe rty  
a re  rea lis tica lly  ob ta inab le , the re fo re , as e ssen tia l va lues, th e y  m ust necessa rily  co -e x is t and 
in te rac t. C onsequen tly , c ircum stances  w ill in e v ita b ly  a rise  in w h ich  th e re  is a  pe rce ived  
tens ion  be tween them . However, ta lk  o f ‘tra d e -o ffs ’ be tw een ‘com pe tin g ’ righ ts  in the  nam e 
o f ‘b a lanc ing ’ libe rty  and secu rity  shou ld  be e schew ed  on the  g rounds  tha t it is to o  c rude  an 
approach , e spec ia lly  w hen  app lied  to  an issue  as com p le x  as re spond ing  p ropo rtio na te ly  to  
th e  th rea t o f te rro rism  in a  r igh ts -based  dem ocracy . U ltim ate ly , the re fo re , it is a rgued  tha t 
ins tead  o f app roach ing  the  issue  o f coun te rin g  te rro rism  from  the  pe rspec tive  th a t upho ld ing  
hum an righ ts  and  sa feguard ing  na tiona l secu rity  a re  oppos ing  ob jec tives , a  m o re  
app rop ria te  app roach , as e xpounded  in the  ICJ Berlin  D ec la ra tion , is to  rega rd  them  as 
fo rm ing  ‘pa rt o f a seam less  w eb  o f p ro tec tion  incum ben t upon  the  S ta te .’92
87 HC  Deb  14 S ep tem ber 2 001 , vol 372 , col 606 .
88 Hom e O ffice, C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  (Cm  6888 , 2 0 0 6 )  
para  5. S ee  also Hom e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  
C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7457 , 2 0 09 ) 8; Hom e O ffice , C O N T E S T :  T h e  U n i t e d  
K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  8123 , 2 0 11 ) 6.
89 Ian Loader and Neil W a lker, C iv i l iz in g  S e c u r i t y  (C am bridge  University Press  2 0 0 7 ) 31 .
90 Je rem y  W ald ron , ‘S a fe ty  and Security’ in R eed  and D um per (n 57 ), C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s ,  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  
a n d  P r o s p e c t s  f o r  C o n s e n s u s :  L e g a l,  P h i lo s o p h ic a l  a n d  R e l ig io u s  P e r s p e c t iv e s  (C am bridge  University  
Press 2 0 1 2 ) 2 2 . Lazarus sim ilarly argues  that ‘a  m inimum  threshold o f security’ constitutes a ‘material 
condition for a citizen ’s enjoym en t of his or her liberty, dignity or equa lity ’: Liora Lazarus, ‘M apping  the  
Right to Secu rity’ in Benjam in J Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds ), S e c u r i t y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (H art  
Publishing 2 007 ) 3 27
91 W a lke r, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (n 52 ) 19.
92 International Comm ission of Jurists, T h e  IC J  D e c la r a t io n  o n  U p h o ld in g  H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  th e  R u le  
o f  L a w  in  C o m b a t in g  T e r r o r is m  (2 004 ), P ream ble . S ee  also International Comm ission of Jurists, 
A s s e s s in g  D a m a g e  (n 8) 21 .
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III. Responding to  Terrorism : The Primacy of Prosecution
‘A t the  roo t o f it, te rro rism  is a c rim e . So c rim ina l a c tiv itie s  re la ted  to  te rro rism  ... can and 
shou ld  be p ro secu ted .’93 T h is  s ta tem ent, w h ich  fea tu red  p rom inen tly  on the  O ffice  fo r  
S ecu rity  and C oun te r-T e rro rism  w ebs ite ,94 endo rses  the  v iew  tha t te rro rism  is fu n dam en ta lly  
a c rim e  and shou ld  the re fo re  be trea ted  as such . C ha rac te ris tica lly , te rro rism  invo lves  the  
comm iss ion  o f ac ts  w h ich  a re  p roscribed  by the  c rim ina l law, inc lud ing , am ongs t o thers , 
m urder, m ans laugh te r, se rio us  o ffences aga ins t the  person , c rim ina l d am age ,95 and  o ffences 
o f m ak ing  o r possess ing  e xp los ives  o r  caus ing  e xp lo s ions .96 Fu rthe r, th e  inchoa te  
equ iva len ts  o f a ttem p ting  o r consp ir ing  to  comm it such  acts, o r in c itin g /encou rag ing  o r 
ass is tin g  the ir com m iss ion ,97 a lso  cons titu te  crim ina l o ffences . Thus, in m any  ins tances , 
te r ro r is t a c tiv ity  m ay  be p rosecu ted  th rough  the  crim ina l ju s tic e  sys tem  as ‘n o rm a l’ c r im e s .98
W h ils t te rro ris t ac ts  o ften  fa ll squa re ly  w ith in  the  pu rv iew  o f the  o rd ina ry  c rim ina l law , th o se  
w h ich  do  no t may, a lte rna tive ly , be suscep tib le  to  p rosecu tion  unde r one  o f th e  U K ’s a n ti ­
te rro rism  s ta tu tes . In pa rt a legacy o f the  na tio n ’s expe rience  in com ba tin g  Irish R epub lican  
te rro rism , the  UK  has w ha t the  gove rnm en t itse lf d e scribed  as, ‘som e  o f the  m os t deve loped  
and  soph is tica ted  an ti-te rro rism  leg is la tion  in the  w o rld . ’99 T h is  spec ia lis t leg is la tion  con ta in s
93 H om e O ffice, O ffice for Security and  Coun ter-Terro rism  website: ‘Legisla tion’ section  
< http ://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/legis lation/>  accessed  6  August 2 0 08 . Follow ing the  change  of 
governm en t in M ay  2010 , the Hom e O ffice w ebsite  w as  archived by the National A rchives. T h e  
archived version o f the ‘Legislation’ section can now be accessed  at  
< h ttp ://tna .eu roparch ive .o rg /20100419081706 /h ttp ://secu rity.hom eoffice .gov .uk/leg is la tion />  accessed  
12 June  2014 .
94 H om e O ffice , O ffice for Security and Coun ter-Terro rism  website < h ttp ://tna.eu roparch ive.o rg /
2 0 1 0 0 4 1 9 0 8 1 7 0 6 /http://security .hom eoffice.gov.uk/> accessed  12 June 2014 .
95 Crim inal D am age  Act 1971 , ss 1 -3 .
96 Explosive Substances Act 1883 , ss 2 -4 .
97 W ith  effect from  1 O ctober 2 008 , the Serious C rim es Act 2 0 0 7  abo lished the common  law  o ffence  
of inc itement (s 59 ), replacing it with th ree  new  inchoate  offences. Th ese  offences  are , ‘in tentionally  
encourag ing  or assisting an o ffence ’ (s 44 ); ‘encouraging or assisting an  o ffence believing it will be  
comm itted’ (s 45 ); and ‘encouraging or assisting offences  believing one or more  will be comm itted ’ (s 
46 ).
98 As David  Anderson notes, ‘the main perpetrators o f the most serious acts of terrorism  a re  alm ost 
always charged with offences under the ordinary criminal law ’: T h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t s  in  2 0 1 3 :  R e p o r t  o f  
th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  th e  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 0  a n d  P a r t  1 o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t  
2 0 0 6  (2 014 ) para  11 .1 . S ee , for exam ple , R  v  B o u r g a s s  [2005] EW CA  Crim  1943 ; R  v  B a r o t  [2007 ]  
EW CA  Crim  1 1 1 9 ] R v  Ib r a h im  [2008] EW CA  Crim  880; R  v  K h y a m  [2008] EW CA  Crim  1612 .
99 H om e O ffice, C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o w e r s :  R e c o n c i l in g  S e c u r i t y  a n d  L ib e r t y  in  a n  O p e n  S o c ie t y :  A  
D is c u s s io n  P a p e r  (Cm  6147 , 2 0 04 ) para  17. In the  press re lease  tha t accompan ied  the  Independen t
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an a rra y  o f te rro rism -re la ted  o ffences, th e  m a jo rity  o f w h ich  a re  loca ted  in th e  TA  2000  and 
T A  2006 . The  2000  A c t c rim ina lises  a range  of ac tiv ities , inc lud ing , m em be rsh ip 100 o r 
s up po rt101 of a p roscribed  o rgan isa tion , fu nd -ra is in g  fo r te rro ris t p u rpo ses ,102 w eapons 
tra in ing ,103 possess ion  of a rtic le s  fo r te rro ris t p u rposes ,104 and inc iting  te rro rism  ove rsea s .105 
In add ition , the  TA  2006  m akes  it a  c rim ina l o ffence  to  encou rage  te r ro rism ,106 d issem ina te  
te rro ris t p ub lica tio n s ,107 engage  in conduc t p repa ra to ry  to  comm itting , o r a ss is ting  ano the r to  
comm it, ac ts  o f te r ro r ism ,108 p rov ide  te rro ris t tra in ing 109 o r  a ttend  a t a p lace  used  fo r  such  
pu rpo ses ,110 o r m ake  o r possess  a rad ioactive  de v ice .111 T h e re  is, then , c le a rly  a  m u ltitu de  
o f bo th  crim ina l and te rro rism -re la ted  o ffences  unde r w h ich  those  who  engage  in te rro ris t 
a c tiv ity  m ay be cha rge d .112
The  pu rsu it o f te rro ris ts  as c rim ina ls  th rough  the  c rim ina l ju s tice  sys tem  is an app roach  
w h ich  ga rne rs  w idesp read  support. Indeed, it has been  e xp lic itly  endo rsed  by  bo th  Lord  
C a rlile 113 and David  A nde rso n ,114 and by success ive  D irec to rs  o f P ub lic  P ro secu tio n s .115
Rev iewer's  2 0 1 4  report on the Terrorism  Acts (Dav id  Anderson, T h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t s  in  2 0 1 3 :  R e p o r t  o f  
th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 0  a n d  P a r t  1 o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 6  (2 0 14 ))  
the UK 's anti-terrorism  laws w ere  sim ilarly described as  'some of the most ex tens ive ... in the  western  
world': 'UK  Independen t R ev iew er of Terrorism  Criticises Too -B road  Defin ition of Terro rism ' (2 014 ) 1 
< h ttps://te rro rism leg is la tionrev iew er.independent.gov .uk /wp-con ten t/up loads /2014 /07 /22 -Ju ly -2014-  
PR ESS -R E LEA SE .pd f>  accessed  22  July 2 014 .
100 TA  2 000 , s 11.
101 ibid s 12.
102 ibid s 15.
103 ibid s 54 .
104 ibid s 57 .
105 ibid ss 5 9 -61 .
106 TA  2 006 , s 1 .
107 ibid s 2.
108 ibid s 5.
109 ibid s 6.
110 ibid s 8.
111 ibid s 9.
112 For further d iscussion of crim inal offences  relating to terrorism , see  W alker, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  
jn  52 ) 2 0 3 -2 5 2 .
13 S ee  Lord Carlile , T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 008 ) para 4. Lord Carlile  held the position of Independen t 
Rev iew er of terrorism  legislation from  Sep tem ber 2001  to February 2 0 11 .
114 S ee  David  Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 18) paras 2 .9 , 3 .20 . David  Anderson rep laced  Lord Carlile  as  
Independen t R ev iew er on 21 Feb ruary  2 0 11 . Th e  role of the Independen t R ev iew er in respec t of the  
Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 0 0 5  is d iscussed in chap te r 3 of this thesis (pp 9 4 -9 5 ).
115 K ier S ta rm er Q C , who was  the D irec tor of Public Prosecutions (D PP ) from  Novem ber 2 0 0 8  to  
Novem ber 2013 , in his ev idence  before the Hom e A ffairs Comm ittee  in N ovem ber 2 0 0 9 , stated: ‘I 
ag ree  with m any others that prosecution would be  fa r better than preven ta tive  m easures  and that
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The  crim ina l ju s tice  approach  has a lso  been  s trong ly  advoca ted  by  the  Em inen t Ju ris ts  
Pane l on T e rro rism , C oun te r-T e rro rism  and Human R igh ts ,116 the  JC H R ,117 p rom inen t 
academ ic  comm en ta to rs  such  as C ono r G ea rty ,118 C live  W a lk e r,119 Paul W ilk in so n 120 and  
Luc ia  Z e dne r,121 and va rio us  hum an  righ ts  NGOs, inc lud ing  Am nes ty  In te rna tio n a l,122 
JU ST IC E ,123 and  H um an  R igh ts W a tch .124
Th e  p ronounced  p re fe rence  fo r crim ina l p rosecu tion  is p rin c ipa lly  e xp la ined  by re fe rence  to  
th e  exacting  p rocedura l s tanda rd s  of the  c rim ina l p rocess. C omm ensu ra te  w ith  the  g ra v ity  of 
th e  po ten tia l consequences  fo r  the  ind iv idua l o f be ing  conv ic ted  o f a c rim ina l o ffence , such  
as pena l inca rcera tion , a long  w ith  the  a ssoc ia ted  m ora l s tigm a  and im p lica tion s  fo r  fu tu re  life  
and ca ree r oppo rtun ities , the  c rim ina l tria l is a tte nded  by a  num be r o f c ruc ia l sa fegua rd s . 
U nder bo th  th e  dom es tic  c rim ina l law 125 and A rtic le  6  ECHR ,126 those  cha rged  w ith  c rim ina l
includes control orders. So there  ought to be, in my view , a presumption in favour of prosecution’: 
Hom e Affairs Comm ittee , T h e  H o m e  O f f i c e ’s  R e s p o n s e  to  T e r r o r is t  A t t a c k s  (H C  2 0 0 9 -1 0 , 117  II) Ev  
27 . S ir Ken M acDonald  Q C , who was  D PP  betw een  2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 8 , likew ise suggested tha t ‘w e  should  
hold it as  an artic le of faith that crimes o f terrorism  are  dea lt with by crim inal ju s tice .’ ‘Fo reword ’ in 
Benjam in J Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), S e c u r i t y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (H art Publishing 2 0 0 7 ) vi.
116 International Comm iss ion of Jurists, A s s e s s in g  D a m a g e  (n 8) 1 5 ,1 6 1 .
117 S ee  JC HR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  ( N in th  R e p o r t ) :  A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  
C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 0 8  (2 0 07 -08 , HL 57 , HC  356 ) para  61; C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  
H u m a n  R ig h t s :  P r o s e c u t io n  a n d  P r e -C h a r g e  D e te n t io n  (2 0 05 -0 6 , HL  240 , HC  1576 ).
118 G earty  contends that ‘the human rights scholar should argue fo r the crim inal process  as  the  right 
way  of securing the protection of all in the face  of the th reat of ... terrorist v io lence ’: C onor G earty , 
Terro rism  and Hum an R ights’ (n 118 ) 361 .
119 S ee  C live W a lke r, B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  to  t h e  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L e g is la t io n  (2 nd edn, O U P  2 009 ) 182 , 
210 , 2 42 . S ee  also C live W a lker, ‘Prosecuting Terrorism : the O ld Bailey versus  Be lm arsh ’ (2 0 0 9 ) 79  
Am icus Curiae  21 .
120 W ilkinson argues  that ‘the only satisfactory w ay  for a liberal sta te to put terrorists sa fe ly  out of 
action for a  very long tim e is to convict them , and if th ey  have  comm itted serious offences, to  insist on 
them  serving long prison te rm s .’ Paul W ilkinson (ed ), T e r r o r is m  v e r s u s  D e m o c r a c y :  T h e  L ib e r a l  S ta t e  
R e s p o n s e  (2 nd edn, Routledge 2 006 ) 83 .
121 S ee  Lucia Zedner, ‘Securing L iberty in the Face  of Terror: Reflections from  Crim inal Jus tice ’ (2 0 0 7 )  
32 (4 ) Journal of Law  and Socie ty 507 .
122 S ee  Amnesty  International UK, ‘Prosecu te D on ’t P ersecu te ’ (5  July 2 0 0 7 )  
<www .am nes ty .o rg .u k /p ress -re leases /uk -% E2% 80% 98p rosecu te -don t-pe rsecu te% E2% 80% 99 -says -  
am nesty -law -lo rds-hear-appea l-con tro l-o rders -cases> accessed  1 July 2 014 .
123 JU S T IC E  D irector, Eric Metcalf, subm its that, ‘terrorism  should first and fo rem ost be add ressed  as  
what it is: a  c rim e ’: JU ST IC E , C o u n te r - t e r r o r is m  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (JU S T IC E  Futures Paper, 2 0 0 7 )  
30.
124 S ee  Hum an  Rights W atch , H e a r t s  a n d  M in d s :  P u t t in g  H u m a n  R ig h t s  a t  t h e  C e n t e r  o f  U n i t e d  
K in g d o m  C o u n te r t e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  (2 007 ) <www .h rw .o rg /legacy /backg rounder/eca /uk0607 /> accessed  
1 July 2 014 .
125 R v  S a n g  [1 980 ] AC  402 .
126 Article 6 (1 ) E C HR  provides: ‘In the determ ination o f ... any  crim inal charge . ..  everyone  is entitled  
to a  fa ir and public hearing within a  reasonab le time by an  independen t and impartial tribunal 
established by law .’ Article 6 is d iscussed in further detail in chap ter 4  o f this thesis.
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o ffences  a re  gua ran teed  a fa ir  tria l, en ta iling  the  a ccu sed ’s righ t to  a hea ring  be fo re  an 
in dependen t and  im pa rtia l tr ibuna l, th e  p resum p tion  o f innocence , the  r igh t to  p re -tr ia l 
d isc lo su re  o f m a te ria l ev idence , th e  oppo rtun ity  to  c ro ss -exam ine  w itne sses ,127 and  the  
requ irem en t o f p roo f beyond  reasonab le  doub t. T hese  p ro tec tio n s  a re  seen  to  re flec t the  
se rio u sness  o f be ing  cha rged  w ith  a c rim ina l o ffence  and  are  in tended  to  ensu re , so  fa r as 
poss ib le , th a t gu ilt is a ttr ib u ted  to  th e  righ t pe rson .128 It w ou ld  the re fo re  appea r tha t, in ligh t 
o f the  s ign ifican t pena ltie s  w h ich  a ttach  to  m any te rro ris t o ffences , it is w ith  am p le  
ju s tifica tio n  tha t A shw orth  a sse rts  tha t, ‘conv ic tion  o f a te rro ris t o ffen ce  is an  e x trem e ly  
se rio us  m a tte r fo r  any ind iv idua l, and all p rope r sa fegua rd s  m ust [the re fo re ] be obse rve d .’129
The  case  fo r g iv ing  p rim acy  to  th e  c rim ina l p rocess, a t least from  a  hum an  righ ts 
pe rspective , is an unden iab ly  s trong  one. However, in sp ite  o f th is, and  no tw iths tand ing  
repea ted  a sse rtion s  tha t p rosecu tion  is its p re fe rred  ap p ro ach ,130 a  num be r o f th e  UK 
go ve rnm en t’s key  post-9 /11 an ti-te rro rism  in itia tives  have  en ta iled  s ign ifican t depa rtu re s  
from  the  trad itiona l c rim ina l ju s tic e  pa rad igm . Indeed, as is d iscussed  in th e  fo llow ing  
sec tion , recou rse  to  p reven tive  coun te r-te rro rism  m easu res  such  as de ten tion  w ithou t t r ia l,131 
con tro l o rders , and TP IM s , has been  p rim arily  ju s tifie d  by c la im s  th a t th e re  a re  ce rta in  
te rro ris t suspec ts  who, fo r  va rio us  reasons, the  gove rnm en t is unab le  to  p rosecu te .
IV. Control Orders and TPIMs: A  ‘Necessary A lternative’132
A t the  S econd  Read ing  o f the  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  Bill in the  H ouse  o f C omm ons, the  
ra tiona le  fo r in troduc ing  con tro l o rde rs  w as e xp la ined  b y  C ha rles  C la rke  in th e  fo llow ing  
te rm s:
127 S ee  Article 6 (2 ) and (3).
128 S ee  Conor G earty , Terro rism  and Hum an R ights’ (n 118 ) 361 .
129 Andrew  Ashworth, ‘Security, Terro rism  and the Va lue  of Human  R ights’ in Benjam in  J Goold and  
Liora Lazarus  (eds), S e c u r i t y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (H art Publishing 2 007 ) 219 .
130 S ee , for exam ple , H om e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  
f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7547 , 2 0 09 ) para  7 .03 ; H om e O ffice, C O N T E S T .  T h e  
U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  8123 , 2 011 ) para 4 .2 5 .
131 A TCSA , ss 2 1 -23 . S ee  Hum an  Rights Act 1 998  (D es ignated  Derogation) O rde r 2001  SI 
2 0 0 1 /3 6 4 4 , sch. T h e  Part 4  detention regim e is d iscussed in chap ter 3 of this thesis (pp 4 6 -4 7 ).
132 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 56 ) 40 .
33
These  o rde rs  a re  fo r th ose  dange rous  ind iv id ua ls  w hom  we  canno t p ro secu te  
o r deport, bu t w hom  we  canno t a llow  to  go  on th e ir w ay  unchecked  because  
o f the  se rio usness  o f the  r isk  th a t th e y  pose  to  e ve rybody e lse  in the  
cou n try .133
As d iscussed  in fu r th e r de ta il be low , in th is  con tex t, th e  in ab ility  to  p rosecu te  is due  to 
spec ific  e v iden tia ry  constra in ts , in pa rticu la r, the  sens itive  na tu re  o f the  na tiona l secu rity  
e v idence  aga in s t the  suspect and the  in adm iss ib ility  o f d om es tic  in te rcep ts  as ev idence  in 
c rim ina l tr ia ls .134 T he  inab ility  to  deport, m eanwh ile , is p rim a rily  due  to  th e  EC tHR  dec is ions  
w h ich  p rov ide  tha t an ind iv idua l m ay  no t be depo rted  w he re  the re  is a risk th a t th e y  w ill 
su ffe r tre a tm en t tha t w ou ld  v io la te  A rtic le  3 o f the  ECHR 135 in the  coun try  to  w h ich  th e y  are 
re tu rned .
/'. The  In a b il i ty  to  P ro s e c u te
S ince  9 /11 , the  UK  gove rnm en t has cons is ten tly  m a in ta ined  tha t p rosecu tion  is its p re fe rred  
m e thod  of dea ling  w ith  ind iv idua ls  w ho  engage  in ac ts  o f te r ro rism .136 Indeed, th e  coun te r- 
te rro rism  s tra teg ie s  o f bo th  the  Labou r137 and C oa litio n138 gove rnm en ts  a sse rt th e  p rio rity  o f 
p rosecu ting  those  w ho  a re  suspec ted  o f invo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity . Fo r a 
num be r o f reasons, however, the  p rosecu tion  o f som e  suspec ts  does no t rep re sen t a v ia b le  
op tio n .139
133 HC  D eb  2 3  Feb  2005 , vol 431 , col 339 .
134 Regulation of Investigatory Powers  Act 2 0 00  [R IPA  2000 ], s 17.
135 Article 3 provides that: No one shall be  subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrad ing trea tm en t  
or punishment.
136 The  UK  governm ent’s prioritisation o f criminal prosecution in responding to terrorism  can , as  
W alke r notes, arguab ly  be traced  back  to the D ip lo c k  R e p o r t  of 1972  ( R e p o r t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  to  
C o n s id e r  L e g a l  P r o c e d u r e s  to  D e a l  w i th  T e r r o r is t  A c t i v i t ie s  in  N o r t h e r n  I r e la n d  (Cm nd  5 185 , 1972 )):  
C live W a lke r, ‘Prosecuting Terrorism : the Old Bailey  Versus  B e lm arsh ’ (n 119 ) 21 .
137 S ee  Hom e O ffice, C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  (Cm  6888 ,  
2006 ) paras  69, 71; Hom e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  
f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7547 , 2 0 0 9 ) para 7 .03 .
138 Hom e O ffice, C O N T E S T :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  8123 ,
2 011 ) para  4 .25 .
139 Addressing the rationale for the introducing the Prevention of Terrorism  Bill, Charles  C la rke  sta ted , 
T h e  fact is that there  will a lways be som e people -  including som e ex trem ely  dangerous peop le  -  
whom  w e  cannot prosecu te ’: HC  Deb  22  Feb ruary 2 0 05 , vol 4 3 1 , col 152.
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The  p rinc ipa l fa c to r th a t o ften  m ilita tes  aga in s t p rosecu tion  is the  na tu re  o f the  m a te ria l upon 
wh ich  a lle ga tio n s  aga ins t te rro ris t su spects  is based. A s exp la ined  by fo rm e r D irec to r 
G enera l o f M I5, E liza  M ann ingham -Bu lle r:
W e  m ay be con fid en t tha t an ind iv id ua l o r g roup  is p lann ing  an a tta c k  bu t tha t 
con fid ence  com es from  the  so rt o f in te llig ence  I d e scribed  ea rlie r, p a tchy  and 
fragm en ta ry  and uncerta in , to  be in te rp re ted  and assessed . A ll to o  o ften  it 
fa lls  sho rt o f ev idence  to  suppo rt c rim ina l cha rges to  bring  an ind iv idua l 
be fo re  the  cou rts , th e  bes t so lu tion  a ch ie vab le .140
Thus, w h ile  such in te lligence  m ay g ive  rise to  a  w e ll- fo unded  susp ic ion  o f invo lvem en t in 
te rro rism -re la ted  activ ity , it m igh t no t be adm iss ib le  as e v idence  in lega l p ro ceed ings  o r be 
su ffic ie n tly  robus t to  sa tis fy  the  c rim ina l s tanda rd  of p roo f beyond  reasonab le  do ub t.141
The  po ten tia lly  devas ta ting  consequences  of a  te rro ris t a tta ck  m eans  tha t it m ay  be 
necessa ry  fo r law  en fo rcem en t agenc ies  to  in te rvene  a t an ea rly  s tage  in o rde r to  p reven t 
p lo ts  com ing  to  fru ition . W h ile  ea rly  in te rven tion  se rves  to  p ro tec t th e  pub lic , it can  resu lt in 
th e re  be ing  lim ited  adm iss ib le  ev idence  aga ins t tho se  in vo lved .142 In th e se  c ircum s tances , it 
is the re fo re  un like ly  th a t the  CPS  ‘th resho ld  te s t’143 fo r cha rg ing  a  suspec t w ith  an o ffence , 
w h ich  requ ire s  p rosecu to rs  to  be sa tis fied  tha t th e re  is e v idence  ‘capab le  o f es tab lish ing  a 
rea lis tic  p rospect o f conv ic tio n ’,144 w ill be  met.
140 E liza  M ann ingham -Bulle r, T h e  International Terroris t T h rea t and the D ilemm as in Countering It’ 
(speech at the R idderzaa l B innenhof, the H ague, Netherlands, 1 S ep tem ber 2 005 )  
<www .m i5 .gov .uk /hom e/abou t-us /w ho -w e-a re /s ta ff-and -m anagem en t/d irec to r-g enera l/speeches -by -  
the -d irec to r-genera l/d irec to r-genera ls -speech -to -the-a ivd -2005 .h tm l> accessed  15 Feb ruary  2014 .
141 S ee  JCHR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  P r o s e c u t io n  a n d  P r e - c h a r g e  D e te n t io n  
(2 0 05 -0 6 , HL  240 , HC  1576 ) paras 31 -32 ; Privy Counsello r R ev iew  Comm ittee , A n t i - T e r r o r is m ,  C r im e  
a n d  S e c u r i t y  A c t  2 0 0 1  R e v ie w :  R e p o r t  (H C  2003 -0 4 , 100 ) para  232 .
142 S ee  Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 56 ) 3 7  (p a ra  10); Robin  
Sim cox, T h e  P r e s u m p t io n  o f  I n n o c e n c e :  D i f f ic u l t ie s  in  B r in g in g  T e r r o r is t  S u s p e c t s  to  T r ia l  (H en ry  
Jackson  Society, 2 0 13 ) 2.
143 Crown Prosecution Service , T h e  C o d e  f o r  C r o w n  P r o s e c u to r s  (2 013 ) 1 1 -12  <www .cps .gov .uk  
/pub lica tions /docs /code_2013_access ib le_eng lish .pd f>  accessed  14  Feb ruary 2 014 .
144 ibid 11. Th e  threshold test requires that ‘there is at least a  reasonab le  suspicion that the  person to  
be charged has comm itted the offence ’, and that prosecutors ‘must be satisfied that there  are  
reasonab le  grounds for believing that the  continuing investigation will provide further ev idence , within  
a  reasonab le  period of time, so that all the evidence  together is capab le  of establish ing a  realistic  
prospect of conviction in acco rdance  with the Full C ode  T es t’ (1 1 -1 2 ).
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A no the r fre qu en tly  c ited  obs tac le  to  p rosecu tion  is the  inadm iss ib ility  o f d om es tic  in te rcep t 
ev idence  in c rim ina l tr ia ls .145 A lthough  fo re ign  in te rcep ts ,146 the  p roducts  o f su rve illa nce  and  
eavesd ropp ing ,147 and  te lephone  conve rsa tion s  re co rded  w ith  the  consen t o f one  o f the  
pa rtic ipan ts  o r by a h idden  m ic rophone  no t a ttached  to  the  te le ph o ne ,148 a re  a ll adm iss ib le , 
R IPA  2000 , s 17 p roh ib its  the  use o f m a te ria l in te rcep ted  under a UK in te rcep tion  w a rran t in 
c rim ina l p ro ceed ing s .149 W h ils t som e  con tend  tha t rem ov ing  th is  s ta tu to ry  ba r w ou ld  
s ign ifican tly  enhance  the  p rospects  o f success fu lly  p ro secu ting  su sp ec ts ,150 and  the reb y  
obv ia te  the  need  fo r m easures  like con tro l o rde rs  and  TP IM s , as  David  A nde rson  no tes , ‘the  
in adm iss ib ility  o f d om estic  te lephone  in te rcep ts  is by  no m eans the  on ly  d iff icu lty  in 
conve rting  in te llig ence  in to  e v idence  usab le  in a crim ina l co u rt. ’151
Even w he re  m a te ria l th a t is p roba tive  o f gu ilt is le ga lly  adm iss ib le , it m ay  none the less  be 
deem ed too  sens itive  to  adduce  as ev idence  in lega l p ro ceed ings  fo r  a va r ie ty  o f reasons. 
D isc los ing  such  in fo rm a tion  in open  cou rt cou ld  risk expos ing  in te llig ence -ga the rin g  
te chn iques  o r  sou rces , endange r cove rt ope ra tives , o r ha rm  re la tion sh ips  w ith  fo re ign  
gove rnm en ts  and the ir in te llig ence  agenc ie s .152 In re la tion  to  ce rta in  suspec ts , the re fo re , the  
p re fe rred  op tion  o f p rosecu tion  is de lib e ra te ly  no t pu rsued  by the  gove rnm en t on  the  bas is  
th a t it cou ld  p rove  in im ica l to  na tiona l se cu rity .153
145 S ee , for exam ple , HC  Deb  26  January  2 005 , vol 4 3 0 , col 3 0 7  (Charles  C larke).
146 R  v  P  [2 002 ] 1 AC  146 .
147 R v A l l s o p  a n d  o th e r s  [2005 ] EW CA  Crim  703; R  v  E [2 0 0 4 ]  EW CA  Crim  1243 .
148 Privy Council Rev iew , I n t e r c e p t  a s  E v id e n c e :  R e p o r t  (Cm  7324 , 2 0 08 ) para  22 .
149 R IPA  2 000 , s 17 (1 ). Section 17 (4 ) provides that, for the purposes o f the Act, ‘“intercep ted  
communication” m eans  any  communication intercepted in the course of its transm ission by m eans  of 
a postal service or telecommunication  system ’.
15 S ee  Amnesty  International, T h e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  2 0 1 1 :  
C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  R e d u x  (2 011 ) 5; JU S T IC E , H o m e  O f f ic e  R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  
P o w e r s :  W r i t te n  S u b m is s io n  o f  J U S T IC E  (2 010 ) paras  192 -193 ; Liberty, F r o m  W a r  to  L a w  (2 010 )  
paras  36 , 38 .
151 David  Anderson, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 2 :  F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  
2 0 1 1  (2 013 ) para 7 .14 .
152 S ee  Jam es  Renw ick and G regory  F T reverton , T h e  C h a l le n g e s  o f  T r y in g  T e r r o r is t s  a s  C r im in a ls  
(R AND  2008 ); S imcox (n 142).
53 S ee  HC  Deb  22  Feb ruary 2005 , vol 4 31 , col 152  (Charles  C larke); H om e O ffice , R e v ie w  o f  
C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 56 ) 37  (para  10).
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ii. T h e  In a b il i ty  to  D e p o r t
W here  a  te rro ris t suspec t w ho  canno t be  p ro secu ted  is a  fo re ign  na tiona l, p u rsuan t to  the  
Imm ig ra tio n  A c t 1971, s 3 (5)(a ), th e y  m ay be depo rted  from  the  UK  if the  H om e S ecre ta ry  
deem s  th e ir d epo rta tio n  to  be conduc ive  to  the  pub lic  good . Indeed, th e  use  o f depo rta tion  
as a m eans  o f d is rup ting  te rro ris t a c tiv ity  cons titu te s  an im po rtan t aspec t o f th e  PURSUE  
s trand  o f the  UK  gove rnm en t’s coun te r-te rro rism  s tra teg y .154 However, an ind iv id ua l can  on ly  
be depo rted  if th e ir rem ova l is com pa tib le  w ith  the  U K ’s comm itm en ts  unde r in te rna tiona l 
hum an righ ts  law .155 T he  m ain lega l obs ta c le  to  th e  depo rta tio n  of n on -na tiona l te rro ris t 
su spec ts  is A rtic le  3  ECHR ,156 wh ich  p roh ib its  to rtu re  and  inhum an o r deg rad ing  tre a tm en t o r 
pun ishm en t in abso lu te  te rm s .157 In the  key  case  o f C h a h a l v  U n ite d  K in g d o m , '58 th e  EC tHR  
he ld tha t, w h ils t it w as m ind fu l o f the  im m ense  d ifficu ltie s  faced  by s ta te s  in p ro tec tin g  the ir 
com m un itie s  aga ins t te rro ris t v io lence :
[T ]he  C onven tio n  p roh ib its  in abso lu te  te rm s  to rtu re  o r  inhum an  o r degrad ing  
trea tm en t o r  pun ishm en t, irrespec tive  o f the  v ic tim ’s conduc t. T he  p roh ib ition  
p rov ided  by A rtic le  3 ... a ga ins t ill- tre a tm en t is equa lly  abso lu te  in e xpu ls ion  
cases .159
Thus , C onven tio n  righ ts  app ly  e x tra -te rr ito ria lly  and  the  re spons ib ility  o f th e  re tu rn ing  s ta te  is 
engaged  in depo rta tio n  cases w he re  the re  a re  ‘subs tan tia l g rounds ... fo r  be liev ing  tha t an
154 S ee  H om e  O ffice, C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  6888 , 2 0 06 ) para  73; H om e  O ffice, 
P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  
T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7547 , 2 0 09 ) para 8 .23 ; C O N T E S T :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n t e r in g  
T e r r o r is m  (Cm  8123 , 2 011 ) paras 1 .21 , 4 .30 .
155 S ee  United Nations Convention against To rture and O ther C ruel, Inhuman or Deg rading T rea tm en t 
or Punishment 1984 , Article 3 (1); United Nations Conven tion  relating to the  S ta tus of R e fugees  1951 , 
Article 33 . S ee  also A lexander Horne and M e lan ie  Gower, D e p o r t a t io n  o f  I n d iv id u a ls  W h o  M a y  F a c e  a  
R is k  o f  T o r tu r e  (H ouse  of Commons Standard  No te  S N /H A /4 1 5 1 , 2 0 13 ) pa ras  1.1 -1 .3 .
156 On  Article 3, see  Aisling Reidy, T h e  P r o h ib i t io n  o f  T o r tu r e :  A  G u id e  to  th e  Im p le m e n t a t io n  o f  A r t i c le  
3  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o n  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  Hum an  R ights Handbooks  No. 6 (Council of Europe  
Publishing, 2003 ).
157 Unlike m any of the other Convention rights, A rticle 3 perm its no excep tions and cannot be  
derogated  from even  in times of w ar or public em ergency . S ee  Article 15 (2 ) of the  Eu ropean  
Convention on Hum an  Rights.
158 (1 9 97 ) 23  E HRR  413 . Th e  case  concerned a challenge to the H om e S ecre ta ry ’s decision to deport 
Karam jit S ingh Chahal to India on the grounds that his alleged  involvem en t in S ikh separatis t activities  
constituted a th reat to the UK ’s national security.
159 ibid paras 7 9 -8 0 . As established in the earlier case  of S o e r in g  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 9 89 ) 11 E H RR  
4 39 , this principle also applies to extradition.
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ind iv idua l w ou ld  fa ce  a real risk o f be ing  sub je c ted  to  tre a tm en t con tra ry  to  A rtic le  3 ’160 in the  
rece iv ing  coun try . W here  such  a  r isk  is be lieved  to  ex is t, the  gove rnm en t is th e re fo re  
p reven ted  from  depo rting  a suspect, re ga rd less  o f the  th rea t th e y  a re  seen  to  p resen t to 
na tiona l se cu rity .161
Fo llow ing  9 /11 , va rio us  s ta tes, inc lud ing  the  UK, have  sough t to  pe rsuade  the  S trasbou rg  
C ou rt th a t th e  C h a h a l p r in c ip le162 shou ld  be  m od ified , a rgu ing  tha t in expu ls ion  cases, the  
th rea t th a t suspec ts  pose  shou ld  be  a re le van t fa c to r to  be w e ighed  aga in s t the  risk o f ill- 
tre a tm en t if th e y  a re  re tu rned  to  th e ir own cou n try .163 In S a a d i v  I ta ly ,164 how eve r, the  G rand  
C ham be r unequ ivoca lly  a ffirm ed  tha t, ‘s ince  p ro tec tio n  aga ins t the  tre a tm en t p roh ib ited  by 
A rtic le  3 is abso lu te , tha t p rov is ion  im poses  an ob lig a tio n  no t to  e x trad ite  o r  expe l any  
pe rson  who , in th e  rece iv ing  coun try , w ou ld  run the  rea l risk  o f be ing  sub je c ted  to  such  
tre a tm en t.’165 C onsequen tly , the  a rgum en t o f the  Ita lian and  U K 166 gove rnm en ts  th a t the  risk 
o f harm  to  th e  ind iv idua l if rem oved shou ld  be ba lanced  aga ins t th e ir d ange rousness  to  the  
comm un ity  if no t sen t back, w as  re jec ted  by the  C ou rt as ‘m isconce ived ’.167 T he  S a a d i
160 C h a h a l  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 997 ) 2 3  E HRR  413 , para  80.
161 It w as  asserted  by the Court that, ‘In these circumstances, the activities o f the individual in 
question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be  a material consideration ’: ibid para 80 .
1 2 T h e  principle of n o n - r e fo u le m e n t .
163 S ee  R a m z y  v  N e th e r la n d s  (Application No 2 5 4 2 4 /0 5 ), in which the governm en ts  of the  UK , Italy, 
Lithuania, Portugal, and S lovakia intervened as third parties, arguing that the approach  fo llowed  by  
the  EC tHR  in C h a h a l  should be ‘altered and clarified’ in light of the increased th reat from  international 
terrorism . S ee  also A  v  N e th e r la n d s  (Application No 4 9 0 0 /0 6 ).
164 (2 0 09 ) 4 9  E H RR  30 . The  case  concerned the Italian authorities’ decision to deport Nass im  Saad i, 
a  Tun isian  national lawfully residing in Italy, to Tun isia. Though  not convicted of any  terrorist o ffences  
in Italy, he had been  convicted in absen tia  of terro rism -re la ted offences by a  m ilitary court in Tun is  
and had been sentenced  to twenty yea rs ’ imprisonment. It w as  cla imed  by Saad i that if depo rted  he  
would be  exposed  to a  risk of being sub jected to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3  in Tun is ia , w here  
the  m is treatm en t of alleged terrorists was routine and well-docum ented . S ee  Dan ie l Moeckli, ‘S a a d i  v  
I t a ly :  T h e  R u le s  o f  th e  G a m e  H a v e  N o t  C h a n g e d  (2 0 0 8 ) 8 (3 ) H R LR  534 .
165 S a a d i  v  I t a ly  (2 009 ) 49  EHRR  30 , para 138.
166 Th e  UK  Governm ent was a  th ird-party in tervener in the case . S ee  paras  1 1 7 -1 2 3  of the  judgm ent.
167 S a a d i  v  I t a ly  (2 009 ) 4 9  E H RR  30 , para  139 . In respect of this argum en t, the Court concluded  that, 
T h e  concepts of “risk” and “dangerousness” in this context do not lend them selves  to a balancing  test 
because  they  are  notions that can only be assessed  independently of each  other’: para 139 .
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dec is ion  has a lso  been  re -a ffirm ed  by the  EC tHR  in a  num be r o f subsequen t ca se s ,168 and 
was app lied  d ire c tly  aga ins t the  UK  gove rnm en t in NA  v  U n ite d  K in g d om ™ 9
In add ition , depo rta tio n  m ay  a lso  ‘e xcep tio na lly ’ be p rec luded  by A rtic le  6 o f the  ECHR .170 In 
O thm a n  v  U n ite d  K in g d om ,171 fo r exam p le , th e  EC tHR  he ld th a t depo rta tion  is p roh ib ited  
w he re  the  depo rtee  has su ffe red  o r  risks su ffe ring  ‘a fla g ran t den ia l o f  ju s tic e ’ in the  
rece iv ing  s ta te , en ta iling  a b reach  o f the  p rin c ip les  o f a fa ir  tria l ‘w h ich  is so  fundam en ta l as 
to  am oun t to  a nu llifica tion , o r  des truc tion  o f the  ve ry  essence  of, the  righ t gua ran teed  by ... 
A rtic le  [6 ]’ .172
O ne  m e thod  used by the  gove rnm en t to  c ircum ven t the  cons tra in ts  im posed  by  the  EC tHR  
ju r isp rudence  is th e  nego tia tion  o f fram ew o rk  depo rta tion  w ith  a ssu rance  (DW A) 
a rrangem en ts  w ith  fo re ign  gove rnm en ts .173 Th is  sys tem  is based  on M em o randa  of 
U nde rs tand ing ,174 w he reby  the  rece iv ing  s ta te  ag rees  tha t, if deported , an in d iv idua l w ill no t 
be  exposed  to  tre a tm en t th a t w ou ld  v io la te  A rtic le  3 .175 T o  date, th e  UK  has ag reed
168 S ee , for exam ple , I s m o i lo v  v  R u s s ia  (2 009 ) 4 9  E HRR  42  and R y a b ik in  v  R u s s ia  (2 009 ) 4 8  E H RR  
55 .
169 (2009 ) 4 8  E HRR  15. N A  concerned a  challenge to the  proposed deportation of the  app lican t to  Sri 
Lanka. H ere, the EC tHR  found that, g iven the particular factors p resen t in the  case , including the  
app licant’s Tam il ethnicity, his previous arrest and detention on suspicion o f invo lvem en t with the  
Tam il T igers (LTTE ), the current clim ate o f vio lence in Sri Lanka, and the authorities ’ ongoing efforts  
to combat the LTTE , there w as a  real risk that he would be  exposed  to ill-treatm en t in vio lation of 
Article 3  if returned.
170 In S o e r in g  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 989 ) 11 EHRR  439 , the  EC tHR  noted that an issue m ight 
exceptionally  be raised under Article 6 in extradition or expulsion cases  w here  the individual ‘has  
suffered or risks suffering a flagran t denial of a fair tria l’ in the sta te to which they  a re  sent: para  113 . 
S ee  also E in h o r n  v  F r a n c e  (Application No 7 1 5 5 5 /0 1 ) para  32 .
171 (2012 ) 55  EHRR  1.
172 ibid para  260 . In O th m a n , the real risk that Abu Q a tad a  would suffer a  ‘flag ran t den ial of jus tice ’ in 
violation of Article 6 arose  from  the risk that ev idence  obtained by torture would be  used in his retrial 
for te rrorism -rela ted  offences  in Jordan: para 282 .
173 S ee  Hom e O ffice, C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  6888 , 2 0 0 6 ) 19; H om e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  
P re v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  
7547 , 2 0 09 ) para 8 .2 7 ; C O N T E S T :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  
8123 , 2 0 11 ) paras 4 .3 0 -4 .3 1 .
174 Deta iled discussion of the legal and practical issues associa ted with the use  of M em o randa  of 
Understanding in the  deportation context is outside the scope of this thesis.
175 S ee  Horne and Gower, D e p o r t a t io n  o f  I n d iv id u a ls  W h o  M a y  F a c e  a  R is k  o f  T o r tu r e  (n 155 ) 14 -17 ;  
Kate Jones, ‘Deportations with Assurances: Addressing Key  Critic isms’ (2 0 0 8 ) 5 7 (1 )  IC LQ  183; 
Jenn ifer Tooze , ‘Deportation  with Assurances: The  Approach  o f the UK  Courts ’ [2010 ] PL 362 .
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fram ew o rk  DW A  a rrangem en ts  w ith E th iop ia, Jo rdan , Lebanon , L ib ya176 and  M o ro cco ,177 
and a lso  has an a rrangem en t based  upon an exchange  o f le tte rs  in p lace  w ith  A lg e r ia .178 
A lthough  con tro ve rs ia l,179 w he re  a ssessed  to  be  c red ib le , th e se  a rrangem en ts  th e re fo re  
a llow  the  gove rnm en t to  depo rt fo re ign  te rro r suspec ts  to  th e se  coun tr ie s  w ithou t 
con tra ven ing  the  U K ’s hum an  righ ts  ob lig a tio n s .180 W h ile  th e y  m ay fa c ilita te  th e  rem ova l o f 
som e  fo re ign  te rro r suspects , th is  s tra tegy  does  not, however, e lim ina te  th e  need  fo r 
m easures  such as con tro l o rde rs  o r TP IM s. Indeed, no t all a ssu rances  have  been  deem ed 
an adequa te  gua ran tee  aga ins t ill- tre a tm en t by the  cou rts .181 Fu rthe rm ore , the  th rea t posed  
by suspec ts  w ho  a re  B ritish  c itizens, as 24  o f the  52  ind iv id ua ls  sub je c ted  to  con tro l o rde rs  
du ring  the  life tim e  o f the  reg im e  w e re ,182 and as n ine ou t o f th e  ten  TP IM  sub je c ts  to  da te  
have  be en ,183 obv ious ly  canno t be dea lt w ith  by m eans o f deporta tion .
A lth ough  p rosecu tion  and depo rta tio n  rep resen t th e  UK go ve rnm en t’s p re fe rred  op tio n s  fo r 
dea ling  w ith  te r ro ris t suspects , the se  a re  no t a lw ays poss ib le . C on tro l o rde rs , and  the ir
176 In a  2011  report, the Foreign A ffairs C omm ittee  however noted that the DW A  with L ibya was  no 
longer in force: Foreign Affairs Comm ittee , T h e  F C O ’s  H u m a n  R ig h t s  W o r k  2 0 1 0 - 1 1  (H C  2 0 1 0 -1 2 ,  
964 ) para  85 .
177 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 56 ) 4; W ebs ite  of the  Foreign  
and Commonwealth  O ffice, ‘M em oranda  o f Understand ing on D ip lomatic A ssu rances ’ 
<www .gov .uk /governm en t/co llec tions /m em oranda-o f-understanding-on-deporta tions-w ith - 
assurances> accessed  25  Novem ber 2013 .
178
There  is no M em orandum  of Understanding in p lace  with A lgeria , instead the  a rrangem en t is 
based upon an exchange of letters betw een  the British and A lgerian governments . S ee  W ebs ite  of the  
Foreign and Commonwea lth  O ffice, ‘Exchange of Letters: A lgeria ’ 
<www .gov .uk /governm en t/pub lications/m emoranda-o f-unders tanding -on-deporta tions-w ith - 
assu rances -dw a-a lgeria> accessed 25  Novem ber 2 013 .
179 S ee  Amnesty  International, D a n g e r o u s  D e a ls :  E u r o p e ’s  R e l ia n c e  o n  ‘D ip lo m a t ic  A s s u r a n c e s ’ 
A g a in s t  T o r tu r e  (2 010 ); Hum an  Rights W atch , S t i l l  a t  R is k :  D ip lo m a t ic  A s s u r a n c e s  N o  S a f e g u a r d  
A g a in s t  T o r tu r e  (2 005 ); In ternational Comm ission of Jurists, A s s e s s in g  D a m a g e  (n 8 ) 1 04 -106 ;  
UNCHR , ‘Report o f the Special Rapporteu r on the question o f torture, M an fred  N ow ak ’ 
(E /C N .4 /2 0 0 6 /6 , 2 3  D ecem ber 2 005 ) paras 3 1 -3 2 .
80 S ee  O th m a n  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 012 ) 55  EHRR  1, paras  20 5 -2 07 ; R B  ( A lg e r ia )  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  
S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2009] UKHL  10.
181 See , for exam ple , A S  ( L ib y a )  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2008] EW CA  C iv 2 8 9 .  
See  also A b id  N a s e e r  a n d  o th e r s  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2 010 ] UKS IAC  
77 /0 9 .
182 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 18) para 3 .14 .
183 David Anderson , T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 3 :  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
In d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  th e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  
2 0 1 1  (2 014 ) para  3 .6 . As of February  2 0 14 , DD  is the only foreign national against whom  a  T P IM  
notice has been  made .
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rep lacem en t, TP IM s, th e re fo re  constitu te  m easu res  des igned  to  ‘p lug the  g a p ’184 w he re  no 
o the r v iab le  s tra tegy  fo r  address ing  the  th rea t posed by a ‘sm a ll and po ten tia lly  ve ry  
dange rous  coho rt o f ind iv id ua ls ’185 is seen  to  ex is t. Indeed, as the  C oa litio n ’s R e v ie w  o f  
C o u n te r -T e r ro r ism  a n d  S e c u r it y  P ow e rs  conc luded , w he re  lega l o r p rac tica l im ped im en ts  
p reven t a  suspec t be ing  p rosecu ted  or depo rted , im pos ing  re s tric tion s on the ir a c tio n s  unde r 
such p reven tive  o rde rs, ‘w ill be an im pe rfe c t if som e tim es  necessa ry  a lte rna tive .’186
V. ‘Old W ine in New Bottles’?187
In troduc ing  the  con tro l o rde r p roposa ls  be fo re  the  H ouse  o f C omm ons in Jan ua ry  2005 , th e  
H ome S ecre ta ry  open ly  acknow ledged  tha t the  schem e  rep resen ted , ‘a ve ry  subs tan tia l 
inc rease  in the  e xecu tive  pow ers  o f the  s ta te  in re la tion  to  B ritish  c itizen s .’188 H oweve r, w h ils t 
th e  PTA ’s p ro v is ions  w e re  pa ten tly  ‘con ten tio u s ’ ,189 they  w e re  by no  m eans  nove l. Indeed , 
exam ina tion  o f th e  h is to rica l record  p roves the  H ouse  o f Lo rds  S e lec t C omm ittee  on the  
C ons titu tio n ’s p roc lam a tion  tha t the re  w as ‘no d ire c t p re ceden t fo r  the  powers  g ran ted  to  th e  
S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te ’190 unde r the  2005  Act, to  be m isconce ived . T h is  sec tion  w ill th e re fo re  
b rie fly  cons ide r an a sso rtm en t o f m easures , w h ich  in na ture , if no t in scope , can  be rega rded  
as p recu rso rs  to  con tro l o rders.
C omm en ta ries  from  a range  o f sou rces  have com pa red  con tro l o rde rs  to  a  va r ie ty  of 
a n te ceden t m easures . In h is app ra isa l o f the  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  Bill, JU ST IC E  D irecto r, 
R oge r Sm ith , sugges ted  tha t an ti-soc ia l b ehav iou r o rde rs  p rov ided  ‘som e  so rt o f
184 Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 011 ) para  82.
185 ibid para  47 .
186 H om e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 56 ) 4 0 . S e e  also Lord  
Macdonald , R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - t e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  A  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  M a c d o n a ld  o f  R iv e r  
G la v e n  Q C  (Cm  8003 , 2 0 11 ) 11.
187 David  Bonner, E x e c u t iv e  M e a s u r e s ,  T e r r o r is m  a n d  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y :  H a v e  th e  R u le s  o f  t h e  G a m e  
C h a n g e d ?  (A shgate 2 0 07 ) x. Bonner suggests that the  use of execu tive m easures  in responding to 
terrorism  post-9 /11 , ‘fa r from  being “new”... [is] very much a case  of old w ine  in new  bottles’ (x ). S ee  
also Susan Donkin, P r e v e n t in g  T e r r o r is m  a n d  C o n t r o l l in g  R is k :  A  C o m p a r a t iv e  A n a ly s is  o f  C o n t r o l  
O r d e r s  in  t h e  U K  a n d  A u s t r a l ia  (Springer 2 0 14 ) 2.
188 H C  D eb  2 6  January  2005 , vol 4 30 , col 309  (Charles C la rke ).
189 ibid.
190 House  of Lords Se lec t Comm ittee  on the Constitution, P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  R e p o r t  (H L  
2 0 0 4 -0 5 , 66 ) para  10.
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p re ceden t.’191 O thers , m eanwh ile , invoked  ana log ie s  be tw een  con tro l o rde rs  and  the  
e xecu tive  o rde rs  m ade pu rsuan t to  the  regu la tions  issued  unde r th e  C ivil A u th o ritie s  (Spec ia l 
Powers) A c t (N orthe rn  Ire land ) 1922 ,192 a long  w ith  ‘the  rep ress ive  reg im es  o f de ten tion , 
depo rta tio n  and ban ishm en t, ex ile  and ‘ru s tica tio n ’ dep loyed  by B ritish  G ove rno rs  in a va rie ty  
o f co lon ie s .’193
Further, the  Hom e S ec re ta ry ’s s ta tem en t tha t, a t the  ‘top  e n d ’, con tro lees  cou ld  be requ ired  
to  ‘rem a in  a t th e ir p rem ises ’,194 lead to  th e  con tro l o rde rs  schem e be ing  likened  to  house  
a rre s t as p rac ticed  by ‘rep ress ive  reg im es  from  Sou th  A fr ica  to  Z im babw e  to  B u rm a .’ 195 
W h ils t lim ited  pa ra lle ls  m ay  be d rawn w ith  th e se  exam p les , it is in th e  coun te r-te rro r  con tex t, 
and  in pa rticu la r ce rta in  m easu re s  enac ted  in re sponse  to  the  cam pa ign  o f Irish  irre den tis t 
te rro rism  tha t reached  its apogee  du ring  the  la tte r ha lf o f th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry , th a t th e  m ost 
sa lien t p receden ts  can  be loca ted .
/. T h e  P r e v e n t i o n  o f  V io l e n c e  ( T e m p o r a r y  P r o v i s i o n s )  A c t  1 9 3 9
The  P reven tion  o f V io lence  (T em pora ry  P rov is ions) A c t 1939 (PVA), in troduced  by the  
C ham be rla in  gove rnm en t in response  to  the  IRA ’s m a in land  bom b ing  cam pa ign  in m id - 
1939 ,196 can be  rega rded  as a fo re runne r to  th e  P TA .197 T h e  PVA  con fe rred  upon the  H om e  
S ecre ta ry  ‘e x trao rd ina ry  pow ers ’ o f expu ls ion , p roh ib ition  and reg is tra tion , m easu res  w h ich  
w ere  des igned  to  fo res ta ll fu r th e r te rro ris t a ttacks  aga in s t G rea t B rita in .198 An expu ls ion  o rde r
191 Roger Sm ith , ‘G lobal Th rea t? ’ (2 0 05 ) 149 (5 ) Solicitors Journal 128 , 128.
192 C live W a lke r, ‘Keeping Control o f Terrorists W ithout Losing Control of Constitutionalism ’ (2 0 0 7 ) 59  
Stanford Law  R ev iew  1395 , 1404 . Regulations 23A  and  23B  (S .R .O . 3 6 /1 9 2 2 ), fo r exam p le , 
em powered  the  Civil Authority to m ake  orders prohibiting individuals from entering, or resid ing in, 
particular a reas , or imposing a  requirem ent that the subject report to the police at specific tim es and  
dates. For detailed  discussion of the operation of the Civil Authorities (Spec ia l Powers) Act (Northern  
Ire land) 1922  see  Donohue (n 49 ) 4 0 -1 1 6 .
193 David  Bonner, ‘Checking the Executive? Detention W ithout Trial, Control O rders, Due  P rocess  and  
Human  R ights’ (2 0 0 6 ) 12 European  Public Law  45 , 62 . S e e  also Ken t Roach , T h e  9 /1 1  E f f e c t :  
C o m p a r a t iv e  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (C am bridge  University Press  2 0 1 1 ) 280 .
194 HC  Deb  2 6  January  2 005 , vol 4 30 , col 3 0 8  (Charles C la rke ).
195 Ben M ac In tyre, ‘Guilty until proven even  guiltier’ T h e  T im e s  (London, January  2 9  2 0 05 ).
196 S ee  Owen  G  Lomas, T h e  Executive  and the Anti-Terrorist Legislation of 1 9 3 9 ’ [1980 ] Public Law  
16; S ee  also Donohue (n 49 ) 2 0 8 -2 16 .
197 W a lke r, ‘Keep ing  Control o f Terro ris ts ’ (n 192 ) 1403 .
198 The  long title proclaimed the Prevention of V io lence (Tem porary  Provisions) Act 1939  to be: An Act
 
to prevent the commission in G rea t Britain of further acts of vio lence designed to influence  public
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cou ld  be m ade  w he re  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  w as ‘re a sonab ly  sa tis fie d ’ tha t a pe rson 199 w as 
conce rned  in th e  p repa ra tion  o r ins tig a tion  o f ac ts  o f v io lence  d ire c ted  a t in fluenc ing  
gove rnm en t po licy  o r pub lic  op in ion  w ith  respec t to  Irish a ffa irs  o r w as know ing ly  ha rbouring  
such  a  pe rson ,200 w he reas p roh ib ition  o rde rs  cou ld  be  issued  to  deny  suspec ted  te rro ris ts  
en try  to  the  B ritish  m a in land .201 However, it is to  reg is tra tion  orders, u nde r w h ich  the  
ind iv idua l w as  requ ired  to  reg is te r th e ir pe rsona l de ta ils  w ith , and  repo rt re gu la rly  to , the  
po lice ,202 tha t con tro l o rde rs  bear th e  s trongest resem b lance . W h ils t th e re  a re  ev iden t 
s im ila ritie s  be tw een  the  requ irem en ts  im posed  by reg is tra tion  o rde rs  and  the  ob lig a tio ns  to  
w h ich  con tro lees  w e re  m ade  sub je c t unde r the  PTA , as W a lke r obse rves, ‘ [reg is tra tion ] 
o rde rs  w e re  fa r  less in trus ive  than  the  2005  A c t equ iva len ts  - the  idea  [be ing ] to  ... fa c ilita te  
su rve illa nce  ra the r than  to  a ve rt the  need fo r  it.’203 It w as  in itia lly  in tended  tha t th is  leg is la tion  
w ou ld  exp ire  a fte r tw o  yea rs ,204 however, th rough  annua l renewa l it u ltim a te ly  su rv ived  until 
1954 ,205 by w h ich  tim e  190 expu ls ion  o rde rs, 71 p roh ib itio n  o rde rs, and  29  reg is tra tion  
o rde rs  had been  is s u e d 206
i i .  T h e  P r e v e n t i o n  o f  T e r r o r i s m  ( T e m p o r a r y  P r o v i s i o n s )  A c t s  1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 9
The  po licy  o f im pos ing  res tr ic tion s upon suspec ted  te rro r is ts ’ fre edom  o f m ovem en t w as  a lso  
a cen tra l fe a tu re  o f the  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  (T em po ra ry  P rov is ions) A c ts  1974 -1989 .207 
T he  backdrop  to  th e  enac tm en t o f th is  s ta tu te , w h ich  w as subs tan tia lly  m ode lled  on  the  1939
opinion or G overnm en t policy with respect to Irish affairs; and to confer on the  Secre ta ry  of S ta te  
extraordinary powers in the  behalf; and for purposes connected  with the matters aforesa id .
199 Expulsion and prohibition orders could only be  m ade  aga inst individuals classified as non ­
residents, or those who had been  resident in G rea t Britain for less than  twen ty  years . S ee  Preven tion  
of V io lence (Tem porary  Provisions) Act 1939 , ss 1 (2 ), (4 ).
200 Prevention of V io lence  (Tem porary  Provisions) Act 1939 , s 1 (2 ).
201 ibid s 1 (4 ).
202 ibid s 1 (3 ).
203 W a lke r, ‘Keeping Control of Terro rists ’ (n 192 ) 1403 .
204 Prevention of V io lence  (Tem pora ry  Provisions) Act 1939 , s 5 (2 ).
205 Th e  Prevention of V io lence  (Tem porary  Provisions) Act 1 939  expired on 31 D ecem ber 1 9 54  by  
virtue of the Expiring Law  Continuance Act 1953 , s 1 (1 ), Sch 1, pt I, and was  subsequen tly repea led  
by the  S tatu te  Law  (R epea ls ) Act 1973 .
2 6 HC  Deb  15 N ovem ber 1951 , vol 4 93 , col 1209 .
207
The  Prevention of Terrorism  (Tem pora ry  Provisions) Act was originally enac ted  in 1974 . T h e  1 974  
Act w as  then repea led  and replaced  by the Prevention of Terro rism  (Tem porary  Provisions) Act 1976 , 
which was  subsequently re -enacted  in 1984  (P revention  of Terrorism  (Tem porary  Provisions) Act 
1984 ), and then again  (with additions) in 1989  (P reven tion  of Terro rism  (Tem porary  Provisions) Act  
1989 ).
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Act, w as  aga in  a  pe riod  o f in tense  te rro ris t v io lence , th is  tim e  pe rpe tra ted  by the  P rov is iona l 
IRA .208 By m id -N ovem be r 1974, th e re  had been  99 sepa ra te  te rro ris t inc iden ts , resu lting  in 
145 casua lties  and 17 dea th s .209 However, it w as the  devas ta ting  dua l pub bom b ings  in 
B irm ingham  on N ovem be r 21 , 1974, w h ich  le ft 21 peop le  dead  and  a fu r th e r 184 in jured , 
w h ich  p rov ided  the  m ost im m ed ia te  ca ta lys t. R espond ing  to  the  pub lic ’s ou trage  a t the  
a ttacks , the  B ill w as la id  be fo re  P a rliam en t on N ovem be r 28  by the  Labou r gove rnm en t’s 
H ome S ecre ta ry , R oy Jenk ins . D esp ite  the  adm itte d ly  ‘d ra co n ian ’ n a tu re  o f the  powers  
con ta ined  the re in ,210 a ided  by the  o ve rw he lm ing  b ipa rtisan  suppo rt engendered  by the  
c ircum s tances , the  A c t becam e law  the  fo llow ing  day ,211 a m ere  180 hou rs  a fte r the  a tro c ity  
th a t had p rovoked  its in troduction .212
The  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  (T em pora ry  P rov is ions) A c t con fe rred  pow ers  upon  the  Home 
S ec re ta ry  to  be exe rc ised  ‘as  appea rs  e xped ien t to  p reven t ac ts  o f te rro rism  (w he the r in 
G rea t B rita in  o f e lsew he re )’ connec ted  w ith  the  a ffa irs  o f N orthern  Ire land .213 M ost ge rm ane  
to  th is  d iscuss ion , the  Act, in its am ended  1989 incarna tion , au tho rised  the  H om e  S ecre ta ry  
to  issue  o rde rs  exc lud ing  pe rsons  from  G rea t B rita in ,214 N orthe rn  Ire land ,215 o r  th e  U n ited  
K ingdom ,216 if sa tis fied  tha t th e y  w e re  o r had been  conce rned  in th e  comm iss ion , 
p repa ra tio n  o r ins tiga tion  o f ac ts  o f te rro rism ,217 o r  w e re  a ttem p ting , o r  m ay  a ttem p t, to  en te r 
G rea t B rita in  w ith  a  v iew  to  be ing  so  conce rned .218 W h ils t de ta iled  ana lys is  o f th e  ope ra tion
208 In D ecem ber 1969 , the IRA  split into two factions, the Provisional IRA  and the  O fficial IRA . S ince  
that date the majority of Nationalist terrorism  has been  carried out by the Provisionals.
209 C live W a lker, T h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  in  B r i t is h  Law  (2 nd edn, M anches te r University Press  
1992 ) 32.
210 HC  Deb 2 5  Novem ber 1974 , vol 882 , col 35 . S ee  the comments  of then H om e Secre tary , Roy  
Jenkins, who, whilst asserting that the powers w ere  ‘fully justified to m ee t the  c lear and present  
danger’, characterised  the powers as ‘D raconian  ... [and] unpreceden ted  in p eace tim e .’
211 The  Act received the Royal Assent at 9 .3 0  am  on the 29  N ovem ber 1974 .
212 David  Bonner, ‘Responding to Crisis: Legislating Agains t Terro rism ’ (2 0 0 6 ) 122  Law  Quarterly  
Review  602 , 630 .
213 Prevention of Terro rism  (Tem pora ry  Provisions) Act 1974 , s 3 (1 ).
214 ibid Prevention of Terrorism  (Tem porary  Provisions) Act 1989 , s 5.
215 ibid s 6.
216 ibid s 7.
^ ib id s s 5 ( 1 ) ( a ) ,  6(1 ){a ), 7 (1 )(a ).
218 ibid ss 5(1 )(b ), 6 (1 )(b ), 7 (1 )(b ).
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of the se  A c ts  is ou ts ide  the  scope  o f th is  s tudy ,219 it is no tew o rth y  tha t th e  e xc lus ion  reg im e  
endu red  fo r  ju s t u nde r tw en ty -s ix  years , even tua lly  be ing  b rough t to  an end  w hen  the  
P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  (T em po ra ry  P rov is ions) A c t 1989 w as repea led  and rep laced  by  the  
TA  2000 .220
Th is  summ a ry  rev iew  revea ls  th a t the re  a re  c lea r pa ra lle ls  be tween  pas t and  p resen t 
p rac tice  rega rd ing  the  use o f execu tive  o rde rs  to  im pose  res tr ic tion s upon ind iv idua l libe rty  in 
o rde r to  p reven t te rro ris t ac tiv ity . D esp ite  the  m an ifes t s im ila ritie s  be tw een  con tro l o rde rs  
and  the  a fo rem en tio ned  powers  con ta ined  in th e  PVA  and  success ive  P reven tion  o f 
Te rro rism  (T em pora ry  P rov is ions) Acts , a t no po in t du ring  the  pa rliam en ta ry  deba te s  w e re  
these  p receden ts  d iscussed ,221 no r w as any re fe rence  m ade  to  them  in e ith e r o f th e  JC H R ’s 
repo rts222 on the  Bill. Indeed, the se  p receden ts  seem ing ly  had ‘little  appa ren t in flu e nce ’223 on 
the  des ign  o f the  lega l fram ew o rk  in troduced  by the  PTA  2005 , an exam ina tio n  o f w h ich  is 
th e  fo cus  of the  fo llow ing  chap te r.
219 For a  comprehensive  discussion of this legislation, see: W a lke r, T h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  in  
B r i t is h  L a w  (n 2 0 9 ). S ee  also Donohue (n 49 ) 2 1 6 -2 5 5 .
220 TA  2000 , s 2 (1 ), sch 16. T h e  decision not to include the power to m ake  exclusion orders in the  
Terrorism  Act 2 0 00  fo llowed Lord L loyd’s recommendation in his R e p o r t  o n  th e  I n q u i r y  in t o  L e g is la t io n  
a g a in s t  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  3420 , 1996 ) that the power should not be re -enac ted  under new  perm anen t  
leg islation. S ee  also the Governm en t’s consultation paper L e g is la t io n  A g a in s t  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  4178 ,  
1998 ), C hap te r 5: Exclusion.
221 Nor w ere  any  of these  an teceden ts  mentioned in the Research  P ape r which accom pan ied  the  Bill: 
Arabe lla  Thorpe , T h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  ( B i l l  6 1  o f  2 0 0 4 / 0 5 ) :  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  L ib r a r y  
R e s e a r c h  P a p e r  0 5 /1 4  (2 005 ).
222 Joint Comm ittee  on Hum an  Rights, P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  P r e l im in a r y  R e p o r t  (2 0 0 4 -0 5 , HL  
61 , HC  389 ); Joint Comm ittee  on Human  Rights, P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (2 0 0 4 -0 5 , H L  68 , HC  
334 ).
223 W alker, T e r r o r is m  a n d  t h e  L a w  (n 52 ) 300 .
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Chapter 3 
The Control Order Regime
Having  iden tified  the  ra tiona le  fo r th e  in troduction  o f con tro l o rde rs  in cha p te r 2 ,1 th is  chap te r 
beg ins  by cons ide rin g  the  imm ed ia te  backg round  to , and  enactm en t of, th e  PTA. T h is  is 
fo llow ed  by  a lega l ana lys is  o f s ta tu to ry  schem e  unde r w h ich  the  con tro l o rde r sys tem  w as 
ope ra ted  by the  UK gove rnm en t be tween March 2005  and D ecem be r 2011 .
I. The Anti-terrorism , Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 4: Detention W ithout Trial
A lthough  the  ex tens ive  T A  2000  had on ly  re cen tly  been  en ac ted ,2 and ‘th e  U K ’s a rm ou ry  o f 
a n ti- te rro rism  m easures  [was] a lready  w ide ly  rega rded  as am ong  the  m os t r igo rous in 
E u rope ,’3 the  B la ir g o ve rnm en t neve rthe less sw iftly  responded  to  th e  9/11 a tta cks  by 
in troduc ing  the  A TCSA .4 Part 4  o f th is  h igh ly  con ten tio us  A c t em pow e red  the  H om e 
S ec re ta ry  to  inde fin ite ly  de ta in , w ithou t cha rge  o r tria l, n on -na tiona ls  w ho  w e re  suspec ted  of 
in te rna tiona l te rro rism ,5 bu t w hom  the  gove rnm en t cou ld  no t p rosecu te  o r  depo rt.6
T he  im p lem en ta tion  o f th e  A TCSA  de ten tion  reg ime, labe lled  ‘G uan tanam o  “ lite ” ’ by  Ni 
A o la in  and G ross ,7 and v iew ed  b y  som e  as en ta iling  the  re su rre c tion  o f the  d ra con ian  po licy  
o f in te rnm en t p rev ious ly  used in N orthern  Ire land ,8 necess ita ted  the  en try  o f d e roga tio n s
1 S ee  pp 3 3 -41 .
2 The  TA  2000 , which comprises 131 sections and 16  schedules , received the  Roya l Assen t on 20  
July 2 000 , and cam e  into force on 19 Feb ruary 2 001 .
3 JCHR , A n t i - t e r r o r is m ,  C r im e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  B i l l  (2 0 01 -0 2 , HL 37 , HC  3 72 ) para  30 .
4 The  A TC SA  was subject to a  rem arkab ly rapid passage  through Parliam en t, the  Bill being  
introduced on 19 Novem ber 2 001 , and receiving the  Royal Assen t a  m ere  2 5  days later on 14  
Decem ber 2001 .
5 A TCSA , ss 2 1 -2 3 . Section 2 1 (1 ) provided that a  certificate could be  issued aga inst an  individual 
where  the Secre ta ry  o f S ta te  (a ) reasonab ly  believed that the person ’s p resence  in the Un ited  
Kingdom  was a  risk to national security, and (b) reasonab ly  suspec ted  that the person was  a  terrorist. 
The  power to detain  following certification was con tained in s 23 (1 ).
6 S ee  Hum an  Rights Act 1998  (D es ignated  Derogation) O rder 2001 SI 2 0 1 /3 6 4 4 , sch. T h e  reasons  
why the governm en t is unab le to prosecute or deport certa in  terrorist suspects is d iscussed  in chap te r  
2  of this thesis (pp 3 4 -3 6 ).
7 F ionnuala Ni Aolain  and O ren Gross, ‘Introduction: G uan tanam o  and Beyond ’ in F ionnuala Ni Ao lain  
and O ren G ross (eds), G u a n ta n a m o  a n d  B e y o n d :  E x c e p t io n a l  C o u r t s  a n d  M i l i t a r y  C o m m is s io n s  in  
C o m p a r a t iv e  P e r s p e c t iv e  (C am bridge  University Press  2 013 ) 33.
8 Am nesty  International described the Part 4  powers as ‘a disturbing echo o f the d isastrous in ternm en t  
of the early 1970s  that proved so counter-productive in the context of the conflict in Northern Ire land ’:
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from  A rtic le  5 (1) ECHR9 and  A rtic le  9 IC C PR .10 T he  P art 4  schem e , w h ich  ex is ted  from  14 
D ecem be r 2001 to  14 M arch 2 0 05 ,11 proved  ‘im m ense ly  con trove rs ia l th roughou t its sho rt 
life ’,12 and  w as sub je c t to  vehem en t c ritic ism  from  a va rie ty  o f pa rliam en ta ry  c om m itte e s ,13 
NGO s ,14 and a cadem ic  com m en ta to rs .15 It w as, however, the  ‘body b low ’16 dea lt to  th e  
reg im e  by  the  House  o f Lo rd s ’ dec is ion  in A  a n d  O th e rs  v  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  
D e p a r tm e n t  (the B e lm a rs h  ca se )17 tha t u ltim a te ly  led the  to  th e  rep la cem en t o f d e ten tio n  
unde r Part 4  w ith  con tro l o rders. In A ,18 w h ile  it w as  a ccep ted  by all bu t Lord H o ffm ann19 tha t 
the re  ex is ted  w ith in  the  UK  an ‘em e rgency  th rea ten ing  the  life o f the  na tio n ’ su ffic ie n t to  
sa tis fy  the  th re sho ld  fo r  de roga tion  unde r A rtic le  15 ECHR ,20 by  a m a jo rity  o f 8 -1 ,21 the  Law  
Lo rds  he ld th a t ATCSA , s 23  w as incom pa tib le  w ith  A rtic le s  5 and  14 o f the  ECHR . A s  Lord  
B ingham  exp la ined , th e  s 23  de ten tion  power w as  deem ed to  be bo th  d isp ropo rtio na te , in 
th a t it ‘le ft B ritish  suspec ted  te rro ris ts  at la rge ’ w h ils t a llow ing  ‘n on -U K  suspected  te rro ris ts  to  
leave the  coun try  w ith  im pun ity ’,22 and  d isc rim ina to ry , as it d iffe ren tia ted  be tween suspec ted  
in te rna tiona l te rro ris ts  ‘on the  g round  o f na tio na lity  o r  im m ig ra tio n  s ta tu s .’23 T he  de roga tio n
U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  H u m a n  R ig h ts :  A  B r o k e n  P r o m is e  (2 0 0 6 ) 14. S ee  also H e len  Fenw ick, T h e  Anti ­
terrorism , C rim e and Security Act 2001 : A  P roportionate R esponse  to S ep tem ber 11 20 01?  (2 002 )  
65 (5 ) M LR  724 , 737 ; Kent Roach K, T h e  9 /1 1  E f f e c t :  C o m p a r a t iv e  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (C am bridge  
University Press  2 0 1 1 ) 2 71 .
9 Hum an  Rights Act 1 998  (D es ignated  Derogation ) O rder 2001  S I 2 0 1 /3 6 4 4 .
10 UK  Derogation under the IC C PR , 18 D ecem ber 2001 .
11 During the reg im e ’s lifetime, 16 foreign nationals w ere  deta ined  under Part 4 , two o f whom  
(A jouaou and F) voluntarily  left the UK  for F rance and Morocco. O n e  additional individual w as  certified  
under A TCSA , s 21 but deta ined  under other powers. S ee  HC  D eb  18 N ovem ber 2 0 03 , vol 4 1 3 , col 
2 7W S  (Dav id  B lunkett).
12 Conor Gearty , Terro rism  and Human  R ights’ (2 0 0 7 ) 4 2 (3 )  G overnm en t and Opposition 340 , 358 .
13 S ee  Privy Counsello r R ev iew  Comm ittee, A n t i - t e r r o r is m , C r im e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  A c t  2 0 0 1 ,  R e v ie w :  
R e p o r t  (H C  2 0 0 3 -0 4 , 100 ) paras 185 -204 ; JC HR , A n t i - t e r r o r is m ,  C r im e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  A c t  2 0 0 1 :  
S ta t u t o r y  R e v ie w  a n d  C o n t in u a n c e  o f  P a r t  4  (2 0 03 -0 4 , HL  38 , HC  381 ).
14 S ee  Amnesty  International, H u m a n  R ig h t s :  A  B r o k e n  P r o m is e  (2 006 ) 13 -17 .
15 Tomkins, for exam ple , described the A TC SA  as ‘the most draconian legislation Parliam en t has  
passed in peace tim e  in over a century’: Adam  Tom kins, ‘Legislating Against Terror; T h e  An ti­
terrorism , C rim e and Security Act 2 0 0 1 ’ [2002] Public Law  205 , 2 05 . S ee  also Fenw ick, T h e  An ti­
terrorism , C rim e and Security Act 2 0 0 1 ’ (n 8).
16 M ary  Arden , ‘Hum an  R ights in the Age  of Terro rism ’ (2 0 05 ) 121 LQR  604 , 6 05 .
17 [2004] UKHL  56.
18 A  a n d  O th e r s  v S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2004 ] UKHL  56 .
19 ibid [88]-[97 ].
20 ibid. S ee , for exam ple , [119 ] (Lord Hope) and [154] (Lord Scott).
21 Lord W a lke r d issenting [191]-[218].
22 ibid [43]. As Lord N ichols noted, the de ta in ees ’ prison was  said to be one with ‘only th ree  w a lls ’
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o rde r w as the re fo re  quashed  and a  dec la ra tion  o f in com pa tib ility  w as m ade  under s 4  o f the  
HRA.
II. The Introduction of the Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2005
The  G ove rnm en t’s in itia l re sponse  to  the  House o f Lo rd s ’ d ec is ion  in A  w as de live red  in the  
fo rm  of a w ritte n  m in is te ria l s ta tem en t issued  by  the  H om e  S ec re ta ry  to  P a rliam en t on the  
day o f th e  ju d gm en t.24 In th is  robus tly  w orded  s ta tem en t C ha rles  C la rke  m ade  it c le a r tha t, 
de sp ite  th e  dec la ra tion  o f incom pa tib ility , the  Part 4  p rov is ions  w ou ld  rem a in  in fo rce , it be ing  
fo r Parliam ent, ra the r than  the  cou rts , to  dec ide  w he the r, and  in w ha t m anne r, th e  law  shou ld  
be am ended .25 C la rke  a lso  exp la ined  tha t he  w ou ld  no t be  revok ing  the  ce rtifica te s  o r 
re leas ing  any o f the  de ta inees  as it w as be lieved  they  con tin ued  to  pose  a  s ign ifican t th rea t 
to  na tiona l secu rity .26
The  fo llow ing  M onday w itnessed  a re tu rn  to  the  d iscuss ion  o f th e  B e lm a rs h  ju d gm en t in th e  
House  o f C omm ons.27 D esp ite  v igo rous  ques tion ing  and  ca lls  fo r c la rifica tion  in re spec t o f 
how  the  G ove rnm en t in tended  to  respond  to  the  dec is io n , th e  H om e S ec re ta ry  a sse rted  tha t 
he w ou ld  no t be rushed  into com ing  to  a conc lus ion  on such  a c ruc ia l issue , ins is ting  th a t no 
s ta tem en t w ou ld  be m ade un til due  cons ide ra tio n  had been  g iven  to  th e  Law  Lo rd s ’ 
ju d gm e n t28 In fact, it w as no t to  be until o ve r a  m on th  la te r th a t th e  le g is la tive  consequences  
o f A 29 w e re  a c tua lly  revea led .
On 26  Janua ry  2005 , the  H ome S ec re ta ry  m ade  a  s ta tem en t to  th e  House  o f C omm ons  on 
the  fu tu re  o f the  Part 4  pow ers .30 In th is, he con firm ed  tha t, a lth ough  the  G ove rnm en t 
m a in ta ined  tha t the  powers  had been ju s tifie d  and  had p layed  a c ruc ia l ro le  in add re ss ing  
the  post-9/11 pub lic  em ergency  and con ta in ing  the  th re a t posed  by those  ce rtifie d  and
24 HC  Deb  16 D ecem ber 2004 , vol 428 , col 1 51W S  (Charles  C la rke).
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 HC  Deb  20  D ecem ber 2004 , vol 428 , cols 1 9 1 1 -1 9 1 9  (Charles  C la rke ).
28 HC  Deb  20  D ecem ber 2 004 , vol 428 , cols 1 9 1 1 -1 9 1 2  (Charles  C la rke ).
29 A  (n 18).
30 HC  Deb  26  January  2 005 , vol 4 30 , cols 3 0 5 -3 0 6  (C harles  C la rke).
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de ta ined  unde r th em ,31 he accep ted  the  House  o f Lo rd s ’ d e c la ra tion  tha t A TCSA , s 23  w as 
in com pa tib le  w ith  the  ECHR .32 Having  re ite ra ted  his conv ic tion  tha t th e re  rem a ined  a pub lic  
em e rgency  th rea ten ing  the  life  o f the  na tion , the  H om e S ec re ta ry  announced  tha t the  
de ten tion  reg im e  w as  to  be rep laced  by a ‘tw in -tra c k  ap p ro ach ’, com pris ing , depo rta tio n  w ith  
a ssu rances  fo r fo re ign  na tiona ls ,33 and a new  m echan ism , con tro l o rders, fo r  use  aga ins t 
th o se  suspec ted  o f invo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity  w ho  cou ld  no t be p rosecu ted  o r 
deported .34
E labo ra tin g  upon the  p lanned  m easures , th e  H om e  S ecre ta ry  e xp la ined  tha t con tro l o rde rs  
w ou ld  be p reven tive  in na tu re , be ing  des igned  to  ‘d is ru p t th o se  seek ing  to  ca rry  ou t a t ta c k s -  
w he the r [in the  UK ] ... o r e ls ew h e re -o r w ho  a re  p lann ing  o r o the rw ise  suppo rting  such  
a c tiv itie s .’35 T he  o rde rs  w ou ld  a llow  fo r  th e  im pos ition  o f con tro ls  ta ilo red  to  th e  spec ific  
th rea t posed  by each ind iv idua l, and w ou ld  be  app licab le  to  any  suspec ted  te rro ris t, 
irre spec tive  o f na tiona lity , thu s address ing  the  Law  Lo rd s ’ conce rn s  rega rd ing  p ropo rtio na lity  
and  d isc rim ina tio n .36 Next, C la rke  tu rned  to  th e  tim esca le  fo r  enac ting  the  p roposa ls . 
A lthough  m ind fu l o f the  se rio us  tim e  p ressu res  invo lved , a B ill w as  to  be in troduced  as soon  
as p ra c ticab le  in o rde r th a t the  con tro l o rde rs  leg is la tion  cou ld  be  passed  in tim e  to  obv ia te  
the  need  fo r renewa l o f the  Part 4  p o w e rs 37 w h ich  w e re  due  to  exp ire  on  14 M a rch .38
31 According to the  Hom e Secretary, the justification fo r the Part 4  ‘imm igration powers’ derived from  
the fac t that, in the  imm ed ia te  afterm ath  of 9 /11 , the terrorist th reat ‘appeared  to com e predom inantly, 
albeit not exclusively, from  foreign nationals’, com bined  with the  need , pursuant to UN  Security  
Council Resolution 1373  ((2 8  Sep tem ber 2 0 01 ) UN  Doc S /R E S /1 3 7 3 ), to take  ‘positive action aga inst  
peripatetic terrorists’ living in the UK: HC  Deb  26  January  2005 , vol 4 3 0 , col 306  (C harles  C la rke).
2 HC  D eb  26  January  2005 , vol 4 30 , cols 3 0 5 -3 0 6  (C harles  C la rke ).
33 The  ‘assu rances ’ mentioned re fe r to ‘d iplomatic assu rances ’ against trea tm ent that would  
con travene Article 3 of the ECHR . This system  is based  upon ‘M em oranda  o f Understand ing ’ with 
countries to which terrorist suspects m ay be deported , w hereby  the  receiving state ag rees  that, if 
detained  following deportation, the deported  person will be ‘afforded adequate  accommodation,  
nourishment, and medical trea tm en t, and will be trea ted  in a  hum ane  and proper m anner, in 
accordance  with internationally accep ted  s tandards’: JCHR , T h e  U N  C o n v e n t io n  A g a in s t  T o r tu r e  
(2 0 05 -0 6 , HL 185-1, HC  701-1) para 105 . S ee  chap ter 2 of this thesis.
4 HC  Deb  2 6  January  2 005 , vol 4 30 , cols 3 0 6 -3 0 7  (C harles  C la rke ). S e e  chap ter 2  of this thesis.
35 HC  Deb  26  January  2 005 , vol 4 30 , col 3 0 7  (Charles  C la rke ).
36 ibid.
37 By virtue of s 29  of the A TCSA , ss 2 1 -2 3  w ere sub ject to annual renew al by order approved  by
 
resolution in both Houses  of Parliament.
38 HC  Deb  2 6  January  2005 , vol 4 30 , col 3 0 8  (Charles  C la rke).
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W hils t the  G ove rnm en t sagac ious ly  dec ided  to  repea l ATCSA , Part 4  in re sponse  to  the  Law  
Lo rd s ’ is suance  o f a dec la ra tion  o f in com pa tib ility , th e y  w e re  under no lega l o b liga tio n  to  do 
so. C ons is ten t w ith  th e  cons titu tio na l d oc tr in e  o f p a rliam en ta ry  sove re ign ty , a  dec la ra tion  
issued  by a cou rt39 unde r HRA, s 4, ‘d oes  no t a ffe c t the  va lid ity , con tinu ing  ope ra tion  o r 
en fo rcem en t o f the  p rov is ion  in re spec t o f w h ich  it is g ive n .’40 Thus , th e  fa c t th a t the  
gove rnm en t is no t com pe lled  to  revoke  the  o ffend ing  p rov is ion  m eans  tha t, as w as 
a cknow ledged  by Lo rd  S co tt in A , ‘the  im po rt o f such  a dec la ra tion  is po litica l no t le g a l.’41 
However, had the  G ove rnm en t op ted  no t to  a c t upon the  Lo rds ’ dec is ion , it is like ly  th a t any  
a ttem p t to  secu re  the  renewa l o f th e  Part 4  powers  w ou ld  have  m e t w ith  v irtu a lly  
insu rm oun tab le  oppos itio n  from  the  H ouse  o f Lo rds  ac ting  in its le g is la tive  capac ity . 
Fu rthe rm ore , as B onner suggests , igno ring  the  dec la ra tion  ‘w ou ld  have  deva lued  the  
constitu tio na l se ttlem en t em bod ied  in the  HRA  ... and  enhanced  the  risk o f a dve rse  
comm en t by  the  European  C ou rt o f H um an R igh ts  ... on the  e ffica cy  o f a D ec la ra tion  o f 
In com pa tib ility  as a rem edy ’ .42
/'. T h e  P re v e n tio n  o f  T e rro r ism  B il l
The  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  B ill43 w as announced  in a B us iness S ta tem en t on M onday 21 
Feb rua ry  2005 , w h ich  lis ted  it fo r deba te  on  Second  Read ing  tw o  days  la te r, w ith  th e  
C omm ittee  and rem a in ing  s tages  schedu led  fo r the  fo llow ing  M onday .44 T h is  exped ited  
tim e tab le , and  the  consequen t cu rta ilm en t o f the  opportun ity  fo r r igo rous  sc ru tin y  and 
deba te , unsurp ris ing ly  engende red  cons te rna tio n  am ongs t pa rliam en ta ria n s ,45 a long  w ith
39 Only  certain  courts are  ab le  to m ake  declarations of incompatibility. T h e  HRA , s 4 (5 ) spec ifies  that 
the courts which have this power a re  the  Suprem e Court, the Judicial Comm ittee  of the Privy Council, 
the Court Martial Appea l Court; in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherw ise than  as  a  
trial court or the Court of Session; in England and W a les  or Northern Ireland, the High Court or the  
Court of Appeal.
40 HRA , s 4 (6 )(a ); nor is it ‘binding on the parties to the  proceedings in which it is m ad e ’ (s 4 (6 )(b )) .
41 A  (n 18) [142] (Lord Scott).
42 David Bonner, ‘Checking the Executive? Detention W ithout Trial, Control O rders , Due  Process and  
Human  R ights’ (2 0 06 ) 12 E u r o p e a n  P u b l ic  L a w 45 , 59 .
43 Prevention of Terrorism  HC  Bill (2 0 04 -0 5 ) [61].
44 HC  D eb  21 Feb ruary 2 005 , vol 4 31 , col 21 (R t Hon P e te r Hain  M P , L eader of the House).
45 HC  Deb  21 February  2 005 , vol 4 31 , cols 21 -30 ; see  also Robert V erka ik  and N igel Morris, ‘M Ps  
Condem n House Arrest and Tagging P lan to ‘Contro l’ T e rro r Suspects ’ T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  (London 2 7
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a ttrac ting  nega tive  comm en t from  the  JC H R 46 and  condem na tion  from  a  range  o f hum an  
righ ts  o rg a n is a tio n s47 In troduc ing  the  B ill in th e  House  o f C omm ons, the  H om e S ecre ta ry  
sough t to  ju s tify  th e  rap id ity  w ith  wh ich  it w as  to  p rog ress  th rough  the  leg is la tive  p rocess  on 
the  g rounds  tha t s im p ly  renew ing  the  Part 4  pow ers  w ou ld  be to  fly  in the  fa ce  o f the  Law  
Lo rds ’ ju d gm en t and crea te  an ‘uncerta in  and unso lid ’ re g im e  w h ich  w ou ld  like ly  be sub je c t 
to  cha llenge  in th e  EC tHR .48 T he  c la im  tha t p ro long ing  the  life  o f Part 4  w as no t an 
accep tab le  op tio n ,49 and  tha t in enac ting  m easures  to  rep lace  it tim e  w as  the re fo re  o f the  
essence , is, to  som e  degree , pe rsuas ive . H owever, th is  does  no t de tra c t from  the  fa c t tha t 
a ffo rd ing  neg lig ib le  pa rliam en ta ry  tim e  to  a  s ta tu te  w ith  fa r-reach ing  hum an  righ ts  
im p lica tions  m e re ly  seem s  to  con fo rm  to  th e  lam en tab le  pa tte rn  w h ich  has em e rged  in 
re la tion  to  the  pass ing  o f m uch o f the  UK ’s an ti-te rro rism  leg is la tion .50 Fu rthe rm ore , in th is  
ins tance  the  G ove rnm en t’s fa ilin g s  a re  rende red  pa rticu la rly  a cu te  due  to  th e ir hav ing  been 
fo rew a rned  by  the  N ew ton  C omm ittee  in D ecem be r 2003  tha t leg is la tion  to  rep lace  the  Part 
4  de ten tion  pow ers  w as needed  as a m a tte r o f u rgency .51
Fo llow ing  th is  in ausp ic ious s ta rt, the  Bill then  had an e xcep tio na lly  tu rbu le n t passage  
th rough  Parliam ent, the  G ove rnm en t’s p roposa ls  be ing  m e t w ith  fie rce  c ro ss -pa rty  
c ritic ism .52 V a rious  a spec ts  o f the  reg im e p rovoked  in tense  con trove rsy, p rinc ipa l am ongs t
January  2 0 05 ) <www .independen t.co .uk /news/uk /c rim e/m ps-condem n-house-arrest-and -tagg ing - 
p lan -to -con tro l-terro r-suspects -488385 .h tm l> accessed  30  June  2 014 .
46 JCHR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  P r e l im in a r y  R e p o r t  (2 0 04 -0 5 , H L  61 , HC  389 ) pa ra  8; 
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (2 0 04 -0 5 , HL 68 , HC  334 ) para  1.
47 S ee , for exam ple , Am nesty  International, T h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  A  G r a v e  T h r e a t  to  
H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  th e  R u le  o f  L a w  in  t h e  U K  (2 005 ) Al Index EUR  4 5 /0 0 5 /2 0 0 5  (Public); Liberty, 
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  L ib e r t y ’s  B r ie f in g  f o r  S e c o n d  R e a d in g  in  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  (2 005 )  
para  1.
48 HC  Deb  22  Feb ruary 2 005 , vol 4 31 , col 159  (Charles  C la rke).
49 The  Shadow  Hom e Secretary, David  Davis, had expressed  the Opposition’s w illingness to support 
a  tem porary  renewal of the Part 4  powers so as to allow  the House of Commons adequa te  tim e to 
consider the Bill: HC  Deb  2 2  Feb ruary  2 005 , vol 4 31 , col 157  (Charles  C la rke).
50 House of Lords Se lect Comm ittee  on the Constitution, F a s t  T r a c k  L e g is la t io n :  C o n s t i t u t io n a l  
Im p l ic a t io n s  a n d  S a fe g u a r d s  (H L  2 0 08 -0 9 , 116-1) paras  6 5 -8 2 . S ee  also Conor G earty, C a n  H u m a n  
R ig h t s  S u r v iv e ? :  T h e  H a m ly n  L e c tu r e s  2 0 0 5  (C am bridge  University Press  2 006 ) 105; David  Bonner, 
‘Responding to Crisis: Legislating Against Terro rism ’ (2 0 06 ) 120 LQR  602 .
51 Privy Counse llo r R ev iew  Comm ittee , R e p o r t  (n 13) para  4.
52 For detailed discussion o f the Bill’s passage through parliam en t see  Laraine Hanlon, ‘UK  Anti- 
Terroris t Legislation: Still D isproportionate?’ (2 0 07 ) 11 International Journal o f Hum an  R ights 4 81 , 
4 9 1 -4 9 7 .
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wh ich  w e re  the  s tanda rd  o f p roo f app licab le  to  the  dec is ion  to  im pose  a  con tro l o rde r,53 the  
tim ing  and  ex ten t of jud ic ia l in vo lvem en t in the  m ak ing  and  re v iew  o f the  orders, and the  
absence  o f p rov is ion  fo r  ongo ing  P rivy  C ounse llo r re v iew .54 A  fu r the r po in t o f con ten tion  was 
the  G ove rnm en t’s re fusa l to  inc lude  a sunse t c lause  p rov id ing  fo r  th e  au tom a tic  exp iry  o f the  
A c t.55 It w as  a rgued  by m em be rs  o f bo th  H ouses  tha t th e  insertion  o f such  a  c lause  was 
essen tia l to  ensu re  tha t th e re  w ou ld  be an oppo rtun ity  fo r  a m ore  tho rough  appra isa l o f 
a pp rop ria te  coun te r-te rro rism  m easu res  w ith in  an a ccep tab le  tim e -fram e .56
Not on ly  does  the  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  Bill have  the  dub ious  honou r o f g iv ing  rise to  the  
longes t s itting  o f the  House  of Lo rds  eve r re co rded ,57 bu t it a lso  becam e  ‘the  ca ta lys t fo r  the  
m ost seve re  bou t o f d isag reem en t be tw een  the  H ouses o f C omm ons and  Lo rds  in m odern 
h is to ry .’58 T he  Bill caused  a b itte r s tando ff be tw een  the  tw o  pa rliam en ta ry  cham be rs , w ith  th e  
gove rnm en t-con tro lle d  H ouse  o f C omm ons  repea ted ly  re jec ting  the  Lo rd s ’ p roposed  
am endm en ts .59 However, the  dead lo ck  w as  even tua lly  b roken  w ith  the  p rom ise  tha t, in lieu 
o f the  des ired  sunse t c lause , a new  d ra ft coun te r-te rro rism  B ill w ou ld  be pub lished  in au tum n 
of 2005, tha t, am ongst o the r th ings , w ou ld  a llow  fo r  a com p rehens ive  rev iew , am endm en t, 
and  if necessary, com p le te  repea l, o f the  con tro l o rde rs  le g is la tio n .60 T he  PTA  the re fo re  
cam e  in to  fo rce  upon rece iv ing  the  Royal A ssen t on M arch 11 20 05 ,61 ju s t 18 days  a fte r its 
in troduction  in Parliam ent.
53 HC  Deb  10 March  2005 . vol 431 , col 1770  (Dom inic  G rieve).
54 HC  Deb  10 M arch 2005 , vol 4 31 , col 1804  (Dom inic G rieve).
55 The  Conservatives proposed the introduction of a  c lause providing that the Act would exp ire on 3 0  
Novem ber 2005 .
56 S ee  HC  Deb  10 March 2 005 , vol 4 31 , cols 1 7 68 -1 7 70 .
57 S ee  the comments  of Lord Falconer, HL  Deb  10 M arch 2 0 0 5 , vol 6 70 , col 1059 . T h e  sitting of 
March 10 2 0 0 5  actually lasted until 7 .0 0  p .m . on M arch 11.
58 C live W a lke r, ‘Keeping Control o f Terrorists W ithout Losing Control o f Constitu tionalism ’ (2 0 0 7 ) 59  
Stanford Law  R ev iew  1 3 9 5 ,1 4 0 8 .
59 Th e  Bill passed betw een  the two Houses  four tim es in an epic  parliam en tary  session which lasted  
over 30  hours. S ee  House  of Lords Se lect Comm ittee  on the Constitution, F a s t  T r a c k  L e g is la t io n  (n 
50 ) paras 81 -82 .
60 HL  Deb  10 March  2 005 , vol 4 31 , cols 1058 -1062 .
61 Excepting section 13 (2 ), which en tered  into force on 14 M arch  2005 .
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Fo llow ing  the  enac tm en t o f th e  PTA, ss 21 -32  o f the  A TC SA  w e re  repea led  w ith  e ffe c t from  
14 M arch 2005 ,62 and the  a ssoc ia ted  de roga tion  from  A rtic le  5 ECHR  re sc inded .63 
Imm ed ia te ly  p rio r to  th is, however, tho se  s till in de ten tion  pu rsuan t to  Part 4  w e re  re leased  
by the  S IAC .64 S ynchronous  w ith  the  P TA ’s en try  in to  fo rce , on 11 M arch, e igh t65 o f the  
rem a in ing  de ta inees  w ere  re leased  on bail by  the  S IAC  cha irm an , M r Ju s tice  O use le y .66 T he  
s tringen t, ye t excep tiona lly  sho rt- lived , ba il cond itio n s67 im posed  w e re  to  d ire c tly  fo re shadow  
the  ob liga tions  to  w h ich  the  fo rm e r de ta inees  w ere  sub sequen tly  m ade  sub jec t unde r the  
con tro l o rde rs  issued  aga ins t them  by the  H om e S ec re ta ry  in th e  firs t e xe rc ise  o f h is new ly  
acqu ired  pow e rs .68
III. Control Orders: The Statutory Scheme
The  PTA  com prised  s ix teen  sec tio n s  and one  schedu le . S ec tion s  1-9 s e t ou t by w hom , and 
in w ha t c ircum s tances , con tro l o rde rs  cou ld  be m ade, the  ob lig a tio n s  the y  cou ld  im pose , and 
the  o ffences  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  th e ir b reach .69 Sec tion s 10 -12  dea lt w ith  th e  p rocedu re  fo r 
appea ls  aga ins t con tro l o rde rs, the  cou rt's  powers  on appea l, and issues  o f ju r isd ic tio n
62 PTA , ss 1 6 (2 )(a ), 16 (3 ). However, pursuant to PTA , s 16 (4 ), repea l w as  not to ‘p revent or otherw ise  
affec t’ any  ongoing appea ls  or claims fo r compensation brought under A TCSA , s 2 5 (1 ).
63 Human  Rights Act 1998  (Am endm en t) O rder 2 0 0 5  S I 2 0 0 5 /1 0 7 1 , which cam e  into fo rce on 8 April
 
2005 .
64 S ee  R  Ford, T e rro r  Suspects Freed  on Bail’ T h e  T im e s  (London 12  M arch  2 0 0 5 ) H om e 6.
65 B, E, H , K, P, Q , Abu Q a tada  and M ahmoud  Abu R ideh.
66 D e ta inee  A, an A lgerian national, had been re leased  on bail by the  S IA C  on 10 M arch 2 0 0 5  under  
the  sam e  conditions that w ere  to be applied to the  other eight deta inees . D e ta in ee  G , who was  
a lready  on bail (G  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t ,  S IAC  App No  S C /2 /2 0 0 2  (2 0  M ay
2004 )) had his conditions relaxed. An eleven th  (fo rmer) Part 4  deta inee , I, w as  serving a  prison  
sen tence  for o ther offences.
67 The  conditions included a  12 hour curfew  (1 9 .0 0 -7 .0 0 ), the  requ irem en t to reside a t the ir hom e  
address , w ea r an electronic tag , and perm it the police and o ther officials to carry  out searches  of their 
residence. In addition, the conditions allowed  the use of one fixed te lephone line, imposed  a  ban on 
the  use of mobile phones or the internet, a long with prohibiting meeting  anyone inside or outside their 
residence w ithout prior Hom e Office authorisation. S ee  ‘Keep ing  Them  Under Control’ T im e s  (12  
March 2 0 0 5 ) Hom e 7; see  also M ike  Nellis, ‘E lectronic Monitoring and the Creation of Control O rders  
fo r Terrorist Suspects in B ritain’ in Tah ir  Abbas (ed ), I s la m ic  P o l i t i c a l  R a d ic a l is m :  A  E u r o p e a n  
P e r s p e c t iv e  (Edinburgh University Press 2 007 ) 2 7 0 -2 7 2 .
68 Non-derogating control orders w ere  m ade against the fo rm er deta in ees  by the H om e Secre ta ry  on  
11 M arch  2 005  under PTA , s 3(1 )(b ) and (c). HC  Deb  16 June  2 0 0 5 , vol 4 3 5 , cols 2 3 -2 4W S .
69 This part of the PTA  also con tained provisions on: arres t pending the making  of a  derogating  
control order (s 5); the revocation or modification of a  control o rder (s 6); and crim inal investigation  
afte r a  control order had been  m ade  (s 8).
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re la ting  to  con tro l o rde r dec is ions  and de roga tio n  m a tte rs .70 T he  du ra tio n  o f se c tio ns  1 -9 ,71 
requ irem en ts  fo r repo rting  and  review , gene ra l in te rp re ta tio n , and connec ted  repea ls  of 
leg is la tion  w e re  cove red  in sec tio n s  13-16. T h e  S chedu le  to  the  A ct con ta ined  a range  of 
p rov is ions  pe rta in ing  to  con tro l o rde r p roceed ings  and  appea ls , a long  w ith  con fe rr in g  spec ia l 
powers  to  m ake  the  ru les o f cou rt to  be fo llow ed  in such  p roceed ings .
T he  cen trep iece  o f the  PTA  w as  the  con tro l o rde r reg im e . A  con tro l o rde r w as  s ta tu to rily  
de fined  as ‘an o rde r aga ins t an ind iv idua l th a t im poses  ob lig a tions  on h im  fo r pu rposes  
connec ted  w ith  p ro tec ting  m em be rs  o f th e  pub lic  from  a risk  o f te rro r ism .’72 T hese  o rde rs  
cou ld  be  m ade aga ins t any  ind iv idua l, irre spec tive  o f na tiona lity  o r the  na tu re  o f the  te rro rism  
invo lved .73 W h ils t on ly  fo re ign  na tiona ls  w ho  w e re  suspec ted  o f invo lvem en t in in te rna tiona l 
te rro rism , spec ifica lly  tho se  w ith  links  to  A l-Q aeda  and  its  a ssoc ia ted  ne tw o rks ,74 cou ld  be  
de ta ined  unde r the  A TCSA ,75 the  con tro l o rde r p ro v is ions  app lie d  to  bo th  non -na tio na ls  and 
B ritish  c itizens. T ha t the  2005  A c t w as subs tan tia lly  b roade r in scope  than  its p redecesso r 
w as pe rce ived  by  som e  to  be a cause  fo r conce rn . H an lon , in pa rticu la r, w as e sp ec ia lly  
critica l o f th is  ex tens ion , sugges tin g  tha t it c rea ted  a ‘d eep ly  d is tu rb in g ’ po ten tia l fo r  m isuse
70 In addition, s 12 dealt with the effect of the court’s decisions on earlie r convictions.
71 Pursuant to  PTA , s 13, sections 1 -9  of the Act (the control o rder powers) w ere  sub ject to annual 
renewal.
72 PTA , s 1 (1 ). PTA , s 15 (1 ) specified that 'the public' m ean t ‘the public in the whole or a part of the  
United Kingdom or the public in ano ther country or territory, or any  section o f the public’, and that  
'terrorism ' had the sam e  mean ing  as in s 1 of the Terrorism  Act 2 0 00 . Fo r a  detailed  d iscussion of the  
definition of terrorism  con tained in TA  2000 , see  Lord Carlile , T h e  D e f in i t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7052 ,
2005 ); David  Anderson , T h e  T e r r o r is m  A c t s  in  2 0 1 3 :  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  
T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 0  a n d  P a r t  1 o f  th e  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 6  (2 014 ) 7 5 -9 8 . S ee  also C live W a lke r, 'The  
Legal Definition of "Terrorism" in United K ingdom Law  and Beyond' [2007 ] Public Law  331 .
73 During the Prevention o f Terrorism  Bill’s First Read ing  in the House o f Commons, the R t Hon Lady  
Hermon M P  asked  the Hom e Secre tary  to confirm  w hether control orders would be app licab le  aga inst 
Martin M cGu inness and G erry  Adam s, as  ‘m em bers  of the IR A  a rm y  council’. Charles  C la rke , whilst 
refusing to comment on individual cases , confirmed that the P TA  provided a ‘fram ework  to dea l with  
all forms o f terrorism ’: HC  Deb  22  February  2 005 , vol 4 31 , col 165.
74 In A  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  ( N o .2 )  [2 004 ] EW CA  C iv 1123 , the  Court of 
Appeal held that the A TC SA ’s detention provisions applied  only to those  whose  suspected  
invo lvement in international terrorism  was specifically  linked to A l-Q aed a  and its associated  networks , 
and that Part 4  could not there fo re  be used to detain  foreign individuals belonging to o ther terrorist 
organisations such as ETA  or the Real IRA. S ee  [64 ]-[65 ] (Pill LJ); [216 ]-[2 17] and  [220 ]-[221 ] (Law s  
LJ); and [373 ]-[375 ] (N euberger LJ).
75 A TCSA , s 23 .
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o f th e  A c t’s pow e rs .76 However, as th e  H om e S ec re ta ry  exp la ined  a t the  tim e  the  con tro l 
o rde r p roposa ls  w e re  unve iled , the  P TA ’s m o re  expans ive  am b it re flec ted  the  fa c t tha t by 
2005  it had becom e  appa ren t th a t the  te rro ris t th rea t to  th e  UK  em ana ted  no t on ly  from  
ne tworks o f fo re ign  na tiona ls  w ith  in te rna tiona l links, bu t a lso  from  B ritish  c itize ns .77 Indeed, 
a lth ough  the  PTA  w as enac ted  p rio r to  the  7 /7  a ttacks, the  th rea t posed  by B ritish  based  
jih ad is ts78 had a lready been dem onstra ted  by the  'shoe  bom ber' R icha rd  R e id ,79 Ahm ed 
Om a r Saeed  S he ikh ,80 and A s if M ohamm ed and  H an if O m a r Khan S ha rif.81 Thus , w h ils t it is 
c lea rly  im pe ra tive  tha t the  reach  o f the  s ta te ’s coun te r-te rro rism  pow ers  be  lim ited  to  
leg itim a te  ta rge ts , th e  na tu re  o f the  con tem pora ry  te rro ris t th rea t d ic ta tes  tha t it is necessa ry  
fo r m easures  such  as con tro l o rde rs to  app ly  equa lly  to  na tiona ls  and  non -na tiona ls .
Pu rsuan t to  s 1(3), a  con tro l o rde r cou ld  im pose  any ob lig a tio n s  tha t th e  S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te  
o r th e  cou rt cons ide red  necessa ry  fo r  pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p re ven ting  o r re s tric ting  the  
con tro lled  pe rson ’s in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity .82 U nder s 1 (9), ‘in vo lvem en t in 
te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity ’83 w as  ‘a ffo rded  a ve ry  w ide  de fin it io n ’ ,84 and  cou ld  con s is t o f any  
one  o r  m ore  o f the  fo llow ing :
76 Hanlon suggested that the P TA ’s ‘b roader perspective’ g ave  rise to the possibility tha t control 
orders could be used agains t ‘hunt supporters, an im al rights activists, m embers  o f ‘Fathers for  
Justice ’, parents d ismantling a mobile te lephone m ast in the ir ch ildren’s school p layground, 
environmentalists, liberals, and defenders of civil rights,’ and that the powers  could therefore  
potentially be em ployed  by an unscrupulous governm ent as  a tool to ‘crush any  d issen t.’ Laraine  
Hanlon, ‘UK  Anti-Terrorist Legislation’ (n 5 2 ) 4 9 8 -4 9 9 .
77 According to the Hom e Secretary, by 2 0 0 5  it had becom e c lear that British nationals w ere  ‘now  
playing a more significant role’ in the  threats facing the  UK: HC  D eb  26  January  2005 , vol 4 3 0 , col 
306 .
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S ee  C live W a lke r, Terro rism : Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 0 0 5  ss .2  and  3  -  Non -Derogating  
Control O rder -  W he the r “Deprivation of Liberty U nder European  Convention  on H um an  R ights A rt.5 ’ 
(2 008 ) 6 C rim inal Law  Rev iew  4 86 , 495 .
9 Reid , who was born in B romley, South London, unsuccessfully attem pted  to b low up a  p lane  on a  
transatlantic flight (Am erican  Airlines Flight 63 ) be tw een  Paris  and M iam i on 2 2  D ecem ber 2001  by  
detonating explosive dev ices  concea led  in his shoes.
80 Sheikh, who was born in London, was the a lleged  masterm ind  of the kidnapping and m urder of the  
Daniel Pearl, a  w riter for the  W all S tree t Journal, in Pak is tan  in 2 0 02 .
81 Han if (who was killed in the attack) and Sharif w ere  British-born terrorists involved in the  suicide  
bombing of a  bar in Te l Aviv on 30  April 2 003 , in which th ree  peop le  w ere  killed and over 5 0  m ore  
were  injured.
82 PTA , s1 (3 ). T h e  Prevention of Terrorism  Bill (H C  Bill (2 0 0 4 -0 5 ) [61], as originally introduced, 
provided that the obligations imposed should be cons idered necessary  for preventing or restricting the  
individual’s ‘fu rther’ involvement in te rrorism -rela ted activity (cl 1 (2 )).
83 A  proposal to constrain the definition o f ‘te rrorism -rela ted  activity’ by inserting the word “in tended” 
into (b), (c) and (d) was rejected, Lord Fa lconer insisting that there  w ere  sufficient sa feguards  in the
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(a) th e  comm iss ion , p repa ra tion  o r  ins tiga tion  o f ac ts  o f te rro rism ;
(b) conduc t w h ich  fac ilita te s  th e  comm iss ion , p repa ra tion  o r  ins tiga tion  o f such 
acts , o r w h ich  is in tended  to  do  so;
(c) conduc t w h ich  g ives  encou ragem en t to  the  comm iss ion , p repa ra tion  of 
ins tiga tion  o f such  acts , o r  w h ich  is in tended  to  do  so;
(d) conduc t w h ich  g ive s  suppo rt o r ass is tance  to  in d iv id ua ls  who a re  known o r 
be lie ved  by the  ind iv idua l conce rned  to  be  invo lved  in conduc t fa llin g  w ith in  
pa rag raphs  (a) to  (c ) .85
Th e  A c t and  accom pany ing  docum en ta tio n  a lso  m ade  it c le a r tha t the  ob liga tio ns  im posed  
cou ld  be  des igned  to  p reven t invo lvem en t in te rro r ism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  genera lly , ra the r than  
ju s t th e  spec ific  a c tiv ity  w h ich  fo rm ed  the  bas is  fo r  th e  H om e S ecre ta ry ’s dec is ion  to  make, 
o r app ly  fo r  the  m aking  of, th e  con tro l o rde r.86
The  types  o f 'ob liga tion ' th a t cou ld  be im posed  on a ‘co n tro le e ’ u nder a con tro l o rde r w e re  
lis ted  in s 1(4) o f th e  Act. Th is  ‘m enu o f po ten tia l o b lig a tio n s ’87 com prised :
(a) a p roh ib ition  o r res tric tion  on his possess ion  o r use o f spec ifie d  a rtic le s  o r 
substances ;
(b) a p roh ib ition  o r res tric tion  on h is use o f spec ifie d  se rv ice s  o r  spec ified  fac ilities , o r on 
h is ca rry ing  on spec ified  ac tiv ities ;
(c) a res tric tion  in respec t o f h is w o rk  o r o the r occupa tion , o r in respec t o f h is bus iness ;
(d) a res tric tion  on h is assoc ia tion  o r  com m un ica tion s  w ith  spec ified  pe rsons o r w ith  
o th e r pe rsons  genera lly ;
(e) a res tric tion  in respec t o f h is p lace  o f re s idence  o r on the  pe rsons  to  w hom  he g ives  
access  to  h is p lace  of res idence ;
(f) a  p roh ib ition  on h is be ing  a t spec ified  p laces  o r w ith in  a  spec ified  a rea  a t spec ifie d  
tim es o r on spec ified  days;
legislation to ensure that it w as  ‘extraordinarily  unlikely that the [Act] would catch peop le  who w ere  not 
in fact terrorists, but w ere  inadvertently caught up in terrorism  in som e w ay ’: HL Deb  3 M arch  2 005 ,  
vol 670 , cols 4 5 8 -60 .
84 Helen  Fenw ick, C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (4 th edn, Routledge 2 007 ) 1441 .
85 Section 1 (9 )(d ), which originally read, ‘conduct which g ives support or ass is tance to individuals who  
are  known or believed  to be involved in terrorism -rela ted  activity’, w as  am ended  by section 7 9 (1 ) of 
the  C TA  2 008 . This am endm ent, which becam e  effective  on 16  Feb ruary  2 0 0 9  (Counter-Terro rism  
Act 2 0 08  (C omm encem en t No. 2 ) O rder 2 0 09 ), w as  m ade in o rder to rem ove  any  ‘unintended  
ambiguity in the original defin ition.’ T h e  revised defin ition is deem ed  to have  had effect since the  P TA  
cam e  into force in 2 0 0 5  (C TA  2008 , s 7 9 (2 )), reflecting the fact that 'this [was] the  w ay  the  provision  
[had] alw ays been interpreted and ... app lied’ (Exp lanato ry  Notes to the Counter-Terro rism  Act 2 0 08 , 
paras  218 -2 19 .
6 PTA , s 1 (9 ) provided that ‘for the purposes of this subsection it is immaterial w hether the acts of 
terrorism  in question are  specific acts of terrorism  or acts o f terrorism  genera lly .’ S e e  also Exp lanato ry  
Notes to the Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 005 , para  31 .
87 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 006 ) para  31 .
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(g) a p roh ib ition  o r res tric tion  on his m ovem ents  to , from  o r w ith in  th e  U n ited  K ingdom , a 
spec ified  pa rt o f th e  U n ited  K ingdom  o r a  spec ified  p lace  o r a rea  w ith in  the  Un ited  
K ingdom ;
(h) a  requ irem en t on h im  to  com p ly  w ith  such  o th e r p roh ib itio n s  o r  re s tric tion s on his 
m ovem ents  as m ay be im posed , fo r a pe riod  no t e xceed ing  24  hours, by d ire c tion s 
g iven  to  him  in the  spec ified  m anner, by a  spec ified  pe rson  and  fo r th e  pu rpose  of 
secu ring  com p liance  w ith  o th e r ob liga tio ns  im posed  by  o r unde r th e  order;
(i) a  requ irem en t on him  to  su rrende r h is passport, o r any th ing  in his possess ion  to 
w h ich  a p roh ib ition  o r re s tric tion  im posed  by  the  o rde r re la tes, to  a  spec ified  pe rson  
fo r a  pe riod  no t exceed ing  the  pe riod  fo r w h ich  the  o rde r rem a ins  in fo rce ;
(j) a  requ irem en t on h im  to  g ive  access  to  spec ifie d  pe rsons to  his p lace  o f res idence  o r 
to  o the r p rem ises  to  w h ich  he  has pow e r to  g ran t access;
(k) a  requ irem en t on him  to  a llow  spec ified  pe rsons to  sea rch  tha t p lace  o r any such  
p rem ises  fo r  the  pu rpose  o f asce rta in ing  w he the r ob lig a tio n s  im posed  by o r unde r 
th e  o rde r have been, a re  be ing  o r a re  abou t to  be  con travened ;
(I) a  requ irem en t on him  to  a llow  spec ified  pe rsons, e ith e r fo r th a t pu rpose  o r  fo r the  
pu rpose  o f secu ring  tha t th e  o rde r is com p lied  w ith , to  rem ove  any th ing  found  in th a t 
p lace  o r on any such p rem ises  and  to  sub je c t it to  te s ts  o r  to  re ta in  it fo r  a  pe riod  no t 
exceed ing  the  pe riod  fo r w h ich  the  o rde r rem a ins  in fo rce ;
(m )a  requ irem en t on him  to  a llow  h im se lf to  be pho tog raphed ;
(n) a  requ irem en t on h im  to  co -ope ra te  w ith  spec ifie d  a rrangem en ts  fo r  enab ling  h is 
m ovem en ts , com m un ica tion s o r o the r ac tiv itie s  to  be m on ito red  by e le c tron ic  o r  o the r 
m eans;
(o) a requ irem en t on h im  to  com p ly  w ith  a dem and  m ade  in the  spec ified  m anne r to  
p rov ide  in fo rm a tion  to  a spec ified  pe rson  in a cco rdance  w ith  the  dem and ;
(p) a requ irem en t on h im  to  repo rt to  a  spec ified  pe rson  a t spec ified  tim es  and  p laces.
S upp lem en ta l to  subsec tion  (4 )(n ),88 s 1(6) p rov ided  tha t con tro lle d  pe rsons  cou ld  be 
requ ired  to  coope ra te  w ith  p rac tica l a rrangem en ts  fo r m on ito ring  con tro l o rde rs , such  as 
w ea ring , us ing and m a in ta in ing  appa ra tus  as d ire c ted .89
D esp ite  its  cons ide rab le  b read th , th e  lis t o f ob lig a tio n s  se t ou t unde r s 1(4) w as  no t 
exhaustive , a fa c t w h ich  a ttrac ted  trenchan t c ritic ism  from  va rio us  m em be rs  o f th e  H ouse  o f 
Lo rds  du ring  the  leg is la tive  p rocess . Lo rd  P lant, fo r  exam p le , desc ribed  the  lis t as  ‘long, 
one rous, open -ended  and som ew ha t inde fin ite ’,90 w h ils t Lo rd  K ings land  op ined  th a t it w ou ld  
be ‘q u ite  w ro n g ’ to  tre a t the  lis t as m e re ly  illus tra tive , con tend ing  tha t th e  need  fo r
88 PTA , s 1 (4 )(n ).
89 PTA , s 1 (6 ). PTA , s 16 (5 ) provided that, for purposes connected  with monitoring com pliance  with  
control order obligations, whether by electronic or o ther m eans, the H om e Secre ta ry  could en te r into 
such contracts and arrangem ents  with th ird-parties as he considered appropriate .
90 HL Deb  3  March  2005 , vol 670 , col 428 .
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p rospec tive  con tro lees  to  be ab le  to  fo re see  the  m easures  to  wh ich  th ey  m ay be sub jec t 
dem anded  tha t it be deem ed conc lu s ive .91 T he  s 1(4) lis t’s non-exc lus iv ity , coup led  w ith  the  
open -ended  d isc re tion  con fe rred  under s 1(3) to  im pose  a n y  o b lig a tio n s  cons ide red  
necessary , w as a lso  ques tio ned  by the  JCHR  on g rounds  o f poss ib le  in com pa tib ility  w ith  the  
ECHR ’s requ irem en t th a t in te rfe rences  w ith  the  righ ts  con ta ined  in A rtic le s  8-11 o f the  
C onven tion  be ‘p rescribed  by law ’.92
In tegra l to  the  con tro l o rde rs  reg im e  w as  the  pow e r to  re s tric t a pe rson ’s m ovem ents . 
S ection  1(5) p rov ided  tha t an o rde r cou ld  requ ire  the  con tro lee  ‘to  rem a in  a t o r w ith in  a 
pa rticu la r p lace  o r  a rea  (w he the r fo r a pa rticu la r pe riod  o r  a t p a rticu la r tim es  o r  ge ne ra lly ) ’, 
th u s  a llow ing  fo r  the  im pos ition  o f cu rfew s, and, m ore  con trove rs ia lly , ‘house  a rre s t’ . T h is  
w as accom pan ied  by  the  ab ility  to  p roh ib it, o r im pose  geog raph ica l lim ita tio n s  upon, a 
pe rson ’s m ovem en ts .93 In add ition , it w as  spec ified  by  s 1(7) th a t a  con tro lee  cou ld  be 
requ ired  to  p rov ide  in fo rm a tion , in pa rticu la r de ta ils  re la ting  to  th e ir p roposed  m ovem en ts  o r 
o the r a c tiv itie s .94 U nder s 1 (8), a  p roh ib ition , re s tric tion  o r requ irem en t im posed  by  a  con tro l 
o rde r cou ld  be exp ressed  in a m anne r th a t enab led  it to  be  w a ived  if the  con tro lee  ob ta ined  
p rio r pe rm iss ion  from  a ‘spec ified  pe rson ’.95
The  PTA  m ade  p rov is ion  fo r  tw o  spec ies  o f con tro l o rder, n on -de roga tin g  and  de roga ting . 
T he  d is tinc tion  be tween these  o rde rs  w as p red ica ted  upon  the  d iv id ing  line  d raw n  w ith in  
ECHR  ju r isp rudence  be tween  pe rm iss ib le  in te rfe rences  w ith  fre edom  o f m o vem en t and  
depriva tions  o f liberty . Those  tha t w e re  pe rce ived  to  be com p lia n t w ith  r igh t to  lib e r ty  and  
secu rity  o f pe rson  guaran teed  by A rtic le  5 ECHR  w ere  te rm ed  ‘n o n -de ro ga tin g ’ con tro l
91 HL Deb  3  March  2005 , vol 670 , cols 4 2 5 -2 6 ). In addition, a  range of am endm en ts  w ere  proposed  
that would have  had the effect of expressly  precluding the imposition of certain  obligations, such as  
ones preventing or restricting the con tro lee from  voting in person in elections (Am endm en t No 26 ), or 
requiring the  controlled person to leave the  Un ited  K ingdom (Am endm ent No 29 ). S ee  H ansard  HL  
Deb  3 March  2005 , vol 670 , cols 4 2 6 -2 9 .
92 JCHR , P r e l im in a r y  R e p o r t  (n 46 ) para  18.
93 PTA , s 1(5).
94 ibid s 1 (7)
95 ibid s1 (8 ). S ee  also Exp lanatory Notes to the Prevention of Terro rism  Act 2 005 , para  24 .
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o rde rs ,96 w he reas those  w h ich , due  to  the  seve rity  o f the  ob lig a tio ns  the reby  im posed , w ou ld  
ac tua lly  deprive  the  con tro lee  o f th e ir libe rty , w e re  known  as ‘d e rog a tin g ’ con tro l o rde rs .97 
Re flec ting  the ir d iffe ring  leve ls  o f s tr in gency , th e re  w ere  s ign ifican t d ive rgences  in re la tion  to  
th e  p rocesses fo r  th e  m ak ing  o f non -de roga tin g  and  de roga ting  o rde rs. T h e  fo llow ing  
sec tions  w ill the re fo re  p rog ress to  a m ore  de ta ile d  ana lys is  o f each  type  o f o rder, 
e n com pass ing  an exam ina tion  o f the  p rocedures  and  pe rsonne l invo lved  in th e ir im pos ition , 
m on ito ring  and review .
IV. Non-derogating Control Orders
The  PTA  de fined  a non -de roga ting  con tro l o rde r as a ‘con tro l o rde r m ade  by the  S ec re ta ry  o f 
S ta te ’ .98 N on -de roga ting  o rde rs  cou ld  inc lude  such  ob lig a tio n s  as the  H om e S ec re ta ry  
cons ide red  necessa ry  fo r pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p reven ting  o r re s tric ting  the  co n tro lee ’s 
invo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity .99 T hey  cou ld  not, however, con ta in  ob lig a tio n s  tha t 
w e re  incom pa tib le  w ith  the  A rtic le  5 righ t to  lib e r ty .100 T he  A ct the re fo re  e ssen tia lly  
d is tin gu ished  non -de roga tin g  from  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  on  the  bas is  th a t the  fo rm e r 
w e re  m ade  by the  H om e Secre ta ry , ra the r than  by  the  co u rt,101 and cou ld  on ly  im pose  
cond itio n s  sho rt o f a dep riva tion  o f lib e rty .102
96 ibid s 2.
97 ibid s 4.
98 PTA , ss 2 (3 ), 15 (1 ). W a lker, with som e justification, described  this statutory definition as  ‘unhelp fu l’, 
suggesting that a  non-derogating control order m ight have been  bette r defined as ‘an order which  
does not contain derogating obligations’: C live W a lke r, B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  to  t h e  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  
L e g is la t io n  (2 nd edn, O U P  2 009 ) para 7 .2 7 . In the Exp lanatory  Notes to the Prevention of Terrorism  
Act 2 005 , non-derogating control orders w ere  referred to as, ‘Control orders that do not involve  
derogating from  the European Convention on Hum an  R ights ... . ’ (para 5).
99 PTA , s 1 (3 ). Note, however, that s 2 (9 ) stated: ‘It shall be immateria l, for the purposes  of 
determ ining what obligations m ay be imposed by a  control order m ade by the  Secre ta ry  of S ta te , 
whether the involvement in terro rism -rela ted  activity to be p reven ted  or restricted by the obligations is 
connected with matters to which the S ecre tary  o f S ta te 's  grounds fo r suspicion re la te .’ Th is  provision  
indicated that the obligations imposed by a  non-derogating  order could therefo re  be des igned  to  
prevent or restrict involvement in any  terrorism -rela ted  activity, not just the activity to which the  H om e  
Secre ta ry ’s grounds for suspicion related.
’ °°P T A ,s 1 (2 ) ( a ) .
As d iscussed below , derogating control orders w ere  to be m ade  by the  court on an app lication by  
the Hom e Secre tary  (PTA , ss 1 (2 )(b ), 4 (1 )).
102 PTA , s 1 (2 ).
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/'. The  P ro c e d u re  fo r  M a k in g  N o n -d e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e rs
T he  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  B ill,103 as o rig ina lly  d ra fte d , em pow ered  the  H om e  S ecre ta ry  to  
m ake  non -de roga ting  con tro l o rd e rs .104 T he  lack o f any ju d ic ia l in vo lvem en t p rio r to  the  
issu ing  of a  non-de roga tin g  o rde r p roved  to  be a  pa rticu la rly  con ten tio us  a sp ec t o f the  
p roposed  schem e, p rovok ing  hea ted  deba te  w ith in  P a rliam en t,105 and be ing  condem ned  by 
JU ST IC E  as ‘one  o f the  B ill’s m ost g la ring  flaw s  . . . . ,106 S eek ing  to  ju s t ify  th e  p ro cedu re  in the  
House  o f C omm ons, C ha rles  C la rke  exp la ined  tha t th e  G ove rnm en t be lie ved  the re  w e re  
th ree  reasons w hy  the  H om e S ec re ta ry  shou ld  im pose  non-de roga tin g  o rde rs .107 F irst, tha t 
th e  p ro tec tion  o f na tiona l secu rity  w as the  re spons ib ility  o f the  gove rnm en t. S econd , tha t 
th e re  w as no lega l o r constitu tiona l p rin c ip le  th a t p rec luded  the  Home S ec re ta ry  from  m ak ing  
such  o rd e rs .108 Th ird ly , it w as  a rgued  tha t, as  m ak ing  con tro l o rde rs  invo lved  ‘an ana lys is  o f 
th e  ove ra ll secu rity  s itua tion  and a ssessm en ts  o f risks  posed  by a pa rticu la r in d iv idua l . . . ’ , 
and requ ired  the  ‘ca re fu l s ifting  o f a w ide  range  o f in te llig ence  m a te ria l’ , the  H om e  S ec re ta ry  
w as be tte r p laced  than  the  cou rts  to  pe rfo rm  th is  fu n c tio n .109
During  the  B ill’s passage  th rough  P arliam en t, the  a lloca tion  o f the  pow e r to  m ake  n o n ­
de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  to  the  H om e S ecre ta ry , and the  lim ited  na tu re  o f th e  co u rt ’s e x  
p o s t  supe rv iso ry  ju risd ic tio n ,110 w e re  e x tens ive ly  c ritic ized  by  m em be rs  o f bo th  H ou se s .111 In
103 Prevention of Terrorism  HC  Bill (2 0 0 4 -0 5 ) [61], as  introduced in the House of C ommons  on 22  
February  2 005 .
104 ibid, cl 1 (1 ).
105 S ee , for exam ple , HC  Deb  22  Feb ruary 2 005 , vol 4 31 , cols 1 5 6 -160 .
106 JU S T IC E  and the International Comm ission of Jurists, P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  J o in t  B r ie f in g  
f o r  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  S e c o n d  R e a d in g  (2 005 ) para  4 8 . S ee  also Hum an  Rights W atch , C o m m e n ta r y  o n  
t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (2005 ) 4; Am nesty  International, T h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  A  
G ra v e  T h r e a t  t o  H u m a n  R ig h ts  a n d  th e  R u le  o f  L a w  in  t h e  U K  (2 0 05 ) 2.
107 HC  D eb  9 March  2005 , vol 431 , col 1575 .
108 Charles C la rke  also wen t on to state that ‘there  is nothing in the law  o f the European  Convention  
on Hum an  R ights that requires the jud iciary  to m ake  such orders ’: HC  Deb  9 M arch 2 0 0 5 , vol 4 3 1 , col 
1575.
109 ibid. S ee  also HC  Deb  28  February 2005 , vol 4 31 , col 6 9 5  (C harles  C larke). W a lk e r  d ism isses this  
contention as implausib le, ‘g iven that judges  regularly have  to assess materials  (and occas iona lly  
must assess claims) relating to national security in other contex ts ’: W a lker, ‘Keep ing  Control of  
Terrorists’ (n 58 ) 1420 .
110 Under the  Bill, a fte r a  non-derogating order had been m ade, the  controlled person was  to be  g iven
a  right to appea l to the High Court aga inst the making of the order (cl 7 (1 )) . In hearing  such an  
appea l, the court’s function was lim ited to determ ining w hether the Hom e S ecre ta ry ’s decision to
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its Report on the  Bill, th e  JCHR  a lso  e xp ressed  s trong  conce rn  rega rd ing  the  res tr ic ted  ro le 
given to  the  cou rt,112 ins is ting  tha t p rio r ju d ic ia l in vo lvem en t w as  requ ired  as an ‘independen t 
sa feguard  aga ins t a rb itra ry  depriva tions  o f libe rty  . . . , ’113 In add ition , th e  Jo in t C omm ittee  
d ispu ted  the  G ove rnm en t’s asse rtion  tha t the  Home S ec re ta ry  w as  bes t p laced  to  dec ide  
w he the r to  im pose  con tro l o rders, obse rv ing  tha t:
Both  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  and the  P rim e  M in is te r have  been  ve ry  cand id  in 
say ing  tha t th e y  a re  p ropos ing  leg is la tion  o f th is  excep tiona l k ind  because  
they  do  no t w an t it to  be poss ib le  fo r  them  to  be a ccused  o f no t do ing  m ore  to  
p ro tec t th e  pub lic  in the  even t o f  a te rro ris t a tta ck  succeed ing  ... A  pe rson  
who  is de te rm ined  to  avo id  be ing  a ccused  o f fa iling  to  do  m ore  to  p ro te c t the  
pub lic  is e x trem e ly  un like ly  to  be  the  bes t pe rson  to  conduc t a rigo rous 
sc ru tin y  o f th e  s tr ic t ne cess ity  fo r a pa rticu la r o rder. T h a t ro le  is bes t 
pe rfo rm ed  by in dependen t cou rts .114
Desp ite  in itia lly  re jec ting  pa rliam en ta ria n s ’ ca lls  fo r  the  ju d ic ia ry  to  be  g iven  a m o re  ex tens ive  
ro le  in th e  p rocess ,115 in the  fa ce  o f m oun ting  po litica l p ressu re , and  the  need  fo r  the  
leg is la tion  to  be in p lace  be fo re  the  exp iry  o f the  A TC S A ’s Part 4  de ten tion  pow e rs ,116 the  
G ove rnm en t w as fo rced  to  y ie ld . D uring  the  C omm ons ’ cons ide ra tion  o f the  Lo rd s ’ 
am endm en ts , having  accep ted  tha t ‘som e  m easure  o f ju d ic ia l in vo lvem en t is necessa ry  and 
des irab le ’ ,117 C ha rles  C la rke  exp la ined  tha t he w as the re fo re  p ropos ing  a  rev ised  p rocedu re  
fo r issu ing  non-de roga tin g  orders , w he reby  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  w ou ld  be requ ired  to  app ly  
to  the  H igh  C ou rt fo r  pe rm iss ion  in advance  o f th e  o rde r be ing  m ade .118 T h is  ‘cu rio us  
fo rm u la tio n ’119 w as subsequen tly  app roved , and  enac ted  in sec tio n  3 (1 )(a ).120 Thus , w h ils t
impose the order, or any  of the obligations under it, w as  ‘flaw ed ’ (cl 7 (4 )), applying the  principles  
applicab le on an application for judicial rev iew  (cl 7 (7 )).
1 1 S ee , for exam ple , HC  Deb  22  February 2 0 05 , vol 4 31 , col 156; HC  D eb  2 3  February  2 0 05 , vol 4 31 ,  
col 359  (D av id  Davis); HL  Deb  3 M arch  2 005 , vol 6 7 0 , cols 3 6 8 -3 7 0 ; H L  Deb  8 M arch  2 0 0 5 , vol 6 7 0 ,  
cols 6 45 -646 .
112 JCHR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (2 0 04 -0 5 , HL  68 , HC  334 ) paras  11 -17 . S ee  also JC H R , 
P r e l im in a r y  R e p o r t  (n 46 ) paras 15 -17 .
113 JCHR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (n 4 6 ) para 14.
114 ibid para  16.
115 HC  D eb  28  February  2005 , vol 4 31 , cols 6 9 7 -6 99 .
116 Pursuant to section 29  of the A TCSA , the  Part 4  powers w ere  due  to lapse on 14 M arch 2 0 0 5 .
117 HC  D eb  9 March 2 005 , vol 4 31 , col 1579 .
118 ibid.
119 Conor G earty , C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  (O U P  2 007 ) 119.
120 PTA , s 3(1 )(a ).
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the  Home S ecre ta ry  fo rm a lly  re ta ined  the  pow e r to  m ake non -de roga tin g  o rde rs ,121 save  
w he re  spec ified  e xcep tion s app lie d ,122 he firs t had to  ob ta in  the  pe rm iss ion  o f th e  cou rt to  do
Pursuan t to  sec tion  2(1), the  H om e S ecre ta ry  cou ld  m ake  a  non -de roga tin g  con tro l o rde r 
w he re  he had reasonab le  g rounds  fo r suspec ting  tha t an  ind iv idua l w as  o r  had been 
invo lved  in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity ,124 and  w he re  he cons ide red  tha t it w as necessa ry , fo r  
pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p ro tec ting  m em be rs  o f the  pub lic  from  a risk o f te rro rism , to  m ake  
a con tro l o rde r im pos ing  ob lig a tio ns  on tha t in d iv id ua l.125 S ection  2 (1 ) th u s  im posed  a ‘tw o ­
p ronged  te s t’126 fo r  m ak ing  non-de roga ting  con tro l o rders. T h e  firs t e lem en t o f the  tes t 
invo lved  an a ssessm en t of fact, w h ils t the  second  requ ired  a va lue  ju d gm en t in respec t of 
w ha t w as necessa ry  in te rm s  o f pub lic  p ro te c tio n .127 O f pa rticu la r conce rn  w as  the  
e v iden tia ry  s tanda rd  wh ich  app lied  to  th e  issu ing  o f non -de roga tin g  o rd e rs .128 U nder su b ­
sec tion  (1 )(a), the  th resho ld  fo r m ak ing  non -de roga tin g  o rde rs  w as reasonab le  susp ic ion , a 
s tanda rd  o f p roo f th a t is even  low er than  the  ba lance  o f p robab ilit ie s . Indeed, th is  s tanda rd  - 
w h ich  a lso  app lied  to  ce rtifica tion  under ATCSA , Part 4 129 - is one wh ich  S IAC , in A jo u a o u ,130 
described  as, ‘no t a dem and ing  te s t fo r  th e  S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te  to  m ee t.’131
121 ibid s 1.
122 ibid ss 3(1 )(b ), (c).
23 ib id s 3 (1 ) (a ) .
124 ibid s 2(1 )(a )
125 ibid s 2(1 )(b ). Section 2 (2 ) further provided that the H om e  Secre ta ry  could m ake  a  non -derogating  
order aga inst an individual who was a lready  subject to a  control order imposed by the court, w here  
the court had decided  to revoke its order but had postponed the revocation in order to allow  the  Hom e
Secre tary  to dec ide w hether to impose a  new  order h imself.
126 HL  Deb  7  March , vol 670 , col 5 0 4  (Lord Falconer).
127 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M B  [2 006 ] EW CA  C iv 1140 , [2006 ] 3  W LR  8 39  [57].
128 S ee  Em inent Jurists Panel, A s s e s s in g  D a m a g e ,  U r g in g  A c t io n :  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  E m in e n t  J u r is t s  P a n e l  
o n  T e r r o r is m ,  C o u n te r - t e r r o r is m  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h ts
 (In ternationa l Comm ission of Jurists, 2 0 0 9 ) 121; 
Lucia Zedner, ‘Preventive Justice or P re-Pun ishm ent?  T h e  C ase  o f Control O rders ’ (2 0 0 7 ) 6 0  Curren t 
Legal Prob lems 1 7 4 ,1 7 6 .
129 A TCSA , s 21 (1 )(b ).
130 A jo u a o u  a n d  o th e r s  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2 003 ] U KS IAC  
SC /1 ,6 ,7 ,9 ,1 0 /2 0 0 2 . T h e  case  involved the first substantive appea ls  to be heard  by S IA C  pursuant to  
s 2 5  of the A TCSA . Each of the five appe llants  sought to challenge the ir certification as a  suspected  
in ternational terrorist under s 2 1 (1 ) of the 2001  Act.
131 ibid [71]. S ee  also Eric Metcalfe , ‘Protecting a F ree  Society? Control O rders and the Preven tion  of 
Terrorism  Act 2 0 0 5 ’ (2 005 ) 2 (1 ) Justice Journal 8, 13; JU S T IC E  and the International Comm ission  of  
Jurists, P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  J o in t  B r ie f in g  f o r  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  S e c o n d  R e a d in g  (2 0 0 5 ) paras  
52 -54 .
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Toge the r w ith  th e  m a tte r o f w ho  shou ld  be re spons ib le  fo r m ak ing  non -de roga tin g  o rders , 
th e  s tanda rd  o f p roo f em erged  as  a  p ivo ta l issue  du ring  the  PTA 's  passage  th rough  
P a rliam en t.132 It w as  va rio u s ly  con tended  tha t th e  th re sho ld  shou ld  be  ra ised, so  as to  
requ ire  e ithe r p roo f beyond  reasonab le  d o ub t,133 o r a lte rna tive ly , on  the  ba lance  o f 
p robab ilitie s .134 D isqu ie t rega rd ing  the  low  s tanda rd  o f p roo f w as e xp ressed  in espec ia lly  
s trong  te rm s by m em be rs  o f th e  House  o f Lo rd s .135 Labou r peer, Lord  P lant, fo r exam ple , 
ins is ted  tha t it w as v ita l th a t th e  s tanda rd  be  'su ffic ie n tly  h igh to  m a tch  the  g rav ity  o f th e  
c la im ed  in vo lvem en t in te rro rism ',136 go ing  on to  a sse rt tha t, g iven  the  po ten tia lly  devas ta ting  
im pact a con tro l o rde r cou ld  have  upon  th e  lives o f th e  con tro lee  and  th e ir  fam ily , 'a t th e  ve ry  
leas t the  c ivil s tanda rd  o f p roo f shou ld  p reva il . . . . ,137 T he  G ove rnm en t, none the less , 
rem a ined  adam an t th a t reasonab le  susp ic ion  w as  app ropria te , a rgu ing  tha t because  con tro l 
o rde rs  w ere  p reven tive  ra the r than  pun itive , th e ir issuance  w ou ld  invo lve  'an exe rc ise  in risk 
a ssessm en t and eva lua tion  o f in te llig ence  m a te ria l, '138 as opposed  to  dea ling  w ith  p roo f of 
issues o f fa c t.139 C ha rles  C larke , m eanwh ile , c la im ed  tha t adop ting  a h ighe r te s t cou ld  
fru s tra te  the  ob jec tives  o f th e  con tro l o rde r powers  and  m ean  tha t 'po ten tia lly  dange rous  
ind iv id ua ls  cou ld  s im p ly  s lip  aw a y .'140
During  the  deba tes , s ta tem ents  from  R e hm a n 141 and A  (N o  2 )U2 w e re  c ited  by the  
G ove rnm en t in suppo rt of the  p ropos ition  tha t the  reasonab le  susp ic ion  te s t w as  a p p o s ite .143
132 S ee  Joo -Cheong  Tham , 'P arliam en tary  Deliberation  and the  Nationa l Executive: T h e  C ase  of 
Control O rders' [2010] Public Law  79, 95 .
133 HC  D eb  22  Feb ruary 2005 , vol 4 31 , col 159  (M ark  O a ten ).
134 HL Deb  7  March  2 005 , vol 670 , col 4 8 6  (Lord K ingsland).
135 See , HL  D eb  3  M arch 2005 , vol 670 , col 3 7 6  (Lord Carlile); HL D eb  7  M arch  2005 , vol 670 , cols  
4 8 7 -4 8 8  (Lord Goodhart). During the legislative process, the House  of Lords tw ice changed  the  
standard of proof from reasonab le suspicion to the  ba lance  of probabilities. In both instances the  
Lords’ am endm ents  w ere  subsequently rejected by the House  o f Commons .
136 HL D eb  1 M arch 2 005 , vol 670 , col 145 .
137 ibid.
138 HL Deb  7  M arch 2005 , vol 670 , col 5 0 4  (Lord Fa lconer).
139 HL  Deb  7  M arch 2 005 , vol 670 , cols 5 0 3 -5 0 4 .
140 HC  Deb 9 M arch 2005 , vol 431 , col 1587 . Th is view  was apparen tly  con firmed  by adv ice  fo r the  
Security Service: HC  Deb  10 March  2005 , vol 431 , col 1 798  (H aze l B lears).
141 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  R e h m a n  [2001 ] UKHL  47 , [2001 ] 3  W LR  877 .
142 A  a n d  o t h e r s  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  ( N o  2 )  [2004 ] EW CA  C iv 1123 , [2005 ]  
1 W LR  414 .
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Both o f the se  cases  con ta in  in s truc tive  comm en ts  rega rd ing  s tanda rd s  o f p roo f and  the ir 
a pp lica tion  to  coun te r-te rro rism  m easures . In R e hm a n  - w h ich  conce rned  a  depo rta tio n  o rde r 
m ade on na tiona l se cu rity  g roun ds144 - Lo rd  H o ffm ann  ave rred  tha t:
In a c rim ina l o r c iv il tria l in w h ich  the  issue  is w he the r a  g iven  e ven t 
happened , it is sens ib le  to  sa y  tha t one  is sure  tha t it d id , o r th a t one  th in ks  it 
m ore  like ly  than  not tha t it d id . But the  ques tion  in th e  p resen t case  is no t 
w he the r a  g iven  e ven t happened  bu t th e  e x ten t o f fu tu re  risk. T h is  depends  
upon an eva lua tion  o f the  ev idence  o f th e  appe lla n t's  conduc t aga in s t a  b road  
range  o f fac ts  w ith  w h ich  they  m ay in te ra c t.145
W h ils t in A  (N o  2 ) ,U6 Laws LJ, address ing  the  leve l o f p roo f requ ired  fo r th e  ce rtifica tion  of 
suspec ted  in te rna tiona l te rro ris ts  unde r ATCSA , s 21, obse rved  tha t, T h e  na tu re  o f the  
sub je c t m a tte r is such  tha t it w ill as  I have  in d ica ted  ve ry  o ften , usua lly , be  im poss ib le  to  
p rove  the  pas t fa c ts  w h ich  m ake  the  case  tha t A  is a te rro ris t. ’147 T hese  p ronouncem en ts , the  
G ove rnm en t a rgued , endo rsed  the  v iew  tha t conven tio na l s tanda rd s  like  the  ba lance  of 
p robab ilit ies  a re  in app rop ria te  w he re , as w as  the  case  w ith  th e  issu ing  o f con tro l o rde rs , the  
dec is ion  is one  w h ich  invo lves  a  risk  a ssessm en t based  upon  the  ana lys is  o f com p le x  
in te lligence  m a te ria l.148
W h ile  reasonab le  susp ic ion  m ay  be a te s t w e ll su ite d  to  p rocesses  w h ich  en ta il ana lys ing  
and d raw ing  in fe rences  from  in te lligence , the re  none the less  rem a ins  som e  conce rn  tha t 
such  one rous, righ ts -in fr ing ing  ob lig a tio n s  as w e re  o ften  con ta ined  in no n -de roga tin g  o rde rs  
cou ld  be im posed  on the  bas is o f such  a low  s tanda rd  o f p roo f.149 It is, however, im po rtan t to  
no te  th a t in h is 2011 report, Lord C arlile  conc luded  tha t e ve ry  non -de roga tin g  o rde r th a t had
143 HL  D eb  7  M arch 2005 , vol 670 , cols 5 0 4 -5 0 5  (Lord Falconer); HC  D eb  9 M arch  2 0 0 5 , vol 4 3 1 , col 
1587  (Charles C larke); HC  Deb  10 M arch 2 005 , vol 4 3 1 , col 1 797  (H aze l B lears).
144 The  Hom e Secre tary  issued a  deportation order under s 3 (5 )(b ) of the Imm igration Act 1971 on the  
grounds that M r R ehm an , a  Pakistani national, w as involved with the Islam ic extrem ist organisation  
M arkaz  D aw a  al Irshad (L ashkar e T ayyaba ).
145 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  R e h m a n  [2001 ] UKHL  47 , [2001 ] 3  W LR  8 7 7  f561.
146 Th e  appea l principally concerned  the admissib ility of ev idence  which has or m ay  have  b een  
procured by torture inflicted by foreign state officials.
147 A  (N o  2 )  (n 142) [231].
148 HL  D eb  7  March  2005 , vol 670 , cols 5 0 4 -5 0 5  (Lord Fa lconer); HC  Deb  9 M arch 2 005 , vol 4 3 1 , col 
1587  (Charles C larke); HC  Deb  10 M arch 2005 , vol 4 3 1 , col 1 797  (H aze l B lears).
149 S ee  JC HR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  
( C o n t in u a n c e  in  F o r c e  o f  S e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  (2 0 0 5 -0 6 , HL  122 , H C  915 ) pa ras  5 5 -6 6 .
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been m ade  and  con firm ed  by the  cou rts  s ince  the  sys tem  w as in troduced  in 2005 , w ou ld  
have ‘a t leas t sa tis fied  the  s tanda rd  o f reasonab le  g rounds  fo r be lie f, and in m ost cases by 
som e d is tance  the  fu ll c iv il s tanda rd  o f ba lance  o f p robab ilit ie s .’150
ii. N o n -d e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e rs :  D u ra t io n  a n d  R e n e w a l151
A  non-de roga tin g  con tro l o rde r las ted  fo r 12 m on th s ,152 bu t cou ld  be renew ed  on one  o r 
m ore  o ccas ions .153 Pursuan t to  s 2(6), renewa l requ ired  the  H om e S ec re ta ry  to  cons ide r the  
o rde r’s con tinua tion  necessa ry  to  p ro tec t th e  pub lic  from  a r isk  o f te rro rism , and the  
ob liga tio ns  it im posed  necessa ry  to  p reven t o r  re s tric t th e  con tro le e ’s invo lvem en t in 
te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity .154 W h ils t a ppea l aga ins t renewa l w as  poss ib le  unde r s 10(1), the  
cou rt w as  requ ired  to  d ism iss  the  con tro lee 's  cha lle nge  un less  it d e te rm ined  tha t the  H om e 
Sec re ta ry 's  dec is ion  rega rd ing  the  necess ity  o f the  o rd e r ’s renewa l o r th e  ob lig a tio n s  it 
im posed  w as 'flaw ed '.155
//'/. C o u r t  S u p e rv is io n  o f  N o n -d e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e rs
Section  3 o f the  PTA  p rov ided  fo r  superv is ion  by  the  cou rt o f the  m ak ing  o f n on -de roga tin g  
orders. T he  p rocess o f m ak ing  a con tro l o rde r began  w ith  the  S ecu rity  S e rv ice  and  the  po lice  
pu tting  tog e the r a  case  spec ify ing  the  g rounds fo r th e  o rde r and  the  m easure s  th ou gh t 
necessa ry  to  p reven t th e  ind iv idua l in ques tion  from  engag ing  in te r ro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity .156 
If th e  H om e S ec re ta ry  th ough t th a t the  te s t fo r im pos ing  a non -de roga tin g  o rde r w as  m e t,157
150 Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 011 ) para 29 .
151 The  renewal and duration of non-derogating control orders, along with a  range of associated  
issues, are  d iscussed in chap ter 4  of this thesis.
152 PTA , s 2 (4 )(a ). Pursuant to s 2 (5 ), the control order had to specify the da te  on which it would  
cease  to have  effect.
’ “ ib id s 2 (4 )(b ) .
ibid s 2 (6 ). Under s 2 (7 ), the renewal period began  to run from  e ither the tim e  the original order  
would otherw ise have ceased  to have  effect, or the beginning of the seven th  day  a fte r renew al, 
whichever was the earliest. In acco rdance  with s 2 (8 ), the  renew al instrument w as  required to specify  
the expiration date of the renew ed  order.
155 ibid ss 10 (4 ), (8).
156 HC  Deb  9 March 2005 , vol 4 31 , col 1579  (Charles  C la rke ).
157 PTA , s 2 (1 ).
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in a cco rdance  w ith  sec tion  3 (1 )(a ) ,158 he w as  then  requ ired  to  app ly  to  the  cou rt fo r 
pe rm iss ion  to  m ake  the  order. CPR  76 .8  p resc ribed  tha t such app lica tio n s  w e re  to  be m ade 
by filing  w ith  th e  cou rt -
(a) a s ta tem en t o f reasons to  suppo rt the  app lica tio n ;
(b) all re levan t m ateria l;
(c) any w ritte n  subm iss ions ; and
(d) the  p roposed  con tro l o rder.
Upon rece iv ing  the  app lica tion , th e  cou rt w ou ld  cons ide r w he th e r th e  H om e S ec re ta ry ’s 
dec is ion  tha t th e re  w e re  g rounds  to  m ake  the  o rde r w as ‘o b v ious ly  flaw ed ’ .159 In m ak ing  th is  
a ssessm en t, the  cou rt w as  to  app ly  the  p rin c ip le s  app licab le  to  ju d ic ia l re v iew .160 U n less  it 
conc luded  tha t th e  dec is ion  w as obv ious ly  flaw ed , the  cou rt w ou ld  g ran t pe rm is s ion 161 and 
g ive  d irec tion s fo r  a fu ll hea ring  to  ta ke  p lace  as soon  as reasonab ly  p ra c ticab le .162 A s  the  
cou rt w as  on ly  ab le  to  deny  pe rm iss ion  w he re  the  H om e S ec re ta ry ’s dec is ion  w as  ‘o b v ious ly  
flaw ed ’,163 th is  rende red  it un like ly  th a t a  con tro l o rde r w ou ld  be  re fused  a t th is  p re lim ina ry  
s ta ge .164
In add ition , s 3(1) a lso  con ta ined  tw o  e xcep tiona l p ro cedu res  unde r w h ich  the  H om e 
S ec re ta ry  w as ab le  to  m ake  non-de roga tin g  o rde rs  w itho u t firs t ob ta in ing  the  cou rt’s 
pe rm iss ion . T he  firs t o f the se  invo lved  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  ce rtify ing  w ith in  th e  con tro l o rde r 
th a t th e  u rgency  o f th e  case  p rec luded  h im  from  seek ing  the  cou rt’s pe rm iss ion  in 
ad vance .165 T h is  p rocedure  was in tended  fo r use  in s itu a tion s  w he re  it w as  be lie ved  the re  
w as  a risk  th a t the  p rospective  sub je c t m ay abscond  shou ld  th e  o rde r ’s im pos ition  be 
de la yed .166 T he  second  excep tion  app lied  w he re  the  con tro l o rde r w as  m ade  be fo re  14
ibid s 3(1 )(a ).
159 ibid s 3 (2 )(a ).
160 ibid s 3 (11 ).
161 ibid s 3 (2 ) (b).
162 ibid s 3 (2 )(c ).
A  test Lord K ingsland described as ‘well below  even  the test that applies  in judicial rev iew ’: HL  Deb  
10  M arch 2 005 , vol 670 , col 869 .
164 Fenw ick, C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (n 84 ) 1445 .
165 PTA , s 3 (1 ) (b ) .
166 HL D eb  10 M arch  2005 , vol 670 , col 8 5 8  (Lord Fa lconer).
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March 2005 , in respec t o f an ind iv idua l a t the  tim e  ce rtified  under ATCSA , s 21 (1 ).167 W here  
an o rde r w as m ade pu rsuan t to  e ith e r o f th e se  p rocedures , it w as  then  imm ed ia te ly  re fe rred  
to  the  cou rt,168 w h ich  w as requ ired  to  assess  w he the r th e  H om e S ec re ta ry ’s dec is ion  to  
im pose  the  o rde r was obv ious ly  fla w e d .169
C ons is ten t w ith  the  ‘sens itive  na tu re  o f the se  in te llig ence -led  p rocedu res ’,170 these  in itia l 
cou rt hea rin gs  cou ld  be, and rou tine ly  w ere , e x  p a r te , w ithou t th e  sub je c t o f the  o rde r be ing  
no tified  o f the  app lica tion  o r re fe rence , and  w ithou t any rep re sen ta tion s  be ing  m ade  on the ir 
b eha lf.171 However, once  pe rm iss ion  w as  g ran ted  o r th e  con tro l o rde r con firm ed , it w as 
m anda to ry  fo r a fu ll hea ring  to  be o rd e red .172 Fu rthe r, w ith in  seven  days o f its  dec is ion , the  
cou rt had to  a rrange  fo r  th e  con tro lee  to  be g iven  an oppo rtun ity  to  m ake  rep re sen ta tions  
in te r  p a r te s  abou t th e  d ire c tion s a lready  g iven  o r the  m ak ing  o f fu r the r d ire c tio n s .173 During  
the  reg im e ’s firs t yea r, th is  lim ited  tim e  fram e  w as  sa id  to  have  g iven  rise  to  va rio us  p rac tica l 
p rob lem s .174 A lthough  these  in itia l d ifficu ltie s  w ere  appa ren tly  reso lved  once  the  sys tem  had 
‘bedded dow n ’,175 s 3(7) w as  subsequen tly  am end ed ,176 the  C TA  2008  inse rting  a new  s 
3 (7A) so as to  c la rify  tha t the  seven  days ran from  the  tim e  the  o rde r w as served  upon the  
con tro lee , ra the r than  from  when  the  cou rt gave  its pe rm iss ion .177
167 PTA , s 3(1 )(c ). This exception applied to those individuals de ta ined  under Part 4  of the A TC SA  
2001 . Section 99  of the Counter-Terro rism  Act 2 0 08  subsequen tly provided for the  repea l of section  
3(1 )(c) (Sch 9, Pt 5).
16*  PTA , s 3 (3 )(a ). S ee  C PR  76 .9 .
169 PTA , s 3 (3 )(b ). T h e  court w as  required to begin considering such references within seven  days of 
the order being m ade (s 3 (4 )). If it determ ined  that the H om e S ecre ta ry ’s decision w as  obviously  
flawed , the  order would be quashed (s 3 (6 )(a )) . A lternatively, if it concluded that the  decision to m ake  
the order w as not obviously flawed , but that decision to impose a  particular obligation was, the  order  
would be confirmed, but the relevant obligation quashed  (s 3 (6 )(b )) . In relation to  orders m ade  
pursuant to section 3(1 )(b ), the court could instead quash  the  H om e  Secre ta ry ’s certificate of urgency  
(s 3 (8 )). W he re  the order w as confirmed, w hether in its original or modified fo rm , the court w as  then  
required to g ive directions for a  full hearing to take  p lace  (ss 3 (6 )(b ), 3 (c )).
170 W a lker, B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  (n 98 ) para 7 .3 8 .
171 PTA , s 3 (5 ). W he re  the hearing concerned  a  re fe rence  under s 3 (3 )(a ), the  court w as , however, 
required to ensure that the controlled person was  notified of its decision (s 3 (9 )).
172 PTA , ss 3 (2 )(c ), 3 (6 )(b ), (c). S ee  also C PR  7 6 .1 0 .
173 PTA , s 3 (5 ).
174 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 87 ) para  49 .
175 Lord Carlile , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 007 ) para  46 .
176 Counter-Terrorism  Act 2 008 , ss 80 (1 ), (2).
177 Section 3 (7 A) w as  inserted by Counter-Terrorism  Act 2 0 08 , s 8 0 (3 ). T h e  am endm en t b ecam e  
effective on Feb ruary 16, 2009 .
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A t the  fu ll hearing , th e  cou rt’s ro le  w as  to  cons ide r w he th e r the  Home S ecre ta ry ’s dec is ion  
tha t the  requ irem en ts  o f s 2(1 )(a) and (b) w e re  sa tis fied  w as  ‘flaw ed ’,178 and a lso  de te rm ine  
w he the r th e  dec is ion  to  im pose  any o f th e  ob lig a tio n s  con ta ined  in the  con tro l o rde r w as 
‘flaw ed ’.179 In m ak ing  these  assessm en ts , th e  cou rt w as aga in  requ ired  to  app ly  ju d ic ia l 
rev iew  p r in c ip le s .180 If the  cou rt de te rm ined  tha t a  dec is ion  o f the  H om e S ec re ta ry  w as 
flaw ed , it had to  e ith e r quash  the  o rde r,181 quash  one o r  m o re  o f the  ob lig a tio ns  im posed  by 
the  o rde r,182 o r g ive  d ire c tio n s  to  the  H om e S ec re ta ry  to  re voke  o r m od ify  th e  o rde r.183 In all 
o the r cases, it had to  con firm  the  o rd e r.184 T he  quash ing  o f an o rde r cou ld, however, be 
s tayed  pend ing  appea l.185 In add ition , s 3 (14) p rov ided  tha t the  cou rt w as requ ired  to  
d iscon tinue  the  hearing  if reques ted  to  do  so  by  the  con tro lee .
In re la tion  to  the  rev iew  o f the  o rde r a t the  fu ll hearing , s 3 (11 ) s tipu la ted  tha t the  cou rt ‘m ust 
app ly  the  p rin c ip les  app licab le  on an app lica tion  fo r  ju d ic ia l re v iew .'186 A s  Su llivan  J 
exp la ined  in M B ,187 th is  m ean t th a t th e  cou rt w as  not ab le  to  engage  in m e rits  re v iew ,188 and  
cou ld  no t subs titu te  its own fin d ings  fo r  tho se  o f the  H om e Secre ta ry . Thus, even a t the  fu ll 
hea ring  s tage, ju d ic ia l sc ru tin y  w as  lim ited  to  de te rm in ing  w he the r any o f the  Home 
S ecre ta ry ’s dec is ions  w e re  ‘flaw ed ’ a cco rd ing  to  the  e s tab lished  g rounds  fo r  ju d ic ia l rev iew , 
com pris ing , illega lity , irra tiona lity , p rocedura l im p rop r ie ty ,189 and  p ropo rtio na lity .190 T he  fa c t
178 PTA , s 3 (1 0 )(a ). Th e  court had to determ ine w hether the Hom e S ecre ta ry ’s decision that there  
were  reasonab le  grounds for suspecting that the contro lee was  or had been involved in te rro rism - 
related activity w as  flaw ed , and whether the H om e Secre ta ry ’s decision that the control o rder w as  
necessary for purposes connected with protecting m em bers  of the  public from  a  risk of terrorism  was  
flawed.
179 PTA , s 3 (10 )(b ). A lthough s 3 (1 0 ) uses the term  ‘flaw ed ’, ra ther than ‘obviously flaw ed ’ - as is used  
under ss 3 (2 ), (6) and (8 ) - there appears  to be  no practical d ifference betw een  these  standards, both  
being defined by reference  to ‘the principles app licab le on an application for judicial rev iew ’ under s
3m ).
180 PTA , s 3 (11 ).
181 ibid s 3 (1 2 )(a ).
182 ibid s 3 (1 2 )(b ).
183 ibid s 3 (1 2 )(c ).
184 ibid s 3 (13 ).
185 ibid s 15 (2 ).
186 ibid s 3 (11 ).
187 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M B  [2006 ] EW HC  1000  (Adm in), [2006 ] HR LR  29 .
188 ibid [79] (Sullivan J). S ee  also R  (D a ly )  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2001 ] UKHL  
26 , [2001] 2 AC  532  [28] (Lord Steyn ).
189 C o u n c i l  o f  C iv i l  S e r v ic e  U n io n s  v  M in is t e r  f o r  t h e  C iv i l  S e r v ic e  [1 985 ] AC  374 , 4 1 0 -411  (Lord  
Diplock).
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th a t the  cou rt’s ro le  w as  con fined  to  one  o f superv is ion  and the  app lica tio n  o f ju d ic ia l rev iew  
p rinc ip les  a ttrac ted  critic ism  from  bo th  the  C onstitu tiona l A ffa irs  C om m ittee191 and the  
JC H R ,192 the  la tte r asse rting  tha t a ‘m e re ly  supe rv iso ry  ju ris d ic tio n ’193 o ve r a  dec is ion  based  
on reasonab le  susp ic ion , cons titu ted  'a  ve ry  w eak  fo rm  o f ju d ic ia l con tro l o ve r m easures  w ith  
a  po ten tia lly  d ras tic  im pac t on C onven tio n  r ig h ts '.194 W he th e r the  cou rt p roceed ings  re la ting  
to  non -de roga ting  o rders , and  the  leve l o f ju d ic ia l supe rv is ion  fo r w h ich  they  p rov ided , 
com p lied  w ith  th e  requ irem en ts  o f A rtic le  6 ECHR , is e xam ined  in the  nex t c h a p te r.195
V. Derogating Control Orders
The  second  spec ies  o f o rde r p rov ided  fo r  unde r th e  PTA , ‘d e roga ting  con tro l o rde rs ’ ,196 w ere  
so  ca lled  as they  en ta iled  ob lig a tio ns  tha t w e re  o r  inc luded  ‘d e roga ting  ob lig a tio n s ’ .197 W h ils t 
de roga ting  o rde rs  cou ld  po ten tia lly  im pact upon  a range  o f C onven tion  righ ts , th e  A c t 
spec ifica lly  p rov ided  tha t ‘d e roga ting  ob lig a tio n s ’ w e re  those  w h ich  w ere  incom pa tib le  w ith  
the  righ t to  libe rty  ensh rined  in A rtic le  5 ECHR .198 Thus , the  essen tia l fe a tu re  o f d e roga ting  
con tro l o rde rs  w as tha t, un like  th e ir n on -de roga tin g  coun te rpa rts , th e y  w ou ld  invo lve  
res tr ic tion s tha t am oun ted  to  a depriva tion  o f libe rty  and cou ld  the re fo re  on ly  be m ade  w he re  
a ‘des igna ted  de roga tio n ’199 from  A rtic le  5 w as in p la ce .200
From  the  ou tse t, th e  G ove rnm en t m ade  c lea r th a t de roga tin g  con tro l o rde rs  w e re  v iew ed  as 
con tin gency  powers , to  be used  on ly  w he re  the  secu rity  th rea t p resen ted  by a  pa rticu la r
190 R  (D a ly )  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2001 ] UKHL  26 , [2001] 2  AC  5 3 2  [25 ]-[28 ]  
(Lord Steyn); R  ( o n  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  B e g u m )  v  G o v e r n o r s  o f  D e n b ig h  H ig h  S c h o o l  [2006 ] U KH L  15, 
[2007] 1 AC  100 [30] (Lord B ingham ).
91 Constitutional Affairs Comm ittee, T h e  O p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  S p e c ia l  Im m ig r a t io n  A p p e a ls  C o m m is s io n  
( S IA C )  a n d  th e  u s e  o f  S p e c ia l  A d v o c a t e s  (H C  2 0 0 4 -0 5 , 3 2 3 -I)  paras  102 -105 .
92 JCHR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  
( C o n t in u a n c e  in  F o r c e  o f  S e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  (2 0 0 5 -0 6 , H L  122 , HC  915 ).
193 ibid para  63 .
194 ibid.
195 Chap te r 4: Control O rders and Hum an  Rights.
196 PTA , s 4 (1 ) (a ) .
197 ibid ss 1 (2 )(b ), 1 (10 )(a ).
198 ibid s 1 (1 0 )(a ).
199 HRA , s 14(1 )(b ).
200 PTA , ss 4 (3 )(c ), 4 (7 )(c ).
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ind iv idua l o r ind iv idua ls  rende red  it im pe ra tive  to  do  so .201 In troduc ing  the  P reven tion  of 
Te rro rism  Bill in th e  House  o f C omm ons , th e  H om e S ecre ta ry  e xp la ined  tha t, d esp ite  be ing  
conv inced  tha t th e  th rea t from  ‘a l-Q aeda , its agenda  and its ad he ren ts ’ m ean t th a t the re  
ex isted  a ‘con tinu ing  pub lic  em e rg ency ’, he w ou ld  no t be seek ing  a de roga tio n .202 The  
dec is ion  no t to  de roga te  w as based  upon adv ice  from  the  po lice  and  secu rity  se rv ice s  w h ich  
ind ica ted  tha t non-de roga ting  o rde rs  w ou ld  be su ffic ie n t to  add re ss  the  dange r posed  by the  
ind iv idua ls  conce rned ,203 m ean ing  tha t de roga ting  o rde rs  cou ld  no t be  sa id  to  be ‘s tr ic tly  
requ ired ’204 a t th a t tim e  205 In ligh t o f th is  announcem en t, the  JCHR  re comm ended  tha t, as 
th e re  w as no im m ed ia te  necess ity  fo r de roga ting  con tro l o rders, th e y  shou ld  be rem oved  
from  the  Bill, a sse rting  tha t the  inc lus ion  o f ‘such unp receden ted  pow ers  o f execu tive  
de ten tion  in leg is la tion  w h ich  is be ing  rushed  th rough  Pa rliam en t a t a speed  wh ich  p reven ts  
p rope r sc ru tin y ’ w as  com p le te ly  un jus tified .206 T he  Jo in t C omm ittee  fu r th e r a rgued  tha t 
in troduc ing  dom es tic  leg is la tion  p rov id ing  fo r fu tu re  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  w ithou t a 
de roga tion  be ing  in fo rce  a t the  tim e  o f enac tm en t m ay  v io la te  the  ECHR .207 T he re  is, 
however, no lega l p re ceden t to  suppo rt th is  con ten tion , and, as  W a lke r righ tly  subm its , it is 
bo th  ‘m is taken  in p rinc ip le  and con tra ry  to  Eu ropean  p ra c tic e .’208
During  the  life tim e  o f th e  reg ime, o s tens ib ly  a t least, no de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  w e re  
issued . T he  absence  o f any cases in w h ich  the  P TA ’s de roga ting  p rov is ions  w e re  invoked  
m eans tha t the re  is no em p irica l ev idence  upon w h ich  to  base  an a ssessm en t o f d e roga ting  
o rders. However, s ta tem en ts  m ade  by the  H om e S ecre ta ry , w h ils t o b v ious ly  som ew ha t 
specu la tive , do  o ffe r c ruc ia l in s igh ts  in to  th e  c ircum s tances  in w h ich  the  go ve rnm en t
201 HC  Deb  22  February 2 005 , vol 4 31 , cols 1 53 -154 . S e e  also Exp lanatory No tes to the Preven tion  of 
Terro rism  HC  Bill (2 0 04 -0 5 ), para  105 .
202 HC  Deb  22  Feb ruary 2 0 05 , vol 4 3 1 , col 153  (Charles  C la rke).
203 ibid.
204 Article 15 (1 ) E C HR  stipulates that any  m easures  derogating  from  a S ta te ’s obligations under the  
Convention must be ‘strictly required by the ex igencies  o f the situation ’.
205 The  Hom e Secre tary  exp la ined  that he had been advised  by the police and security authorities that 
whilst depriving the individuals o f their liberty would be  ‘va lu ab le ’, it w as  not, a t tha t tim e, considered  
necessary  to dea l with suspects concerned: H C  D eb  22  Feb ruary  2 0 05 , vol 4 3 1 , col 153  (C harles  
C larke).
206 JCHR , P r e l im in a r y  R e p o r t  (n 46 ) para  8.
207 ibid para 9. S ee  also HC  D eb  2 3  February 2005 , vol 4 3 1 , cols 390 -391  (R ichard  Shepherd ).
208 C live W a lke r, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (O UP  2 0 1 1 )3 1 1 .
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env is ioned  de roga ting  o rde rs  be ing  made, a long  w ith  the  na tu re  o f the  ob lig a tio ns  tha t th e y  
m ay have invo lved .
In ora l ev idence  be fo re  the  JCHR  in F eb rua ry  2005 , C ha rles  C la rke  exp la ined  in c le a r te rm s 
the  type  o f te rro ris t th rea t he fe lt w ou ld  w a rran t the  use o f de roga ting  o rde rs. R espond ing  to  
the  C ha ir ’s request fo r c la rifica tion  on the  k inds  o f te rro rism  in re la tion  to  w h ich  con tro l 
o rde rs w ou ld  be ava ilab le , the  H ome S ecre ta ry  con firm ed  tha t a lthough  the  reg im e  wou ld  
app ly  to  all fo rm s of te rro rism , de roga ting  o rde rs  w ou ld  on ly  be u tilized  in re sponse  to  ‘the  
m ost e x trem e  th re a ts ’, in pa rticu la r ‘in te rna tiona l te rro rism  o f the  a l-Q aeda  va rie ty ’ .209 W h ils t 
th e  c la im  tha t de roga ting  o rde rs  w ou ld  be rese rved  fo r  ‘th e  m ost dange rous  fo rm s  o f 
te rro r ism ’210 im p lied  tha t th e ir  a pp lica tio n  w as  p ro spec tive ly  lim ited , th e  con tem po ra ry  
p reva lence  o f m ass-casua lty  ‘a l-Q aeda  va r ie ty ’ te rro rism , sugges ts  tha t, in rea lity , th is  m ay  
have  not necessa rily  have  been  the  case.
As de linea ted  above , the  fundam en ta l cha ra c te ris tic  o f d e roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  w as  tha t 
th e y  w ou ld  have  invo lved  ob lig a tio ns  tha t w e re  incom pa tib le  w ith  A rtic le  5. T he  ques tio n  tha t 
th e re fo re  ine v itab ly  a rose  was: w hen  w ou ld  th e  ob lig a tio n s  im posed , e ith e r s in g ly  o r 
cum u la tive ly , be o f su ffic ien t seve rity  to  b reach  the  A rtic le  5 th re sho ld?  N e ithe r th e  A c t itse lf, 
no r the  a ccom pany ing  e xp lana to ry  no tes ,211 fu rn ished  any  ins truc tion  on  th is  p ivo ta l issue . 
Som e degree  o f gu idance  as to  the  G ove rnm en t’s v iew  on th is  m a tte r w as, however, 
p rov ided  du ring  the  B ill’s F irs t R ead ing  in the  H ouse o f C omm ons. Here , th e  H om e 
S ec re ta ry  e luc ida ted  tha t de roga tion  wou ld  be necessa ry  w he re  the  con tro l o rde r in c luded  ‘a 
requ irem en t fo r  the  ind iv idua l to  rem a in in a pa rticu la r p lace  a t all tim e s ’.212 Indeed , th a t an 
ob liga tion  to  rem a in a t a spec ified  loca tion  ‘a t a ll tim e s ’ w ou ld  cons titu te  a dep riva tion  o f 
libe rty  is con firm ed  by a  se rie s  o f S trasbou rg  dec is io ns  dea ling  w ith  tw en ty - fo u r hou r house
209 JCHR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (n 46 ) Ev 5 (Q  14).
210 ibid.
211 Exp lanatory Notes to the Prevention of Terrorism  HC  Bill (2 0 0 4 -0 5 ).
212 HC  Deb  22  February 2 0 05 , vol 4 31 , col 152  (Charles  C larke).
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a rres t.213 Fu rthe rm ore , som e comm en ta to rs  have  sugges ted  tha t a lth ough  it w as no t 
e xp lic itly  p rov ided  fo r  in the  A c t,214 de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  cou ld  po ten tia lly  have  a llow ed  
fo r de ten tion  in p rison .215
/. The  P re v e n t io n  o f  T e rro r ism  B ili :  T h e  P ro c e d u re  fo r  M a k in g  D e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e rs
Pursuan t to  ss  1(2)(b) and  4 (1), the  pow e r to  m ake  a de roga ting  con tro l o rde r w as 
e xe rc isab le  by  the  cou rt on an app lica tio n  by the  H om e S ec re ta ry .216 T h is  a rrangem en t 
d iffe red  s ign ifican tly  from  tha t w h ich  fea tu red  in th e  o rig ina l d ra ft o f the  Bill, w he re  the  
au tho rity  to  m ake de roga ting  o rde rs  w as ves ted  e xc lu s ive ly  in the  Hom e S ec re ta ry .217 U nder 
th e  Bill, the  H om e S ecre ta ry  cou ld  m ake  an o rde r if sa tis fied , on the  ba lance  o f p robab ilit ies , 
th a t the  ind iv idua l w as o r had been invo lved  in te r ro rism -re la ted  ac tiv itie s  and  the  o rde r w as  
cons ide red  necessa ry  fo r pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p ro tec tin g  the  pub lic  from  risks 
a ssoc ia ted  w ith  a spec ific  pub lic  em ergency , in re spec t o f w h ich  the re  e x is ted  a  va lid  
de roga tion  from  A rtic le  5 ECHR .218 O nce  m ade, th e  o rde r w as then  to  be im m ed ia te ly  
re fe rred  to  the  H igh C ou rt,219 w he re  it w ou ld  be  cons ide red  w ith in  seven  days .220 If no t 
sa tis fie d  tha t the  m a tte rs  re lied  on by the  H om e S ec re ta ry  w e re  capab le  o f cons titu tin g  
reasonab le  g rounds  fo r  m ak ing  a de roga ting  o rde r aga ins t the  con tro lee , the  C ou rt w as  
requ ired  to  quash  the  o rde r.221
213 N C  v  I t a ly  App no 2 4 9 5 2 /9 4 , [2002] X  E C HR  824 , para  33 ; M a n c in i  v  I t a ly  App no 4 4 9 5 5 /9 8  
(EC tHR , 2  August 2 001 ), para  17; V a c h e v  v  B u lg a r ia  App  no 4 2 9 8 7 /9 8  (EC tHR , 8 O c tober 2 0 0 4 ),  
para 64; N ik lo v a  v  B u lg a r ia  (No. 2) App no 4 0 8 9 6 /9 8 , [2004 ] I E C HR  462 , para  60; P e k o v  v  B u lg a r ia  
App no 5 0 358 /9 9 , [2006 ] 4 3  E CHR  299 , para 73 . For further d iscussion see  chap te r 4  of this thesis.
214 No ‘obligation’ o f confinem ent in prison was included in section 1 (4 ) o f the Preven tion o f Terro rism  
Act 2 005 . This list of obligations, however, was not exhaustive.
215 S ee  Fenw ick, C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (n 8 4 ) 1439; Susanne Forster, ‘Contro l O rders:  
Borders to the Freedom  of M ovem ent or Moving the Borders o f F reedom ? ’ in M arianne  W ad e  and  
Alm ir Maljevic (eds) A  W a r  o n  T e r r o r ?  T h e  E u r o p e a n  S ta n c e  o n  a  N e w  T h re a t ,  C h a n g in g  L a w s  a n d  
H u m a n  R ig h ts  Im p l ic a t io n s  (Springer 2 0 0 9 ) 354 . W a lke r, however, suggests that it ‘m ay  be doub ted ’ 
whether a derogating control order could, in fact, have  allowed  ‘internment’: W a lke r, B la c k s t o n e ’s  
G u id e  (n 98 ) 222 .
216 PTA , ss 1 (2 )(b ), 4 (1 ).
217 Prevention of Terrorism  HC  Bill (2 0 04 -0 5 ) [61], cl 2 (1 ).
218 ibid.
219 ibid cl 2 (2 ).
220 ibid cl 2 (3 ).
221 ibid cl 2 (4 ).
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P rinc ipa l am ongst the  conce rn s  tha t a ro se  in re la tion  to  th e  p roposed  p rocedure  w as  the  
lack  o f ju d ic ia l in vo lvem en t in the  m ak ing  o f d e roga ting  con tro l o rders. A s  ou tlined  above , 
c lau se  2(1) p rov ided  fo r de roga ting  o rde rs to  be m ade  by  the  Home S ecre ta ry  w ithou t p rio r 
ju d ic ia l a u tho risa tio n .222 In its P re lim ina ry  R eport on the  Bill, the  JCHR  exp ressed  se rio us  
doub ts  abou t w he the r the  B ill’s e x  p o s t  ju d ic ia l p ro cedu re  w ou ld  sa tis fy  the  European  
C onven tio n ’s requ irem en t th a t th e  power to  deprive  an ind iv idua l o f th e ir libe rty  m us t be 
sub je c t to  adequa te  sa feguard s  aga ins t a rb itra ry  de ten tion , op in ing  tha t the  EC tHR  w ou ld  be 
like ly  to  cons ide r th e  schem e  incons is ten t w ith  th e  ru le  o f law .223
The  pu rpo rted  ra tiona le  fo r exc lud ing  a requ irem en t o f p rio r jud ic ia l a u tho risa tio n  w as 
e xp la ined  by the  H om e S ecre ta ry  in th e  fo llow ing  te rm s:
[T jhe  e xecu tive  has the  re spons ib ility  fo r  th e  na tiona l secu rity  of th e  coun try  in 
a w ay  tha t no ju d ge  can have ... fo r  a ny  H om e S ecre ta ry  a t any tim e  to  sa y  
tha t he w ou ld  de lega te  re spons ib ility  fo r  ... na tiona l secu rity  issues to  
som eone  e lse  w ou ld  [the re fo re ] be a se rio u s  de roga tion  o f re spons ib ility .224
It w as a lso  con tended  tha t it is p rope r fo r  ju d gem en ts  conce rn ing  the  na tio n ’s se cu rity  to  be 
m ade  by the  H om e S ecre ta ry , as he, un like  th e  ju d ic ia ry , is d ire c tly  a ccoun tab le  to  
Pa rliam en t 225 Further, im p lic it in th e  H om e S e c re ta ry ’s s ta tem en ts  on th is  issue  w as  the  
sugges tio n  tha t th e  need to  ob ta in  advance  ju d ic ia l a pp rova l cou ld  p rove  de le te rio u s  to  
na tiona l secu rity  w he re  c ircum stances  d ic ta ted  tha t it w as necessa ry  fo r a de roga tin g  con tro l 
o rde r to  be im posed  im m ed ia te ly .226
The  im po rtance  o f th e  e xecu tive ’s ro le  in sa fegua rd ing  na tiona l secu rity  is in co n tro ve rt ib le ,227 
no r is it d ispu ted  tha t the  Home S ecre ta ry  is w e ll p laced  to  assess  w he the r an ind iv idua l 
poses  a th rea t su ffic ie n t to  w a rran t th e  im pos ition  of m easu res  such  as con tro l o rde rs, o r th a t 
exped itious  ac tion  m ay  be v ita l in ce rta in  s itua tions . However, th e  G ove rnm en t’s re fusa l to
222 ibid cl 2 (1 ).
223 JCHR , P r e l im in a r y  R e p o r t  (n 46 ) paras  10 -11 .
224 O ral ev idence  taken  before the JC HR  on 9 Feb ruary 2 0 05 . S ee  JC HR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  
(n  4 6 ) Ev 1 1 -12  (Q  42 ).
25 ibid. S ee  also HC  D eb  22  February  2 005 , vol 4 31 , col 154  (Charles  C la rke).
226 HC  Deb  22  February 2 0 05 , vol 431 , col 154  (Charles  C la rke).
227 S ee  chap ter 2  of this thesis.
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coun tenance  p rio r ju d ic ia l a u tho risa tio n  o f de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs on the  bas is th a t th is  
w ou ld  have constitu ted  an abd ica tio n  o f the  e xe cu tive ’s re spons ib ility  fo r  the  na tio n ’s secu rity  
appea rs  p red ica ted  upon a m isconce ived  no tion  o f the  sepa ra tio n  o f p ow e rs .228 As the  JCHR  
comm en ted , such  a  c la im  igno res  the  ju d ic ia ry ’s ‘long accep ted  and re spec ted  ... 
re spons ib ility  fo r  the  libe rty  o f the  in d iv id ua l’,229 to  deny  w h ich  by invok ing  na tiona l se cu rity  ‘is 
to  subve rt o u r tra d itiona l cons titu tio na l d iv is ion  o f p ow e rs .’230
Fo llow ing  the  JC HR ’s censo rious  rem arks , a long  w ith  tre nch an t oppos itio n  in th e  House  of 
C omm ons,231 the  G ove rnm en t conceded , am end ing  the  B ill in the  Lo rds  to  p rov ide  tha t 
de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs had to  be m ade  by the  H igh  C ou rt as opposed  to  th e  Hom e 
S ecre ta ry .232 W h ils t the  rev ised  p rocedure  w as genera lly  rega rded  as be ing  an im p rovem en t 
upon  the  o rig ina l schem e , fo r som e, it n one the le ss  rem a ined  unaccep tab ly  flaw ed . T he  
JCHR , fo r  exam ple , ques tioned  w he the r the  am ended  p rocedu re  rep resen ted  a su ffic ie n t 
sa fegua rd  aga ins t a rb itra ry  de ten tion  to  sa tis fy  th e  bas ic  requ irem en t o f le ga lity .233 L iberty , 
m eanwh ile , a sse rted  tha t a llow ing  the  cou rt to  m ake its own de te rm ina tion  abou t th e  need 
fo r  a de roga ting  con tro l o rde r ‘d id  no t tra n s fo rm  con tro l o rde r au tho risa tion  in to  a fa ir  and 
law fu l p ro cess ,’234 bu t ins tead  m e re ly  gave  the  p rocedure  a ‘th in  venee r o f fa irn es s .’235
Fo r a num be r o f pa rliam en ta rians , and  repo rted ly  a lso  som e  sen io r m em be rs  o f the  
ju d ic ia ry ,236 the  p rospect o f ju dges  be ing  requ ired  to  m ake  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  w as 
exceed ing ly  d isqu ie ting . In the  C omm ons, David T rim b le  c la im ed  tha t th e  in vo lvem en t o f the  
cou rts  w ou ld  b ring  them  into  d is repu te .237 S im ila r fe a rs  w e re  a lso  vo iced  in the  U pper H ouse ,
228 JCHR , P r e l im in a r y  R e p o r t  (n 46 ) para  12.
229 ibid.
230 ibid.
231 S ee , for exam ple , the comments  of M r M ark O aten  MP: HC  D eb  2 3  February, vol 4 31 , col 370 .
232 HL Deb  7  March  2 005 , vol 670 , cols 5 1 7 -5 19 .
233 JCHR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (n 46 ) paras 4 -10 .
234 Liberty, P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l :  L ib e r t y ’s  B r ie f in g  f o r  t h e  R e m a in in g  S ta g e s  in  th e  H o u s e  o f  
L o r d s  (2 005 ) para 3.
235 ibid para  4.
236 HC  Deb  9 M arch 2005 , vol 431 , col 1576  (Charles  C la rke ).
237 HC  Deb  23  Feb ruary  2 005 , vol 431 , col 419 .
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Lord W add ing ton  s ta ting  tha t he w as  ‘d eep ly  w o rrie d ’ a bou t the  p roposed  schem e ,238 w h ils t 
Lord L loyd dec la red  tha t the  dec is ion  to  im pose  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs w as  one  in w h ich  
ju dges  ough t no t to  pa rtic ipa te , as do ing  so  cou ld  e xpose  them  to  dam ag ing  po litica l 
b ack lash .239 Having  re lu c tan tly  y ie lded  on the  m a tte r o f a llow ing  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  to  
un ila te ra lly  im pose  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs , the  G ove rnm en t was, however, unw illing  to  
m ake any  fu r th e r am endm en ts  to  w ha t th e y  cons ide red  an ‘a pp rop ria te ’ p rocedu re  w h ich  
adequa te ly  m e t conce rns  regard ing  the  need  fo r  ju d ic ia l in vo lvem en t in th e  issu ing  of 
de roga ting  o rde rs .240
ii. T h e  P re v e n tio n  o f  T e rro r ism  A c t  2 0 0 5 : T h e  P ro c e d u re  fo r  M a k in g  D e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l 
O rd e rs
The  p rocedure  fo r m ak ing  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs w as se t ou t under PTA, s 4. P u rsuan t to  
s 4 (1 ), the  Home S ecre ta ry  w as requ ired  to  app ly  to  the  cou rt fo r th e  m ak ing  o f a  de roga ting  
con tro l o rde r,241 CPR  76 .4  spec ify ing  tha t th is  app lica tion  w as  to  be m ade  by  filin g  w ith  th e  
c o u r t -
(a) a  s ta tem en t o f reasons  to  suppo rt the  app lica tio n  fo r -
(i) m ak ing  such  an order, and
(ii) im pos ing  each o f the  ob lig a tio ns  to  be  im posed  by  tha t order;
(b) all re levan t m a te ria l;
(c) any w ritten  subm iss ions ; and
(d) a d ra ft o f the  o rde r sought.
Upon rece iv ing  an app lica tion , th e  cou rt w as then  requ ired  to  ho ld an ‘im m ed ia te ’242 
p re lim ina ry  hearing , the  pu rpose  o f w h ich  w as to  de te rm ine  w he the r to  m ake  the  requested  
o rde r.243
238 HL D eb  1 March  2005 , vol 670 , col 147 .
239 HL  D eb  1 March , vol 670 , col 163 .
240 HC  D eb  9 March  2005 , vol 431 , col 1578  (Charles  C la rke ).
241 PTA , s 4 (1 ).
242 The  Act did not specify what tim e scale the term  ‘imm ed ia te ’ denoted in this context. H ow ever, it 
was  suggested that this would take  p lace within 2 4 -4 8  hours. S ee  JC H R , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  
(n 46 ) para  3.
*43 PTA , s 4 (1 ) (a ) .
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iii. T h e  P re lim in a ry  H e a r in g
The  p re lim ina ry  hearing  re la ting  to  a  de roga ting  con tro l o rde r cou ld  be  he ld w ithou t the  
sub jec t be ing  no tified  o f the  app lica tion  o r  be ing  g iven  the  oppo rtun ity  to  m ake  
rep resen ta tions  to  the  cou rt.244 T he  te s t to  be  app lied  by the  cou rt w as se t ou t under s 4(3), 
w h ich  spec ified  tha t it cou ld  m ake  the  o rde r aga in s t th e  ind iv idua l in ques tio n  w he re  it 
appea red :
(a) th a t th e re  is m a te ria l w h ich  (if no t d isp roved ) is capab le  o f be ing  re lied  on by 
the  cou rt as  es tab lish ing  tha t the  ind iv idua l is o r  has been  invo lved  in 
te rro rism -re la ted  activ ity ;
(b) th a t the re  a re  reasonab le  g rounds  fo r  be liev ing  tha t the  im pos ition  of 
o b liga tio ns  on  tha t ind iv idua l is necessa ry  fo r  pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  
p ro tec ting  m em be rs  o f the  pub lic  from  a risk o f te rro rism ;
(c) th a t th e  risk a rises  ou t of, o r is assoc ia ted  w ith , a  pub lic  em e rgency  in respec t 
o f w h ich  the re  is a des igna ted  de roga tion  from  the  w ho le  o r  pa rt o f A rtic le  5 o f 
th e  Human R igh ts C onven tion ; and
(d) th a t th e  ob lig a tio ns  tha t th e re  a re  reasonab le  g rounds  fo r be liev ing  shou ld  be 
im posed  on the  ind iv idua l a re  o r inc lude  de roga ting  ob lig a tio n s  o f a 
descrip tion  se t ou t fo r the  pu rposes  o f the  des igna ted  de roga tion  in the  
des igna tion  order.
If the  cou rt m ade the  order, it w as then  requ ired  to  g ive  d ire c tion s  fo r the  ho ld ing  o f a  fu ll 
in te r  p a r te s  hearing  to  de te rm ine  w he the r to  con firm  the  o rde r.245 In th e  in te rim  be tw een  the  
m ak ing  o f the  o rde r and the  cou rt’s fina l de c is ion  a t the  con firm a tio n  hea ring , th e  cou rt w as  
ab le  to  im pose  such  ob lig a tions  as it had reasonab le  g rounds  fo r  be lie v ing  w ere  necessa ry  
fo r pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p reven ting  o r res tric ting  the  con tro le e ’s invo lvem en t in 
te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity .246
A lthough  the  p re lim ina ry  hea ring  p rov ided  fo r e x tens ive  ju d ic ia l in vo lvem en t in th e  m ak ing  o f 
de roga ting  orders, the  p rocess neve rthe less  rem a ined  de fic ie n t in a  num be r o f respects . T he  
lack o f adve rsa ria l p rocedure  p rio r to  im pos ing  a de roga ting  con tro l o rder, in pa rticu la r, w as
ibid s 4 (2 ).
245 ibid s 4(1 )(b); C PR  76 .5 (1  )(a ).
246 PTA , s 4 (4 ).
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robustly  c ritic ised  by the  JCH R .247 W h ils t conced ing  tha t an e x  p a r te  app lica tion  w ou ld  be 
approp ria te  w he re  the re  w as a r isk  th a t an ind iv idua l w ou ld  abscond  if no tified  abou t the  
p roposed  order, the  JCHR  conc luded  tha t, as s 5 pe rm itted  de ten tion  pend ing  a de roga ting  
con tro l o rde r,248 the re  w as  no le g itim a te  reason  w hy  the  p re lim ina ry  hea rin g  shou ld  no t be 
in te r  p a r te s 249 A no the r aspec t o f the  p re lim ina ry  hearing  wh ich  p rovoked  conce rn  w as the  
te s t fo r m ak ing  a  de roga ting  con tro l o rder. U nder s 4 (3 )(a ), th e  te s t to  be app lied  by the  cou rt 
w as essen tia lly  w he the r the re  w as a p r im a  fa c ie  case  fo r  im pos ing  the  o rde r aga ins t the  
ind iv idua l in ques tio n .250 W h ils t th is  te s t w as  ‘ra the r m o re  sea rch ing  than  fo r a non ­
de roga ting  o rde r’ ,251 it w as  none the less  c lea rly  a low  th re sho ld  fo r im pos ing  an o rde r 
dep riv ing  an ind iv idua l o f th e ir liberty , espec ia lly  g iven  the  b read th  o f th e  PTA ’s de fin ition  o f 
‘ in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity ’.252
iv . T h e  F u ll H e a r in g
In a cco rdance  w ith  CPR  76.5(1 )(b), th e  fu ll hea ring  w as requ ired  to  comm ence  no la te r than  
7  days a fte r the  da te  on w h ich  the  o rde r w as m ade. A t th is  hearing  the  cou rt cou ld  con firm  
the  con tro l o rder, w ith  o r w ithou t m od ifica tio ns ,253 o r  revoke  it.254 Section  4(7) p rov ided  tha t 
th e  cou rt cou ld  con firm  the  o rde r on ly  if -
(a) it is sa tis fied  on the  ba lance  o f p robab ilit ies , th a t th e  con tro lle d  pe rson
is an ind iv idua l w ho  is o r has been  invo lved  in te rro rism -re la ted  
activ ity ;
(b) it cons ide rs  th a t the  im pos ition  o f a  con tro l o rde r is necessa ry  fo r
pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p ro tec ting  m em be rs  o f the  pub lic  from  a  risk 
o f te rro rism ;
(c) it appea rs  to  the  cou rt th a t the  risk is one  a ris ing  ou t of, o r  is
a ssoc ia ted  w ith , a pub lic  em ergency  in re spec t o f w h ich  the re  is a 
des igna ted  de roga tion  from  the  w ho le  o r a  pa rt o f A rtic le  5 o f the  
Human R igh ts C onven tio n ; and
247 JCHR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (n 46 ) para  5.
248 PTA , s 5 (1 ).
249 JC HR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (n 46 ) para 5.
250 Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 005 , s 4 (3 )(a ).
251 W a lker, ‘Keeping Control o f Terroris ts ’ (n 58 ) 1425 .
252 JCHR , P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  (n 46 ) para 6.
253 PTA , s 4 (5 )(a ).
254 ibid s 4 (5 )(b ). Section 4 (5 )(b ) fu rther provided that, ‘w here  the court revokes the order it m ay  (if it
thinks fit) d irect that this Act is to have  effect as if the order had been quashed .’
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(d) the  ob liga tio ns  to  be im posed  by the  o rde r o r (as th e  case m ay  be) by 
the  o rde r as m od ified  a re  o r  inc lude  de roga ting  ob lig a tio ns  o f a 
desc rip tion  se t ou t fo r the  pu rposes  o f th e  des igna ted  de roga tion  in 
the  des igna tion  o rde r.255
A lthough  the  te s t to  be app lied  by the  cou rt w hen  cons ide rin g  w he the r to  con firm  the  o rde r 
w as s ign ifican tly  m ore  dem and ing  than  tha t w h ich  app lied  to  th e  dec is ion  w he the r to  m ake 
the  o rde r in the  firs t in s tance ,256 de roga ting  con tro l o rde r p roceed ings none the less  fe ll ‘fa r 
short, in te rm s  o f due process, o f a c rim ina l tr ia l.’257
The  low  s tanda rd  o f p roo f app licab le  to  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs under s 4  engendered  
pa rticu la r concern . T he  JCHR , am ongs t o the rs ,258 w as h igh ly  c ritica l o f th e  fa c t tha t 
de roga ting  o rde rs  cou ld  be im posed  on the  o rd ina ry  c iv il s tanda rd , a rgu ing  tha t:
D ep riva tion  o f libe rty  on a  ba lance  o f p robab ilit ie s  is ana them a  both  to  the  
comm on  law ’s tra d itiona l p ro tec tion  fo r  th e  libe rty  o f the  ind iv idua l and to  the  
guaran tees  in m odern  hum an righ ts  in s trum en ts  w h ich  re flec t tho se  anc ien t 
gua ran tees . In ou r v iew  the  app rop ria te  s tanda rd  fo r such  m easures  is th e  
beyond  reasonab le  doub t s tanda rd .259
Indeed, th e ir ca se  fo r advoca tin g  tha t th e  c rim ina l s tanda rd  shou ld  app ly  to  any o rde rs  w h ich  
invo lve  a  depriva tion  o f libe rty  is c lea rly  a  s trong  one .260
The  im po rtan t issue o f the  bu rden  o f p roo f w as  addre ssed  a t som e  length  du ring  the  B ill’s 
C omm ittee  S tage  in th e  H ouse  o f Lords, Lo rd  F a lcone r e luc ida tin g  tha t in th e se  
c ircum s tances , the  ba lance  o f p robab ilit ies  te s t w ou ld  requ ire  the  cou rt to  a ssess  ‘w he th e r it 
is m ore  like ly  than  no t the  suspec t is o r  has been a te rro r is t. ’261 He fu r the r exp la ined  tha t, ‘as  
th e  cou rts  have sa id in o the rs  con te x ts ’, w he re  the  a lle ga tio n s  aga in s t th e  susp ec t a re
2  PTA , s 4 (7 ).
A t the prelim inary hearing the  court could m ake  the  order w here  it appeared  that there w as  
‘m aterial which (if not d isproved) ... [was] capab le  o f being relied on by the court as establishing that  
the in d iv idua l... [was or had been] involved in terrorism -re la ted  activity’: PTA , s 4 (3 )(a )) .
257 Fenw ick, C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (n 84 ) 1444 .
258 S ee  Zedner, ‘P reventive  Justice or P re -Pun ishm en t?1 (n 128) 178; Fenw ick, C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  a n d  
H u m a n  R ig h t s  (n 84 ) 1444 .
259 JCHR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  
fC o n t in u a n c e  in  F o r c e  o f  S e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  (2 0 0 5 -0 6 , HL 122 , HC  9 15 ) para  64 .
*60 ibid para  66.
261 HL Deb  7  March  2 005 , vol 670 , col 507 .
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serious, ‘the  s tanda rd  o f p r o o f ... goes  up .’262 A s  a lluded  to  by Lord  Fa lconer, in R  (o n  th e  
a p p lic a tio n  o f  M cC a n n )  v  M a n c h e s te r  C ro w n  C o u r t,263 a  case  conce rn ing  an ti-soc ia l 
b ehav iou r orders, the  H ouse  o f Lo rds  ru led  tha t:
[A ]ccoun t shou ld  be taken  o f th e  se rio usness  o f the  m a tte rs  to  be p roved  and 
the  im p lica tions  o f p rov ing  them  ... if th is  is done  the  c iv il s tanda rd  o f p roo f w ill 
fo r  all p rac tica l pu rposes  be  in d is tin gu ishab le  from  the  c rim ina l s tanda rd .264
There fo re , in app ly ing  the  ba lance  o f p robab ilit ie s  te s t u nde r s 4 (7) th e  cou rt w ou ld  have  
been expec ted  to  adap t th e  c iv il s tanda rd  so  as to  re flec t th e  se rio us  a llega tio n  tha t the  
suspec t w as o r had been invo lved  in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  and w ou ld  be sub je c t to  a 
con tro l o rde r th a t dep rived  them  o f th e ir libe rty .265 Thus , a lth ough  the  s tanda rd  o f p roo f fo r 
con firm ing  a de roga ting  con tro l o rde r w as  fo rm a lly  se t a t th e  ba lance  o f p robab ilit ie s ,266 had 
it been  app lied , in p rac tice  it is like ly  the  s tanda rd  w ou ld  have  e ssen tia lly  been  
‘in d is tin gu ishab le ’ from  the  s ign ifican tly  m ore  e xacting  c rim ina l s tanda rd  o f beyond  
reasonab le  doubt.
O nce  a de roga ting  con tro l o rde r had been  con firm ed  a t the  fu ll hearing , a no tice  se ttin g  ou t 
its te rm s  was then  to  be  g iven  to  th e  con tro lee  in pe rson .267 Fo r th e  pu rposes  o f de live ring  
no tice  o f a con tro l o rde r a cons tab le  o r  o th e r au tho rised  pe rson  cou ld, if n e cessa ry  by fo rce , 
en te r and sea rch  any p rem ises  w he re  he had reasonab le  g rounds  to  be lieve  the  sub je c t o f 
the  con tro l o rde r to  be .268
262 ibid. On the variab le nature of the civil standard o f proof, see  Andrew  Ashworth, ‘Socia l Control 
and "Anti-Social Behaviour”: The  Subversion o f Hum an  R ights?’ (2 0 0 4 ) 120  LQR  263 .
263 R  ( o n  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  M c C a n n )  v  M a n c h e s t e r  C r o w n  C o u r t  [2003 ] 1 AC  787 . S ee  also B  v  C h ie f  
C o n s ta b le  o f  A v o n  a n d  S o m e r s e t  C o n s t a b u la r y  [2001] 1 W LR  3 40  [31] (Lord B ingham ); G o u g h  v  
C h ie f  C o n s ta b le  o f  th e  D e r b y s h i r e  C o n s t a b u la r y  [2002 ] QB  1213  [90] (Lord Phillips).
264 ibid [83] (Lord Hope).
265 PTA , s 4 (7 ).
ibid s 4 (7 )(a ).
267 ibid s 7 (8 ).
268 ibid s 7 (9 ).
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v. D e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e rs :  D u ra t io n  a n d  R e n e w a l
Pursuan t to  s 4(8), a de roga ting  con tro l o rde r w ou ld  las t fo r  s ix  m on th s ,269 un less  revoked  
p rio r to  the  exp iry  o f th is  pe riod ,270 o r it ceased  to  have e ffec t unde r s 6 .271 Sec tion  6(1) 
p rov ided  tha t a de roga ting  con tro l o rde r had e ffec t on ly  if th e  re levan t de roga tion  rem a ined  
in fo rce  and  no m ore  than  12 m on ths  had e lapsed  s ince  the  m ak ing  of the  o rde r des igna ting  
tha t de roga tion ,272 o r the  H om e S ec re ta ry  had m ade an o rde r dec la ring  tha t it rem a ined  
necessary  fo r h im  to  have the  pow e r to  im pose  de roga ting  ob lig a tio ns  by re fe rence  to  tha t 
de roga tion  273 T he  p rocedure  by w h ich  the  H om e S ec re ta ry  w as  ab le  to  m ake  an o rde r 
dec la ring  the  con tinu ing  necess ity  o f im pos ing  de roga ting  ob lig a tio ns  w as  se t ou t under s 
6 (2 )-(7 ).274
Deroga ting  con tro l o rde rs cou ld , on an app lica tio n  by the  H ome Secre ta ry , be  renewed  by 
the  cou rt fo r fu r the r pe riods o f up to  s ix  m on th s .275 T he  cou rt’s pow er o f renewa l cou ld , 
however, on ly  be exe rc ised  upon the  sa tis fa c tion  o f th e  c rite ria  se t ou t unde r s 4 (10). Thus, 
the  A c t requ ired  tha t the  con tro lee ’s pos ition  be fo rm a lly  rev iew ed  e ve ry  6 m onths , and 
p rov ided  tha t the  du ra tion  o f a de roga tin g  con tro l o rde r on ly  be ex tended  if th e  cou rt 
cons ide red  its  m a in tenance  ‘ne cessa ry  fo r  pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p ro tec tin g  m em be rs  o f 
the  pub lic  from  a risk o f te rro rism ’,276 and  rega rded  the  ob liga tio ns  the reby  im posed  as 
‘n e cessa ry ’ to  p reven t o r re s tric t the  con tro le e ’s in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity .277 In
269 PTA , s 4 (8 ).
270 ibid s 4 (8 )(a ).
'bid s 4 (8 ) (b).
272 ibid s 6(1 )(b )(i).
273 ibid s 6(1 )(b )(ii).
ibid s 6 (2 )-(7 ). This power was exerc isab le  by statutory instrument (s 6 (2 )), requiring prior approval 
by resolution in both Parliam en tary Houses (s 6 (3 )).
2 5 ibid s 4 (9 ). It is noteworthy that the Prevention of Terrorism  Bill, as orig inally drafted , provided that 
derogating control orders could not be renewed  (cl 4(1 )(c )), the H om e Secre ta ry  instead  being  
authorised to m ake  a new  control order ‘to the sam e  or sim ilar effect fo r a further 6 month period ’(cl
27 ibid s 4 (1 0 )(a ).
277 ibid s 4 (1 0 )(d ).
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add ition , the  cou rt a lso  had the  power to  tem po ra rily  e x tend  the  pe riod  of a  de roga ting  o rde r 
w h ich  w as due to  exp ire  pend ing  the  conc lus ion  o f renewa l p ro ceed ings .278
Notw iths tand ing  the  ju d ic ia ry ’s le ade rsh ip  o f th e  p rocess, and s 4 (10 ) ’s s tr ic t p re cond ition s  
fo r  renewal, the  fa c t th a t the re  w as  no cap  on the  num be r of tim es  a de roga ting  con tro l o rde r 
cou ld  po ten tia lly  be renewed  p rovokes  s im ila r conce rn s  to  tho se  assoc ia ted  w ith  the  
po ten tia lly  inde fin ite  du ra tion  o f non -de roga tin g  o rde rs .279 Indeed, g iven  the  seve rity  o f the  
res tric tions  tha t w e re  im posab le  unde r them , it m ay be a rgued  tha t th e  case fo r  se ttin g  a 
m ax im um  tim e -lim it app lied  w ith  even g rea te r fo rce  to  de roga ting  o rde rs  than  it d id  to  no n ­
de roga ting  ones .280
vi. A r r e s t  a n d  D e te n t io n  P e n d in g  a  D e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e r
Section  5(1) p rov ided  fo r th e  pow e r o f a rres t and  de ten tion  pend ing  the  m ak ing  o f a 
de roga ting  con tro l o rde r.281 W he re  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  had app lied  to  th e  cou rt fo r  a 
de roga ting  order, a  cons tab le  w as ab le  to  a rre s t th e  p ro spective  con tro lee  if th e y  cons ide red  
a rres t and  de ten tion  necessa ry  to  ensu re  tha t the  ind iv idua l w as a va ilab le  to  be  g iven  no tice  
o f th e  o rde r shou ld  it be  m ade .282 O nce  a rres ted , th e  ind iv idua l w as to  be taken  to  a 
‘des igna ted  p la ce ’,283 w he re  they  cou ld  be  he ld fo r  up to  48  hou rs ,284 th is  in itia l pe riod  o f
ibid s 4 (11 ).
279 PTA , s 4 (10 ) provided that: the  power of the  court to renew  a  derogating control o rder is 
exerc isab le  on as m any occasions as  the court thinks fit. T h e  concerns associa ted  with the renew al 
and duration of non-derogating control orders are  d iscussed in chap te r 4  of this thesis.
280 S ee , for exam ple , Lord Carlile , T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  t o  S e c t io n  
1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (H om e  O ffice, 2 0 08 ) paras 50 -51 ; JC HR , C o u n te r -  
T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  ( N in th  R e p o r t ) :  A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  
2 0 0 8  (2 0 07 -0 8 , HL  57 , HC  356 ) paras  8 5 -8 7 . T h e  tw o -year upper limit proposed by Lord C arlile  in 
respect of non-derogating orders, may, however, have  required som e adjustm ent in o rder to  reflect 
the potentially increased  likelihood of re -engagem en t by individuals whose  previous level of 
involvement in terrorism -rela ted  activity had been  deem ed  sufficiently serious to w arran t the  
imposition of derogating control order.
281 PTA , s 5 (1 ).
282 ibid.
283 A  ‘des ignated p lace ’ m ean t any  p lace designated by the Hom e Secre ta ry  under para 1 (1 ) o f Sch 8  
to the TA  2 0 0 0  as a  p lace at which persons could be de ta ined  under s 41 of that Act: PTA , s 5 (1 0 ).
284 PTA , s 5 (3 ).
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de ten tion  be ing  e x tendab le  fo r  up to  a  fu r th e r 48  hou rs  by the  H igh C ou rt if n e cessa ry .285 An 
ind iv idua l de ta ined  pu rsuan t to  s 5 w ou ld  be deem ed to  be in ‘po lice  de ten tio n ’ fo r th e  
pu rposes  o f the  Po lice  and  C rim ina l E v idence  A c t 1984 ,286 and the re fo re  en titled , w ith  som e  
m od ifica tions , to  the  righ ts  g ran ted  to  th o se  he ld unde r s 41 o f TA  2000 ,287 inc lud ing  the  righ t 
to  consu lt a  so lic ito r and have som eone  in fo rm ed  o f th e ir d e ten tion .288 The  s 5 pow e r to  
de ta in  w ou ld  cease  once  an ind iv idua l b ecam e  bound  by  a de roga ting  con tro l o rde r o r the  
cou rt d ism issed  the  Home S ec re ta ry ’s ap p lica tio n .289
The  pow er to  a rre s t and de ta in  pend ing  the  m ak ing  o f a  de roga ting  con tro l o rde r d id  no t 
fe a tu re  in th e  o rig ina l d ra ft o f the  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  Bill. Indeed, it w as on ly  inse rted  
a fte r th e  leg is la tion  w as am ended  so  as to  p rov ide  tha t it w as the  cou rt, ra the r than  the  
Home Secre ta ry , w ho  cou ld  issue  de roga ting  o rde rs .290 T h is  rev ised  a rrangem en t w as  seen  
to  crea te  the  poss ib ility  o f a ‘tim e  la g ’ be tw een  the  H om e Sec re ta ry 's  app lica tio n  and the  
ju d g e ’s m ak ing  o f the  order. It w as  the re fo re  a rgued  tha t, in som e  cases, de ten tion  cou ld  be 
necessa ry  in o rde r to  p reven t th e  suspec t d isappea ring  in th e  in te rim .291 T he  pow e r to  a rre s t 
and de ta in  d id  no t app ly  to  non-de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs, s 3(1 )(b), u nde r w h ich  the  H om e 
S ecre ta ry  w as ab le, w he re  u rgency  requ ired , to  m ake  a non -de roga tin g  o rde r o f im m ed ia te  
app lica tio n , rende ring  it u n n e ce s sa ry 292
285 ibid s 5 (4 ) provided that the  period of detention could be ex tended  for up to a  fu rther 4 8  hours if the  
court considered that it was necessary  to do so to ensu re that the individual in question w as  ava ilab le  
to be given notice of any derogating control o rder that w as  m ade  against him.
286 ibid s 5 (7 ).
287 TA  2000 , s 41 contains the  power to  arrest w ithout w arran t of a  person who  a  constab le  
reasonably suspects of being a  terrorist.
288 PTA  s 5 (8 ) provided that deta in ees  were  entitled the  rights contained in paras  1 (6 ), 2 , 6  to 9 and  
16  to 19 of Schedule 8 to the TA  2 000 . Note, however, the  modifications specified in s 5 (8 )(a )- (c ) .
289 ibid s 5 (5 ).
290 HL Deb  7 March 2005 , vol 670 , col 521 . It w as asserted  by Baroness Scotland that it ‘would leave  
a  significant gap in the ... sys tem ’ if there w as no power to p revent an  individual, in respec t of whom  
the Hom e Secre tary  had applied to the court for a  derogating control order, from d isappearing befo re  
such time as the order, if m ade, could be served  on him.
291 HL Deb  7  March  2005 , vol 670 , col 529  (Baroness  Sco tland).
292 PTA , s 3 (1 ) (b ) .
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vii. D e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e rs :  C o n c lu s io n s
In itia lly  rega rded  as one  o f the  re g im e ’s m ost con trove rs ia l a spec ts ,293 the  pow e r to  issue  
de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs w as u ltim a te ly  neve r used. W h ils t the  gove rnm en t m a in ta ined  tha t 
th e  g row ing  th rea t to  the  UK  from  in te rna tiona l te rro rism  p o s t-9 /1 1 m ean t th a t th e  cond itio n s  
fo r de roga tion  w e re  sa tis fie d ,294 non -de roga tin g  o rde rs  w e re  neve rthe less  deem ed ‘su ff ic ie n t’ 
to  add ress the  dange r posed  by those  suspec ts  m ade  sub je c t to  con tro l o rde rs  be tw een  
2005  and 2011 .295 A lthough  no t pu rsued , th e  poss ib ility  o f de roga ting  fo r the  pu rposes  o f 
con tro l o rde rs  was, however, sa id  to  have  been  cons ide red  by the  gove rnm en t in 2007  
fo llow ing  the  d isappea rance  o f a  num be r o f con tro lees296 and  the  se rie s  o f adve rse  cou rt 
d e c is ions  in w h ich  non -de roga tin g  o rde rs  w e re  he ld to  be  in b reach  o f A rtic le  5 .297 Fu rthe r, 
g iven tha t the  dom estic  cou rts298 and  the  EC tHR299 a ccep ted  tha t a ‘pub lic  em e rge ncy ’ 
ex is ted  su ffic ie n t to  ju s tify  th e  de roga tion  en te red  in 20 0 1 ,300 it appea rs  p laus ib le  tha t, in ligh t
293 Hum an  Rights W atch , fo r exam p le , described derogating  control orders as an  ‘indefensib le attem pt 
to reintroduce detention w ithout tria l’: C o m m e n ta r y  o n  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  B i l l  2 0 0 5  (H um an  
Rights W atch  Briefing Paper, 2 0 05 ). Bonner, m eanwhile , asserted  that the ‘house  arrest’ enab led  by  
derogating orders, constituted ‘in ternment by ano ther n am e ’: David  Bonner, E x e c u t iv e  M e a s u r e s ,  
T e r r o r is m  a n d  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y :  H a v e  th e  R u le s  o f  t h e  G a m e  C h a n g e d ?  (A shgate 2 0 0 7 ) 3 46 . S ee  
also JCHR , P r e l im in a r y  R e p o r t  (n 4 6 ) paras  6 -9 ; Ben M ac In tyre, ‘Guilty Until Proven Guiltie r’ T h e  
T im e s  (London, January  2 9 , 2005 ).
294 In its 2 0 0 7  reply to the JCHR , the Governm en t exp lained  that the ‘decision not to derogate  from  
Article 5 fo r the purposes o f control orders . ..  [did] not reflect an assessm en t that w e  no longer face  a  
public em ergency  threaten ing the life of the nation’: H om e  O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  
N in e te e n th  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  o f  S e s s io n  2 0 0 6 - 0 7  (Cm  7215 , 2 0 0 7 ) 16. 
S ee  also HC  Deb  22  February  2005 , vol 4 31 , col 153  (C harles  C larke); JC HR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  
P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  ( S e v e n te e n th  R e p o r t ) :  B r in g in g  H u m a n  R ig h t s  B a c k  In  (2 0 09 -1 0 , HL 86 , HC  
111) para  14.
295 S ee  HC  Deb  22  Feb ruary 2005 , vol 431 , col 153  (C harles  C larke); Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  (n 
150 ) para  13. Fo r an opposing v iew  on the adequacy  of non-derogating control orders, see  the  
comments of then Hom e Secre tary , John Reid: HC  Deb  2 4  M ay  2 007 , vol 460 , col 1428 .
296 S ee  chap ter 6 of this thesis.
297 S ee  HC  Deb  24  M ay  2 007 , vol 4 60 , col 1428  (John Reid ). S e e  also A lan Travis and V ikram  Dodd, 
‘Reid  W arn ing  to Judges O ver Control O rders ’ T h e  G u a r d ia n  (London, 25  M ay  2 0 0 7 )  
<www .guard ian .co .uk /po litics /2007 /m ay/25 /uk .topsto ries3>  accessed  18 July 2 013 . S ee  chap te r 4  of 
this thesis.
298 A  (n 18) [29], [118 ]-[1 19], [154 ], [166], [208 ], [226]; see , however, the no table d issent of Lord  
Hoffmann [86 ]-[97 ]. S ee  also A  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2002 ] EW CA  C iv  
1502 .
299 A  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 009 ) 4 9  EHRR  29 , paras  1 8 0 -1 81 . Fo r fu rther discussion, see  S teve  Foster, 
T h e  Fight Against Terrorism , Detention W ithou t Trial and Hum an  R ights’ (2 0 09 ) 14 (1 ) C oven try  Law  
Journal 4.
300 Hum an  Rights Act (D es ignated  Derogation) O rder 2 0 0 1 , S I 2 0 0 1 /3 6 4 4 .
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o f the  even ts  o f 7/7, the  issuance  o f a  new  de roga tion  m ay  have  been a  lega lly  v iab le  cou rse
Th roughou t the  reg im e ’s cu rrency , Lord  C arlile  repea ted ly  exp ressed  the  hope  tha t, ‘g iven 
the  res tric tive  na tu re  o f non -de roga tin g  o rde rs ’ , and the  ‘re ve rbe ra tio n s ’ th a t a fresh  
de roga tion  wou ld  po ten tia lly  cause, no  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  w ou ld  be cons ide red  
necessa ry .302 He thus w e lcom ed303 the  conc lus ion  reached  by  the  R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r -  
T e rro r ism  a n d  S e c u r ity  P o w e rs  tha t, as it w as  ‘h igh ly  un like ly ’ th a t a fu tu re  de roga tion  wou ld  
be requ ired ,304 the  rep lacem en t fo r  con tro l o rde rs  w ou ld  m ake  no p rov is ion  fo r im pos ing  
cond itio n s  tha t w ou ld  deprive  an in d iv idua l o f th e ir r igh t to  lib e rty .305 F rom  a hum an  righ ts  
pe rspec tive , th e  fa c t tha t ne ith e r TP IM s ,306 no r th e ir ‘e nhan ced ’ va rian t, E -TP IM s ,307 
e xp ress ly  pe rm it d e roga tion  from  A rtic le  5, m ay the re fo re  be rega rded  as a pos itive  
deve lopm en t in th e  des ign  o f th e  U K ’s p re ven tive  coun te r-te rro rism  m easures .
VI. Revocation or Modification of Control Orders
The  m od ifica tion  and revoca tion  o f n on -de roga tin g308 and de roga tin g309 con tro l o rde rs  w e re  
cove red  by PTA, s 7. In respec t o f n on -de roga tin g  o rders, w he re  the  con tro lee  cons ide red  
tha t the re  had been a m a te ria l change  in c ircum s tances , th e y  cou ld  app ly  to  th e  H om e
301 S ee  C live W a lke r, T h e  Th rea t of Terrorism  and the Fate  o f Control O rders ’ [2010 ] Public Law  4, 
11; Bonner, E x e c u t iv e  M e a s u r e s  (n 293 ) 313 .
302 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 87 ) para  50; S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 175 ) para  47; T h i r d  R e p o r t  (n 2 80 )  
para  54; F o u r t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (H om e  O ffice, 2 0 09 ) paras 63; F i f t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  
to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (H om e  O ffice, 2 0 10 ) paras  128; S ix t h  R e p o r t  
(n 150) para 119. S ee  also David  Anderson, C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  in  2 0 1 1 :  T h e  F in a l  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  (2 012 ) para  3 .3 .
303 Lord Carlile  stated  that, having exam ined  the Coalition ’s proposals for rep lacem en t o f control 
orders, he was ‘content that the possibility o f making derogating orders is to be rem oved ’: S ix t h  
R e p o r t  (n 150) para  13.
304 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  R e v ie w  F in d in g s  a n d
R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  (Cm  8004 , 2 011 ) 41 . S ee  also H C  Deb  26  January  2 011 , vol 5 52 , cols 3 0 8 -3 0 9
306 TP IM A , sch 1.
307 Draft Enhanced  Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill (Cm  8166 , 2 0 11 ), sch 1.
308 PTA , ss 7 (1 )-(3 ).
309 ibid ss 7 (4 )-(7 ).
of a c tio n .301
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Sec re ta ry  fo r the  revoca tion  o f th e  o rd e r,310 or, a lte rna tive ly , fo r the  m od ifica tion  o f the  
ob lig a tions  the reby  im posed .311 T he  H om e S ecre ta ry  m eanwh ile  had the  pow e r to  revoke  a 
non -de roga tin g  order, o r re lax  o r rem ove  any o f the  ob liga tio ns  it im posed .312 A ppea ls  
aga ins t non -consensua l m od ifica tions  to  non-de roga tin g  o rde rs  w e re  p rov ided  fo r  unde r s 
10.313
VII. Section 8: The Duty to Consider Prosecution
The  in troduc tion  o f the  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  B ill314 in P a rliam en t w as a ccom pan ied  by  an 
a ffirm a tio n  tha t the  go ve rnm en t’s p re fe rred  approach , its 'f irs t op tion ', w as  to  p rosecu te  and 
conv ic t te rro ris ts .315 During  the  B ill’s S econd  R ead ing  in th e  C omm ons, the  H om e S ecre ta ry  
was aga in  a t g rea t pa ins  to  s tre ss  the  se rio u sness  w ith  w h ich  the  gove rnm en t to o k  the  v iew  
tha t, ‘w e  m ust go  down  the  p rosecu tion  rou te  firs t and fo rem ost, if w e can  ach ieve  th a t. ’316 
E labo ra ting  upon th is  po int, C ha rles  C la rke  em phas ised  tha t con tro l o rde rs  w ou ld  on ly  be 
used in c ircum stances  w he re  p rosecu tion  w as  no t v ia b le .317 Fu rthe rm ore , it w as  e xp la ined  
tha t, p rio r to  m ak ing  a  con tro l o rder, he w ou ld  consu lt w ith  the  po lice  rega rd ing  the  p rospec ts  
of b ring ing  crim ina l cha rges  aga ins t th e  ind iv idua l conce rned , and wou ld  seek  con firm a tion  
tha t the  po lice  w ou ld  con tin ue  inves tiga tio n s  th roughou t th e  du ra tion  of th e  o rde r w ith  a  v iew  
to  p rosecu ting  the  con tro lee  shou ld  it b e com e  fea s ib le .318 D esp ite  the se  assu rances , the  
B ill’s lack o f p rov is ions  e xp re ss ly  requ iring  p rio r consu lta tion  o r  com pe llin g  ongo ing  
investiga tio n  in to  the  poss ib ility  o f p rosecu tion  p rovoked  ca lls  fo r  am endm en t.319 In re sponse
ibid s 7(1 )(a ).
311 ibid s 7(1 )(b ).
ibid s 7 (2 ). By s 7 (3 ), the Hom e Secre ta ry  could not, however, modify any of the obligations in a  
manner that would have the effect of converting a  non-derogating  control order into a  derogating one .
313 ibid s 10(1 )(b).
314 Prevention of Terrorism  HC  Bill (2 0 0 4 -0 5 ) [61].
315 HC  D eb  22  Feb ruary 2005 , vol 4 3 1 , col 151 (Charles  C la rke).
316 HC  D eb  23  Feb ruary 2005 , vol 4 31 , col 339  (Charles  C la rke ).
317 Th e  reasons why the  governm en t is unab le to prosecute certain  terrorist suspects are  d iscussed in 
chap ter 2  of this thesis.
318 HC  Deb  2 3  Feb ruary 2 0 05 , vol 4 3 1 , col 3 39  (C harles  C la rke ).
319 HC  Deb  2 3  February  2 005 , vol 4 31 , cols 340 -341  (D av id  K idney).
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to  pa rliam en ta ria n s ’ concerns , s 8 w as  the re fo re  inse rted  a t th e  House o f Lo rds ’ C omm ittee  
S tage .320
Section  8 app lied  w he re  it appea red  to  th e  Home S ec re ta ry  th a t the  ind iv id ua l’s suspec ted  
in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  m ay have  invo lved  the  comm iss ion  o f an o ffence  
re la ting  to  te rro rism , and tha t th e  comm iss ion  o f th a t o ffence  w as  be ing  o r w ou ld  fa ll to  be 
inves tiga ted  by a po lice  fo rce .321 If th is  th re sho ld  requ irem en t w as sa tis fied , be fo re  m aking, 
o r app ly ing  fo r, a  con tro l o rder, the  H om e S ecre ta ry  w as requ ired  to  consu lt th e  ch ie f po lice  
o ffice r abou t w he the r th e re  w as ev idence  tha t cou ld  rea lis tica lly  be used fo r the  pu rposes  o f 
a  p ro secu tio n .322 If it w as de te rm ined  tha t p rosecu tion  was no t poss ib le , and  a con tro l o rde r 
w as m ade, th e  H om e S ecre ta ry  had to  in fo rm  the  ch ie f o ffice r.323 O nce  in fo rm ed , the  ch ie f 
o ffice r, in consu lta tio n  w ith  the  re le van t p rosecu ting  au tho rity ,324 w as then  requ ired  to  ensu re  
tha t the  investiga tion  o f th e  con tro le e ’s conduc t w as  kep t unde r rev iew , w ith  a v iew  to  
secu ring  the ir p rosecu tion  fo r a te rro rism -re la ted  o ffence  shou ld  th a t becom e poss ib le .325
The  fo cus  p laced  on p rosecu tion  under s 8 ev iden tly  appea rs  con s is ten t w ith  the  
gove rnm en t’s c la im s tha t th e  c rim ina l ju s tic e  rou te  cons titu te s  its p re fe rred  app roach  fo r  
dea ling  w ith  te rro ris t suspec ts . C omm en ts  m ade  by the  Independen t R ev iewer, a long  w ith  
in fo rm a tion  revea led  in the  case  o f E,326 however, gave  rise to  a  num be r o f conce rn s  re la ting  
to  both th e  na tu re  o f the  s ta tu to ry  du ties  and  a lso  the  a ss idu ity  w ith  w h ich  the y  w e re  
d ischarged  in p ractice .
320 HL  Deb  7  March  2 005 , vol 670 , cols 5 3 6 -5 3 8  (Baroness  Scotland ).
321 PTA , s 8 (1 ).
322 ibid s 8 (2 ).
323 ibid s 8 (3 ).
324 PTA , s 8 (7 ) specified that, in relation to offences  that would be likely to be prosecuted in Eng land  
and W a les , the relevant prosecuting authority w as  the  D irector of Public Prosecutions; in Scotland , it 
was  the appropriate procurator fiscal; and in Northern Ireland, the D irector of Public Prosecutions for 
Northern Ireland.
325 ibid ss 8 (4 )-(5 ).
326 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2007 ] EW HC  2 3 3  (Adm in).
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First, it w as sugges ted  by Lo rd  C a rlile  th a t th e  sec tion 's  qua lify ing  c rite ria327 cou ld  se rve  to  
'exc lude  cases w he re  on pub lic  in te re s t g rounds  it had been p re -de te rm ined  tha t the re  
shou ld  be no inves tiga tion  w ith  a v iew  to  p ro secu tio n .’328 D esp ite  th is  po ten tia l lim ita tion  
upon s 8 's  scope, it is n o tew orthy  tha t, du ring  the  reg im e 's  life tim e , the re  w e re  no cases  in 
wh ich  such  a de te rm ina tio n  w as  a c tua lly  m ade .329
The  fa c t th a t the  po lice , ra the r than  the  CPS , w e re  g iven  re spons ib ility  fo r  assess ing  the  
v iab ility  o f p ro secu tion330 under s 8 is desc ribed  by W a lk e r as ‘o b tu se ’.331 T he  ra tiona le  fo r  
th is  som ew ha t pecu lia r a rrangem en t w as  sa id  to  be the  need  to  m a in ta in  the  independence  
o f the  DPP  and ensure  a c lea r d iv ide  be tw een  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  and  the  p ro secu ting  
au tho ritie s  so  as to  p reven t any im p rope r in te rfe rence  by the  e xecu tive  in th e  la tte r’s 
dec is io ns .332 W h ils t the  gove rnm en t c la im ed  tha t it w ou ld  be  s tanda rd  p rac tice  fo r  po lice  to  
consu lt the  CPS  be fo re  adv is ing  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  w he the r p rosecu tion  w as  po ss ib le ,333 
the  A c t itse lf d id no t s tipu la te  th a t such consu lta tion  had to  ta ke  p lace  p rio r to  th e  m ak ing  of 
a con tro l o rder. In add ition , a lth ough  the  ch ie f po lice  o ffice r w as ob liged  to  consu lt the  
p rosecu ting  au tho rity  a fte r the  o rde r w as  m ade, s 8 (5 ) p rov ided  tha t th is  need  on ly  be ‘to  the  
e x ten t th a t he [cons ide red ] it a pp rop ria te  to  do  s o ’,334 s 8(6) fu rthe r s ta tin g  tha t th is  
requ irem en t cou ld  be sa tis fie d  by consu lta tio n  tha t to o k  p lace  w ho lly  o r pa rtly  be fo re  the  
pass ing  o f the  PTA .335 T he  s 8 du ties  w ere  the re fo re  ne ith e r as a ll-em b rac ing  o r  fa r  reach ing  
as in itia l im p ress ions m ay suggest.
^  PTA , s 8 (1 ).
328 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 87 ) para  55 .
329 Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 150) para  141.
330 PTA , s 8 (2 ).
331 W a lker, ‘Keeping Control of Terro ris ts’ (n 58 ) 1429 . Indeed , W a lk e r  suggests that T h e re  seem s  to 
be a  muddle here  betw een  the possibilities of investigation and the  collection of m ore  ev idence  (a  
police affair) and decisions about the weight of that ev idence  and the public interest (a  prosecution  
affa ir)’ (1429 ).
332 HL Deb  3  March  2 005 , vol 670 , col 4 4 2  (Baroness Sco tland). W a lke r, however, argues  that it is 
unclear why the  prosecuting authorities should be more  deserving of symbolic independence  than  the  
police in this context, and also subm its that it is ‘illogical’ to regard prosecutors as  lacking  
independence simply because  their professional judgm ent is reported to the H om e S ecre ta ry  rather  
than to a  court. S ee  W a lker, ‘Keeping Control o f Terroris ts ’ (n 58 ) 1430 .
333 HL Deb  3  M arch 2 005 , vol 670 . col 4 4 0  (B aroness Scotland).
334 PTA , s 8 (5 ).
335 ibid s 8 (6 ).
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Cen tra l to  s 8 w as the  ob lig a tion  im posed  upon the  H om e S ec re ta ry  to  consu lt the  ch ie f 
po lice  o ff ice r abou t the  fea s ib ility  o f p ro secu tio n .336 Indeed, the  im po rtance  o f th is  p rocess 
w as  s trong ly  em phas ised  by Lo rd  C a rlile ,337 w ho  a sse rted  tha t it 'm us t neve r be  rega rded  as 
a  ve s tig ia l e xe rc ise .’338 In his firs t th ree  annua l reports , Lo rd  C arlile  w as pa rticu la rly  c ritica l o f 
the  lack  o f de ta il con ta ined  in th e  le tte rs  from  ch ie f o ffice rs  certify ing  tha t th e re  w as no 
rea lis tic  p ro spect o f p ro secu tion .339 He consequen tly  p roposed  tha t th e se  le tte rs  shou ld  g ive  
c lea r reasons  fo r the  inab ility  to  p rosecu te , w ith  an ‘o p en ’ ve rs ion  be ing in te rm s  d isc losab le  
to  the  con tro lee , and, if necessa ry , a ‘c lo se d ’ ve rs ion  be ing  p roduced  fo r  the  cou rt.340 T h is  
recomm enda tion , w h ich  the  JCHR  a lso  s trong ly  endo rsed ,341 was a ccep ted  by the  
gove rnm en t, the  Home S ec re ta ry  con firm ing  tha t the  po lice  had ag reed  to  ‘p roac tive ly  
cons ide r on a  case -b y-case  bas is  w he the r any  fu r the r in fo rm a tion  ... cou ld  be  exp la ined  in 
the  le tte r'.342 Desp ite  th is  p ledge , in h is S econd  Report, Lo rd  C arlile  no ted  tha t a lthough  the  
le tte rs  now  gave  ‘s lig h t reasons ’ he  be lieved  th a t add itiona l de ta il w as  s till n e cessa ry .343 
Fu rthe rm ore , he rem arked  tha t, in som e  cases, ev idence  tha t the re  had been  a  tho rough  
and con tinu ing  exam ina tion  o f th e  poss ib ility  o f p rosecu tion  w as  unconv in c ing .344 In ligh t of 
th is, he u rged tha t all fu tu re  dec is io ns  w he the r to  p rosecu te  shou ld  be p receded  by  de ta iled  
and docum ented  consu lta tion  be tween the  CPS , the  po lice , th e  S ecu rity  S e rv ice  and  the  
Home O ffice , add ing  tha t, g iven  the  sm a ll n um be r o f cases  invo lved , th is  request cou ld  no t 
be deem ed excess ive .345
ibid 8 (2 ).
337 S ee , for exam ple , Lord Carlile , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 75 ) para  53 .
338 ibid para 57 .
339 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 87 ) para 58; S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 75 ) para  57; T h i r d  R e p o r t  (n 2 8 0 ) para  
74 .
340 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 87 ) para  58 .
341 JCHR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  
(C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  (2 0 05 -0 6 , HL  122 , HC  915 ) para  21 .
42 Secre tary  of S ta te  for the Hom e Departm ent, Charles  C lark, H o m e  S e c r e t a r y ’s  R e s p o n s e  to  th e  
F i r s t  A n n u a l  R e v ie w  (2 006 ) 2.
343 Suggesting, for exam ple , that an exp lanation of the sensitivity of the material that could not be
placed before the court be provided, in the closed version if necessary : Lord Carlile , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n
75 ) para 57.
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/. The  C o n tro l O rd e r  R e v ie w  G ro u p
In h is F irs t  R e p o rt, Lord C arlile  ca lled  fo r  the  e s tab lishm en t o f a  Home O ffice -le d  p rocedure  
w he reby  o ffic ia ls  and  rep re sen ta tives  o f th e  con tro l a u tho rities  m ee t to  m on ito r each case .346 
In response  to  th is  re comm enda tion , in 2006, the  H om e O ffice  es tab lished  the  C on tro l O rde r 
R ev iew  G roup  (CORG ).347 A cco rd ing  to  its te rm s  o f re fe rence, the  CO RG ’s pu rpose  w as  to  
bring toge the r Home O ffice  o ffic ia ls , th e  con tro lees ’ case  w o rke rs , and law  en fo rcem en t and 
in te lligence  rep resen ta tives  on a qua rte rly  bas is  in o rde r to  keep  all e x tan t con tro l o rde rs  
unde r fo rm a l, aud ited  rev iew , ensure  tha t the  ob lig a tio n s  im posed  w e re  necessa ry  and 
p ropo rtiona te , and m on ito r the  o rd e r ’s im pac t on the  m en ta l and phys ica l w e llbe ing  o f the  
con tro lees  and  the ir fam ilie s .348 M ost s ign ifican tly  from  the  pe rspective  o f s 8, th e  CORG  w as 
a lso  requ ired  to  ‘keep  the  p rospec t o f p rosecu tion  unde r rev iew , inc lud ing  fo r b reach  o f the  
o rde r.’349
ii. T h e  P o s s ib il i ty  o f  P ro s e c u t io n :  J u d ic ia l C h a lle n g e s
The  opera tion  o f th e  sys tem s  fo r rev iew ing  the  poss ib ility  o f p rosecu tion  w e re  e xposed  to  
jud ic ia l sc ru tiny  in th e  case  o f E,350 in w h ich  one  o f the  g rounds  o f cha lle nge  w as  tha t th e  
Home S ecre ta ry  had fa iled  to  fu lly  com p ly  w ith  s 8 (2 ).351 A t firs t ins tance , w h ils t the  
‘pa rticu la r im po rtance  o f cons ide rin g  p rosecu tion  w he re  the  im pos ition  o f p re ven tive  
m easures  are be ing con s ide re d ’352 w as acknow ledged , th e  H igh  C ou rt n e ve rthe le ss  re je c ted  
the  con ten tion  tha t the  s 8(2) du ty  to  consu lt cons titu ted  a  cond ition  p re ceden t fo r m ak ing  a
346 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 87 ) para  43 .
347 Secre tary  of S ta te  for the Hom e Departm ent, Charles  C lark, H o m e  S e c r e t a r y ’s  R e s p o n s e  to  th e  
F i r s t  A n n u a l  R e v ie w  (2006 ) 1 -2.
348 T e rm s  of R e ference  for the Control O rde r R ev iew  G roup ’, see  Lord Carlile , T h i r d  R e p o r t  (n 2 80 )  
para  47 .
49 ibid.
350 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2007 ] EW HC  2 3 3  Adm in.
351 It w as  argued  that the decision to maintain E ’s control o rder w as  ‘flaw ed ’ due to the  H om e  
Secre ta ry  having failed to d ischarge his duty of consultation under s 8 (2 ): ibid [11]. T h e  legal 
challenges under Articles 3, 5  and 8 of the E CHR  are  d iscussed in chap te r 4  of this thesis.
352 ibid [248] (Beatson  J).
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non -de roga tin g  con tro l o rde r.353 A lthough  the re  had been no b reach  of s 8 (2 ),354 acco rd ing  to  
Bea tson  J, once  the  o rde r w as m ade, the  Home S ec re ta ry  then  becam e  sub je c t to  an 
im p lic it ‘con tinu ing  du ty ’ to  keep  the  m a tte r o f p rosecu tion  unde r re v iew .355 O n  the  facts, it 
w as found  tha t th is  du ty  had no t been  adequa te ly  d ischa rged  as the  p rospects  of 
p rosecu tion  had no t been rev iewed  in ligh t o f s ign ifican t new  m ateria l - in th e  fo rm  o f tw o  
Be lg ian  cou rt ju d gm en ts  in w h ich  E ’s a ssoc ia te s  w e re  p rosecu ted  fo r te rro rism  o ffences356 - 
w h ich  had becom e  ava ilab le  s ince  the  m ak ing  o f E ’s o rde r in M arch 2005 .357 It w as 
consequen tly  he ld th a t the  Home S ec re ta ry ’s  fa ilu re  to  cons ide r the  im pac t o f th is  m a te ria l 
on the  v iab ility  o f p rosecu ting  E m ean t th a t th e  dec is ion  to  m a in ta in  h is con tro l o rde r w as 
necessa rily  ‘flaw ed ’.358
The  C ou rt of A ppea l,359 w h ils t a g ree ing  in pa rt w ith  H igh C ou rt’s ju dgm en t, ‘saw  the  m a tte r 
d iffe ren tly .’360 F irs tly, it w as  a ffirm ed  tha t ‘w hen  p rope rly  cons ide red  in its  s ta tu to ry  
con te x t’,361 the  s 8 (2) du ty  w as  no t a  cond ition  p re ceden t.362 It w as a lso  a ccep ted  tha t, on ce  
the  o rde r w as m ade, the  H om e S ec re ta ry  w as  unde r an im p lied  du ty  to  keep  the  o rder, and 
the  m a tte r of p rosecu tion , under con tinu ing  re v iew .363 T h is  du ty  invo lved  the  H om e S ec re ta ry  
do ing  w ha t he cou ld  to  ensu re  the  ongo ing  rev iew  w as m ean ing fu l, w h ich  requ ired  h im  to  
ta ke  ‘re asonab le  s tep s ’ to  ensu re  tha t the  p rosecu ting  au tho ritie s  w e re  keep ing  the
353 ibid. Indeed, as Beatson J noted, the condition p receden ts  app licab le to the  making  of non ­
derogating control orders w ere  those set out in PTA , s 2 (1 ).
354 ibid [284]. S ee  also [251].
355 ibid. S ee  also [248].
356 ibid see  [65]-[70 ]. In the Belg ian proceedings, in tercept ev idence  from Spain and the N e therlands  
had been  adm itted, which, as  it originated from  abroad , would there fo re  in principle be  adm issib le in 
England (see  [287]).
357 Belg ian judgm en ts  were  then obtained  by the Hom e O ffice in N ovem ber 2 005 , and, a fte r being  
translated  into English, b ecam e part of the open case  aga inst E in January  2 006 .
358 ibid [293]. Beatson J [310] held that the appropriate course in respect of the failure to rev iew  the
prospects of prosecuting E in light of the Belgian judgm en ts  would be  to quash  the control order,
either under PTA , s 3 (1 2 )(a ) or, in respect of its renewal, s 1 0 (7 )(a ).
359 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  a n d  a n o t h e r  [2007 ] EW CA  C iv  459 .
360 Dom inic McGoldrick, ‘Security Detention: United K ingdom P rac tice ’ (2 0 08 ) 4 0 (3 )  C ase  W es te rn  
Reserve  Journal of In ternational Law  507 , 525 .
361 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  a n d  a n o t h e r  [2007 ] EW CA  C iv 4 5 9  [87].
362 ibid.
363 ibid [94], [97].
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prospects  of p rosecu tion  unde r re v iew .364 It d id  not, however, ex tend  to  th e  H om e S ecre ta ry  
becom ing  the  p rosecu ting  au tho rity .365 H aving  rev iew ed  the  fac ts , the  C ou rt conc luded  tha t, 
as the  Home O ffice  had rece ived  the  Be lg ian  ju d gm en ts  in N ovem be r 2005 , and these  had 
no t been p rov ided  to  the  po lice  un til F eb rua ry  and  M arch  2006, th e re  had been  a b reach  by 
the  Home S ec re ta ry  o f h is du ty  to  keep  the  ques tion  o f poss ib le  p rosecu tion  under rev iew , 
‘no t in the  sense  tha t the  dec is ion  to  p rosecu te  w as  one  fo r  h im  ... bu t in th e  sense  tha t it 
w as  in cum ben t on h im  to  p rov ide  the  po lice  w ith  m a te ria l in h is possess ion  w h ich  w as  o r 
m igh t be re levan t to  any re cons ide ra tion  o f p ro secu tio n .’366
The  C ou rt o f A p pe a l’s dec is ion  in re spec t o f s 8 w as  subsequen tly  uphe ld  by the  H ouse  o f 
Lo rds  367 T he ir Lo rdsh ips  unan im ous ly  ag reed  tha t the  s 8(2) du ty  to  consu lt, w h ile  
‘exp ressed  in s trong  m anda to ry  te rm s ’,368 and ‘p la in ly  ... to  be taken  se rio u s ly ’ ,369 w as  no t a 
cond ition  p receden t fo r m ak ing  a con tro l o rde r.370 T he  v iew  tha t, once  the  o rde r w as  m ade, 
th e  Home S ecre ta ry  w as  unde r an  im p lic it du ty  to  ensu re  tha t th e  p ro spect o f p ro secu tion  
w as  kep t unde r ‘m ean ing fu l’ con tinu ing  review , requ iring  h im  to  supp ly  th e  po lice  w ith  any  
re levan t m a te ria ls , w as a lso  exp lic itly  endo rsed .371
These  ju dgm en ts  thus  served  to  c la rify  the  scope  o f th e  s 8 du ties, es tab lish ing  tha t th e  
ob liga tion  to  keep  p rosecu tion  unde r rev iew  cou ld  no t be sa tis fied  by the  H om e S e c re ta ry  
m e re ly  m ak ing  pe riod ic  inqu iry  o f th e  po lice  as to  w he the r the  p rospect o f su ccess fu l 
p rosecu tion  had in c reased .372 E ’s lega l cha llenge  rega rd ing  s 8, however, u ltim a te ly  ‘ended  
in a w h im pe r’ ,373 it be ing  de te rm ined  tha t, even if th e  Home S ecre ta ry  ‘had ac ted  d ilig e n tly
366 ibid [97] (Pill LJ).
367 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  a n d  a n o t h e r  [2007 ] UKHL  47 .
368 ibid [15] (Lord B ingham ).
369 ibid.
370 ibid; [23] Lord Hoffmann; [27 ]-[28 ] (Baroness Hale ); [32] (Lord Carswell); [36] Lord Brown).
371 S ee  [18] Lord B ingham ; [28] (B aroness Hale).
372 ibid [18].
373 W a lker, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (n 2 08 ) 322 .
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and e xped itious ly  in re la tion  to  the  Be lg ian  ju d gm en ts  ... th e y  cou ld  no t have  g iven  rise to  a 
p rosecu tion  a t any  tim e  m a te ria l to  [the] ca se .’374
//'/'. C o n tro l O rd e rs  a n d  C r im in a l P ro s e c u t io n :  C o n c lu s io n s
The  gove rnm en t c la im ed  tha t, as  a resu lt o f th e  recomm enda tion s m ade by Lo rd  C arlile  and 
the  ju dgm en ts  in E, im proved  p ro cedu res  w e re  im p lem en ted  fo r  rev iew ing  the  p rospects  of 
p rosecu tion .375 Desp ite  th e  poss ib ility  o f p rosecu tion  be ing  cons ide red  on an ongo ing  bas is 
pu rsuan t to  s 8 ,376 and  a lso  assessed  on a quarte rly  bas is by the  CORG , no con tro lee  was 
e ve r success fu lly  p rosecu ted , o the r than  fo r b reaches  o f th e ir o rde r.377 Howeve r, g iven  the  
na tu re  of th e  re stric tion s con tro l o rde rs  im posed  on suspects , th e  exp ress pu rpose  o f w h ich  
w as to  p reven t th e ir in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity ,378 it is a rguab ly  unsu rp ris ing  
tha t, as David  A nde rson  repo rted , th e y  p roved  ‘no t [to  be] e ffec tive  as an a id to  the  
inves tiga tion  and p rosecu tion  o f te r ro ris t c r im e .’379
VIII. Breach of a Control Order
The  con traven tion  o f an ob liga tion  im posed  by a con tro l o rde r w ithou t reasonab le  excuse  
w as a c rim ina l o ffen ce ,380 pun ishab le  on ind ic tm en t fo r a  m ax im um  te rm  o f five  yea rs , o r a
374 E  [2007] EW CA  C iv  4 5 9  [103] (Pill LJ). S ee  also E [2007] UKHL  4 7  [21] (Lord B ingham ); [34] (Lord  
Carswe ll).
375 Secre ta ry  of S ta te  for the  H om e Departm en t, Jacqui Sm ith , T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  t o  t h e  R e p o r t  
b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  p u r s u a n t  t o  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  
o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  7194 , 2 007 ) 5 -7 . From  2008  onwards, Lord C arlile ’s 
annual reports acknow ledged  that the quality of the letters from  the chief police officers to the H om e  
Secre ta ry  regarding possible prosecution had improved year-on -year: T h i r d  R e p o r t  (n 2 80 ) para  74; 
F o u r th  R e p o r t  (n 302 ) para  78; F i f t h  R e p o r t  (n 3 02 ) para 154; S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 150 ) para  145 .
376 As interpreted by the  Court of Appeal and  House of Lords in E.
377 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 3 02 ) para 3 .51 . Out of the total of 52  contro lees , only n ine w ere  
ever arrested on suspicion of a  terrorist o ffence during the currency of the ir control order. O f this n ine,
only one individual was charged with a  terrorist offence. Further, the activity in respect of which he
was charged  actua lly p re -dated  his control order; and  the charges did not result in a  conviction: David  
Anderson, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 2 :  F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  
R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  (2 0 13 )  
para  8 .14 .
5378 PTA , s 1 (3 ).
379 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 3 0 2 ) para 3 .5 2 .
380 PTA , s 9 (1 ). Further o ffences  of failing, without reasonab le  excuse , to report as required on
entering and leaving the UK , and of intentionally obstructing the  delivery of notice of a  control o rder  
under s 7 (9 ), w ere  contained in ss 9 (2 ) and 9 (3 ) respectively.
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fine , o r bo th ,381 and  on summ a ry  conv ic tion , to  a p rison  sen tence  o f up to  tw e lve  m on ths , o r 
a  fine , o r bo th .382 W h ils t sm a ll b reaches, such  as a few  m inu te s ’ la teness in repo rting  to  the  
po lice  s ta tion  o r  m on ito rin g  com pany, w e re  repo rted  to  be ‘com m onp la ce ’ ,383 p ro secu tio ns  
fo r these m ino r in frac tion s tended  no t to  be pu rsued .384 Repea ted , o r m o re  s ign ifican t, 
v io la tions  w ere , however, taken  se rio us ly , and o ve r the  reg im e ’s life tim e  14 con tro lees  w ere  
p rosecu ted  fo r b reach ing  the  te rm s  o f th e ir o rde r.385 As David A nde rson  no tes, the  ou tcom e  
o f these  p ro secu tion s  ‘w as  no t encou rag ing  fo r  the  au tho ritie s ’, 386 w ith  on ly  tw o  con tro lees  
be ing conv ic ted , MB rece iv ing  a sen tence  o f 20  w ee ks ’ im p risonm en t,387 and  BX  15 
m on ths .388 D esp ite  the  d ifficu lties  encoun te red  in success fu lly  p rosecu ting  con tro lees  fo r 
breach  389 in h is ‘End o f Te rm  R epo rt’ on  the  sys tem , A nde rson  neve rthe less  conc luded  tha t 
con tro l o rde rs  p roved  ‘gene ra lly  en fo rce ab le ’,390 as dem onstra ted  by the  com p le te  absence  
o f absconds a fte r June  2 0 0 7 391 and the  ‘re la tive ly  m ino r na tu re  o f th e  b reaches  th a t w e re  
p rosecu ted  in [the] la te r ye a rs ’392 o f th e  reg im e.
ibid s 9 (4 )(a ). 
ibid s 9 (4 )(b ).
383 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 302 ) para  3 .5 9 . S ee  also Lord Carlile , S p e c ia l  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  in  R e la t io n  to  Q u a r t e r ly  R e p o r t s  to  P a r l ia m e n t  U n d e r  S e c t io n  1 4 (1 )  o f  t h e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 006 ) para  13.
384 Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  (n 150 ) para  33 .
385 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 3 02 ) para  3 .61 . O ne  con tro lee was prosecuted  for breaching  his 
control order obligations on two separa te  occasions.
386 ibid para  3 .62 .
387
ibid. The  outcom es  in respect of the other prosecutions w ere  as follows: two acquittals; in six  
cases  no ev idence  was offered as it w as considered no longer in the public interest to continue with  
the trial; one con tro lee absconded  prior to his trial; and one  contro lee voluntarily left the  UK , resulting  
in the case  being closed. At the tim e of the F in a l  R e p o r t ,  th ree trials rem ained  pending (para  3 .6 2 ).
388 Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 150) 6 5 . S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B X  
[2010] EW HC  990  (Adm in) [13] for details  of the breaches  with which BX was charged .
89 According to Anderson, two of the principal difficulties in securing convictions w ere  tha t juries  did 
‘not always take  a serious view  o f repea ted  small b reaches  o f apparently  m undane  requ irem en ts ’, 
and the  fac t that, in som e cases , it w as  not possib le to deploy  evidence  of non -compliance  in court for  
fe a r  of divulging how the intelligence had been  collected: David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 3 0 2 ) para  
10 .5 . S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C e r ie  B u l l i v a n t  [2008 ] EW H C  3 3 7  
(Adm in), in which Bullivant w as  acquitted by the jury on the basis that his m enta l health  prob lem s  
(anxie ty and depression) w ere  regarded as constituting a ‘reasonab le  excuse ’ for breaching  his 
control order.
390 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 3 02 ) 6.
391 Th e  issue of absconds is d iscussed in chap ter six of this thesis.
392 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 3 02 ) para  6 .1 6 .
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IX. Renewal and Review
A s  David  A nde rson  obse rved  in h is 2012  repo rt on the  Act, ‘excep tiona l pow ers  requ ire  
excep tiona l s a feg ua rd s .’393 In a cco rdance  w ith  th is, and  so  as to  ensu re  tha t th e re  w ou ld  be 
an oppo rtun ity  fo r  annua l pa rliam en ta ry  deba te  on the  con tinua tion  o f the  con tro l o rde r 
sys tem , s 13 p rov ided  tha t, un less renew ed  by P a rliam en t,394 ss  1-9  of th e  PTA  w ou ld  
au tom a tica lly  e xp ire  a fte r 12 m on th s .395
S cru tin y  o f the  reg im e  w as a lso  secu red  th rough  the  reporting  and rev iew  requ irem en ts  
im posed  by s 14. P u rsuan t to  s 14(1), th e  H om e S ecre ta ry  had to  report to  P a rliam en t eve ry  
th ree  m on ths  on the  e xe rc ise  o f th e  con tro l o rde r pow ers  du ring  tha t pe rio d .396 In add ition , 
unde r s 14(2), the  H om e S ecre ta ry  w as requ ired  to  appo in t a pe rson  to  rev iew  the  opera tion  
o f the  A c t on an annua l bas is .397 During  the  life tim e  o f th e  reg ime, seven  such repo rts  w e re  
p roduced , s ix  by Lord  C a rlile ,398 w ho  he ld the  pos t o f Independen t R ev iew er be tw een  2005 - 
2011, and one  by h is successor, David A nde rso n .399 T hese  reports , ‘w h ich  w e re  in fo rm ed  by 
sec re t m a te ria l’ ,400 had to  be la id  be fo re  P a rliam en t.401 A s  a m eans  o f p rov id ing  o ve rs igh t o f 
the  PTA ’s opera tion , th e  Independen t R ev iew e r’s repo rts  w e re  inva luab le , o ften  be ing 
re fe rred  to  a t length  by MPs in the  annua l renewa l de ba te s .402 Fu rthe rm o re , ce rta in
393 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 3 0 2 ) para  1.6.
394 PTA , s 13 (4 ). Sections 1 -9  could be renewed  for periods not exceeding  one yea r at a  tim e by order  
made by statutory instrument (s 13 (2 )(c )), the  draft of which had to be laid before  Parliam en t and  
approved  by a  resolution of each  House (s 13 (4 )). Prior to making the renewal order, the  H om e  
Secre ta ry  was required to consult the independen t review er of terrorism  legislation, the  Intelligence  
Services Comm iss ioner, and  the D irec to r-G enera l o f Security Service  (s 13 (3 )). During the reg im e ’s 
lifetime, ss 1 -9  w ere  renewed  by statutory instrument six tim es  - see: SI 2 0 0 6 /5 1 2 , S I 2 0 0 7 /7 0 6 , SI 
2 0 0 8 /5 59 , S I 2 0 0 9 /5 5 4 , SI 2 0 1 0 /6 4 5  and 2 0 1 1 /7 16 .
395 PTA , s 13 (1 ). T h e  initial 12 month period began on the day  the PTA  was passed  (11 M arch  2 0 0 5 ).
396 These  reports took the form  of written m inisterial s tatem en ts . S ee , for exam p le , HC  D eb  16  June  
2005 , vol 4 35 , cols 2 3 -2 4W S  (Charles  C la rke).
397 PTA , s 14 (3 ).
398 In addition to these  six annual reports, a t the request of then Hom e Secre tary , John Reid , Lord  
Carlile  also produced a  one-o ff report on the Hom e S ecre ta ry ’s quarterly reports to Parliam en t:  
S p e c ia l  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  in  R e la t io n  to  Q u a r t e r ly  R e p o r t s  t o  P a r l ia m e n t  U n d e r  
S e c t io n  1 4 (1 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 006 ).
399 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 3 02 ).
400 ibid para  1 .6 . S ee  also Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 87 ) para  35 .
401 PTA , s 17 (6 ).
402 S ee , for exam ple , the 2 0 0 7  renewal debates  in House of Commons: HC  D eb  2 2  Feb ruary  2 0 0 7 ,  
vol 4 57 , cols 4 3 4 -4 60 .
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re comm enda tion s  m ade by Lo rd  C a rlile  a lso  p roved  in fluen tia l in te rm s o f gove rnm en t 
p ractice , as dem onstra ted  by the  c rea tion  o f th e  C on tro l O rde r R ev iew  G roup .403 T h roughou t 
the  reg im e ’s life tim e, va rious  pa rliam en ta ry  C omm ittees  a lso  ‘m a in ta ined  a c lose  and o ften  
c ritica l in te re s t in con tro l o rde rs ’ ,404 m ost no tab ly  the  JCHR , w ho  p roduced  yea rly  repo rts  to  
co inc ide  w ith  the  renewa l o f PTA, ss  1-9.405
W h ils t th e se  sa fegua rd s  ensu red  tha t th e  ope ra tion  o f the  reg im e  was sub je c t to  regu la r, 
o ften  rigo rous, scru tiny , as w ill be d iscussed  in th e  fo llow ing  chap te r, it w as the  re v iew  o f 
con tro l o rde rs  by the  cou rts  th a t p roved  to  be the  c ruc ia l m echan ism  th rough  w h ich  the  
human righ ts  o f the  ind iv idua l con tro lees  w e re  p ro tec ted .
403 S ee  Hom e O ffice, M e m o r a n d u m  to  th e  H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m it t e e  P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  
t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  7797 , 2 0 1 0 ) paras  35 -39 .
404 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 302 ) para 1.7.
405 S ee , for exam ple , JC HR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  A c t  ( C o n t in u a n c e  in  F o r c e  o f  S e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  (2 0 05 -06 , HL  122, HC  9 15 ). T h e  
JC H R ’s reports primarily focused  on the reg im e’s comp liance with E C H R  rights, including Articles, 3, 
5, 6  and 8, the duration of control orders, and also the possibility of prosecuting contro lees.
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Chapter 4 
The Control Order Regime and Human Rights
A cco rd ing  to  CO NTEST ,1 the  p ro tec tion  o f hum an righ ts  cons titu te s  a ‘key p rin c ip le ’ w h ich  
unde rp ins  the  UK  go ve rnm en t’s coun te r-te rro rism  w o rk  bo th  a t hom e and o ve rseas .2 
N eve rthe less , as W a lke r obse rves , one  ‘un re len ting  th em e ’3 tha t has em erged  in re la tion  to  
th e  UK ’s response  to  th e  th rea t o f te rro rism  - pre- and p o s t-9 /1 1 - has been the  ‘tro ub le som e  
re la tio n sh ip ’4 be tw een  coun te r-te rro rism  m easu res  and hum an  rights.
M easu res  in troduced  to  com ba t te rro rism  o ften  en ta il re s tric tion s upon a range  o f human 
righ ts  and civ il lib e rtie s .5 W h ils t a n ti- te rro rism  laws frequ en tly  engende r conce rns  rega rd ing  
com p lia nce  w ith  A rtic les  3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and  14 o f th e  ECHR ,6 the  r igh t to  libe rty  and 
secu rity  o f pe rson  unde r A rtic le  5 is, as  F oste r no tes, ‘espec ia lly  su scep tib le  to  
in te rfe rence ’.7 Indeed, a num be r o f the  UK ’s coun te r-te rro rism  m easures  have  had 
pa rticu la rly  s ign ifican t im p lica tion s  in re la tion  to  the  A rtic le  5 righ t to  liberty , such  as 
in te rnm en t,8 exc lus ion  o rd e rs ,9 th e  ex tended  p re -cha rge  de ten tion  of te rro ris t s u sp ec ts ,10
1 C O N TE S T  is the United K ingdom ’s counter-terrorism  strategy. C O N TE S T , and  its main aim s, are  
discussed in chap ter 2  of this thesis.
2 Hom e O ffice, P u r s u e ,  P r e v e n t ,  P r o te c t ,  P r e p a r e :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  7547 , 2 0 0 9 ) 63 . S ee  also H om e  O ffice , C o u n te r in g  I n t e r n a t io n a l  
T e r r o r is m :  T h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  (Cm  6888 , 2 0 06 ) para  44; H om e O ffice, C O N T E S T :  T h e  
U n i t e d  K in g d o m ’s  S t r a t e g y  f o r  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m  (Cm  8123 , 2 0 1 1 ) para  1 .14 .
3 C live W a lke r, Terro rism  and Crim inal Justice: Past, Presen t and Fu tu re ’ [2004] C rim inal Law  
Review  55, 70.
4 ibid. S ee  also Ken t Roach , T h e  9 /1 1  E f fe c t :  C o m p a r a t iv e  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (C am bridge  Un iversity  
Press 2 011 ).
5 Fenwick, fo r exam ple , states that, ‘A  tediously fam iliar aspec t of the counter-terrorist schem e is tha t 
it often runs counter to British common law  traditions and opposes the values of the  European  
Convention on Human  R ights’: H elen  Fenw ick, C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (4 th edn, Routledge  
2007 ) 1329 .
6 S ee  Colin W arbrick, T h e  Principles of the European  Conven tion on Human  R ights and the  
Response  of S ta tes to Terro rism ’ (2 0 02 ) 3 Eu ropean  Hum an  R ights Law  R ev iew  287; Colin W arb rick , 
T h e  European  Convention on Hum an  R ights and the Prevention of Terro rism ’ (1 9 8 3 ) 3 2 (1 )  
In ternational and Com parative  Law  Quarterly  82.
7 S teve  Foster, H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  (3 rd edn, Longman  2 011 ) 7 65 . S ee  also Ste fan  
Sottiaux, T e r r o r is m  a n d  t h e  L im i t a t io n  o f  R ig h t s  (H art Publishing 2 0 0 8 ) 197.
8 S ee  Gerard  Hogan  and C live W a lke r, P o l i t ic a l  V io le n c e  a n d  th e  L a w  in  I r e la n d  (M anches te r  
University Press  1989 ) 86 -96 ; John McGuffin , I n t e r n m e n t  (Anvil Books 1973 ); RJ Spjut, ‘In ternm en t 
and Deten tion  without T rial in Northern Ireland 1 971 -1975 : M inisterial Policy and P ractice ’ (1 9 8 6 )  
49 (6 ) Modern  Law  Rev iew  712 .
9 S ee  chap ter 2  (pp 4 3 -4 5 ) of this thesis.
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po lice  powers  of s top  and sea rch  under TA  2000 , s 4 4 ,11 and de ten tion  w ithou t tria l pu rsuan t 
to  Part 4  o f the  A TC SA .12 Fu rthe rm ore , th e  UK  has a lso  invoked  A rtic le  15 o f the  C onven tion  
in o rde r to  de roga te  from  A rtic le  5 in re spec t o f certa in  p rov is ions  des igned  to  add ress  
th rea ts  from  both dom estic  and  in te rna tiona l te r ro rism .13
I. Control Orders and Human Rights
As no ted  by  the  Independen t R ev iew e r in h is F in a l  R e p o r t  on the  P TA ,14 one  o f the  p rinc ipa l 
reasons  ‘con tro ve rsy  a ttended  con tro l o rde rs  th roughou t the  life  o f the  reg im e ’15 w as due  to  
th e ir im pact upon a num be r o f ‘ba s ic  fre e dom s ’.16 A lthough  they  rou tine ly  invo lved  
in te rfe rences  w ith  a  va rie ty  o f C onven tion  r ig h ts ,17 con tro l o rde rs w e re  m ost fre qu en tly  
cha llenged  on the  g rounds  tha t the  ob lig a tio n s  im posed , in com b ina tion , am oun ted  to  a  
dep riva tion  o f libe rty  con tra ry  to  A rtic le  5. O the r s ign ifican t human righ ts  issues assoc ia ted  
w ith  con tro l o rde rs  conce rned  w he the r th e  p rocedu res  invo lved  in th e ir is suance  and  rev iew  
con travened  A rtic le  6 ’s fa ir  tria l re qu irem en ts ,18 and  w he the r the  res tric tions  they  im posed
10 Pre -charge  detention of terrorist suspects for up to 7  days was perm itted under success ive  
Prevention of Terro rism  (Tem pora ry  Provisions) Acts (1 974 , 1976 , 1 984  and 1989 ). T h e  seven  day  
upper limit w as  also initially m aintained  under the  TA  2 000 , which cam e  into fo rce  on 19 February  
2001 . Section 3 06  of the Crim inal Justice Act 2 0 03 , however, subsequently am ended  Sch  8  of the  TA  
2000 , increasing the m aximum  period of p re -charge  detention to 14 days. T h e  p re -charge  detention  
limit w as then  further extended  to 2 8  days by ss 2 3 -2 5  of the TA  2006 . Pursuant to s 2 5  of the  TA  
2006 , the pre -charge  detention limit under sch 8 of the TA  2 0 0 0  reverted to 14  days on 2 5  January  
2011 , following the  lapse of the most recent renewal order. S ee  A lexander Ho rne and Gavin  B erm an , 
P r e - c h a r g e  D e te n t io n  in  T e r r o r is m  C a s e s  (S N /H A /5 634 , House  of Commons Library, 2 0 12 ).
11 TA  2 000 , s 4 4 . S ee  also Sch 7  of the Act, which provides for the  power to stop and search  a t ports  
and airports w ithout reasonab le  suspicion.
12 A TCSA , ss 2 1 -2 3 . S ee  chap ter 3  (pp 4 5 -4 7 ) of this thesis.
13 S ee  I r e la n d  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 978 ) 2  E HRR  25 ; B r a n n ig a n  a n d  M c B r id e  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  
(1993 ) 17 EHRR  539; Hum an  Rights Act 1998  (D es ignated  Derogation ) O rder 2 0 01 , SI 2 0 0 1 /3 6 4 4 ; A  
v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2004 ] UKHL  56; A  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 009 ) 4 9  E H RR  
29 . S ee  also Jean  A llain , ‘Derogation from  the  European  Convention of Hum an Rights in the  Light of 
"O ther Obligations Under International Law"’ (2 0 0 5 ) 5 Eu ropean  Hum an  R ights Law  R ev iew  480 ; 
Susan Marks, ‘Civil L iberties at the Margin: the UK  Derogation  and the European  Court of Hum an  
Rights’ (1995 ) 15  Oxford Journal of Legal S tud ies 69 .
14 David  Anderson , C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  in  2 0 1 1 :  F in a l  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 012 ).
15 ibid para  1.3.
16 ibid.
17 S ee  JC HR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  
( C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  (2 0 05 -0 6 , HL 122, HC  915 ) para  25 .
8 Article 6  ECHR : Right to a  Fa ir Trial.
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in fringed  the  con tro lee ’s o r  th e ir fam ily  m em be rs ’ righ ts  unde r A rtic le  8 19 and  A rtic le  320 o f 
the  ECHR . T h is  chap te r the re fo re  c ritiq ues  the  ope ra tion  o f the  con tro l o rde r reg im e  from  a 
human righ ts  pe rspective , and, th rough  ana lys is  o f re levan t dom estic  and  European 
ju risp rudence , eva lua tes  the  reg im e ’s con fo rm ity , in p rin c ip le  and in p rac tice , w ith  the  righ ts 
ensh rin ed  in th e se  A rtic les . V a rio us  re la ted  m a tte rs , inc lud ing  the  du ra tion  o f con tro l o rders, 
the  p rospect tha t suspec ts  m ay  re -engage  in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity  once  free  o f restra in t, 
and  the  lega lity  o f pe rsona l sea rch  ob lig a tions , are  a lso  cons ide red .
II. A rticle 5 ECHR
A rtic le  5 o f th e  ECHR , and  the  lega l d iffe ren tia tion  be tween  res tric tion s upon, and 
dep riva tions  of, pe rsona l liberty , w e re  c ruc ia l to  the  con tro l o rde r reg ime. T he  o rde rs  issued  
unde r the  PTA  invo lved  the  im pos ition  o f a  range  o f ob liga tio ns  upon te rro ris t su spects  in 
o rde r to  p reven t o r res tric t th e ir in vo lvem en t in te r ro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity .21 A ll con tro l o rde rs  
the re fo re  ine v itab ly  resu lted , to  d iffe ring  deg rees, in a  d im inu tion  o f the  con tro le e ’s liberty . 
However, it w as the  ac tua l e x ten t o f th e  d im inu tion  tha t w as de te rm ina tive  o f th e  type , and 
a lso  the  lega lity , o f the  con tro l o rde r used  in each case .
Cen tra l to  the  PTA ’s s ta tu to ry  reg im e  w as  the  dem arca tion  o f n on -de roga ting  and  de roga ting  
con tro l o rd e rs 22 T he  d is tin c tion  be tw een  the  tw o  spec ies  o f o rde r w as p rem ised  upon  the  
d iv id ing  line w h ich  is d rawn w ith in  ECHR  ju r is p rudence  be tw een  pe rm iss ib le  in te rfe rences  
w ith  freedom  o f m ovem ent and s itu a tion s  w he re  the  seve rity  o f the  re s tric tion  invo lved  
am oun ts  to  a  dep riva tion  o f liberty . Thus , w h ils t non -de roga tin g  con tro l o rde rs  w e re  seen  to  
be com p lia n t w ith  ‘righ t to  libe rty  and secu rity  o f p e rson ’ g ua ran teed  by A rtic le  5, de roga tin g
19 Article 8 ECHR : Right to R espec t for P rivate and Fam ily  Life.
20 Article 3  ECHR : Prohibition of Torture.
21 PTA , ss 1 (1 ), 1 (3 ).
22 ibid ss 1 (2 ), 2 , 4 . S ee  chap ter 3 of this thesis.
98
con tro l o rde rs invo lved  an in te rfe rence  w ith  a con tro le e ’s libe rty  on g rounds o th e r than  those  
pe rm itted  unde r A rtic le  5 (1 )(a )-(f).23
W h ils t th e  d is tinc tion  be tw een  non -de roga tin g  and de roga ting  o rde rs  w as  fundam en ta l to  the  
ope ra tion  o f the  reg ime, the  PTA  itse lf p rov ided  e x trem e ly  lim ited  gu idance  as to  the  
re spective  pa ram ete rs  o f the  d iffe ren t types  o f order. T he  c lea res t ind ica tion  o f w he re  the  
boundary  a c tua lly  lay  w as  fu rn ished  by s 15(1 )’s gene ra l in te rp re ta tive  p rov is ion , w h ich  
s ta ted  tha t a  de roga ting  con tro l o rde r w as  one  tha t invo lved  “de roga ting  ob lig a tio n s ” ,24 s 
1(10) o f th e  A c t in s truc tive ly  de fin ing  a “de roga ting  ob liga tio n ” as ‘an  ob liga tio n  on  an 
ind iv idua l w h ich  is incom pa tib le  w ith  h is righ t to  libe rty  unde r A rtic le  5 o f th e  H uman R igh ts 
C onven tio n ’.25 T he  lack  o f spec ific  de ta il w ith in  th e  A c t itse lf, a long  w ith  th e  pauc ity  o f the  
d iscuss ion  o f th is  issue  in th e  accom pany ing  o ffic ia l d o cum en ts ,26 m ean t th a t it rem a ined  
unc lea r w hen  the  res tric tion s p laced  upon the  con tro lee  w ou ld  be rega rded  as be ing  o f such  
a se ve rity  th a t th e y  cou ld  on ly  law fu lly  be  im posed  under a de roga ting  con tro l o rder.
In o rde r to  de lim it n on-de roga ting  and  de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  in sa tis fa c to rily  c le a r te rm s  it 
is the re fo re  necessary  to  unde rtake  a  de ta iled  exam ina tion  o f A rtic le  5 ECHR  and  its 
a ccom pany ing  case  law. T he  fo llow ing  ana lys is  has a  num be r o f in te rre la ted  pu rposes . F irst, 
to  iden tify  the  no tion  o f ‘libe rty ’ th a t is re le van t in th is  con tex t and es tab lish  the  na tu re  and 
scope  o f the  guaran tee  o f ‘libe rty  and secu rity  o f  p e rson ’ ensh rin ed  in A rtic le  5; second , to  
asce rta in  w he re  the  degree  o f in te rfe rence  w ith  an  ind iv id ua l’s fre edom  is such  th a t A rtic le  5 
is engaged ; and th ird , to  id en tify  the  p rec ise  locus  o f the  d iv id ing  line  be tw een  no n ­
de roga ting  and  de roga ting  con tro l o rders.
23
Prior to a  derogating control o rder being m ade, it would therefore have  been  necessary  to en te r a  
derogation from  Article 5 ECHR . S e e  PTA , ss 4 (3 )(c ), 4 (7 )(c ).
24 PTA , s 15 (1 ).
25 ibid s 1 (10 )(a ).
26 Ne ither the House  of Commons Research  P aper that accompan ied  the Bill (A rabella  Tho rp , T h e  
Prevention of Terrorism  Bill: Bill 61 of 2 0 0 4 /0 5 ’ (HC  Library R esearch  P aper 0 5 /14 , 2 0 0 5 )) ,  nor the  
Exp lanatory Notes to the Prevention of Terro rism  Act 2 005 , provide any  further detail on this issue.
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/. T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  ‘L ib e r t y ’
L iberty , like  ‘se cu rity ’ ,27 is a  c ritica l, ye t com p le x  concep t.28 T he  righ t to  ind iv idua l libe rty  is 
com m on ly  he ld to  be one  of th e  m ost fundam en ta l o f all hum an  righ ts .29 Indeed , legal, 
po litica l and  ph ilosoph ica l d iscou rse  is rep le te  w ith  s ta tem ents  rega rd ing  the  p re -em inence  
o f the  righ t to  liberty . Lord D ona ldson  in e x  p a r te  C h e b la k ,30 fo r  ins tance , a sse rted  tha t ‘the  
libe rty  o f the  c itizen  unde r the  law  is th e  m os t fu ndam en ta l o f all fre edom s ’ , w h ils t Lo rd  Hope 
in A  v  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  D e p a r tm e n t , 3 1  ave rred  tha t, ‘it is im poss ib le  e ve r to  
ove rs ta te  the  im po rtance  o f the  righ t to  libe rty  in a dem oc racy .’32 In a  2007  speech  en titled  
‘On L ibe rty ’, G ordon  B row n ,33 m eanwh ile , exp la ined  tha t, ‘a pass ion  fo r  libe rty  has 
de te rm ined  the  dec is ive  po litica l deba tes  o f o u r h is to ry ’, p roc la im ing  tha t, in th e  UK, ‘libe rty  is 
and rem a ins  a t th e  cen tre  ou r co ns titu tio n ’ .34
The  concep t o f ‘lib e rty ’, and the  m anne r in w h ich  it m ay  be de fined , has been  sub je c t to  
de ta iled  cons ide ra tion  in va rio us  ph ilo soph ica l w orks . For exam p le , in O n  L ib e r ty , M ill po s its  
th a t ‘libe rty  cons is ts  in do ing  w ha t one  de s ire s ’ ,35 w h ils t in T a k in g  R ig h ts  S e r io u s ly , Dwork in  
sugges ts  th a t liberty , in a tra d itiona l sense , m ay  be pe rce ived  as ‘the  absence  o f cons tra in ts  
p laced  by gove rnm en t upon w ha t a m an m igh t do  if he w an ts  to . ’36 Berlin , w ho  desc rib e s
27 S ee  chap ter 2  of this thesis.
28 Indeed , G earty  asserts that, T h e re  are  few  words more  dangerously confusing in the ir mean ing  
than ‘liberty’ and ‘security’.’ Conor G earty, ‘Escaping Hobbes: L iberty and Security for our Dem ocra tic  
(N o t Anti-terrorist) A ge ’ in Esther D  R eed  and M ichael Dumper, C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s ,  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  a n d  
P r o s p e c t s  f o r  C o n s e n s u s :  L e g a l,  P h i lo s o p h ic a l  a n d  R e l ig io u s  P e r s p e c t iv e s  (C am bridge  Un iversity  
Press  2 012 ) 35 . S ee  also Tom  B ingham , T h e  R u le  o f  L a w  (Allen Lane 2 010 ) 7 2 -73 .
29 For a  deta iled account of the  developm en t of individual liberty, see  Ben W ilson , W h a t  P r ic e  L ib e r t y ?  
H o w  F r e e d o m  W a s  W o n  a n d  is  B e in g  L o s t  (F abe r and Faber 2 009 ).
30 R  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  e x  p a r t e  C h e b la k  [1991 ] 1 W LR  890 , 8 94 .
31 [2004] UKHL  56.
32 ibid [100]. S ee  also [81] (Lord Nicholls); [88] (Lord Hoffm ann).
33 W ho  was Prim e M in ister a t the time.
34 Gordon Brown, ‘On  Liberty’ (W estm inster University, 2 5  O ctober 2 0 0 7 )  
< http ://n ewsvo te .bbc .co .U k /m papps /pagetoo ls /p rin t/news .bbc .co .uk /1 /h i/uk_po litics /7062237 .s tm >  
accessed  11 July 2 012 .
35 John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in O n  L ib e r t y  a n d  O th e r  E s s a y s  (O U P  1991 ) 107.
36 Ronald Dworkin, T a k in g  R ig h ts  S e r io u s ly  (Duckworth  2 0 05 ), 2 67 . In ‘Do Va lu es  Conflict?  A  
Hedgehog ’s Approach’, Dworkin  alternatively  proposes a more ‘dynam ic ’ conception o f liberty, 
whereby  'L iberty consists in being ab le  to do what one  w ishes, short o f violating the rights o f others, 
with the resources ass igned by a reasonab ly  just distribution of resources .’ Ronald  Dworkin , ‘Do  
Va lues  Conflict? A  H edgehog ’s Approach ’ (2 0 01 ) 43  A rizona Law  R ev iew  251 , 2 56 .
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libe rty  as th e  ‘ab sence  o f ob s ta c le s ’ to  ac tua l o r po ten tia l cho ice s ,37 in T w o  C oncep ts  o f 
L ibe rty ’, fu r th e r d is tin gu ishes  be tw een  ‘po s itive ’38 and ‘nega tive ’39 no tions  of liberty . W h ils t 
p e rsona l libe rty  m ay the re fo re  be  understood , in gene ra l te rm s , to  re fe r to  ind iv idua l 
a u tonom y  and  the  freedom  to  do  as one  chooses ,40 fo r lega l pu rposes  it is u sua lly  a ss igned  
a fa r m ore  res tric tive  m ean ing , w he reby  fo cus  is spec ifica lly  p laced  upon phys ica l libe rty  and 
freedom  of m ovem en t.41 Indeed, as d iscussed  be low , it is th is  na rrow e r concep tion  wh ich  is 
taken  to  app ly  to  the  righ t to  libe rty  o f th e  pe rson  unde r A rtic le  5 o f th e  ECHR .
ii. A r t ic le  5 : T h e  R ig h t  to  L ib e r ty  a n d  S e c u r ity  o f  P e rs o n
The  righ ts  to  libe rty  and  secu rity  o f th e  pe rson  comm and  a  p rom inen t p lace  in m ost hum an 
righ ts  ins trum en ts . T he  gua ran tee  o f pe rsona l liberty , and  its p ro tec tion  aga ins t unwarran ted  
in te rfe rence  by  the  sta te , cons titu te  cen tra l fea tu re s  o f the  M agna  C a rta  o f 1215 ,42 the  
Dec la ra tion  o f the  R igh ts  o f Man 1789 ,43 the  US Bill o f R igh ts  1791,44 the  Un ive rsa l 
D ec la ra tion  o f H um an R igh ts  1 9 4 8 45 and the  In te rna tiona l C ovenan t on C ivil and  Po litica l
37 Isaiah Berlin, ‘In troduction’ in F o u r  E s s a y s  o n  L ib e r t y  (O U P  1969 ) xl.
38 According to Berlin, ‘the ‘positive’ sense  of the word ‘liberty’ derives from  the wish on the  part of the  
individual to be  his own m aster. I wish m y life and decisions to depend  on myself, not on external  
forces  of w hatever kind. I w ish to be the instrument of my own, not o f other m en ’s, acts o f w ill.’ Isa iah  
Berlin, T w o  Concepts o f L iberty’ in F o u r  E s s a y s  o n  L ib e r t y  (O U P  1969 ) 131.
39 Berlin explains ‘negative ’ liberty in the following terms: ‘I am  normally said to be free  to the deg ree  
to which no man or body of m en interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense  is simply the  
a rea  within which a  m an  can act unobstructed by others. If I am  preven ted  by others from  doing w hat I 
could otherw ise do, I am  to a  deg ree  unfree; and if this a rea  is contracted by other men beyond a  
certain m inimum , I can be described as being coerced , or, it m ay  be, ens laved ’: ibid 122 . On  the  
notion of ‘negative ’ liberty genera lly , see  Isaiah Berlin, T w o  Concepts of L iberty’ in F o u r  E s s a y s  o n  
L ib e r t y  (O UP  1969 ) 1 2 2 -131 .
40 Foster, H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  (n 7) 269 .
41 S ee  R ichard Stone, ‘Deprivation o f Liberty: Th e  Scope of Article 5  of the European Convention of 
Human  R ights’ (2 0 1 2 ) 1 European  Hum an  R ights Law  R ev iew  46 , 4 7 . S ee  also, S ir W illiam  
Blackstone, C o m m e n ta r ie s  o n  th e  L a w  o f  E n g la n d :  B o o k  1 : O f  t h e  R ig h t s  o f  P e r s o n s  (Un iversity  of 
Chicago  Press 1979 ) 130 .
42 Chap ter 39: ‘No free  m an  shall be  taken  or imprisoned ... excep t by the lawful judgm ent of his peers  
or by the law  of the land’ (N u l lu s  l i b e r  h o m o  c a p ia tu r ,  v e l  im p r is o n e t u r  . . .  n i s i  p e r  le g a le  ju d i c iu m  
p a r iu m  s u o r u m  v e l  p e r  le g e m  te r r a e ) .
43 Th e  Declaration  of the  R ights of M an  and the C itizen 1789 , A rticles 4 -9 .
44 Fifth Am endment: No person s h a l l ... be  deprived of life, liberty, or property, w ithout due  process of 
law. S ee  also section 1 of the  Fourteenth Am endm ent (1868 ).
45 Article 3: Everyone has  the  right to life, liberty and security of person. In addition, A rticle 9 provides  
that: No one shall be  sub ject to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile .
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R igh ts 1966 .45 T he  righ t to  libe rty  and  secu rity  o f pe rson  is a lso  p ivo ta l to  th e  schem e  of 
hum an righ ts  p ro tec tion  under th e  ECHR , A rtic le  5 (1) o f w h ich  prov ides:
Eve ryone  has the  righ t to  libe rty  and  secu rity  o f pe rson . No one  sha ll be 
dep rived  o f is libe rty  save  in the  fo llow ing  cases47 and in a cco rdance  w ith  a 
p ro cedure  p rescribed  by law .
W h ils t th e  righ t to  libe rty  and  secu rity  o f pe rson  is g iven exp lic it recogn ition  unde r A rtic le  5, 
the  ac tua l subs tance  o f the  p ro tec tio n  is no t read ily  appa ren t on a s im p le  e xam ina tion  o f the  
C onven tion  text. In o rde r to  es tab lish  w ha t is m ean t by th e  te rm s  ‘libe rty ’ and  ‘s e cu rity ’ in th is  
con tex t, it is th e re fo re  necessa ry  to  cons ide r th e  m anne r in w h ich  they  have  been  in te rp re ted  
by the  EC tHR  and  the  European  C omm iss ion  o f H um an  R ights.
A rtic le  5 is one  o f the  m ost fre quen tly  invoked  C onven tio n  p rov is ions  and  is consequen tly  
the  sub je c t o f a  cons ide rab le  body  o f case  law . T h rough  c lose  exam ina tion  o f a range  o f 
ins truc tive  dec is io ns  it is p oss ib le  to  c la rify  a  num be r of c ritica l issues, com pris ing : th e  no tion  
o f ‘libe rty ’ upon w h ich  A rtic le  5 is founded ; w he the r o r  no t ‘libe rty ’ and ‘se cu rity ’ cons titu te  
au tonom ous concep ts ; the  ob jec t and p rec ise  scope  o f the  A rtic le  5 guaran tee , and ; the  
S trasbou rg  C ou rt’s app roach  to  de te rm in ing  w he the r an ind iv idua l has been  deprived  o f th e ir 
liberty .
/'//. ‘L ib e r ty ’ a n d  ‘S e c u r ity ’ o f  th e  P e rs o n :  A u to n o m o u s  C o n c e p ts ?
A rtic le  5 beg ins  w ith  the  b road s ta tem en t th a t ‘E ve ryone  has the  righ t to  libe rty  and  secu rity  
o f p e rson .’48 T he  ques tion  the re fo re  em erges , do  ‘lib e rty ’ and ‘se cu rity ’ cons titu te  
au tonom ous concep ts?  Pu rsuan t to  no rm a l p rin c ip les  o f in te rp re ta tion , the  tw o  te rm s  shou ld  
be g iven  sepa ra te  m ean ings . A  lim ited  num be r o f C omm iss ion  dec is io ns  have  a lso
46 Article 9 (1 ): Everyone  has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be  subjec ted  to  
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be  deprived  of his liberty excep t on such grounds and in 
accordance  with such procedure as are  established by law.
47 The  ‘cases ’ in which a person m ay legitimately be deprived o f their liberty a re  enum era ted  under  
Article 5(1 )(a )-(f).
48 Article 5 (1 ) ECHR .
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sugges ted  tha t ‘lib e rty ’ and ‘se cu rity ’ m ay  be rega rded  as d is tin c t concep ts .49 Further, 
d e sp ite  op in ing  th a t it is d ifficu lt to  ass ign  any in dependen t m ean ing  to  th e  te rm , W a rb rick  
sugges ts  tha t, ‘it is ju s t conce ivab le  th a t [“se cu rity ”] cou ld  be read as im pos ing  upon  the  
S ta te  ob lig a tio ns  to  ensu re  the  un in te rrup ted  en jo ym en t o f an ind iv idua l’s lib e rty .’50 However, 
as th e  EC tHR  has con firm ed  in a num be r o f cases, th e  p re va len t v iew  is th a t libe rty  and 
secu rity  o f pe rson  shou ld  be cons trued  as a  un ita ry  no tio n .51 Indeed, a w e lcom e  deg ree  of 
c la rity  w as  in jec ted  in to  th is  a rea  by the  case  o f B o z a n o ,52 the  C ou rt e luc ida tin g  tha t th e  
p rim a ry  fo cu s  o f A rtic le  5 is th e  depriva tion  o f liberty , th e  te rm  ‘se cu rity ’ s ign ify ing  tha t a rre s t 
o r de ten tion  m ust no t be a rb itra ry .53 Thus, in re la tion  to  A rtic le  5, ‘secu rity  o f p e rson ’ is 
m e re ly  an ‘a u x ilia ry  con cep t’ ,54 w h ich , as M acove i exp la ins , ‘m ust be unde rs tood  in the  
con te x t o f phys ica l libe rty  and ... canno t be in te rp re ted  as re fe rr ing  to  d iffe ren t m a tte rs  (such 
as a du ty  on the  s ta te  to  g ive  som eone  pe rsona l p ro tec tion  from  an a ttack  by o the rs  . . . ) . ’55 
U ltim ate ly, the re fo re , it a ppea rs  c lea r th a t the  ph rase  ‘libe rty  and secu rity  o f p e rson ’ shou ld  
be  read as a w ho le , A rtic le  5 (1) em body ing  an essen tia l sa feguard  des igned  to  p ro te c t 
ind iv idua ls  aga ins t a rb itra ry  in te rfe rences  w ith  th e ir phys ica l libe rty  by the  sta te .
49 E a s t  A f r i c a n  A s ia n s  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 978 ) 13 DR  5, 10: In the Comm ission's view , the protection  
of "security" in this context is concerned with arbitrary interference, by a  public authority, with an  
individual's personal "liberty". O r, in o ther words, any  decision taken  within the  sphere  of A rticle 5  
must, in o rder to sa feguard  the individual's right to ‘security of person ’, conform  to the procedural as  
well as the substan tive requ irem ents laid down by an a lready  existing law . In T s a v a c h id is  v  G r e e c e  
(1 997 ) 23  E HRR  CD  135 , the Comm ission asserted  that ‘"liberty of person" ... m eans  freedom  from  
arrest and detention,' w hereas  “security of person” w as  said to be  ‘the protection agains t arb itrary  
in terference with this liberty’ (p a ra  2). S ee  Rhonda Powell, T h e  R ight to Security of Person  in 
European  Court o f Hum an  Rights Jurisp rudence’ (2 0 0 7 ) 6 European  Hum an  R ights Law  R ev iew  649 .
50 Colin W arbrick, T h e  European  Convention on Hum an  R ights and the Prevention o f Terro rism ’ 
(1 983 ) 3 2 (1 ) In ternational and Comparative  Law  Quarterly  82 , 110.
1 S ee , for exam ple , A l t u n  v  T u r k e y  App No 2 4 5 6 1 /9 4  (EC tHR , 1 June  2 004 ), para  57 . S e e  also the  
Comm ission ’s decision in A ,  B ,  C , D ,  E ,  F ,  G , H , a n d  I  v  F e d e r a l  R e p u b l ic  o f  G e rm a n y  App No  
5 5 73 /7 2  and 6 6 7 0 /7 2  (Comm ission  Decision, 16 July 1976 ), para 28: T h e  term  "liberty and security of  
person" in this provision must be read as a w ho le .’
2 B o z a n o  v  F r a n c e  (1 987 ) 9 EHRR  297 .
53 ibid, para 54: T h e  Convention ... requires that any  m easure  depriving the individual o f liberty must 
be com patib le with the purpose of Article 5, nam ely  to protect the individual from  arb itrariness. W h a t  
is a t stake here is not only the ‘right to liberty’ but also the ‘right to security o f person. S ee  also O c a la n  
v T u r k e y  (2 005 ) 41 E H RR  985 , para  83 .
54 Powell subm its that, as an ‘auxiliary concep t’, the Article 5 right to security o f person ‘is abou t  
s e c u r in g  liberty and has no independen t content of its own ’: Powell, (n 49 ) 650 .
55 Monica M acovei, T h e  R ig h t  to  L ib e r t y  a n d  S e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  P e r s o n :  A  G u id e  to  t h e  Im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  
th e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (Council of Europe Publishing 2 002 ) 6. S ee  chap te r 2  of 
this thesis for discussion of the qualified right to protect which arises under Article 2 ECHR .
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iv . T h e  A r t ic le  5  R ig h t  to  ‘L ib e r t y ’
The  co re  o f A rtic le  5 is th e  r igh t to  libe rty  o f the  pe rson . The re fo re , th e  firs t s tep  in 
e s tab lish ing  the  p rec ise  scope  o f the  guaran tee  em bod ied  w ith in  the  p rov is ion  is de te rm in ing  
w ha t is m ean t by the  te rm  ‘lib e rty ’ . N e ith e r th e  te x t o f the  C onven tio n  itse lf, no r the  t ra v a u x  
p re p a ra to ire s , con ta in  any  exp lic it s ta tem en t as to  w ha t concep tio n  o f libe rty  is app licab le . 
However, a u tho rita tive  e xp lica tion  o f the  concep t w as p rov ided  by  the  EC tHR  in the  case  o f 
E n g e l,56 w he re in  it w as  de te rm ined  tha t: ‘ In p roc la im ing  the  ‘righ t to  lib e rty ’, pa rag raph  1 o f 
A rtic le  5 is con tem p la tin g  ind iv id ua l libe rty  in its c lass ic  sense , th a t is to  say  the  phys ica l 
libe rty  o f the  pe rson .’57 It is thu s ev iden t th a t A rtic le  5  is e xc lu s ive ly  p ro tec tive  o f phys ica l 
liberty , w h ich  is rega rded  as ‘in th e  firs t rank  o f fundam en ta l r igh ts ’58 in any  dem ocra tic  
soc ie ty  w h ich  pu rpo rts  to  be gove rned  in a cco rdance  w ith  th e  ru le  o f law .59 In E nge l, the  
C ou rt fu r the r iden tified  tha t the  a im  o f A rtic le  5 is to  p reven t un jus tified  in te rfe rences  w ith  
pe rsona l libe rty ,60 th is  a ssessm en t be ing  re ite ra ted  and  a ffirm ed  in num erous  subsequen t 
ca ses .61 Indeed, th e  A rtic le  p ro sc ribe s  any  dep riva tion  o f libe rty  th a t is no t pu rsuan t to  one  o f 
the  pe rm iss ib le  g rounds  and  im posed  in acco rdance  w ith  a  p rocedure  p re sc ribed  by  law .62 
T he  fo rego ing  ana lys is  th e re fo re  rende rs  it a ppa ren t th a t A rtic le  5, ‘re la tes  on ly  to  a ve ry  
spec ific  a spec t o f hum an lib e rty ’,63 its essen tia l conce rn  be ing  to  p ro tec t ind iv idua ls  from  
be ing  d ispossessed  o f th e ir phys ica l libe rty  in an a rb itra ry  m anne r.64
56 E n g e l  v  N e th e r la n d s  (1 976 ) 1 E H RR  647 .
57 ibid para 58.
58 M c K a y  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 006 ) 4 4  E HRR  827 , para  30.
59 S ee  W in te rw e r p  v  T h e  N e th e r la n d s  (1 979 ) 2  E HRR  387 , paras 37 , 39; A s k o y  v  T u r k e y  (1 996 ) 23  
EHRR  553 , para 76.
60 E n g e l  (n 56 ) para 58 .
61 S ee , for exam ple , W in te rw e r p  (n 59 ) para  37 , B o z a n o  v  F r a n c e  (1 987 ) 9 E HRR  297 , para  54;  
B r o g a n  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 989 ) 11 E HRR  117 , para  58; G u z z a r d i  v  I t a ly  (1 981 ) 3  E H RR  333 , para  
92; A  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 009 ) 4 9  E HRR  29 , para  162 .
62 Article 5 (1 )(a )-(e ) ECHR .
63 EU  Network of Independent Experts on Fundam enta l R ights, C o m m e n ta r y  o n  th e  C h a r t e r  o f  
F u n d a m e n ta l  r ig h t s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n io n  (2 006 ) 67 .
64 T rechse l observes that Article 5 is based  upon a  ‘rather specific model o f protection o f personal 
liberty’, one which is strongly influenced by the Ang lo -Saxon  legal tradition: S te fan  T rechse l, T h e  
Right to Liberty and Security of Person: Article 5 of the European  Conven tion  on Hum an  R ights in the  
Strasbourg C ase -law ’ (1 9 8 0 ) 1 (1 ) Hum an  R ights Law  Journal 88 , 8 9 -9 1 .
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v. T h e  S c o p e  o f  A r t ic le  5  E C H R
In o rde r fo r  A rtic le  5 to  be engaged , the  c ircum stances  m ust invo lve  a ‘d e p riv a tio n ’ o f  liberty . 
There fo re , a necessa ry  s tep  in de te rm in ing  the  app lica tion  and  scope  of A rtic le  5 is to  
es tab lish  p rec ise ly  w ha t ‘d ep riva tion  o f lib e rty ’ m eans in th is  con tex t.
It a ppea rs  c lea r from  exam ina tio n  o f th e  C onven tio n  itse lf th a t A rtic le  5 is in tended  to  a ffo rd  
p ro tec tion  aga ins t dep riva tio ns  of, ra the r than  m ere  re s tric tion s upon, an in d iv id ua l’s phys ica l 
liberty. F irstly, th a t th is  in te rp re ta tion  is appos ite  is ind ica ted  by  A rtic le  5 ’s use  o f the  te rm s  
‘dep rived  o f h is lib e rty ’ , ‘a rre s t’ and ‘d e ten tio n .’65 T he  co rre c tness  o f th is  app roach  can  a lso  
be in fe rred  from  the  e x is tence  o f A rtic le  2 o f P ro toco l 4  o f the  C onven tio n .66 A rtic le  2 (1 ) o f 
th is  op tiona l P ro toco l g ua ran tees  to  e ve ry  lega l re s iden t o f a s ta te  the  r igh t o f ‘libe rty  o f 
m ovem en t’ w ith in  the  te r r ito ry  o f  th a t coun try . W e re  A rtic le  5 to  be cons trued  to  co ve r 
res tric tions  on freedom  o f m ovem ent, A rtic le  2 o f P ro toco l 4  w ou ld  consequen tly  be  rende red  
o tiose . W h ils t it can  the re fo re  be con fid en tly  a sse rted  tha t A rtic le  5 is conce rned  e xc lu s ive ly  
w ith  ins tances  o f d ep riva tion  o f liberty , res tric tions  upon libe rty  o f m ovem en t be ing  the  
p rov ince  o f A rtic le  2 o f P ro toco l 4, d e te rm in ing  exac tly  w he re  the  d iv id ing  line  be tw een  th ese  
tw o  p rov is ions  lies  rem a ins  an  issue  fraugh t w ith  com p lex ity .
vi. D e p r iv a t io n  o f  L ib e r ty
The  pa rad igm  case  o f dep riva tion  o f libe rty  a rise s w he re  an ind iv idua l is in ca rce ra ted  in a 
pena l ins titu tion  fo llow ing  conv ic tion  by a com pe ten t cou rt o f law .67 W h ils t phys ica l d e ten tio n  
o f th is  k ind  wou ld  p la in ly  pose  no d ifficu lty  in te rm s  o f c lass ifica tio n , obv ious ly  no t all 
s itu a tion s  a re  th is  c lea r cut. W he re  the  res tric tions  upon  an in d iv id ua l’s lib e rty  a re  less 
abso lu te , it becom es necessa ry  to  a ssess w he the r th e  degree  o f in te rfe rence  is su ch  tha t a 
depriva tion  o f liberty , w ith in  the  m ean ing  o f A rtic le  5, has occu rred .
65 E n g e l  (n 56 ) para 58.
66 Protocol No 4  to the Convention  for the Protection of Hum an  Rights and Fundam en ta l F reedom s  
Securing Certa in  Rights and F reedom s O ther Than  Those  A lready  Included in the Conven tion  and  in 
the First Protocol There to  (1 963 ).
67 Article 5(1 )(a ) ECHR .
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A lthough  A rtic le  5 is th e  sub je c t o f a  substan tia l body  o f ju r isp rudence , as S tone  obse rves, 
‘the  S trasbou rg  case law  is no t pa rticu la rly  he lpfu l, in th a t it p rov ides  no c le a r gu idance  as  to  
when  a re s tric tion  on freedom  w ill reach the  degree  o f in tens ity  requ ired  fo r it to  be rega rded  
as a “depriva tion  o f libe rty ” .’68 D esp ite  the  ine v itab le  d ifficu ltie s  incu rred  in a ttem p ting  to  
de te rm ine  the  locus o f the  d iv ide  be tw een  depriva tions  of, and res tric tions  upon, lib e rty  w ith  
any real p rec is ion , as is d iscussed  in de ta il be low , th is  d is tin c tion  w as none the less  in teg ra l to  
the  ope ra tion  o f the  con tro l o rde rs  reg ime. In the  fo llow ing  sec tion , the re fo re , ana lys is  o f a 
num be r o f key  A rtic le  5 cases  w ill be used in o rde r to  de lin ea te  the  C ou rt’s app roach  to  th is  
critica l issue.
vii. D e te rm in in g  th e  E x is te n c e  o f  a  ‘D e p r iv a t io n  o f  L ib e r ty ’: T h e  A p p ro a c h  o f  th e  E u ro p e a n  
C o u r t  o f  H um a n  R ig h ts
There  a re  m an ifo ld  w ays in w h ich  a pe rson ’s libe rty  m ay  be constra ined  by the  s ta te . 
T here fo re , in de te rm in ing  w he the r an  ind iv idua l has been  dep rived  of th e ir libe rty , fo cu s  m us t 
be p laced  upon th e ir a c tua l c ircum s tances . Thus, the  s ta rting  po in t o f inqu iry  is the  ‘conc re te  
s itu a tio n ’ o f th e  re le van t in d iv id ua l.69 T he  ra tiona le  fo r  th is  app roach  w as e lu c ida ted  b y  the  
C ou rt in th e  m ilita ry  d isc ip line  case  o f E nge l:
The  bounds  tha t A rtic le  5 requ ires  the  S ta te  no t to  exceed  a re  no t id en tica l fo r  
se rv icem en  and c iv ilians . A  d isc ip lin a ry  pena lty  o r m easure  w h ich  on ana lys is  
w ou ld  unquestio nab ly  be deem ed a dep riva tion  o f libe rty  w ere  it app lie d  to  a  
c iv ilian  m ay no t possess th is  cha ra c te ris tic  w hen  im posed  upon  a 
se rv icem an .70
It is the re fo re  c lea r th a t the  concep t o f ‘dep riva tion  o f lib e rty ’ does  no t cons titu te  a fixed  lega l 
s tanda rd  wh ich  is to  be app lied  in a un ifo rm  m anne r rega rd less o f th e  c ircum s tances  
invo lved . Indeed, the  C ou rt a dop ts  a con tex t sens itive , ra the r than  fo rm a lis tic , a pp roach  
w h ich  takes  in to a ccoun t the  p rac tica l rea lities  o f the  ind iv id ua l’s case .
68 S tone  (n 4 1 )  51 . S ee  also Jim  Murdoch, ‘Safeguard ing the Liberty of the Person: R ecen t 
Strasbourg Ju risp rudence’ (1 9 93 ) 4 2 (3 )  In ternational and Com para tive  Law  Quarterly  4 9 4 , 4 9 5 .
69 E n g e l  (n 56 ) para 59.
70 ibid.
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Once  the  con tex t o f the  app lican t’s loss o f libe rty  has been  iden tified , the  C ou rt w ill then  
p roceed  to  cons ide r all fa c to rs  re le van t to  e s tab lish ing  w he the r th e  re s tric tion  o f the  
ind iv id ua l’s fre edom  is such  tha t it is ju dged  to  fa ll w ith in  the  scope  o f A rtic le  5. A s  Fenw ick  
iden tifies , the  ‘lead ing  dec is ion  on non -parad igm  cases  o f in te rfe rences  w ith  lib e rty ’71 is 
G u z z a rd i v  I ta ly .72 T he  case  conce rned  a  suspec ted  M a fioso  who  had been p laced  unde r 
spec ia l superv is ion , w h ich  invo lved  h im  be ing  con fined  fo r a pe riod  o f th ree  yea rs  to  a  2 .5  
square  k ilom e tre  a rea  o f the  rem o te  is land  o f A s ina ra , a  n ine -hou r cu rfew  (22 :00 -7 :00 ), and 
a requ irem en t to  repo rt to  th e  au tho rities  tw ice  da ily . In ho ld ing  tha t the  app lica n t’s A rtic le  5 
righ ts had been  v io la ted ,73 the  C ou rt a d voca ted  a b road  approach  to  de te rm in ing  w he the r a 
dep riva tion  o f libe rty  had occu rred , unde r w h ich , ‘a ccoun t m ust be taken  o f a w ho le  range  o f 
c rite ria  such as the  type , du ra tion , e ffec ts  and  m anne r o f im p lem en ta tion  o f the  m easu re  in 
qu es tio n .’74
Desp ite  th e  a ccep ted  app roach  be ing  one  w h ich  is based  upon a de ta iled  exam ina tio n  o f the  
app lican t’s s itua tion , assess ing  w he the r the  A rtic le  5 th re sho ld  has been c ro ssed  in a 
pa rticu la r ca se  is neve rthe less  o ften  p rob lem atic . Indeed, the  C ou rt itse lf has exp lic itly  
re cogn ised  the  d ifficu lties  in he ren t in c lass ify ing  cases, a cknow ledg ing  tha t, p a rticu la rly  in 
bo rde rline  cases, it is essen tia lly  ‘a m a tte r o f pure  op in ion ’.75
A lthough  the  p rocess o f ca tego riza tion  is fre quen tly  com p lex , and a rguab ly  som ew ha t 
im prec ise , it is som e th ing  w h ich  canno t be avo ided , as it is de te rm ina tive  o f  A rtic le  5 ’s 
app licab ility  in any  g iven  case . Due to  th e  na tu re  o f th e  C ou rt’s approach , th e  fo rm u la tio n  of 
a ny  c lea r gu ide line s on w he re  the  boundary  be tween  A rtic le  5 and  A rtic le  2 o f P ro toco l 4  lies 
is ine v itab ly  d ifficu lt. T he  m ost ins truc tive  s ta tem en t on th is  issue  is cu rren tly  p ro v ided  b y  the
71 Helen  Fenw ick, ‘Recalibra ting  E C H R  Rights, and the Ro le  of the Hum an  R ights Ac t Post 9 /11 : 
Reasserting  International Hum an  Rights Norms in the  ‘W a r  on Terro r’ (2 0 1 0 ) 6 3 (1 ) Curren t Legal 
Prob lems 153, 167.
72 (1981 ) 3 E HRR  333 .
73 Th e  Court held by 10 vo tes  to 8 that the restrictions imposed upon G uzzard i, ‘cum ulatively and in 
combination’, am ounted  to  a  deprivation of liberty in violation of Article 5 (1 ) EC HR .
74 G u z z a r d i  (n 72 ) para  92.
75 ibid para  93.
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G u z z a rd i ju dgm en t, w he re in  the  C ou rt conc luded  tha t, ‘the  d iffe rence  be tw een  dep riva tion  o f 
and res tric tion  upon  libe rty  is ... m e re ly  one  o f degree  o r  in tens ity , and no t one  o f na tu re  o r 
subs tance .’76
viii. P e rm is s ib le  D e p r iv a t io n s  o f  L ib e r ty
The  righ t to  libe rty  and secu rity  o f pe rson , w h ils t rega rded  as fundam en ta l in a libera l 
dem ocracy, does no t en joy  abso lu te  s ta tus  unde r the  ECHR .77 A rtic le  5 spec ifies  a range  of 
s ta te  in te res ts , pu rsuan t to  w h ich  an ind iv idua l m ay  leg itim a te ly  be deprived  o f th e ir liberty . 
The  s ix  pe rm iss ib le  g rounds  fo r dep riva tion  o f libe rty  se t ou t unde r pa rag raph  1 com prise :
(a) the  law fu l de ten tion  o f a pe rson  a fte r conv ic tion  by a  com pe ten t court;
(b) the  law fu l a rres t o r de ten tion  o f a  pe rson  fo r non -com p lia n ce  w ith  the  law fu l o rde r of 
a cou rt in o rde r to  secu re  the  fu lfilm en t o f a n y  ob liga tion  p rescribed  by law ;
(c) th e  law fu l a rres t o r de ten tion  o f a  pe rson  e ffec ted  fo r  th e  pu rpose  o f b ring ing  him  
be fo re  the  com pe ten t lega l a u tho rity  on reasonab le  susp ic ion  o f hav ing  comm itted  an 
o ffence  o r w hen  reasonab ly  cons ide red  necessa ry  to  p reven t h is com m itting  an 
o ffence  o r fle e ing  a fte r hav ing  done  so;
(d) the  de ten tion  o f a  m ino r by law fu l o rde r fo r th e  pu rpose  o f educa tiona l supe rv is ion  o r 
h is law fu l de ten tion  fo r the  pu rpose  o f b ring ing  h im  be fo re  the  com pe ten t lega l 
au tho rity ;
(e) the  law fu l de ten tion  o f pe rsons  fo r th e  sp read ing  o f in fec tious  d iseases , o f p e rsons  o f 
unsound  m ind, a lcoho lics  o r  d rug  add ic ts  o r vag ran ts ;
(f) the  law fu l a rres t o r de ten tion  o f a pe rson  to  p reven t h is e ffec ting  an unau tho rized  
en try  in to  the  coun try  o r o f a  pe rson  aga ins t w hom  action  is be ing  ta ken  w ith  a  v iew  
to  depo rta tio n  o r ex trad itio n .78
The  lis t o f c ircum s tances  se t ou t unde r (a )-(f) is exhaustive , as ind ica ted  by A rtic le  5(1 ) ’s use  
o f the  p re fa to ry  ph rase  ‘save  in the  fo llow ing  c ircum s tances ’, and con firm ed  by EC tHR  
ju risp rud ence .79 A ny  dep riva tion  o f libe rty  no t ju s tifie d  by re fe rence  to  one  o f th e  A rtic le  5(1) 
subpa rag raphs  w ill the re fo re  be deem ed un law fu l u nder th e  C onven tio n .80 Fu rthe rm o re , the
76 ibid.
77 Unlike, for exam ple , the right to protection against subjection to torture or inhuman and  degrad ing  
trea tm ent or punishment em bodied within Article 3 ECHR .
78 For a  deta iled  survey  of the d ifferent grounds for deprivation of liberty under A rticle 5 (1 ) and  
associated case  law, see  M acove i (n 55 ).
79 E n g e l  (n 56 ) para 57; G u z z a r d i  (n 72 ) para  96; B o u a m a r  v  B e lg iu m  (1 989 ) 11 E HRR  1, para  43 .
80 S ee , for exam ple , the case  of R ie r a  B lu m e  a n d  o t h e r s  v  S p a in  (2 000 ) 30  E H RR  632 . H e re , six 
members  of a  religious group, the C e n t r o  E s o te r ic o  d e  I n v e s t ig a c io n e s ,  w ere , by court order, re leased
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EC tHR  has cons is ten tly  a sse rted  tha t th e  enum e ra ted  excep tion s a re  to  be g iven  a s tr ic t 
in te rp re ta tion .81
In add ition  to  fa lling  w ith in  one  o f th e  re cogn ised  g rounds  fo r depriva tion , the  a rres t o r 
de ten tion  m ust a lso  be ‘law fu l’ and im posed  ‘in a cco rdance  w ith  a p rocedure  p rescribed  by 
law ’.82 T hese  c rite ria  essen tia lly  requ ire  th e  dep riva tion  o f libe rty  to  be ca rr ied  ou t in 
com p lia nce  w ith  the  p rocedura l and subs tan tive  ru les o f the  s ta te ’s na tiona l law . Fu rthe r, as 
w as em phas ised  by  the  cou rt in W in te rw e rp  v  T h e  N e th e r la n d s :83
[T ]he  dom es tic  law  itse lf m ust be  in con fo rm ity  w ith  the  C onven tio n , inc lud ing  
the  gene ra l p rin c ip les  e xp ressed  the re in . T he  notion  underly ing  the  te rm  in 
ques tion  is one  o f fa ir and p rope r p rocedure , namely, tha t any  m easure  
dep riv ing  a  pe rson  o f his libe rty  shou ld  issue  from  and  be e xecu ted  by  an 
app rop ria te  au tho rity  and shou ld  no t be a rb itra ry .84
Thus, no t on ly  m ust the  dep riva tion  o f libe rty  be ca rr ied  ou t in fu ll com p lia nce  w ith  dom es tic  
lega l p rocedures , bu t tho se  p rocedures  them se lves  m ust sa tis fy  th e  s tanda rd  o f law fu lness  
se t by the  C onven tion , en ta iling  tha t th e  app licab le  p ro v is ions  o f na tiona l law  be fo rm u la ted  
w ith  su ffic ie n t p rec is ion  to  pe rm it c itizens to  fo resee , to  a  reasonab le  degree , the  
consequences  a  g iven  ac tion  m ay  in vo lve .85
III. Control Orders: Impact on Liberty
Measures  tha t im pose  res tric tion s on libe rty  o f m ovem en t fo r th e  pu rposes  o f p reven ting  the  
fu tu re  comm iss ion  o f un law fu l ac ts  are, as th e  JCHR  has a cknow ledged , ‘no t in p rin c ip le
into the custody of their fam ilies who, with the ass istance of the Cata lan  police, then confined the  
applicants to a  hotel for nine days for the purpose of ‘dep rogramm ing’ by a psychiatrist and  
psychologist. The  Court held that ‘dep rogramm ing ’ did not fall within the exceptions provided fo r  
under subparagraphs (a )-(f), and that there had therefo re been  a  violation of A rticle 5 (1 )  of the  
Convention.
81 S ee , for exam p le , L a b i t a  v  I t a ly  (2 000 ) 4 6  E HRR  1228 , para  170; L e x a  v  S lo v a k ia  [2008 ] E C H R  
886 , para 119.
82 Article 5 (1 ) ECHR .
83 W in te rw e r p  (n 59 ). The  case  involved a cha llenge  to the applican t’s compulsory detention under the  
Menta lly  III Persons Act 1884 .
84 ibid para  45 .
85 S ee  S te e l  a n d  o t h e r s  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 998 ) 2 8  EHRR  603 , para  54 .
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con tra ry  to  the  C onven tio n .’86 Indeed, th a t p reven tive  m easures  wh ich  re s tr ic t a pe rson ’s 
freedom  o f m ovem en t a re  capab le  o f A rtic le  5 com pa tib ility  has been re cogn ised  by the  
EC tHR  in a num be r o f cases concern ing  Ita ly ’s use  o f ‘spec ia l supe rv is io n ’ m easu res  aga ins t 
suspec ted  M a fia  m em be rs .87 W h ils t S trasbou rg  ju r isp rudence  unequ ivoca lly  e s tab lishes  tha t 
24 -hou r house  a rres t rep resen ts  a dep riva tion  o f libe rty ,88 w he the r lesse r res tra in ts , such  as 
curfew s, re s idence  requ irem en ts , and  e xc lus ion  zones, engage  A rtic le  5, o r ins tead  
cons titu te  re s tric tion s on freedom  o f m ovem ent, w h ich  a re  governed  by P ro toco l 4, A rtic le  2, 
is a  com p le x  m a tte r. A s  d iscussed  above , th e  p rec ise  pa ram e te rs  o f the se  tw o  p rov is io ns  is 
som ew ha t unce rta in , th e  absence  o f any read ily  id en tifiab le  b rig h t- line  be tw een  re s tric tion s  
on m ovem ent and  dep riva tion  o f libe rty  o ften  rende ring  it d ifficu lt to  p red ic t w he the r pa rticu la r 
m easures  a re  like ly  to  c ross  the  A rtic le  5 th resho ld .
D esp ite  no t be ing  cove red  by any o f th e  spec ified  excep tion s  to  A rtic le  5 ,89 the  P TA ’s con tro l 
o rde r p rov is ions  were , p r im a  fa c ie , com pa tib le  w ith  A rtic le  5, a  s ta tem en t o f com pa tib ility  
w ith  C onven tion  righ ts  be ing  m ade  by the  H om e S ecre ta ry  unde r HRA, s 19(1 )(a ) a t th e  tim e  
the  leg is la tion  w as  in troduced .90 A lthough  a con tro l o rde r cou ld  inc lude  a  po ten tia lly  
un lim ited  range  o f ob lig a tio n s ,91 pu rsuan t to  PTA, s 1(2), o b liga tio ns  tha t w e re  incom pa tib le  
w ith  an ind iv id ua l’s A rtic le  5 righ t to  libe rty  cou ld  on ly  be im posed  by a de roga ting  con tro l 
o rd e r92 However, as the  UK  has no t ra tified  A rtic le  2 o f P ro toco l 4, n on -de roga tin g  o rde rs  
cou ld  law fu lly  res tr ic t fre edom  of m ovem en t and  im pose  any  ob lig a tio n s  sho rt o f a  
depriva tion  o f libe rty  the  Home S ec re ta ry  cons ide red  necessa ry  fo r pu rposes  connec ted  w ith
86 JCHR , D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  ( C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  
(n 17) para  27 .
7 S ee  G u z z a r d i  (n 7 2 ) para  92; R a im o n d o  v  I t a ly  (1 9 9 4 ) 18 EH RR  237 , para  39; L a b i ta  v  I t a ly  App no  
2 6 7 7 2 /9 5  (EC tHR , 6 April 2 000 ), paras  193 -195 . S ee  also the Comm ission’s decision in C ia n c im in o  v  
I t a ly  (1 991 ) 7 0  DR  103, 1 22 -123 .
88 N C  v  I t a ly  App no 2 4 9 5 2 /9 4  (EC tH R , 11 January  2 001 ), para  33; M a n c in i  v  I t a ly  A p p  no 4 4 9 5 5 /9 8  
(EC tHR , 2 August 2 001 ), para 17; V a c h e v  v  B u lg a r ia  App no 4 2 9 8 7 /9 8  (EC tHR , 8 O c tober 2 0 0 4 ),  
para  64; N ik lo v a  v  B u lg a r ia  (No . 2 ) App no 4 0 8 9 6 /9 8  (EC tHR , 30  D ecem ber 20 04 ), para  60; P e k o v  v  
B u lg a r ia  App no 5 0 3 5 8 /9 9  (EC tHR , 30  June 2006 ), para  73.
89 Articles 5 (1 )(a )-(f) . S ee  vi'ii. P e rm is s ib le  D e p r iv a t io n s  o f  L ib e r t y  above .
90 Th e  Prevention of Terro rism  HC  Bill (2 0 04 -0 5 ) was  accompan ied  by a  s ta tem en t from  Charles  
C larke  that, in his view , the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism  Bill w ere  compatib le  with  
Convention rights.
91 PTA , s 1 (3 ). S ee  also ss 1 (1 ), 1 (4 ), 1 (5).
92 ibid ss 1 (2 )(a ), (b). S ee  further discussion in chap ter 3  of this thesis.
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p reven ting  o r res tric ting  the  con tro lee ’s in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity .93 W h ile  the  
‘d e rog a tin g ’/ ’n on -de roga tin g ’ nom enc la tu re  appea red  to  sugges t th a t the  use o f non ­
de roga ting  o rde rs  w ou ld  no t tr ig g e r A rtic le  5, th e  A c t’s lack  o f c la rity  rega rd ing  the  d is tinc tion  
be tween the  tw o  types  o f o rder, and the  consequen t poss ib ility  th a t o rde rs  pu rpo rting  to  be 
non -de roga ting  in cha ra c te r cou ld  in fa c t invo lve  ob liga tio ns  wh ich  dep rived  the  con tro lee  of 
th e ir liberty , q u ick ly  em erged  as one  o f th e  p rinc ipa l sou rces  o f conce rn  in re la tion  to  the  
reg im e .94
From  the  ou tse t, con tro l o rde rs ’ im pact on libe rty  w as iden tified  as a key  hum an  righ ts  issue  
by the  JCHR . In its 2006  report, the  C omm ittee  exp ressed  d isqu ie t a bou t the  s ys tem ’s 
po ten tia l in com pa tib ility  w ith  A rtic le  5, sugges ting  tha t the  non-de roga tin g  con tro l o rde r 
powers  w ere , in p rac tice , ‘like ly  to  be exe rc ised  ... in a w ay  w h ich  am oun ts  to  a “dep riva tio n  
o f libe rty ’” .95 S ign ifican t conce rns  re la ting  to  the  reg im e ’s com pa tib ility  w ith  A rtic le  5 w ere  
s im ila rly  re ite ra ted  by  the  JCHR  in its subsequen t repo rts ,96 and  w ere  a lso  e choed  b y  the  
Counc il o f E u rope  C omm iss ione r fo r H um an R igh ts .97 D e ta ils  o f the  ob lig a tio n s  im posed  on 
‘m ost bu t no t qu ite  a ll ’ o f the  con tro lees  du ring  the  firs t ten  m on ths  o f th e  reg im e  w ere  
p rov ided  in th e  2006  annua l rev iew  o f th e  A c t.98 In h is report, Lord C arlile  desc rib ed  the
93 ibid ss 1 (2 )(b ), 1 (3 ).
94 S ee  Lucia Zedner, ‘P reventive  Justice or Pre -Pun ishm ent?  Th e  case  o f Control O rde rs ’ (2 0 0 6 ) 60  
Current Legal Problem s 1 7 4 ,1 7 8 .
95 JCHR , D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  ( C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  
(n 17) para  26 . S ee  also paras  36 -42 .
6 S ee  JC HR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  
( C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 t o  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 7  (2 0 06 -0 7 , HL 60 , HC  365 ) paras 2 1 -2 9 ; C o u n te r -  
T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h ts :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  ( C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  
s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 8  (2 0 07 -08 , HL 57 , HC  3 56 ) paras 35 -49 ; C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l i c y  a n d  
H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 t o  9 )  O r d e r  
2 0 0 9  {2 0 08 -0 9 , HL 37 , HC  282 ) paras  10, 43 ; C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  ( S ix t e e n th  
R e p o r t ) :  A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 1 0  (2 0 09 -1 0 , HL 64 , HC  395 ) 3.
97 Council of Europe, Comm issioner for Hum an  Rights, R e p o r t  b y  M r  A lv a r o  G i l - R o b le s ,  
C o m m is s io n e r  f o r  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  o n  h is  V is i t  to  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  4 - 1 2 th N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 4  
(C ommDH , 2 0 05 ) para  17.
8 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 006 ) para 42 . The  obligations included an 18 hour curfew , elec tron ic tagg ing , 
tw ice daily reporting requ irem ents , limitation of visitors and meetings to persons approved  in advance  
by the Hom e O ffice, a requ irem ent to allow  the police to en ter the contro lee’s residence  at any  tim e, 
conduct searches, and rem ove  any  item , prohibitions on mobile phones and the  use of the  internet, 
and restrictions on m ovem ent to within a  defined a rea . A pro form a of the  full Schedu le  of Obligations  
imposed under the orders is contained in Annex  2 (pp 2 8 -3 5 ) of the report.
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ob liga tio ns  as ‘e x trem e ly  re s tric tive ’,99 s ta ting  tha t th e y  inh ib ited  no rm a l life  cons ide rab ly , 
and fe ll ‘no t ve ry  sho rt o f house  a rre s t.’100
During  the  life tim e  o f the  reg ime, no de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  w e re  issued , all o f the  o rde rs  
m ade be tw een  2005-2011  be ing  o f th e  non-de roga tin g  va rie ty .101 W h ils t n on -de roga tin g  
o rde rs w ere  o s tens ib ly  A rtic le  5 com p lian t, th e y  w e re  frequen tly  sub je c t to  lega l cha lle nge  on 
the  g rounds  tha t, in p rac tice , the  package  o f ob liga tio ns  they  invo lved  am oun ted  to  a 
dep riva tion  o f liberty . O n 31 O c tobe r 2007 , th e  House  o f Lo rds  handed  down jud gm en ts  in a 
trio  o f im po rtan t cases, JJ ,102 E ,103 and  M B  a n d  A F ,104 comm on  to  all o f w h ich  w e re  c la im s  
tha t the  non-de roga tin g  o rde rs  th a t had been  im posed  deprived  the  con tro lees  o f th e ir  libe rty  
in v io la tion  o f A rtic le  5 .105 The  dec is ions  in the se  cases, and  the ir im pact upon the  ope ra tion  
o f the  con tro l o rde r reg im e, a re  e xam ined  in de ta il be low .
/. N o n -D e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e rs :  T h e  A r t ic le  5  L it ig a t io n
JJ , w h ich  rep resen ts  th e  key  ju dgm en t w ith  respec t to  A rtic le  5, conce rned  s ix  re sponden ts , 
all o f w hom  w e re  no n -n a tio na ls .106 Each w as  sub je c t to  a con tro l o rde r th a t w as  in ‘m o re  o r  
less s tanda rd  fo rm .’107 T he  o rde rs  im posed  on the  con tro lees  an 18 -hou r cu rfew  (16 :00 - 
10 :00), du ring  wh ich  th ey  w e re  con fined  to  th e ir de s igna ted  one -bed room  fla ts . T h e ir  
res idences  w e re  sub je c t to  spo t sea rches  by the  po lice , and  all v is ito rs  had to  rece ive  p rio r
99 ibid.
100 ibid para  43 .
101 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para 3 .3 .
102 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J  [2007 ] UKHL  45 .
103 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2 007 ] UKHL  47 .
104 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M B  a n d  A F  [2007 ] UKHL  46 .
105 These  cases  have been the subject of extens ive  academ ic  commentary . S ee  Ed Bates, ‘Anti- 
Terrorism  Control O rders: Liberty and Security Still in the B a lance ’ (2 0 0 9 ) 2 9 (1 )  Legal S tud ies  99; 
David Fe ldm an , ‘Deprivation of L iberty in Anti-Terrorism  Law ’ (2 0 0 8 ) 6 7 (1 )  Cam bridge  Law  Journal 4; 
Helen  Fenw ick  and Gavin  Phillipson, ‘Covert Derogations and Judicial Defe rence: Redefin ing  L iberty  
and Due Process in Counterterrorism  Law  and Beyond ’ (2 0 1 1 ) 5 6 (4 ) McG ill Law  Journal 863; C live  
Walker, Terro rism : Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 0 0 5  ss 2  and 3 -  Non-derogating Control O rde r -
W he the r “Deprivation o f L iberty” Under European  Convention  on Hum an  R ights A rt 5 ’ (2 0 0 8 ) 6
Crim inal Law  R ev iew  486 .
106 F ive of the respondents w ere  Iraqi nationals, whilst the sixth was  e ither an Iraqi or Iranian national. 
Th ree  had been  granted leave  to remain and th ree  had tem pora ry  admission. All w ere  suspected  by  
the  H om e Secre ta ry  of having been  involved in terrorism -rela ted  activities and w ere  assessed  to pose  
a  th reat to the public within the Un ited  K ingdom or overseas.
107 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J  [2007] UKHL  4 5  [20] (Lord B ingham ).
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c lea rance  from  the  Home O ff ic e .108 During  the  s ix  hou rs  th ey  w ere  pe rm itte d  to  leave  the ir 
res idences , th e  con tro lees  w e re  re s tr ic ted  to  de fined  u rban a reas o f up to  se ven ty -tw o  
squa re  k ilom e tre s ,109 and  w e re  fo rb idden  from  m ee ting  anyone  by p rea rrangem en t. T hey  
w ere  a lso  requ ired  to  w ea r an e le c tron ic  tag  and had to  report to  th e  m on ito rin g  com pany 
tw ice  da ily . In add ition , a s ide  from  one  fixed  land line , the  ow ne rsh ip  o r use  of 
com m un ica tio n s  equ ipm en t w as p ro h ib ite d .110
In the  H igh C ou rt,111 a fte r su rvey ing  the  re levan t S trasbou rg  ju risp rudence , S u llivan  J 
conc luded  tha t he was, ‘le ft in no  doub t w ha tsoeve r th a t the  cum u la tive  e ffe c t o f the  
ob lig a tio ns  has been to  dep rive  the  re sponden ts  o f th e ir lib e rty ’,112 desc rib ing  the  con tro le es ’ 
s itua tion  as ‘the  an tithe s is  o f liberty , and ... m ore  akin to  de ten tion  in an open  p r ison .’113 As 
the  o rde rs  im posed  ob lig a tions  tha t w e re  in com pa tib le  w ith  A rtic le  5, th e y  had been  m ade  by 
the  Home S ecre ta ry  in b reach  o f the  powers  con fe rred  by the  P TA .114 It w as  u ltim a te ly  he ld 
tha t, as  th e  o rde rs  w e re  m ade  w ithou t ju risd ic tion  and  w e re  the re fo re  nu llities , the  p rope r 
cou rse  o f ac tion  w as to  quash  them  pu rsuan t to  s 3 (12 )(a ) o f th e  A c t.115 Su llivan  J ’s dec is ion , 
w h ils t c r itic ised  by the  H om e S ec re ta ry ,116 w as uphe ld  by the  C ou rt o f A pp ea l,117 w ho  ag reed  
th a t the  o rde rs  c lea rly  fe ll ‘on the  w rong  s ide  o f the  d iv id ing  lin e ’, the  ob lig a tio n s  im posed  on 
the  con tro lees  am oun ting  to  ‘a dep riva tion  o f libe rty  con tra ry  to  a rtic le  5 ’.118
108 Visitors w ere  required to supply the ir nam e, address, date of birth and photographic identification.
109 Each a rea  contained a  mosque, a  hospital, primary health care  facilities, shops and en terta inm en t 
and sporting facilities.
110 S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J ,  K K ,  G G , H H , N N , L L  [2006 ] EW H C  1623
ibid [74].
114 ibid [93].
115 ibid [92], [99].
116 A lan Travis , ‘Judge  “M isunderstood” An ti-Terro r Legislation’ T h e  G u a r d ia n  (London, 4  Ju ly  2 0 0 6 )  
<www .guard ian .co .uk/uk/2006 /ju l/04/te rro rism .po litics> accessed  2 0  July 2 012 .
117 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J  a n d  o th e r s  [2006 ] EW CA  C iv 1141 .





By a m a jo rity  o f th ree  to  tw o ,119 the  House  o f Lo rds  re jec ted  the  H om e S ec re ta ry ’s
subsequen t appea l, upho ld ing  the  low er cou rts ’ fin d ings  tha t, due to  the  cum u la tive  im pact of
th e  ob lig a tions , the  o rde rs  dep rived  the  con tro lees  o f th e ir libe rty  in b reach  o f A rtic le  5. 
G iving  the  lead ing  ju dgm en t, Lo rd  B ingham  s ta ted  tha t, w h ils t ‘in o rd ina ry  pa rlan ce  a pe rson  
is taken  to  be dep rived  o f h is o r  he r libe rty  w hen  locked  up in a p rison  c e ll’ ,120 the  concep t is 
no t lim ited  to  th is, and ‘d ep riva tion  o f libe rty  m ay  ta ke  num erous  fo rm s  o th e r than  c la ss ic  
de ten tion  in p rison  o r  s tric t a rre s t.’121 R e ly ing  on E n g e l122 and  G u z z a r d i '23 he exp la ined  tha t 
th e  cou rt’s ta sk  w as  to  cons ide r the  ind iv id ua l’s ‘conc re te  s itu a tio n ’ ,124 and, ta k ing  in to  
a ccoun t th e  w ho le  range  o f fac to rs , such  as the  na ture , du ra tion , and  m anne r o f e xecu tion  or 
im p lem en ta tion  o f the  m easu re s  in qu es tio n ,125 to  assess  the ir im pact on the  ind iv idua l 
sub je c t to  them  in te rm s  o f th e ir e ffec t ‘on the  life  the  pe rson  w ou ld  have  been  liv ing  
o th e rw ise .’126
O bse rv ing  tha t the  leng thy  cu rfew  and  e ffe c tive  exc lus ion  of v is ito rs  m ean t th a t th e
con tro lees  w e re  ‘in p rac tice  in so lita ry  con fin em en t’ fo r  m uch  o f the  day, Lo rd  B ingham
conc luded  tha t th e y  had been  dep rived  o f th e ir liberty , th e ir lives be ing  ‘w ho lly  regu la ted  by 
the  Home O ffice ’ .127 B a roness Ha le concu rred  w ith  th is  assessm en t, em phas iz ing  the  e x ten t 
to  w h ich  the  reg im e  cu t the  con tro lees ’ o ff from  no rm a l so c ie ty ,128 and s ta tin g  tha t th e  rea lity  
w as tha t ‘eve ry  a spect o f th e ir  lives w as  seve re ly  con tro lle d .’129 W h ils t bo th  Lo rd  B ingham
and Baroness  Ha le w e re  re lu c tan t to  sugges t an  upper lim it in te rm s o f th e  leng th  o f cu rfew  
tha t w ou ld  be  com pa tib le  w ith  A rtic le  5 ,130 Lo rd  B rown op ined  th a t a lth ough  18 hou rs  w as




122 Enge l (n 56 ).
123 G u z z a r d i  (n 72 ).
124 J J  (n 102) [15].
125 ibid [16].




130 ibid. S ee  [16] (Lord B ingham ); [63] (Baroness Ha le ). S ee  also the comments  of Lord Carswell at  
[84].
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‘s im p ly  to o  long to  be cons is ten t w ith  the  re ten tion  o f phys ica l libe rty ’ ,131 he be lie ved  a  16- 
hou r cu rfew  w ou ld  no rm a lly  be a c ce p ta b le .132 He d id , however, go  on to  s tre ss  tha t 16 hours 
‘shou ld  be rega rded  as the  abso lu te  lim it.’133
In con tras t to  the  m a jo rity , the  d issen tien ts , Lord H o ffm ann  and  Lord C arswe ll, a d voca ted  
adop tin g  a ve ry  na rrow  concep tion  o f dep riva tion  o f lib e rty .134 Lord  H o ffm ann , fo r  exam p le , 
subm itted  tha t it w as  ‘essen tia l no t to  g ive  an o ve r-e xpans ive  in te rp re ta tion  to  th e  concep t of 
d epriva tion  o f lib e rty ’ ,135 s ta ting  tha t it w as  ‘c lea r from  the  unqua lified  na tu re  o f th e  [A rtic le  5] 
righ t to  libe rty  ... th a t it dea ls  w ith  lite ra l phys ica l re s tra in t.’136 He w en t on to  dec la re  th a t the  
concep t shou ld  be  con fined  to  ‘ac tua l im p risonm en t o r  som eth ing  w h ich  is fo r  p rac tica l 
pu rposes  little  d iffe ren t from  im p risonm en t’, ins is ting  tha t to  in te rp re t it o the rw ise  w ou ld  
‘p lace  too  g rea t a re s tric tion  on the  s ta te  to  dea l w ith  se rio us  te rro ris t th re a ts ’ .137 A s  Lo rd  
H o ffm ann  found  it im poss ib le  to  say  tha t th e  con tro lees  w e re  ‘fo r  p rac tica l pu rposes  in 
p rison ’ ,138 he be lie ved  tha t the  o rde rs  d id no t v io la te  A rtic le  5, bu t ins tead  cons titu ted  
res tr ic tion s on freedom  o f m ovem en t.139 Lord  C arswe ll, w h ils t consc ious  o f th e  m a jo rity ’s 
conce rns , ag reed  w ith  Lord  H offm ann , conc lud ing  tha t, on  ba lance , even  the  e x tens ive  
cu rfew s  im posed  on the  con tro lees  d id no t ta ke  the  cases ‘o ve r the  line  o f d ep riva tion  o f 
lib e rty .’140
ibid [105 ].
1 3 2
ibid. Lord Brown went on to state that: ‘leaving the suspect with eight hours (adm ittedly in various  
respects contro lled) liberty a day. ... in my opinion, can and should properly be charac terised as  . ..  [a 
regime] which restricts the suspect's liberty of m ovem en t rather than actually deprives  him of his 
liberty’ [105 ]. S ee  also [108].
133 ibid [105].
134 S ee  Dom inic McGoldrick, T e rro rism  and Hum an  R ights Paradigm s: T h e  United K ingdom  a fte r 11 
Sep tem ber 2 0 0 1 ’ in A ndrea  Bianchi and A lexis Keller, C o u n te r t e r r o r is m :  D e m o c r a c y ’s  C h a l le n g e  
(H art Publishing 2 008 ) 172.
* J J ( n 1 0 2 )  [44].
136 ibid [36].
137 ibid [44].
138 ibid [45]. Lord Hoffm ann went on to sta te  that to describe the contro lees as  such would be  ‘an  




In S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E ,141 th e  cou rts  w ere  requ ired  to  de te rm ine  
w he the r a non -de roga tin g  o rde r im pos ing  less onerous  ob lig a tio n s  than  those  w h ich  app lied  
to  the  con tro lees  in J J  am oun ted  to  a dep riva tion  o f liberty . E ’s 142 con tro l o rde r inc luded  
e le c tron ic  tagg ing , res idence  a t a spec ified  address , a  12 -hour cu rfew  (19 :00 -7 :00 ), tw ice  
da ily  repo rting , res tric tions  on v is ito rs  to , and on p re -a rranged  m ee tings ou ts ide  of, the  
res idence , and the  p roh ib ition  o f any m ob ile  phone  o r equ ipm en t capab le  o f connec tin g  to  
the  in te rne t.143 In the  H igh Court, Bea tson  J conc luded  tha t, a lthough  ‘m o re  fin e ly  ba lanced  
than  the  J J  ca ses ’,144 the  cum u la tive  e ffe c t o f the  ob liga tions  d id deprive  E o f h is libe rty  in 
b reach  o f A rtic le  5. T h is  dec is ion  was, however, reve rsed  by the  C ou rt o f A p p e a l.145 In ligh t 
o f th e  fa c t th a t E w as  liv ing  w ith  h is fam ily  in h is own hom e, w as  no t sub je c t to  any 
geog raph ica l res tric tion s du ring  non -cu rfew  hours, cou ld  engage  in a  num erous e ve ryday  
ac tiv ities , and  w as ab le  to  m a in ta in  a  w ide  range  o f soc ia l con tac ts , th e  C ou rt he ld th a t the  
degree  o f re s tra in t w as  ‘fa r  from  a dep riva tion  o f libe rty  in A rtic le  5 te rm s .’146 T h is  dec is ion  
was subsequen tly  uphe ld  by  the  House  o f Lo rds ,147 Lord  B ingham  comm en ting  th a t a  12- 
hour cu rfew  as ‘the  co re  e lem en t o f con fin em en t’ w as ‘in su ffic ien tly  s tr in gen t’ fo r  th e re  to  be 
a  dep riva tion  o f lib e rty .148
The  A rtic le  5 cha lle nge  in the  th ird  case , M B  a n d  A F ,U9 spec ifica lly  re la ted  to  th e  con tro l 
o rde r im posed  upon A F .150 T he  o rde r inc luded  a 14 -hour cu rfew  (18 :00 -8 :00 ), re s idence  a t 
the  fla t he o ccup ied  w ith  h is fa the r, e le c tron ic  tagg ing , reporting  requ irem en ts , and  a range
141 [2007] EW HC  233  (Admin); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  a n d  a n o t h e r  [2 007 ]  
EW CA  C iv 459 ; S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2007 ] UKHL  47 .
142 E, a  Tun isian national who had arrived in the UK  in 1994 , w as  one of the individuals certified  by the  
Hom e Secre ta ry  under s 21 of Anti-terrorism , C rim e and Security Act 2 001 , and had been  de ta in ed  in 
Belmarsh betw een  2001  and 2005 .
143 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2007] EW HC  233  (Admin) [49]. In addition, the  
order imposed obligations requiring E to perm it police searches  of his residence  and notify the  H om e  
Office of any  intended departure  from the UK, and also involved restrictions on E ’s bank  account and  
on the transfer of money, documents or goods to destinations outside the UK.
144 ibid [242 ].
145 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  a n d  a n o t h e r  [2007 ] EW CA  C iv 4 59 .
146 ibid [63] (Pill LJ).
147 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2007 ] UKHL  47 .
148 ibid [11]. S ee  [23] (Lord Hoffmann); [25] (Baroness Hale); [30 ]-[31 ] (Lord Carsw ell); [36] (Lord  
Brown).
U9 M B  a n d  A F ( n 104).
150 AF  was  a  dual UK /Libyan national.
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of o the r anc illa ry  ob lig a tio n s .151 In add ition , du ring  non -cu rfew  hours, A F  w as  res tric ted  to  an 
urban  a rea  o f app ro x im a te ly  n ine  squa re -m ile s . D isag ree ing  w ith  the  H igh  C ou rt’s 
de c is io n ,152 the  House  o f Lo rds  unan im ous ly  he ld th a t th e re  had been  no dep riva tion  o f 
lib e rty .153 Lord B rown, re fe rr ing  to  h is dec is ion  in JJ , s ta ted  tha t he d id  no t regard  a 14 -hou r 
cu rfew  as ‘invo lv ing  a su ffic ie n t deg ree  o f phys ica l con fin em en t to  cons titu te  a  dep riva tion  o f 
lib e rty ’,154 w h ils t Lo rd  H o ffm ann  asse rted  tha t the  re s tric tion s  im posed  on A F  d id no t ‘com e  
anyw he re  nea r am oun tin g  to  a depriva tion  lib e rty  in the  sense  con tem p la ted  by  the  
C onven tio n .’155
In som e  respects , th e  H ouse  o f Lo rds ’ dec is ion  in J J  m ay  be rega rded  as an  im po rtan t 
a sse rtion  o f the  cou rts ’ ro le in sa feguard ing  human righ ts  in the  na tiona l se cu rity  c o n te x t.156 
In JJ , it w as  subm itted  by the  H om e S ecre ta ry  tha t, due  to  th e  p reva iling  secu rity  c lim a te , th e  
concep t o f dep riva tion  o f libe rty  shou ld  be g iven  an espec ia lly  na rrow  in te rp re ta tio n .157 T he  
m a jority , however, re fused  to  a ccede  to  th is  a rgum en t, Lord  B rown fo rce fu lly  p ro c la im ing  
tha t:
The  bo rde rline  be tw een  dep riva tion  o f libe rty  and res tric tion  o f libe rty  o f 
m ovem en t canno t va ry  a cco rd ing  to  the  pa rticu la r in te res ts  sough t to  be 
se rved  by the  res tra in ts  im posed . T he  s iren  vo ice s  u rg ing  tha t it be  sh ifte d  to  
a ccomm oda te  today 's  need to  com ba t te rro rism  ... m ust be firm ly  res is ted . ...
L ibe rty  is to o  p rec ious a  righ t to  be  d isca rded  e xcep t in tim es  o f genu ine  
na tiona l em ergency . None is sugges ted  he re .158
151 T h e  additional obligations comprised: perm itting the police to en te r and search  his residence, 
restrictions on visitors, banking facilities, and on money, documents and goods transfers ab road . A F  
was also lim ited to attending a  specified m osque and  was  prohibited from  using mobile phones  or the  
in ternet. S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A F  [2007 ] EW HC  651 (Adm in) [5].
152 ibid [89 (O use ley  J). O use ley  J granted a ‘leapfrog certifica te ’ a llow ing direct appea l to the House  
of Lords.
153 M B  a n d  A F  {n  104 )..
154 ibid [89].
155 ibid [47].
156 Bates (n 105 ) 106 .
157 ibid, citing JU S T IC E , W r it te n  S u b m is s io n  o n  b e h a l f  o f  J u s t i c e  (intervening in M B  and A F  befo re  the  
House of Lords) availab le  at <www .justice .o rg .uk>.
158 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J  a n d  o t h e r s  [2007 ] UKHL  4 5  [107]. Lords  
Hoffm ann  and Carswell, however, appeared  to exp ress  som e deg ree  of support fo r the  H om e  
Secre ta ry ’s contention, Lord Hoffmann opining that, ‘it is essen tial not to g ive an ove r-expans iv e  
interpretation to the concep t of deprivation of liberty. ... O therw ise the law  would p lace  too g rea t a  
restriction on the  powers of the state to deal with serious terrorist threats to the lives o f its c itizens ’ 
[44]. S ee  also the comments  of Lord Carswell a t [70].
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Desp ite  J J s  appa ren t, if som ew ha t qua lified , v in d ica tion  o f the  con tro lees ’ r igh t to  ind iv idua l 
liberty , as F os te r no tes, the  House  o f Lo rds ’ ju d gm en ts  in th is  trio  o f linked  cases  re ta ined  
‘an a ir o f u n ce rta in ty ’,159 in tha t, a s ide  from  con firm ing  tha t o rde rs im pos ing  an 18 -hou r 
cu rfew  w ere  in b reach  o f A rtic le  5, th e y  p rov ided  scan t gu idance  on w hen  the  cum u la tive  
e ffec t o f m u ltip le  con tro l o rde r ob lig a tions  w ou ld  am oun t to  a dep riva tion  o f libe rty . Further, 
as Ew ing and Tham  obse rve , the  dec is io ns  w ere , in a sense , ‘rem a rkab ly  pa rad ox ica l’ ,160 as 
they  u ltim a te ly  p roved  to  be ‘m ore  im po rtan t fo r w ha t th e y  appea red  to  pe rm it ra the r than  
w ha t th e y  pu rpo rted  to  p roh ib it.’161
A lthough  J J  fo re c lo sed  the  poss ib ility  o f im pos ing  18 -hour curfew s  unde r non -de roga tin g  
o rd e rs ,162 the  House  o f Lo rds ’ ju d gm en ts  w e re  neve rthe less he ra lded  by the  gove rnm en t as 
a ‘pos itive  en do rsem en t o f th e  p rin c ip le s  o f con tro l o rde rs .’163 Indeed , Lo rd  B row n ’s 
s ta tem en t on the  pe rm iss ib ility  o f 16 -hou r cu rfew s  w as trea ted  as p rov id ing  de fin itive  
c la rifica tion  as  to  the  locus o f the  d iv id ing  line  be tw een  de roga ting  and  no n -d e roga tin g  
o rde rs .164 O ne  im m ed ia te  consequence  o f JJ , the re fo re , w as tha t fo u r e x is tin g  con tro l o rde rs  
w ere  m od ified  so  as to  inc rease  the ir cu rfew  pe riods  from  12 to  16 ho u rs .165 T he  dec is io ns  
w ere  a lso  used as  the  bas is upon w h ich  to  re s is t the  JCH R ’s re comm enda tion  tha t th e  PTA
159 Steve  Foster, ‘Control O rders , Hum an  Rights and the House o f Lords’ (2 0 07 ) 12 (2 ) C oven try  Law  
Journal 27 , 35 . S ee  also Adam  Sandell, ‘Liberty, Fairness and the UK  Control O rde r C ases : Tw o  
Steps Forward, Two  S teps Back ’ (2 008 ) 1 European  Hum an  Rights Law  R ev iew  120 , 124.
160 Keith D Ewing and Joo -Cheong  Tham , T h e  Continuing Futility of the Hum an  R ights A c t’ [20081  
Public Law  668 , 669 .
161 ibid.
162 Th e  finding that 18 -hour curfews am ounted  to a breach o f Article 5 was  said to have  ‘d isappo in ted ’ 
the Hom e Secretary, who, in certain  cases , considered such ex tensive curfews as ‘n ecessa ry ’ to 
protect national security. S ee  HC  Deb  12 D ecem ber 2 007 , vol 4 69 , col 3 9W S  (Tony  McNulty).
63 R e p l ie s  to  t h e  l i s t  o f  is s u e s  (C c p r /C /G b r /Q /6 )  to  b e  ta k e n  u p  in  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  t h e  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  
t h e  S ix th  P e r io d ic  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  th e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  o f  G r e a t  B r i t a in  a n d  N o r t h e r n  
I r e la n d  (C cp r/C /G b r/6 ), 13 June 2008 , para  124  <www2.ohchr.o rg /eng lish /bod ies /h rc /docs / 
AdvanceD ocs /CCPR .C .G BB .Q .6 .A dd .1 .doc>  accessed  21 N ovem ber 2 012 . S ee  also H om e  O ffice, 
G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  T e n th  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  S e s s io n  2 0 0 7 - 0 8  
(Cm  7368 , 2 0 08 ) 1.
64 HC  Deb  12 D ecem ber 2 007 , vol 4 69 , col 3 9W S  (Tony McNulty). S ee  also JC HR , C o u n t e r -  
T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h ts :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  
s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 8  (2 007 -08 , HL  57 , HC  3 56 ) para 39; H om e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  
t h e  T e n th  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  S e s s io n  2 0 0 7 - 0 8  (Cm  7368 , 2 0 0 8 ) 4 .
165 JCHR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  
( C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 8  (2 0 07 -0 8 , HL  57 , HC  356 ) pa ra  4 3 . T h e  curfew s  
imposed by these  orders had previously been  reduced, first from  18 to 14  hours, and then  from  14  to  
12 hours, in response to the earlier lower court judgm en ts . S ee , for exam ple , S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  
t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A F [ 2008 ] EW CA  C iv 117 .
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be am ended  so  as to  s ta tu to rily  lim it d a ily  cu rfew s  to  12 hours, the  gove rnm en t asse rting  
tha t in J J th e  m a jo rity  had ‘e ffe c tive ly  ind ica ted  tha t a con tro l o rde r w ith  ob lig a tio n s  inc lud ing  
a 16 -hour cu rfew  w ou ld  no t b reach  A rtic le  5 ’,166 and fu rthe r, tha t, as a resu lt o f the  H ouse  of 
Lo rds ’ ju dgm en ts , th e  leg is la tion  w as  ‘fu lly  com p lia n t’ w ith  the  ECHR , thus  rende ring  
am endm en t unnecessa ry .167
W h ils t Lord B row n ’s lone p ronouncem en t in J J  w as  sa id  by the  JCHR  to  be a ‘ve ry  s le nde r 
lega l b as is ’168 fo r th e  v iew  tha t o rde rs  con ta in ing  16 -hou r cu rfew s  w ere  A rtic le  5 com p lian t, 
non -de roga ting  o rde rs  im pos ing  cu rfew s  of th is  leng th  w e re  subsequen tly  uphe ld  in a 
num be r o f ca ses .169 As w as  em phas ised  in A E ,170 however, 16 -hour cu rfew s  w ou ld  no t 
necessa rily  be  law fu l in all ins tances . Here , w h ils t upho ld ing  the  o rde r m ade  aga in s t A E ,171 
S ilb e r J  s ta ted  tha t, ‘a lthough  a 16 -hour cu rfew  w ill no t in fr in ge  the  a rtic le  5 righ ts  o f som e  of 
th o se  w ho  a re  sub je c t to  con tro l o rders, th a t conc lus ion  m ost ce rta in ly  does  no t m ean  tha t a 
16 -hour cu rfew  is pe rm iss ib le  in e ve ry  ca se ’.172 Indeed, as bo th  th e  S trasbou rg  and  dom es tic  
cou rt de c is io ns  m ake  c lea r, w h ils t cu r few  leng th  m ay  be the  s ta rting  po int, o r  ‘co re  e lem en t’, 
w hen  it com es  to  assess ing  com pa tib ility  w ith  A rtic le  5 ,173 it is no t the  so le  de te rm inan t of 
lega lity .
166 Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  T e n th  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  
S e s s io n  2 0 0 7 - 0 8  (Cm  7368 , 2 008 ) 4. It w as  subm itted that: in troducing a  m ax im um  curfew  of 12  
hours fo r controlled individuals would significantly d am age  the G overnm en t’s ability to protect the  
public from the th reat of terrorism .
167 ibid 1.
168 JCHR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  
fC o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 8  (2 0 07 -0 8 , HL  57 , HC  3 56 ) para  41 .
69 S ee , for exam p le , S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A E  [2008 ] EW HC  5 8 5  (Adm in); 
A i l  a n d A V  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2008] EW HC  1895  (Adm in).
170 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A E  [2 008 ] EW HC  585  (Adm in).
171 ibid. AE , who  the Hom e Secre tary  assessed  to be a ‘we ll-known  figure Iraqi Kurdish community ’ 
and ‘a leading figure in Is lam ist extrem ist circles’ in the town in which he lived, was  suspected  of 
providing support fo r the ‘Jihadist insurgency in Iraq ’, radicalising individuals in the  UK , and  was  
believed to have  received terrorist training and to have taken  part in terrorist activities [62]. A E ’s 
control order, following modification by the  H om e Secre ta ry  on 31 O ctober 2 0 07 , im posed  a  range  of 
restrictions, including a  16-hour curfew  and a ban on visitors to A E ’s res idence.
172 ibid [86].
173 S ee  E n g e l  (n 56 ) para  59; G u z z a r d i  (n 72 ) para 92; S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  
J J  [2007] UKHL  4 5  [16], [58], [91]; S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A H  [2008 ] EW HC  
1018  (Adm in) [21]..
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ii. C o n tro l O rd e r  C u r fe w s
As is c le a r from  the  fo rego ing  d iscuss ion , a  cen tra l conce rn  in assess ing  w he th e r a con tro l 
o rde r b reached  the  A rtic le  5 righ t to  libe rty  w as  the  leng th  of the  cu rfew  im posed . In itia lly , 18 
hours  w as  the  norm , curfew s  o f th is  leng th  be ing  im posed  on ‘m os t’ o f the  18 con tro lees  
m ade sub je c t to  o rde rs  in 20 05 .174 However, fo llow ing  the  de te rm ina tion  tha t con tro l o rde rs  
inc lud ing  an 18 -hour cu rfew  am oun ted  to  a  dep riva tion  o f libe rty  in JJ ,175 no cu rfew s  of 
longe r than  16 hours  w e re  im posed . T ab le  4.1 se ts  ou t the  num be r o f con tro l o rde rs  w ith  
cu rfew s  o f each  pa rticu la r du ra tion  tha t w e re  in e x is tence  a t th e  end o f each  yea r from  2006 - 
2011.
Table 4.1 Control Orders: Duration of Curfews 2006-2011176
Year
Curfew: Number of Hours Average
Curfew
Duration177.'1 61 MMh 13 10 l | 9 i : H P o178
2006 - 8 - 2 - - - - 8 7.5
2007 5 1 - 2 - 1 3 1 2 10
2008 5 1 - 7 1 - 1 - - 13
2009 1 2 - 5 - - 2 - 2 12
2010 - 2 1 3 1 - 1 - - 11.9
2011 - 1 - 5 - 2 1 - - 11.1
174 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 98 ) para 42 . Unlike in subsequen t reports, Lord Carlile  did not specify  
the duration of the curfews imposed on each  of the contro lees  in his F i r s t  R e p o r t .  H e  did, however, 
state that ‘M a le  12 ’ w as  under ‘no curfew  or tag ’ (p 5), and commen ted  that the control orders  o f ‘most 
but quite not all contro lees’ m ade subject to orders in 2 005 , included an 18-hour cu rfew  (paras  4 2 -4 3 ).
175 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J  [2006 ] EW HC  1623  (Adm in); [2006 ] EW C A  C iv  
1141; [2007] UKHL  45 .
176 Th e  information in T ab le  4.1 is compiled from  the annua l reports of the independen t rev iew ers  of 
the Prevention of Terro rism  Act 2 005 . S ee  Lord Carlile , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  
P u r s u a n t  t o  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 007 ) 5; T h i r d  R e p o r t  (2 0 08 ) 37;  
F o u r th  R e p o r t  (2 009 ) 33; F i f th  R e p o r t  (2 010 ) 65; S ix t h  R e p o r t  (2 011 ) 64; David  Anderson , F in a l  
R e p o r t  (n 14) 85; David  Anderson, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 2 :  F i r s t  
R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  
M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  (2 013 ) 52. S ee  also Adrian Hunt, ‘From  Control O rders to TP IM s : V aria tions  on a  
Num ber of T hem es  in British Legal R esponses to Terro rism ’ (2 0 1 3 ) C rim e, Law  and Socia l C hange , 
26  < h ttp ://ss rn .com /abs trac t=2235805> accessed  21 April 2 014 .
177 This column displays the average  curfew  duration (in hours) for each  year.
178 O rders which did not include a  curfew , and which imposed  a  lim ited range of obligations which  
were  des igned  to prevent or restrict travel abroad , w ere  som etim es  referred to as 'light touch' control 
orders. T h ese  orders w ere  genera lly  used aga inst 'less obviously dangerous targets', such as  those  
individuals in relation to whom  the Hom e Secretary's main ground for suspicion w as  that they  
in tended to travel ab road for terrorist training or other terrorism -re la ted purposes: D av id  Anderson , 
F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para 3 .28 .
120
As Tab le  4.1 show s, w h ils t 16 -hour cu rfew s  w e re  im posed  on a  num be r o f con tro lees , th e y  
w ere  no t th e  no rm .179 Instead , as H un t obse rves , pos t-2007 , th e re  w as  ‘gene ra l te n dency  
tow a rds  us ing  cu rfew s  o f 12 h, o r  be low , as the  s tanda rd  du ra tion  w hen  a le ng thy  cu rfew  
[was] th oug h t to  be requ ired .’180 T h is  tre nd  aw ay from  the  im pos ition  o f long cu rfew s  is a lso  
m an ifes t in th e  annua l a ve rage  cu rfew  du ra tion , w h ich  decreased  yea r-o n -ye a r be tw een  
2008  and 2011 , the  a ve rage  leng th  o f cu rfew  in the  reg im e ’s fina l yea r o f o pe ra tio n  be ing  
11.1 hours.
/'//. C o n tro l O rd e rs , R e lo c a t io n  a n d  S o c ia l  Is o la t io n
In po s t-J J  cases, one  fa c to r th a t em erged  as be ing  pa rticu la rly  s ign ifican t in re spec t o f th e  
cou rts ’ a ssessm en t o f com pa tib ility  w ith  A rtic le  5 w as  the  e x ten t to  w h ich  the  in d iv idua l w as  
soc ia lly  iso la ted  as  a  resu lt o f be ing  sub je c t to  a con tro l o rder. Faced  w ith  th e  in ab ility  to  
im pose  curfew s in e xcess  o f 16 hou rs  unde r non-de roga tin g  o rd e rs ,181 the  gove rnm en t 
began  to  m ake  inc reas ing  use o f cond itio n s  com pe lling  the  con tro lee  to  re lo ca te  and  res ide  
a t a des igna ted  res idence  in a spec ific  town o r c ity. Fo rced  re loca tion , sa id  by  the  
gove rnm en t to  be necessa ry  in ce rta in  cases in o rde r to  rem ove  the  con tro lee  from  the ir 
‘ne tw o rk  o f e x trem is t con ta c ts ’,182 was rega rded  by m any  as an espec ia lly  tro ub lin g  a sp ec t o f 
the  schem e. For exam p le , in its 2010  repo rt,183 the  JCHR  exp ressed  ex trem e  d isq u ie t a t the  
p rac tice  o f requ iring  B ritish  c itizens to  up roo t th em se lves  - and  in som e  cases , a lso  the ir 
fam ilie s184 - from  the ir com m un ity  and m ove to  an un fam ilia r loca tion , cha ra c te ris in g
179 In 2 0 0 7  and 2008 , one-th ird  of the control orders (5  out of 15) in force a t the  end  of the  yea r  
included a  curfew  of 16 hours, and in 2 009 , only one control o rder out of the eight in fo rce  at the  end  
of the yea r imposed a  16 -hour curfew . In 2 006 , 2 010 , and 2 011 , no con tro lees w ere  sub ject to 16-  
hour curfews at the end of the year, the longest curfew  periods in each  of these  years  being 14  hours.
180 Hunt, ‘From  Control O rders  to TP IM s ' (n 176 ) 27 . For fu rther useful analysis of the trends  observed  
in the  use of curfews under control orders see  2 6 -2 8  of the sam e  article.
181 J J (n 1 0 2 )  [105 ]-[106].
182 Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  th e  N in th  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  
S e s s io n  2 0 0 9 - 1 0  (Cm  7856 , 2 0 10 ) 3.
183 JCHR , A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 1 0  (n 96 ) paras 41 , 4 5 -4 6 .
184 The  Comm ittee noted that the impact o f relocation on the controlled person’s fam ilies  w as  said  to
be ‘ex traord inary ’, with the fem a le  partners o f contro lees being ‘trea ted with com ple te  con tem p t’, and  
their children being ‘uprooted from  the schools they have  been  attend ing ’: ibid para  41 .
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re loca tion  as a ‘fo rm  o f in te rna l e x ile ’ ,185 and conc lud ing  tha t th e y  had ‘ve ry  g rave
re se rva tion s  abou t th e  use  o f such  h is to rica lly  despo tic  execu tive  o rde rs ’ .186 T he  use  of
re loca tion  w as  s im ila rly  decried  by L ibe rty , w ho  described  it as ‘pe rhaps  the  m ost s in is te r’ o f
the  cond itio n s  im posed  unde r con tro l o rd e rs .187
Desp ite  a ttrac tin g  trenchan t c ritic ism , ex tens ive  use w as m ade  o f re loca tion  du ring  the  
life tim e  o f the  reg im e , the  Independen t R ev iew er’s 2011 R eport revea ling  tha t 23  con tro lees  
ou t of th e  to ta l o f 52  w e re  re loca ted  ‘fo r  na tiona l secu rity  o r  p rac tica l re asons ’.188 A s  w ith  
o the r con tro l o rde r ob lig a tio ns , the  necess ity , im pact, and lega lity  o f re loca tion  cond ition s  
had to  be assessed  on a  case -b y -case  basis. In A H ,189 the  issue  of soc ia l iso la tion , and 
w he the r re loca tion , in com b ina tion  w ith  o the r ob liga tions , c rea ted  a dep riva tion  o f liberty , 
w as addre ssed  by the  H igh Court. Here , the  con tro l o rder, w h ich  had been  m ade  fo llow ing  
A H ’s acqu itta l o f cha rges under the  Te rro rism  A c t 20 00 ,190 im posed  a num be r o f res tric tions , 
inc lud ing  a 14 -hour cu rfew  (18 :00 -8 :00 ),191 e lec tron ic  tagg ing , and geog raph ica l re s tric tion s  
on m ovem en t.192 In add ition , AH  was requ ired  to  res ide  a t a fla t in N orw ich , h is rem ova l from  
London  be ing  des igned  to  d is tance  h im  from  his ex trem is t a ssoc ia te s .193 D istilling  th e  key  
p rin c ip les  from  the  ju d gm en t in JJ , M itting  J iden tified  tha t, in assess ing  com pa tib ility  w ith  
A rtic le  5, soc ia l iso la tion  rep resen ts  a s ign ifican t fac to r, ‘espec ia lly  if it a pp roaches  so lita ry
186 ibid para 4 5 . Th e  JC H R ’s reference  to ‘historically despotic execu tive  orders ’ w as  rejected as  
‘m isp laced ’ by the Governm en t in its reply to the Comm ittee ’s Report. H om e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t
R e p ly  to  t h e  N in t h  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  S e s s io n  2 0 0 9 - 1 0  (Cm  7856 ,
2010 ) 4.
187 Liberty, L ib e r t y ’s  B r ie f in g  o n  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (C o n t in u a n c e  in  F o r c e  o f  
S e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  D r a f t  O r d e r  2 0 1 1  (2 011 ) 6. S ee  also Liberty, L ib e r t y ’s  B r ie f in g  o n  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (C o n t in u a n c e  in  F o r c e  o f  S e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  D r a f t  O r d e r  2 0 1 0  (2 0 1 0 ) 3; Scotland  
Against C rim inalising Communities  (SACC ), Y e a r  1 0 :  S ix  E x t r a o r d in a r y  S ta te  P o w e r s  a t  t h e  C lo s e  o f  
t h e  F i r s t  D e c a d e  o f  t h e  W a r  o n  T e r r o r  (2 010 ) 10.
188 Th is figure does not include voluntary moves. The  contro lees relocated w ere  AE , AH , AM , AN , AP , 
AS, AU , AY, BF, BG, BM , BX, CA , CB , CC , CD , CE , C F , GG , HH , JJ, KK and NN . S e e  Dav id  
Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) 23 , para  3 .3 4  and footnote 81.
189 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A H  [2008] EW HC  1018  (Adm in).
190 AH  had been charged with possessing documents likely to be useful to a  person comm itting or 
preparing an act of terrorism  under s 58  of the Terro rism  Act 2 000 .
191 Th e  curfew  was reduced to 10 hours on 17 April 2 008 .
192 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v A H  [2008] EW HC  1018  (Adm in) [19].
193 AH , an Iraqi national, w as  suspected of collecting funds for the insurgency in Iraq; having used  
anti-su rve illance techniques; being an associa te  of BC , an Islam ist extrem ist; and having know ingly  
facilitated the  travel of others to Pakis tan  for terrorist-related purposes.
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con fin em en t du ring  cu rfew  pe rio ds .’194 W h ils t fin d ing  tha t re loca tion  to  an un fam ilia r c ity  
m ean t th a t AH  expe rienced  a h igh deg ree  o f soc ia l is o la t io n ,195 he neve rthe less  he ld tha t 
A rtic le  5 w as  no t engaged . It w as , however, no ted  tha t th e  case  w as  ‘ve ry  c lose  to  the  
bo rde rline  and  we ll in to  the  rea lm  o f “pu re  op in ion ” .’196
As was e s tab lished  in A P ,197 the  e ffec t o f re loca tion  on the  con tro le e ’s p riva te  and  fam ily  life 
cou ld  a lso  p rove  c ritica l in re spec t o f w he the r A rtic le  5 had been  b reached . AP , an  E th iop ian  
na tio na l,198 becam e  sub je c t to  a con tro l o rde r in Jan ua ry  2 0 0 8 .199 T he  o rde r im posed  a 
range  of cond ition s, inc lud ing  a 16 -hour cu rfew  (18 :00 -10 :00 ), a  requ irem en t to  w e a r an 
e le c tron ic  tag , da ily  repo rting  ob lig a tions , and a num be r o f o the r res tr ic tion s on  assoc ia tion  
and  comm un ica tio n .200 U nder the  te rm s  o f the  order, AP  w as a lso  fo rb idden  from  leav ing  the  
loca l a rea , and  w as requ ired  to  res ide  a t a  des igna ted  fla t in T o ttenham ,201 w h ich  cou ld  be  
sea rched  by  the  po lice  a t any tim e , and  to  w h ich  h is m o the r and b ro the rs  w e re  the  on ly  
au tho rised  v is ito rs . In April 2008, the  H om e S ecre ta ry  m od ified  the  o rde r so  as to  requ ire  AP  
to  m ove to  a tow n  in th e  M id lands, som e 150 m iles  aw ay  from  his add re ss  in Londo n .202 T h is  
m od ifica tio n  w as  subsequen tly  cha llenged  by A P ,203 w ho  c la im ed  tha t e xc lu s ion  from  h is
194 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A H  [2008 ] EW HC  1018  (Adm in) [21].
195 ibid [23].
196 ibid [22]. S ee  also [24].
197 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v A P  [2008 ] EW HC  2001  (Adm in); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v A P  [2010] UKSC  24 .
198 AP, along with m em bers  of his fam ily, cam e  to the UK  in 1 992  and claim ed  asylum . In O ctober  
1999 , AP , his siblings, and their mother, w ere  granted indefinite leave to remain.
199 H e  had previously been  detained under imm igration powers and then  re leased  on bail under  
stringent conditions.
200 AP  was  required to report to the local police station every  day  and to te lephone the  monitoring  
com pany tw ice daily. W hilst he w as  perm itted to have  a  fixed telephone line a t his flat and  to use a  
mobile, he w as banned  from  accessing the internet. T h e  order also prohibited AP  from  arrang ing  to  
m eet anyone as ide from  his mother and brother outside his flat and from  attending p re -a rranged  
meetings or gatherings w ithout prior Hom e O ffice approval, and he could only visit one  M osque, 
which had been approved in advance  by the Hom e O ffice. S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  
D e p a r tm e n t  v A P  [2008 ] EW HC  2001 (Adm in) [17].
201 Th e  specified a rea  covered  approximately twen ty-five square  kilometres.
202 Aside from the necessary  adjustm ent to the geograph ical limits of the local a re a  to which A P  was  
restricted, the rest of the obligations under the control o rder rem ained  unchanged.
203 AP  also appea led  against the Hom e Secre tary ’s refusal to vary  the obligations prohibiting his 
a ttendance  at p re -arranged  meetings and at more than one mosque.
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fam ily  and fr ie nds  resu lted  in a leve l o f soc ia l iso la tion  tha t he pe rce ived  to  be  ‘w o rse  than  
go ing  to  p r ison .’204
In the  H igh C ou rt,205 it w as accep ted  tha t the re  w e re  reasonab le  g rounds  fo r  su spec tin g  tha t 
AP  had been  invo lved  in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity ,206 Ke ith  J obse rv ing  tha t ‘the  m any pa rts  
o f the  jig s aw  to  w h ich  the  ana lys is  o f the  e v id ence ’ re la ted , com b ined  to  ‘c rea te  a w o rry ing  
pro file  o f A P .’207 G iv ing  ‘due, bu t no t undue , de fe re nce ’ to  the  Home S ec re ta ry ’s 
a ssessm en t, he the re fo re  conc luded  tha t the  con tro l o rde r w as necessa ry .208 In rev iew ing  
the  necess ity  o f A P ’s re loca tion , Ke ith  J asse rted  tha t the  ju s tifica tio n  fo r  th e  m ove  had to  
ba lance  the  need  to  m ake  it m o re  d ifficu lt fo r h im  to  see  h is e x trem is t a ssoc ia tes  w ith  the  
‘the  in con te s tab le  ha rdsh ip  fo r  A P  in be ing  iso la ted  from  h is m o the r and b ro the r.’209 W h ils t 
a cknow ledg ing  the  cons ide rab le , though  no t insuperab le , p rac tica l d ifficu lties  A P ’s fam ily  
encoun te red  in v is iting  h im ,210 and the  ‘undoub ted  ha rdsh ip ’ he e xpe rienced  due  to  no t 
know ing  anyone  in th e  area, he found  tha t th e  in te rfe rence  w ith  A P ’s righ ts  to  p riva te  and 
fam ily  life  unde r A rtic le  8 w as ju s tifie d  and  p ropo rtiona te  in the  in te re s ts  o f n a tiona l secu rity , 
rem ov ing  AP  from  London be ing  the  m ost e ffec tive  w ay  o f reduc ing  h is cha nce s  of 
m a in ta in ing  pe rsona l con tac t w ith  ex trem is ts .211 A cknow ledg ing  tha t in bo rde rlin e  cases, 
w he the r a  con tro l o rde r cons titu te s  a res tric tion  on m ovem en t o r a  dep riva tion  o f lib e rty  is a 
‘m a tte r o f “pu re  op in ion ’” , Ke ith  J found  tha t A P ’s o rde r b reached  A rtic le  5 .212 Here , ‘the  
com b ina tion  o f th e  equ iva len t o f house  a rres t up  to  th e  m ax im um  period  [o f 16 h o u rs ] ’ , and
204 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A P  [2008 ] EW HC  2001  (Adm in) [69].
205 ibid.
206 The  Hom e S ecre ta ry ’s suspicions that AP  had been  involved in terro rism -rela ted  activity w ere  
founded on th ree  core features  of his activities over the preceding few  years: A P ’s a ttendance  a t w hat  
was assessed  to be a  terrorist training cam p in Cumbria  in 2004 ; his visit to Som alia , w here  it w as  
believed he had undergone param ilitary or terrorist training; and A P ’s connection w ith peop le  




210 A P ’s ev idence  was that his mo ther and brother had visited him about tw ice a  w eek  when  he w as  
located in To ttenham , but since the move, his brother had visited him just tw ice, and his m o ther had  
not visited him at all. Keith J, however, found that A P ’s fam ily  could visit him  on certa in  days, and  
could conceivab ly travel at tim es that would allow  them  to take  advan tage  of o ff-peak  fa res .
211 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  AP  [2008 ] EW HC  2001  (Adm in) [93].
212 ibid [97].
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the  ‘e qu iva len t o f in te rna l ex ile  w h ich  m akes  AP  so  soc ia lly  iso la ted  du ring  the  re la tive ly  few  
hours  o f the  da y ’ w hen  no t under cu rfew , ‘coup led  w ith  h is in ab ility  to  m ake even soc ia l 
a rrangem en ts  because  p re -a rranged  m ee tings  ... a re  p roh ib ite d ’ , led Ke ith  J to  conc lude  
tha t the  ob lig a tio ns  im posed  upon AP  ‘fe ll on the  s ide  o f th e  line w h ich  invo lve s a dep riva tion  
o f lib e rty ’,213 and  tha t th e  res idence  ob lig a tion  shou ld  th e re fo re  be quashed .214
Upon appea l by the  Hom e Secre ta ry , the  H igh C ou rt’s dec is ion  tha t A P ’s con tro l o rde r 
invo lved  an un law fu l d ep riva tion  o f libe rty  w as reversed  by the  C ou rt o f A pp ea l.215 Here , it 
w as  he ld by the  m a jo rity  th a t Ke ith  J, hav ing  found  tha t th e  in te rfe rence  w ith  A P ’s A rtic le  8 
righ ts  w as ju s tifie d  on the  g rounds  o f na tiona l secu rity , had e rred  in then  trea tin g  the  e ffe c t of 
re loca tion  on fam ily  v is its  as dec is ive  in re spec t o f A rtic le  5 .216 K ay  LJ, re jec ting  the  
con ten tio n  tha t a 16 -hour cu rfew  cou ld  neve r am oun t to  a depriva tion  o f libe rty , a ffirm ed  tha t 
in cases w he re  the  length  o f cu rfew  is no t de te rm ina tive , ‘the  te s t m u s t em b race  o the r 
a spects  o f th e  fac tua l m a trix ,’ one  po ten tia lly  re levan t fa c to r be ing soc ia l is o la tio n .217 
However, as it had been  conc luded  tha t th e  co re  e lem en t o f con fin em en t - th e  16 -hour 
cu rfew  - w as o the rw ise  com pa tib le  w ith  A rtic le  5, he found  tha t Ke ith  J had  the re fo re  been  
‘w rong  in law  to  pe rm it the  issue  o f fam ily  v is its  to  tip  the  ba lance . ... [and ] a llow  the  fa ile d  
A rtic le  8 case  to  p rove  dec is ive ’ in re la tion  to  A rtic le  5 .218 T he  m a jo rity , re a son ing  tha t A P ’s 
iso la tion  w as m itiga ted  by the  fa c t th a t h is fam ily  cou ld  s till v is it h im ,219 and  v iew ing  the  
in te rfe rence  w ith  h is p riva te  and fam ily  life  as pu re ly  an A rtic le  8 issue, sub sequen tly  he ld 
th a t A P ’s righ t to  libe rty  had no t been v io la ted .220
213 ibid [97]. Keith J, however, m ade  clear that, had AP  rem ained  in London w here  he could still be  
visited by his fam ily, his decision would have  been different.
214 ibid [99].
215 A P  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2009 ] EW CA  C iv 731 . S ee  also B X  v  S e c r e t a r y  
o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2010] EW HC  990  (Adm in).
216 ibid [31] (K ay  LJ); [35 ]-[37 ] (W all LJ). Lord Carnwath  d issenting.
217 ibid [27].
218 ibid [32] (K ay  LJ).
219 ibid [31] (K ay  LJ); [40] (W all LJ).
220 ibid [32] (K ay  LJ); [39] (W all LJ).
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In the  S up rem e  Court, th e  C ou rt o f A pp e a l’s dec is ion  w as , however, o ve rtu rned .221 O f the
th ree  m a in  issues cons ide red  by  the  Court, tw o  a re  o f p a rticu la r re levance  here , firs tly ,
w he the r cond ition s  wh ich  w ere  p ropo rtio na te  re s tric tion s upon A rtic le  8 righ ts  cou ld  have  a 
de te rm ina tive  im pac t in re la tion  to  A rtic le  5; and, second , w he the r the  ju d ge  cou ld  ta ke  in to  
accoun t sub jec tive  and /o r pe rson -spec ific  fac to rs , such  as the  pa rticu la r d ifficu ltie s  faced  by 
the  con tro lee ’s fam ily  in v is iting  h im , w hen  cons ide rin g  w he th e r a con tro l o rde r am oun ted  to  
a  dep riva tion  o f lib e rty .222 In re la tion  to  the  firs t issue, the  C ou rt a nswered  in the  a ffirm a tive , 
ho ld ing  tha t, if an A rtic le  8 res tric tion  w as a  re le van t cons ide ra tion  in de te rm in ing  w he the r a  
con tro l o rde r b reached  A rtic le  5, then  ‘by  de fin ition  it ... [w as] capab le  o f be ing  a dec is ive  
fa c to r’ .223 A pp ly ing  the  dec is ions  in G u z z a rd f24 and J J ,225 Lo rd  B rown e lu c ida ted  tha t in th e  
‘g re y  a rea ’ be tw een  14 and 18 -hou r cu rfew s, re s tric tion s o the r than  con fin em en t cou ld  tip  
th e  ba lance  in dec id ing  w he the r th e  res tric tions , in com b ina tion , dep rived  the  con tro lee  of 
th e ir libe rty .226 W h ils t it w as no ted  tha t the  w e igh t to  be g iven  to  a  re levan t cons ide ra tio n  w as  
a lw ays a ques tion  o f fa c t and en tire ly  a m a tte r fo r th e  dec is ion -m ake r, Lo rd  B rown 
none the less  a ve rred  tha t:
[F ]o r a con tro l o rde r w ith  a 16 -hour cu rfew  (a  fo r t io r i one  w ith  a 14 -hour
curfew ) to  be s tru ck  down as invo lv ing  a  depriva tion  o f liberty , the  o the r 
cond ition s  im posed  wou ld  have to  be unusua lly  des truc tive  o f th e  life  the  
con tro lee  m igh t o the rw ise  have been  liv ing .227
W ith  regard  to  the  second  issue , th e  C ou rt re jec ted  the  Home S ec re ta ry ’s subm iss ion  tha t 
the  pa rticu la r c ircum stances  o f the  con tro lee ’s fam ily  shou ld  be igno red  w hen  a ssess ing  the
221 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A P  [2010 ] UKSC  24 . On 2  July 2 0 09 , the  H om e  
Secre tary  had revoked the control order, having dec ided  that AP  should be deported on national 
security grounds. A fter being deta ined  under imm igration powers until 2 0  July 2 009 , AP  w as  then  
released  on bail pending deportation. Under his bail conditions, A P  was  required to reside  in the  
Midlands and was  subject to an 18-hour curfew . Desp ite the fac t that the  outcom e would no longer  
directly affect AP, the  Sup rem e Court gave leave to appea l as the  challenge raised  points of law  that 
were  of general im portance with regard to control orders.
222 ibid [4]. T h e  third issue addressed  by the  Suprem e Court was w hether it w as  perm iss ib le for the
 
Court of Appea l to interfere with the first instance judgm ent w here  there  w ere  inconsistencies  
between the ju dge ’s findings of fac t in respect of A rticle 5 and Article 8.
223 ibid [12] (Lord Brown).
224 G u z z a r d i  (n 72 ).
225 J J (n 102).
226 A P  (n 2 21 ) [2].
227 ibid [4].
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e ffec t o f re loca tion . Thus, the  fa c t th a t A P ’s re loca tion  to  the  M id lands s ign ifican tly  d is rup ted  
con tac t w ith  his fam ily , w ho  rem a ined  in London, w as deem ed a m a te ria l fa c to r when  
a ssess ing  the  im pact o f the  res idence  ob liga tion  on A P ’s soc ia l iso la tio n .228 W h ile  it w as 
p la in  th a t the  fam ily  cou ld  no t be  pe rm itte d  to  thw a rt an o the rw ise  app rop ria te  res idence  
requ irem en t, th e re  w as  no sugges tio n  tha t th e  fam ily  had behaved  un reasonab ly  in fa iling  to  
ove rcom e the  d ifficu ltie s  th e y  faced  in v is iting  AP  m ore  regu la rly .229 A s  e xp la ined  by  Lord  
Dyson:
T he  fo cus  o f the  a rtic le  5 inqu iry  is on the  actua l e ffec t o f th e  m easures  on the  
con tro lee  ... P r im a  fa c ie , th e  ac tua l iso la ting  e ffec t resu lting  from  cho ices  
m ade  by the  con tro lee , h is fam ily  and  fr ie nds  in re sponse  to  th e  m easu res  
shou ld  [the re fo re ] be taken  in to  a ccoun t.230
In ligh t o f the se  find ings , and the  h igh degree  o f iso la tion  to  w h ich  AP  w as  sub jec t, the  
appea l w as unan im ous ly  a llow ed  and the  dec is ion  o f th e  H igh  C ou rt resto red .
W h ils t the  ‘m ore  ho lis tic  app ro ach ’231 adop ted  by the  S up rem e  C ou rt in A P  m ay be 
w e lcom ed  in te rm s  o f its r igou r in assess ing  the  im pact o f con tro l o rde rs, as W a lke r 
sugges ts , the  ju d gm en t ‘is tro ub ling  no t on ly  because  it re s tric ts  d isc re tion  bu t a lso  because  
it re in troduces unce rta in ty  in to  the  A rtic le  5  litiga tion , m ov ing  aw ay from  a  quan tita tive  
a rgum en t abou t hours  in to  qua lita tive  a rgum en ts  abou t soc ia l life .’232 T h is  unce rta in ty  
obv ious ly  rende rs  it excep tio na lly  d ifficu lt to  fo resee  w ha t com b ina tion  o f cond ition s  is like ly  
to  be  rega rded  as am oun ting  to  a b reach  o f A rtic le  5. In A U ,233 fo r  exam p le , M itting  J he ld 
th a t th e re  had been  no dep riva tion  o f libe rty  due  to  th e  fa c t th a t th e  soc ia l iso la tio n  o f AU , h is 
w ife , and  th e ir  ch ild ren , w as deem ed  not to  resu lt from  the  ob lig a tio n s  im posed  by  the
228 ibid [15]. T h e  particular difficulties highlighted included fact that AP 's  mother had never left London  
alone; that, due to the children, Sunday  was the only day the fam ily could travel during term  time; and  
financial lim itations, which preven ted  rail travel [13].
229 ibid [15].
230 ibid [29].
231 H elen  Fenw ick  and Gav in  Phillipson, ‘UK  Coun ter-Terro r Law  Post-9 /11 : Initial A ccep tance  of 
Extraord inary M easures  and the Partial Return to Hum an  R ights Norm s’ in V ic to r V  R am ra j and  
others, G lo b a l  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L a w  a n d  P o l i c y  (2 nd edn, Cam bridge  University P ress 2 0 1 2 ) 4 88 .
232 C live W a lker, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (O UP  2 011 ) 3 18 . For fu rther comment on the  decision, see  
S teve  Foster, ‘Hum an  Rights: Anti-terrorism  - Control O rders ’ (2 0 11 ) 1 6 (1 ) Coven try Law  Journal 74; 
Ben M iddleton, 'D raw ing a (Not-So-B right) L ine Under Control O rder L iberty C ha llenges ’ (2 0 1 0 ) 7 4 (5 )  
Journal of C rim inal Law  405 .
233 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A U  [2009 ] EW HC  49  (Adm in).
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con tro l o rder, bu t ins tead  from  the  unw illingness  o f A l l ’s m o ther, friends , and a ssoc ia tes  to  
seek  H om e O ffice  app rova l to  v is it th em .234
A cco rd ing  to  the  F in a l R e p o r t  o f the  Independen t R ev iewer, o ve r the  re g im e ’s life tim e , 
re loca tion  cond itio n s  w e re  s tru ck  down as d isp ropo rtio na te  in a t least th ree  cases ,235 w h ils t 
in a fou rth , BM ,236 the  H igh C ou rt o rde red  tha t the  ob liga tio n  requ iring  the  con tro lee  to  
re loca te  to  Le ice s te r be revoked  on the  g rounds  o f in su ffic ien t d isc losu re . In th e  m a jo rity  of 
cases, however, re loca tion  was uphe ld  as necessa ry  and  p ropo rtiona te ,237 and, even  w he re  
com b ined  w ith  a  cu rfew  and o the r m easu res  res tric ting  m ovem ent and  assoc ia tion , w as 
ad judged  no t to  g ive  rise  to  a v io la tion  o f A rtic le  5 .238 A lso , w he re  re loca tio n  cond itio n s  w e re  
im posed , s teps w e re  rou tine ly  taken  to  am e lio ra te  the  im pact o f the  m ove ,239 and  to  a llow  
the  con tro lee ’s w ife  and ch ild ren  to  re loca te  w ith  th em .240
Re loca tion , a lth ough  con trove rs ia l,241 and w h ils t ob je c tionab le  from  a hum an  righ ts  
s tandpo in t, can be  seen  to  possess  ce rta in  v irtu es  from  the  pe rspective  o f cu rb ing  
in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  activ ity . R e loca tion  m ay be an e ffec tive  m eans  o f lim iting  a 
su sp ec t’s in te rac tion  and comm un ica tion  w ith  th e ir e x trem is t assoc ia tes , th e reb y  re s tric ting  
th e ir a b ility  to  engage  in p lann ing  o r  fac ilita tion  a c tiv itie s .242 R em oving  a key  ind iv idua l from
ibid [19].
235 These  w ere  B F , A N  and C A .  David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para 3 .3 5 . S e e  also B H  v  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2 009 ] EW HC  3319  (Adm in).
236 B M  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2009 ] EW HC  1572  (Adm in).
237 In C D  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2011 ] EW HC  1273  (Adm in ), however, S im on  
J held that, in o rder to aba te  the interference with C D ’s Article 8 rights, it w as  necessary  for H om e  
Secre ta ry  to reimburse a proportion o f the travel costs incurred by C D ’s fam ily in visiting him  a t the  
specified location, this being  a 'proportionate and app ropriate w ay  of reducing the  onerous and  
isolating effect of the relocation obligation’ [55].
238 S ee , for exam ple , B X  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2010] EW H C  9 9 0  (Adm in ), 
which involved relocation from  London to the W es t of England and a  12 -hour curfew . S e e  also  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C E  [2011 ] EW HC  3159 , w here  C E  w as  re loca ted  aw ay  
from  London and required to reside at a  specified address  where  he was subject to a  1 2 -hou r curfew .
239 For exam ple , a  furnished property of sufficient size to accommodate  the con tro lee and their fam ily, 
and  information about the a rea , including details of schools and places of worship , w as  provided. T h e  
controlee was  also usually given up to seven  days ’ notice of the relocation. S ee  H om e  O ffice, 
G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  N in t h  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  S e s s io n  2 0 0 9 - 1 0  
(Cm  7856 , 2 010 ) 3.
40 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para 3 .35 .
241 David  Anderson  (ibid para  3 .36 ) describes relocation as ‘the most controversial fe a tu re ’ o f the  
control o rder regime.
242 S ee  C D  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2 011 ] EW HC  1273  (Adm in) [24].
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an e x trem is t g roup  o r ne twork  th rough  re loca tion  cou ld  he lp d is rup t its  ‘o pe ra tio na l tem po ’ 
and deg rade  its capab ilit ie s .243 S epa ra ting  an ind iv idua l from  the ir a ssoc ia tes  m ay help 
reduce  the  risk  o f them  abscond ing , and  m ake  it m ore  d ifficu lt fo r  th em  to  a rrange  trave l 
ab road  fo r  te rro rism -re la ted  pu rposes  244 D is tanc ing  a suspec t from  a soc ia l m ilieu  popu la ted  
by o th e r e x trem is ts  cou ld  a lso  conce ivab ly  encou rage  d isengagem en t from  te rro rism .245 In 
add ition , re loca tion  is sa id  to  g ive  rise  to  ce rta in  opera tiona l a dvan tages  fo r  th e  po lice  
cha rged  w ith  m on ito ring  suspects , ‘su rve illa nce  in som e  a reas  ... [be ing ] fa r  ea s ie r  than  in 
o the rs . ’246
In sp ite  o f its u se fu lness  as a too l fo r  con tro llin g  the  r isk  posed  by som e  te rro ris t suspects , 
and  desp ite  its e ffica cy  be ing  endo rsed  by the  po lice ,247 the  Independen t R ev iew e r,248 and 
by m em be rs  o f th e  ju d ic ia ry ,249 the  p rac tice  o f re loca tion  w as d iscon tin ued  fo llow ing  the  
abo lition  o f th e  con tro l o rde r reg ime. A lthough  re loca tion  cond ition s w e re  inc luded  in a 
num be r o f the  o rde rs  issued  unde r the  Coa lition  gove rnm en t,250 the ir R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r -  
T e rro r ism  a n d  S e c u r it y  P o w e rs  n one the less  conc luded  tha t th e re  shou ld  ‘be an  end to  the  
use  o f fo rced  re lo ca tio n ’ 251 As d iscussed  m ore  fu lly  e lsew he re ,252 in vo lun ta ry  re lo ca tio n  is
243 See  B X  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2010] EW HC  990  (Adm in) [9], [15].
244 S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C E  [2011 ] EW HC  3 1 5 9  [98]
245 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para  6 .1 0 .
246 DAC  O sborne in oral ev idence  to the Joint Comm ittee  on the Draft Enhanced  Terro rism  Prevention  
and Investigation M easu res  Bill. Jo int Comm ittee  on the Draft Enhanced  Terrorism  Preven tion and  
Investigation M easures  Bill, D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  
O r a l  E v id e n c e  (2 0 12 -1 3 ) 15 (Q  42 ). S ee  also Joint Comm ittee  on the Draft Enhanced  Terro rism  
Prevention and Investigation M easures  Bill, D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  
M e a s u r e s  S ///(2 0 1 2 -1 3 , HL  70 , HC  4 95 ) para 62.
247 Joint Comm ittee  on the  D raft Enhanced  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, 
D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (2 0 12 -1 3 , HL 70 , HC  4 9 5 ) para  
62.
248 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) paras 5.21 and 6 .63 .
249 S ee  B X  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2010] EW HC  990  (Adm in) [9], [15] (Collins  
J); C D  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2011 ] EW HC  1273  (Adm in) [53] (S im on  
J ) ;S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C E  [2011 ] EW HC  3159  [103] (Lloyd Jones  J).
2 0 S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B F  [2011] EW HC  1878  (Adm in); C D  v  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2011] EW HC  1273  (Adm in); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  th e  
H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C E  [2011 ] EW HC  3159  (Adm in); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  
C C  a n d  C F  [2012] EW HC  2 8 3 7  (Adm in).
251 HM  Governm en t, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  R e v ie w  F in d in g s  a n d  
R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  (Cm  8004 , 2 0 11 ) para  23 .
252 S ee  chap ter 5 (pp 169 -1 70 ) of this thesis.
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no t the re fo re  one  o f the  ‘m easu re s ’ th a t can  be im posed  under a TP IM  no tice .253 T he  pow er 
to  re loca te  cou ld , however, be re in s ta ted  unde r Enhanced  TP IM s ,254 shou ld  th e  gove rnm en t 
dec ide  to  enac t th e se  con tin gency  m easures  in the  fu ture .
iv . N o n -D e ro g a t in g  C o n tro l O rd e rs :  R e n e w a l, D u ra tio n  a n d  A s s o c ia te d  Is s u e s
A  non-de roga ting  con tro l o rde r las ted  fo r 12 m on th s ,255 bu t cou ld  be renew ed  on one  o r 
m ore  o ccas ions .256 T he  absence  o f a  s ta tu to rily  s tipu la ted  m ax im um  du ra tio n , and  the  
resu ltan t poss ib ility  th a t con tro l o rde rs  cou ld  be im posed  fo r long, po ten tia lly  inde fin ite , 
pe riods , gave  rise  to  unde rs tandab le  conce rn . T he  Ins titu te  o f R ace  Re la tions , fo r  exam p le , 
described  con tro l o rde rs ’ un lim ited  du ra tion  as ‘th e ir w o rs t fe a tu re ’,257 w h ils t th e  ICJ Pane l 
fo und  the  lack o f a de fin ite  tim e -lim it to  be one  o f a num be r o f ‘im po rtan t sa fe gu a rd s ’ m iss ing  
from  the  con tro l o rde r sys tem .258 G ea rty , m eanwh ile , w a rned  tha t the  in de fin ite ly  renew ab le  
na tu re  o f con tro l o rde rs  crea ted :
a real d ange r ... o f a d rift tow ards  a casua l, b u reaucra tic  k ind o f 
a u tho rita rian ism , w ith  in d iv idua ls  los t to  pub lic  v iew  by  non -de roga tin g  con tro l 
o rde rs  w h ich  a re  m a in ta ined  in pe rpe tu ity  as m uch  by  rep ress ive  m om en tum  
com b ined  w ith  o ve r-cau tio u s  r isk  assessm en ts  as by any  genu ine  and 
con tinu ing  soc ie ta l need .259
M o tiva ted  by such conce rns , va rio us  comm en ta to rs  a rgued  tha t con tro l o rde rs  shou ld  be 
sub je c t to  spec ific  tim e  lim its . T he  E uropean  C omm iss ione r fo r  Hum an R ights, fo r ins tance , 
re comm ended  a lim it o f tw e lve  m on ths  on the  bas is tha t fa ilu re  to  fin d  su ffic ie n t e v idence  to  
b ring  cha rges w ith in  th is  ‘g e ne ro us ’ tim e  fram e, ‘o ugh t to  ... cons titu te  g rounds  fo r  lifting  the
TP IM A , sch 1.
254 Draft Enhanced  Terrorism  and Investigation M easu res  Bill, sch 1, pa ra  1 (3 ).
255 PTA , s 2 (4 )(a ). Pursuant to s 2 (5 ), the control order had to specify  the date  on which it would  
cease  to have  effect.
256 ibid s 2 (4 )(b ).
257 Frances W ebber, ‘F ive Y ea rs  of Control O rders ’ (Institute o f R ace  Relations, 2 0 1 0 )  
<www .irr .o rg .u k /2010 /feb ruary /h a000031 .h tm l> accessed  2 7  M ay  2 013 .
258 International Comm ission of Jurists, A s s e s s in g  D a m a g e ,  U r g in g  A c t io n :  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  E m in e n t  
J u r is t s  P a n e l  o n  T e r r o r is m ,  C o u n te r - t e r r o r is m  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (2 009 ) 121.
259 Conor G earty, C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  (O U P  2 0 0 7 ) 119 . G earty ’s concerns m irrored those  of the European  
Comm issioner for Hum an  Rights, who expressed  disquiet a t the prospect that, ‘th e  indefinitely  
renewab le  nature of control orders ... [risked] elevating the exceptional to the perm anen t by obviating  
the need  ever to prove suspicions the restrictions are  supposed to counter’: R e p o r t  b y  M r  A lv a r o  G i l -  
R o b le s ,  C o m m is s io n e r  f o r  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  o n  h is  v is i t  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  C omm DH  (2 005 ) 6, para  
25 .
130
re s tr ic tio n s ’ .260 A  tw e lve  m on th  lim it w as a lso  advoca ted  by W a lke r, w ho  sugges ted  tha t th is  
cou ld  ‘tra ns fo rm  the  s itua tion  by tu rn ing  a con tro l o rde r in to  a  k ind  o f a p ro v is io na l-cha rge  o r 
p rov is iona l-depo rta tio n  bail o rde r. ’261
The  du ra tion  o f con tro l o rde rs  w as an issue  tha t w as a lso  addre ssed  a t som e  leng th  by bo th 
the  Independen t R ev iew ers  and the  JCHR  in th e ir annua l reports  on the  ope ra tion  and 
renewa l o f the  reg ime. In h is F ir s t  R e p o r t  on  the  PTA , Lord  C arlile  exp re ssed  h is ‘a n x ie ty ’ 
a bou t con tro l o rde rs ’ du ra tion , s ta ting  tha t it w ou ld  be unaccep tab le  fo r  ‘s ign ifican t 
re s tr ic tion s on libe rty  to  con tinue  fo r  yea rs  on en d ’.262 T he  v iew  tha t con tro lees ' o rde rs  cou ld  
no t be m a in ta ined  inde fin ite ly , a long w ith  conce rn s  rega rd ing  the  ‘endgam e ’ in each  ca se ,263 
w as  subsequen tly  re ite ra ted  in each  o f Lord C arlile ’s subsequen t repo rts .264 In h is 2008 , 
2009  and  2010  reports , he consequen tly  re comm ended  tha t, save  in genu ine ly  e xcep tiona l 
c ircum s tances , th e re  shou ld  be a p resum p tion  aga in s t a  con tro l o rde r be ing  e x tended  
beyond  tw o  yea rs , on the  g rounds  tha t, ‘a fte r th a t tim e  ... th e  im m ed ia te  u tility  o f  even  a 
ded ica ted  te rro ris t w ill se rio us ly  have  been d is rup te d .’265 A lthough  re cogn is ing  tha t the  
ques tion  o f w he the r th e re  shou ld  be a  tim e  lim it on con tro l o rde rs  w as a  d ifficu lt one , the  
JCHR  s im ila rly  endo rsed  im pos ing  a m axim um  lim it on the ir du ra tion  as an 'im po rtan t 
sa feguard  o f th e  libe rty  and m enta l hea lth ' o f con tro lees .266
260 European  Comm issioner for Hum an  Rights, R e p o r t  b y  M r  A lv a r o  G i l - R o b le s ,  C o m m is s io n e r  f o r  
H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  o n  h is  v is i t  t o  th e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  C omm DH  (2 005 ) 6, para  25.
261 C live W a lke r, B la c k s t o n e ’s  G u id e  to  th e  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L e g is la t io n  (2 nd edn, O U P  2 0 0 9 ) 2 41 .
262 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 98 ) para  72.
263 In his 2 0 0 7  Report, Lord Carlile  cau tioned that: As a  m atter of urgency, a  stra tegy is needed  for the  
ending of the orders in relation to each  controlee: to fail to p repare  for this now w hether on a  case -b y -  
case  basis or by legislation (if appropriate) would be short-sighted. Lord Carlile , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n  
177) para  43 .
264 S ee  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 176) para 43; T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to
S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 008 ) paras  4 9 -51 ; F o u r t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e
In d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 0 09 )  
paras 57 -59 ; F i f t h  R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 010 ) paras  121 -123 ; S ix t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  
S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 011 ) para  115.
265 T h i r d  R e p o r t  (n 2 64 ) paras  50 -51 ; F o u r t h  R e p o r t  (n 2 64 ) paras 5 8 -59 ; F i f t h  R e p o r t  (n 2 6 4 ) paras  
122 -123 .
266 JC HR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  ( N in th  R e p o r t ) :  A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  
O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 0 8  (2 007 -08 , HL  57 , HC  3 56 ) para 87 . S ee  also JC HR , C o u n t e r - T e r r o r is m  
P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  ( F o u r te e n th  R e p o r t ) :  A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 0 9  
(2 0 08 -09 , HL 37 , HC  282 ) para 32. Rather than  specifying a  m aximum  limit, the JC H R  concluded  that  
Parliam ent should deba te  what tim e limit ought to be  imposed.
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W h ils t th e  gove rnm en t accep ted  tha t con tro l o rde rs  'shou ld  no t con tinue  in de fin ite ly ’,267 and 
shou ld  be im posed  ‘fo r as sho rt a tim e  as poss ib le , com m ensu ra te  w ith  the  r isk  posed ’ by 
each  ind iv id ua l,268 they  s tead fa s tly  opposed  the  no tion  tha t o rde rs  shou ld  be sub je c t to  ‘an 
a rb itra ry  end da te ’ .269 T h e  gove rnm en t asse rted  tha t th e  s ta tu to ry  te s t fo r  renewa l p rov ided  
fo r 'rigo rous ex te rna l jud ic ia l sc ru tin y '270 o f the  necess ity  fo r  each  o rd e r ’s con tin ua tio n , and 
tha t se ttin g  a  de fin ite  end da te  w ou ld  c rea te  the  poss ib ility  th a t con tro lees  m ay  s im p ly  
d isengage  from  in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  du ring  the  cu rrency  o f th e ir o rder, 
know ing  tha t th e y  cou ld  re -engage  once  it had exp ired .271 Fu rthe r, po ten tia l ‘e x it s tra teg ie s ’ 
from  con tro l o rde rs, com pris ing , p rosecu tion , depo rta tion , m od ifica tion  o f the  ob lig a tio ns  
im posed , and  revoca tion  o r non -renew a l,272 w e re  sa id  to  be fo rm a lly  cons ide red  as  an 
‘in teg ra l and s ign ifican t pa rt’ o f the  CO RG ’s qua rte rly  rev iew s o f each  e x tan t o rde r.273
The  ju d ic ia l pos ition  on  the  pe rm iss ib le  du ra tion  o f con tro l o rde rs, as exp ressed  in cases  
such as R id e h ,274 G G  a n d  N N ,275 and a lso  A M ,276 w as  tha t th e y  cou ld  be  m a in ta ined  fo r as
267 Home O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  p u r s u a n t  t o  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7194 , 2 0 07 ) 5.
268 Hom e O ffice , G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  th e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7367 , 2 0 08 ) 4.
269 ibid. S ee  also Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  T e n th  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  
H u m a n  R ig h t s  S e s s io n  2 0 0 7 - 0 8  H L  P a p e r  5 7 ,  H C  3 5 6  (Cm  7368 , 2 0 08 ) 10; H L  Deb  10  M arch  2 010 ,  
col W S 1 8 -W S 21 .
270 Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  th e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7367 , 2 0 08 ) 4 . S ee  also Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  F i f t h  R e p o r t  f r o m  t h e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  
o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  S e s s io n  2 0 0 8 - 0 9  H L  P a p e r  3 7 ,  H C  2 8 2  (Cm  7625 , 2 0 0 9 ) 2.
271 H om e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  t h e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  p u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7367 , 2 0 08 ) 4.
272 Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  p u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7194 , 2 007 ) 4 -5 .
273 Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  t h e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  p u r s u a n t  t o  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7367 , 2 0 08 ) 4.
274 In R id e h ,  O us ley  J asserted: I reject the subm ission tha t a  control o rder cannot continue  
indefinitely if there is evidence  of continuing terro rism -related  activity which warrants it. I s e e  no  
reason why a  controlled person should be ab le  to elim inate controls which continue to be justified by  
his continuing activity, by virtue of his persistence in that activity. R id e h  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  
H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2008] EW HC  2019  (Adm in) [24].
275 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  G G  a n d  N N  [2009 ] EW H C  142  (Adm in) [50].
276 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A M  [2009 ] EW HC  3053  (Adm in) [194], [211].
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long as the re  w as ev idence  o f con tinu ing  te rro rism -re la ted  activ ity . In som e  cases, however, 
the  passage  o f tim e  d id p rove  dec is ive  in re la tion  to  th e  cou rt's  dec is ion  rega rd ing  the  need 
fo r  the  con tro l o rde r.277 In A l-S a a d i,278 fo r  exam p le , the  fa c t tha t the re  had been  no a llega tio n  
o f te rro ris t-re la ted  a c tiv ity  aga ins t the  con tro lee  fo r seven  and a ha lf yea rs , du ring  w h ich  tim e  
any  te rro ris t links w ere  though t to  have 'subs tan tia lly  a troph ied ', led W ilk ie  J to  ho ld th a t the  
con tro l o rde r shou ld  be revoked .279 S im ila rly , th a t du ring  the  th ree  yea rs  o f h is con tro l o rde r 
NN had no t show n  any  inc lina tion  to  con tin ue  h is invo lvem en t in te rro r ism -re la ted  ac tiv ity , 
s trong ly  in flu enced  C o llin s  J 's  dec is ion  to  quash  the  o rde r on the  g rounds  tha t it w as  no 
lo nge r necessa ry .280
A cco rd ing  to  the  Independen t R ev iew er’s fin a l report, be tw een  M arch 2005  and D ecem be r 
2011 , the  sho rte s t pe riod  fo r  w h ich  an ind iv idua l w as sub je c t to  a con tro l o rde r w as  tw o  
m onths , w ith  the  longes t pe riod  be ing  in e xcess o f 55  m on th s .281
Table 4.2 Control Orders: Duration282
0-1 years 1-2 years 2-3 years 3-4 years 4-5 years
16 14 8 4 3
As Tab le  4 .2  shows, 15 ind iv idua ls  w ere  sub jec t to  a  con tro l o rde r fo r  m o re  than  tw o  yea rs , 
the  tim e  lim it p roposed  by Lord Carlile , and now , absen t any  ev idence  o f ‘n ew ’ te rro r ism - 
re la ted  ac tiv ity ,283 the  m ax im um  du ra tion  o f a  TP IM  no tice .284 Thus, in respec t o f a t lea s t
W a lke r  (n 232 ) 327 .
278 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A l - S a a d i  [2009 ] EW HC  33 9 0  (Adm in).
279 ibid [186 ]-[187].
280 G G  a n d  N N  (n 2 75 ) [23].
281 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para 3 .47 .
282 Th e  total num ber of control orders included in Tab le  4 .2  is 45 . T h e  da ta  excludes the control orders  
of the seven  contro lees who absconded. This data is taken from  David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) 
para  3 .47 .
*83 TP IM A , s 3 (6 )(c ).




one -th ird  o f con tro lees ,285 the  gove rnm en t regarded  it as  necessa ry  to  m a in ta in  th e ir con tro l 
o rde r beyond  tw o  yea rs , an a ssessm en t uphe ld by  the  cou rts  in each  case . During  the  
life tim e  o f th e  reg im e , cons ide ra tion  o f ‘ex it s tra teg ie s ’ from  con tro l o rde rs  w as  sa id  to  be  
‘re gu la r and m ean ing fu l’ ,286 and  a lthough  no fo rm er con tro lees  w e re  success fu lly  p ro secu ted  
fo r a te rro ris t o ffence , ten  w e re  se rved  w ith  no tices  o f in ten tion  to  depo rt,287 and  a num be r o f 
o rde rs  w e re  e ith e r revoked  o r  no t renewed  by  the  g o v e rnm e n t288
L im iting  the  du ra tion  o f m easures  like  con tro l o rde rs  and  TP IM s m ay conce ivab ly  p roduce  
ce rta in  bene fits , such  as p reven ting  the  ‘w a reho us in g ’ o f su spects  fo r  leng thy  pe rio d s ,289 and  
ensu rin g  v ig ila n ce  in the  pu rsu it o f ex it s tra teg ies . It m ay  a lso  be  seen  to  rende r them  s lig h tly  
m ore  pa la tab le  in human righ ts  te rm s .290 However, un less  a  w ay  is fo und  to  im p rove  the  
p rospects  o f p rosecu ting  those  suspec ts  aga ins t w hom  these  m easures  a re  used, a  tw o - 
yea r lim it cou ld  po ten tia lly  p rove  in im ica l to  p ro tec ting  the  pub lic  from  a  risk o f te rro rism . A s  
each  o rde r is des igned  to  address  ‘ind iv idua l r isk ’ , th e re  a re  obv ious  dange rs  in a ssum ing  
tha t all suspec ts  w ill cease  to  pose  a th rea t w ith in  an iden tica l tim e  fram e .291 Indeed , as the  
leng th  o f som e  con tro l o rde rs  ind ica tes , and  as Lord  C arlile  a cknow ledged , in the  case  o f 
ce rta in  suspects , th e ir capac ity  to  engage  in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity  and  de te rm ina tio n  to
285 As Hunt notes, ‘this figure m ay  undercount those who w ere  sub ject to restrictions fo r longer than a  
two yea r period’: Adrian Hunt, ‘From Control O rders to T P IM s 1 (n 176 ) 20 . Indeed , it is possib le th a t a  
number of the seven  abscondees  m ay have  had the ir control orders renewed  beyond two years, 
though all absconded  befo re that point was reached . Further, four individuals who had been  under a  
control order for less than two years had their control order converted into a  T P IM  in January  2 012 ,  
and there fo re  ‘had the potential to stay  subject to the two reg im es  for more than  two years  in to ta l’: 
David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para 3 .48 .
286 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B F  [2011 ] EW H C  1878  (Adm in) [52] (D av is  J). Th is  
v iew  was subsequently endorsed by the Independent Review er: David  Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) 
para  3 .46 . S ee  also Lord Carlile , F o u r t h  R e p o r t  (n 2 64 ) para  57 .
87 As of 14 D ecem ber 2 0 11 , six of these  ten had been deported: David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14)  
para  3 .46 .
88 20  contro lees had the ir orders revoked, 4  orders w ere  not renew ed , 3  w ere  quashed  by the  High  
Court, 5  expired a fte r the contro lee had absconded , 1 individual absconded  a fter his order had been  
quashed but before a  new  order was served, and 9 orders w ere  superseded  by T P IM s  in 2011  -2 0 12 .  
For fu rther details, see  David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para  3 .4 9 .
289 S ee  Lord Macdonald, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  A  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  
M a c d o n a ld  o f  R iv e r  G la v e n  Q C  (Cm  8003 , 2 0 11 ) para  11; C live W a lke r, T h e  Th rea t of Terro rism  and  
the Fa te  of Control O rders' [2010 ] Public Law  3 ,1 6 .
290 S ee  chap ter 5 of this thesis.
291 S ee  Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  th e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  F o u r t h  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7624 , 2 0 09 ) 9.
134
‘becom e  ope ra tiona l in th e  fu tu re ’ e ndu res  beyond  tw o  yea rs .292 Thus, th e re  is a  ve ry  real 
p ro spec t tha t ind iv idua ls  w ho  a re  deem ed to  cons titu te  a  th rea t to  secu rity , and  w ho  w ou ld  in 
the  past have  rem a ined  sub je c t to  a con tro l o rder, w ill n ow  becom e  fre e  o f con s tra in t a fte r 
tw o  yea rs  due  to  a TP IM  reach ing  its m ax im um  du ra tio n .293
v. R e c id iv ism  a n d  th e  T h re a t  o f  R e -e n g a g em e n t in  T e rro r is t A c t iv ity
C ritica l to  the  deba te  conce rn ing  the  du ra tion  o f p reven tive  m easures  like  con tro l o rde rs  and 
TP IM s  is th e  issue  o f ‘re c id iv ism ’.294 W he th e r a suspect is like ly  to  ‘re -en gag e ’ in te rro ris t 
a c tiv ity  once  th e  re s tric tion s im posed  by the  o rde r a re  rem oved  rep resen ts  a  key  conce rn  in 
re la tion  to  de te rm in ing  the  app rop ria te  tem pora l lim it fo r p reven tive  cou n te r-te rro rism  
m easu res .295 A ssess ing  w he the r an ind iv idua l is liab le  to  re -engage  in te rro r is t ac tiv ity  
fo llow ing  the  d iscon tinua tion  o f an o rde r is, however, inhe ren tly  p rob lem a tic , as any  
a ssessm en t w ill ne cessa rily  be based  upon a p red ic tion  o f th e ir po ten tia l fu tu re  conduc t.
A t p resen t, th e re  is un fo rtuna te ly  a  dea rth  o f m a te ria l on the  rec id iv ism  ra tes  o f te rro ris ts , 
espec ia lly  jih a d is t te rro ris ts , w h ich  m ay he lp in fo rm  th is  pa rticu la r deba te . Indeed , th e  pa uc ity  
o f research  on th is  im po rtan t issue  m eans tha t, as H organ  and  T a y lo r  no te , ‘R eg re ttab ly , w e  
know  ve ry  little  abou t rec id iv ism  and te rro r ism .’296 W h ils t th e re  have been no ad equa te ly
292 Lord Carlile , F o u r th  R e p o r t  (n 264 ) para  58 .
293 Indeed, the  T P IM  notices imposed on AM , AY , BF, BM , CD , C E  and C F  all expired be tw een  2  
January  and 10 Feb ruary 2 0 1 4  due to  reaching their tw o -yea r limit: David  Anderson , T e r r o r is m  
P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 3 :  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  t h e  
O p e r a t io n  o f  th e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  (2 0 14 ) para  4 .2 0 . S ee  
chap ter 5 of this thesis.
294 Recidivism , in general terms, ‘is the tendency  of those who  have been convicted once  to re ­
o ffend ’: Shadd  M aruna , ‘Recid ivism ’ in Peter C ane  and Joanne  C onaghan  (eds ), T h e  N e w  O x f o r d  
C o m p a n io n  to  L a w  (Oxford University Press 2 008 ). Pluchinsky, exam in ing the issue of recid ivism  in 
the context of global jihadist terrorism , explains that a  recidivist m ay  be defined  as ‘one who , a fte r  
release  from  custody for having comm itted a crime, is not rehab ilita ted ’, going on to state that, ‘In 
most cases , the terrorist recidivist m ay  return to participating in terrorist opera tions ’: Denn is  A  
Pluchinsky, ‘G lobal Jihadist Recidivism : A  Red  F lag ’ (2 0 0 8 ) 31 S tud ies  in Conflict & Terro rism  182 , 
186.
295 As control orders did not involve the conviction or incarceration of the suspect, the  te rm  ‘re ­
engagem en t’, denoting a resumption o f the suspec t’s engagem en t in te rro rism -rela ted  activity, is to  
be preferred to ‘recid ivism ’ in relation to control orders, and, for the sam e  reasons, T P IM s .
296 John Horgan  and M ax  Tay lor, ‘D isengagem ent, De-rad ica liza tion  and the  Arc of Terro rism : Fu tu re  
Directions for R esea rch ’ in Rick Coo lsae t (ed ), J ih a d i  T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  R a d ic a l is a t io n  C h a l le n g e :  
E u r o p e a n  a n d  A m e r ic a n  E x p e r ie n c e s  (2 nd edn, Ashgate  2 0 11 ) 177.
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com prehens ive  s tud ies  o f jih ad is t te rro ris t rec id iv ism  to  da te , a num be r o f sou rces  have 
sugges ted  tha t jih ad is t te rro ris ts  do  e xh ib it a  s trong  p ropens ity  tow a rds  re c id iv ism .297
Acco rd ing  to  in fo rm a tion  re leased  by va rio us  US gove rnm en t agenc ies , inc lud ing  the  
D epartm en t o f D e fense ,298 the  House  A rm ed  Se rv ice s C omm ittee ,299 and the  D ire c to r o f 
N a tiona l In te lligence  (DN I), a  s ign ifican t pe rcen tage  o f the  de ta inees  fo rm e r ly  he ld  at 
G uan tanam o  Bay have  re -engaged  in te rro ris t o r  in su rgen t a c tiv itie s  fo llow ing  the ir 
re lease .300 T he  D N I’s 2013  Report, fo r  exam ple , c la im ed  tha t, as o f Janua ry  2013 , 97  o f 603 
(16.1 pe r cen t) fo rm e r de ta inees  w e re  ‘con firm ed  o f re -en gag ing ’, w ith  a fu r th e r 72 (11 .9  per 
cen t) be ing  suspec ted  o f re -engag ing .301 T he  a ccu ra cy  o f the se  ‘o ffic ia l’ fig u re s  has, 
however, been  fo rce fu lly  d ispu ted . D enbeaux, in su ccess ive  reports , has a sse rted  th a t the  
gove rnm en t’s va rio us  lis ts  o f G uan tanam o  re c id iv is ts  a re  ‘rife  w ith  e rro rs , in cons is tenc ie s , 
and in fla ted  s ta tis tic s .’302 Bergen, m eanwh ile , ca lcu la tes  tha t th e  num be r o f con firm ed  o r
297 See  Neil Ferguson, ‘D isengaging from  Terro rism ’ in Andrew  S ilke (ed ), T h e  P s y c h o lo g y  o f  
C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (R outledge , 2 0 11 ) 112; P luchinsky (n 2 9 4 ) 184.
298 The  D epartm en t of D e fense ’s 2 0 09  ‘Fact S hee t’, for exam p le , claims that, as  o f m id -M arch  2 0 0 9 ,  
of m ore than 5 30  fo rm er de ta inees , 2 7  w ere  confirmed and 4 7  w ere  suspected of re -engag ing  in 
terrorist activity. United States D epartm ent o f D efense , ‘Fact S hee t’ (0 4 /0 7 /2 0 0 9 )  1 
<www .defense.gov/new s/return to thefigh tfac tsheet2.pdf> accessed  9 M ay  2013 .
299 The  House A rm ed  Services  Comm ittee reported that, as of Sep tem ber 2 011 , the  U S  governm ent 
believed  that 2 7  per cen t of fo rm er G u a n ta n a m o  d e ta in e e s  ‘w e r e  c o n f i r m e d  o r  s u s p e c t e d  to  h a v e  
b e e n  e n g a g e d  in  t e r r o r is t  o r  in s u r g e n t  a c t i v i t ie s ’:  L e a v in g  G u a n ta n a m o :  P o l ic ie s ,  P r e s s u r e s ,  a n d  
D e ta in e e s  R e tu r n in g  to  t h e  F ig h t  (H A SC  112 -4 , 2 0 12 ) 10.
300 In 2 0 12 , the DN I reported that, as of 19 July 2 0 12 , of 6 0 2  fo rm er deta in ees , 95  (1 5 .8  per cen t)  
were  confirmed and 7 3  (12.1 per cent) w ere  suspected  of re-engaging: D irector of National 
In telligence, S u m m a r y  o f  t h e  R e e n g a g e m e n t  o f  D e ta in e e s  F o rm e r ly  H e ld  a t  G u a n ta n a m o  B a y ,  C u b a  
(2012 ) 1 <www .dn i.gov /files /docum en ts /N ew sroom /R eports% 20and% 20Pubs / R epo rts% 20and% 20  
Pubs% 202012 /S um m ary% 20o f% 20 the% 20R eengagem en t% 20o f% 20D e ta in ees% 20Fo rm e rly% 20H e l  
d% 20a t% 20G TM O .p d f> accessed  9 M ay  2013 .
301 D irector of National In telligence, S u m m a r y  o f  t h e  R e e n g a g e m e n t  o f  D e ta in e e s  F o rm e r ly  H e ld  a t  
G u a n ta n a m o  B a y ,  C u b a  (2 013 ) 1 <www .dn i.g o v /file s /docum en ts /M a rch% 202013% 20G TMO% 20  
Reengagem en t% 20R e lease .pd f> accessed  9 M ay  2013 . According to the D N I ’s  m o s t  r e c e n t  f ig u r e s ,  
a s  o f  1 5  J u ly  2 0 1 4 ,  107  of 620  (1 7 .3  per cent) fo rm er deta in ees  are  ‘confirmed o f re -engag ing ’, w ith a  
further 7 7  (1 2 .4  per cent) being suspected  of re-engag ing: D irector of National In telligence, S u m m a r y  
o f  th e  R e e n g a g e m e n t  o f  D e ta in e e s  F o rm e r ly  H e ld  a t  G u a n ta n a m o  B a y ,  C u b a  (2 0 1 4 ) 1 
<www .dn i.gov/index .php /new sroom / reports -and-pub lica tions /204-reports -pub lica tions -2014 /1 1 0 7 -  
summ ary-o f-the -reengagem en t-o f-de ta in ees -fo rm erly -he ld -a t-guan tanam o -bay ,-cuba-2014>  
accessed  8 S ep tem ber 2014 .
3 0 2
Mark P D enbeaux  and others, ‘Revisionist Recid ivism : Th e  Analysis o f G ove rnm en t’s 
Represen ta tions of A lleged “Recid ivism” of the G uan tanam o  D e ta in ees ’ (2 0 0 9 ) 2
< h ttp ://law .shu .edu /P rog ram sCen ters /Pub lic ln tG ovServ /C SJ /up lo ad /G TMO_F in a l_F in a l_R ec id iv is t_6 - 
5 -09 -3 .p d f> accessed 13 M ay  2013 . S ee  also ‘Justice Sca lia , the  D epartm en t of D e fense , 
and the Perpetuation  of an Urban Legend: T h e  Truth About the A lleged Recid ivism  of R e leased  
Guan tanam o  D eta in ees ’ (2 008 ); ‘R e leased  G uan tanam o  Deta in ees  and the D epartm en t O f D e fense : 
Propaganda by the Num bers? ’ (2009 ); ‘National Security  D eserves  Better: "Odd" Recid ivism  Num bers
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suspec ted  fo rm e r de ta inees  to  have  re -engaged  in te rro ris t o r m ilitan t ac tiv ity  by  2013  was 
ac tua lly  53, cons titu ting  a rec id iv ism  ra te  o f 8 .8  pe r cen t, ra the r than  the  28  pe r cen t c ited  by 
the  DN I.303 D enbeaux ’s and B e rgen ’s c la im s, a long w ith  the  na rrow  scope  o f the  US 
gove rnm en t’s repo rts ,304 and the  lack o f de ta iled  e v idence  p rov ided  in suppo rt o f the ir 
s ta tis tics , the re fo re  sugges t tha t a hea lthy  degree  o f cau tion  is necessa ry  in fo rm u la tin g  any 
conc lus ions  rega rd ing  the  like lihood  o f jih a d is t te rro ris t rec id iv ism  based  upon these  sou rces .
W h ils t the  absence  o f com prehens ive  ana lyses  poses  p rob lem s  in te rm s  o f id en tify ing  any 
genera l tre nds  in respec t o f jih ad is t te rro ris t rec id iv ism , P lu ch insky  subm its  th a t the  ava ilab le  
anecdo ta l ev idence  does  dem onstra te  a ‘te ndency  fo r  re leased  im prisoned  g loba l jih a d is t 
te rro ris ts  ... to  re tu rn  to  te rro ris t a c tiv ity .’305 A lthough  the  ev idence  surveyed  in d ica tes  tha t 
jih a d is t te rro ris ts  have  a p ropens ity  to  re -engage  in te rro ris t ac tiv ity  po s t- in ca rce ra tio n ,306 as 
P lu ch insky  a cknow ledges , ‘the re  have no t [yet] been  a su ffic ie n t num be r o f g loba l jih ad is t 
te rro ris ts  re leased  from  prison ... to  deduce  a trend  tow a rd  rec id iv ism  o r  no t.’307 Indeed, 
g iven  th a t tho se  w ho  a re  success fu lly  p ro secu ted  fo r te rro rism -re la ted  o ffe nces  a re  o ften  
g iven  leng thy  p rison  sen tences ,308 it m ay no t be poss ib le  to  deve lop  a  de ta iled , em p ir ica lly  
g rounded  unders tand ing  o f jih ad is t te rro ris t rec id iv ism  fo r  a num be r o f yea rs  to  com e.
Focus ing  spec ifica lly  on those  ind iv idua ls  w ho  w ere  sub je c t to  con tro l o rde rs , th e  a va ilab le  
ev idence  ind ica tes  tha t a t least th ree  fo rm e r con tro lees  d id re -engage  in te rro r is t a c tiv ity
Underm ine the G uan tanam o  Policy D eb a te ’ (2 0 12 ) < h ttp ://law .shu .edu /P rogram sCente rs /Public ln t  
GovServ /po licy research /G uan tanam o-Reports .c fm > accessed  9  M ay  2013 .
303 Peter Bergen, T e r ro r  Th rea t from  G itmo Prisoners is E xaggera ted ’ C N N  (8  M ay  2 0 1 3 )  
< h ttp ://ed ition .cnn .com /2013/05 /07 /op in ion /bergen-g itm o-terro r-th reat/index .h tm l> accessed  10 M ay  
2013 . S ee  also Pe te r Bergen, Katherine T iedem ann  and Andrew  Lebovich, ‘H ow  M any  G itm o  A lumni 
Take  Up Arm s? ’ F o r e ig n  P o l ic y  (January 11, 2 011 ) <www .fo re ignpo licy .com /a rtic les /2011 / 
01 /11 /how _m any_g itm o_a lum n i_ take_up_arm s> accessed  10 M ay  2013 .
304 Th e  figures re leased  by the US  government have  focused  solely upon recidivism  rates am ongst
 
fo rm er G u a n ta n a m o  d e ta in e e s .
305 P luchinsky (n 2 94 ) 182.
306 ibid 182 -183 .
307 ibid 184.
308 For a  detailed discussion of the penology of terrorism  and the sentenc ing  of terrorists in the  UK , 
see  W a lker, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (n 2 32 ) 2 8 3 -2 9 1 . S ee  also Ali N Bajwa, ‘Sen tencing  T e rro r  
O ffences ’ 1 74 (33 ) CL & J (2 0 10 ) 500 .
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once  free  o f th e ir con tro l o rders. A fte r a  se rie s  o f lega l cha lle nges ,309 M ahm oud  Abu  R ideh ’s 
con tro l o rde r w as lifted  a fte r th e  H om e O ffice  g ran ted  h im  pe rm iss ion  to  leave  the  UK  fo r 
S yria  in Ju ly  2 009 .310 A cco rd ing  to  a num be r o f sou rces , R ideh w as  then  subsequen tly  k illed, 
a long  w ith  o the r m ilitan ts , by an a irs trike  in A fghan is tan  in D ecem be r 20 10 .311 Tw o  o the r 
con tro lees, Ibrah im  and Lam ine  Adam , w ho  absconded  from  th e ir o rde rs  in M ay  20 07 ,312 
w ere  a ssessed  to  have  subsequen tly  tra ve lled  to  Pak is tan  and ‘engaged  in e x trem is t figh ting  
in the  Fede ra lly  A dm in is te red  T riba l A re a s .’313 It w as la te r repo rted  tha t Ib rah im  w as k illed  by 
a  US d rone  s tr ike  in Sou th  W az ir is tan  in N ovem be r 2011 .314
The  th ree  exam p les  d iscussed  above  p rov ide  som e , a lth ough  adm itte d ly  lim ited , e v idence  
tha t the  type  o f jih ad is t te rro ris t suspec ts  aga ins t w hom  p re ven tive  o rde rs  have  been  used  to  
da te , do  have a p ropens ity  tow ard  re -engagem en t.315 Indeed, th is  tendency , and  the  
endu ring  th rea t the se  ind iv idua ls  po ten tia lly  pose, has been  comm en ted  upon in bo th  the  
lite ra tu re  on re c id iv ism ,316 by Lord  C a rlile ,317 and a lso  in a num be r o f UK  te rro rism
309 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M a h m o u d  A b u  R id e h  [2 007 ] EW HC  8 0 4  (Adm in); 
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A b u  R id e h  &  A n o t h e r  [2007 ] EW CA  C iv 441 ; M a h m o u d  
A b u  R id e h  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2007 ] EW HC  2 2 3 7  (Adm in); S e c r e t a r y  o f  
S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A b u  R id e h  [2008 ] EW HC  1993  (Adm in); A b u  R id e h  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  
S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2008] EW HC  2 0 1 9  (Adm in).
310 N igel Morris, T e r ro r  Suspec t W ins  Battle to Leave  Britain ’ T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  (4  July 2 0 0 9 )  
<www .independent.co .uk /news/uk /hom e-news /terro r-suspect-w ins-battle -to -leave-b rita in -
1 7 3 1 2 6 0 .htm l> accessed  10 M ay  2 013 .
311 The  Arabic  jihadi w eb  forum  which reported R ideh ’s death described  him as  having becom e a  
‘martyr in A fghan is tan ’. Robin S im cox and others, I s la m is t  T e r r o r is m :  T h e  B r i t is h  C o n n e c t io n s  (2 nd 
edn, T h e  H enry  Jackson Socie ty 2 0 11 ) 4 3 1 -4 32 ; Duncan G ardham  and Parveen  Sw am i, ‘British A l-  
Q aeda  R efugee  Killed in A fghan is tan’ T h e  T e le g r a p h  (16  D ecem ber 20 10 )  
<www .te leg raph .co .uk /new s /uknew s /te rro rism -in -the -uk /8207784 /B ritish -a l-Q aeda-re fugee -k illed -in -  
Afghanistan .h tm l> accessed  10 M ay  2013 .
312 Robin S im cox and others, I s la m is t  T e r r o r is m :  T h e  B r i t is h  C o n n e c t io n s  (2 nd edn, T h e  Henry  
Jackson Socie ty  2 011 ) 29 .
313 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B F  [2011 ] EW HC  1878  (Adm in) [27] (D av is  J).
314 Ian Cobain, T w o  British Terro r Suspects  Killed in US  Drone Strikes in Pak is tan ’ T h e  G u a r d ia n  (18  
Novem ber 2 011 ) <www .guard ian .co .uk /w orld /2011 /nov /18 /b ritish -terro r-suspects-killed -d rone-  
pak is tan> accessed  10 M ay  2013 .
15 W hilst the cases  of Abu R ideh and the Adam  brothers provide dram atic  exam p les  of re ­
engagem en t by fo rm er contro lees, g iven the varied  profiles of the  suspects who have  been  m ade  
subject to control orders and T P IM s  since 2005 , other instances of re -engagem en t m ay  involve more  
subtle forms of terrorism -rela ted activity, such as p lanning or reconnaissance, fund-rais ing, or other  
facilitative acts.
316 S ee  P luchinsky (n 2 9 4 ) 187; Neil Ferguson, ‘D isengag ing  from  Terro rism ’ in Andrew  S ilke (ed ), 
T h e  P s y c h o lo g y  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  (Routledge, 2 0 11 ) 112.
317 In his 2 0 1 0  report, for exam ple , Lord Carlile  stated that, ‘a t least som e persons discharged  from  
[control] orders would resum e terrorist activities’: Lord Carlile , F i f t h  R e p o r t  (n 2 64 ) paras  41 .
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judgm en ts . In E,318 fo r  exam ple , the  a ssessm en t th a t the  suspec t had, ‘a  h igh  deg ree  of 
com m itm en t to  the  ex trem is t cause ’, and tha t the re  w as  the re fo re  a ‘m a te ria l risk  th a t he 
wou ld  re -engage  in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity ’, w as  deem ed re levan t to  th e  C ou rt’s dec is ion  
rega rd ing  E ’s con tro l o rde r,319 w h ils t in R  v  B a ro t ,320 it w as  rem arked  tha t, ‘A  te rro ris t w ho  is 
in the  g rip  o f idea lis tic  ex trem ism  ... is like ly  to  pose a se rio u s  risk fo r an in de fin ite  pe riod  if 
he is no t con fin ed .’321
W h ils t assess ing  w he the r a  pa rticu la r suspec t is like ly  to  re -engage  in te rro r is t a c tiv ity  w ill 
ne cessa rily  invo lve  an ind iv idua lised  risk  assessm en t, the  na tu re  o f th e  th rea t som e  
suspec ts  a re  seen  to  pose, in com b ina tion  w ith  th e  nascen t e v idence  on jih ad is t te r ro ris t 
rec id iv ism , fu rthe r sugges ts  tha t the  im pos ition  o f res tric tive  tim e  lim its  on p re ven tive  
m easu res  m ay  be ill-adv ised  when  v iew ed  from  a secu rity  pe rspective .
vi. C o n tro l O rd e rs  a n d  L ib e r ty :  C o n c lu s io n s
The  le ng thy  cu rfew s  and o the r seve re  res tr ic tion s on m ovem en t rou tin e ly  im posed  on 
suspec ts  unde r con tro l o rde rs  ine v itab ly  m ean t th a t th e y  ‘sa t unhapp ily  w ith  ... in d iv idua l 
lib e rty .’322 N one the less , un like  the  schem e  o f de ten tion  w ithou t tria l th a t p re ceded  it,323 the  
con tro l o rde r reg im e  was capab le  o f fun c tio n ing  in an A rtic le  5 -com p lia n t m anne r.324 During  
the  in itia l phase  o f the  reg im e ’s opera tion , however, the  lack  o f ce rta in ty  rega rd ing  the  cu t-o ff 
po in t be tw een  non-de roga ting  and de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  c lea rly  p roved  p rob lem a tic , 
resu lting  in a  num be r o f un law fu l d e  fa c to  de roga ting  o rde rs  be ing  im posed  by  the  H om e  
S ec re ta ry .325 Fenw ick  and Ph illipson  consequen tly  con tend  tha t, as  the  ob lig a tio n s  con ta ined
318 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2007 ] EW H C  233  (Adm in).
319 Ibid [89] (Beatson  J). S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M a h m o u d  A b u  R id e h  
[2007 ] EW HC  804  (Adm in) [65].
520 [2007] EW CA  Crim  1119 .
321 ibid [37] (Lord Phillips CJ).
322 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para  2 .13 .
323 A TCSA , Part 4. S ee  chap ter 3 of this thesis.
324 S ee  Hom e O ffice, M e m o r a n d u m  to  t h e  H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m it t e e  P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  
t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  7797 , 2 0 10 ) para  63 .
325 As d iscussed in chap ter 3  of this thesis, the power to m ake  derogating control orders w as  ves ted  in 
the court under PTA , s 1 (2 )(b ), with the power to impose an order containing ‘derogating ob ligations’
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in som e o f the  ea rly  con tro l o rde rs cou ld  no t be reconc iled  w ith  the  righ t to  liberty , in the se  
cases, the  e xecu tive ’s use o f the  powers  con fe rred  unde r the  PTA  ‘depended  in e ffe c t on a 
cove rt d e rog a tio n ’326 from  A rtic le  5.
Severa l o f th e  key  cou rt d e c is ions  d iscussed  above , however, se rved  to  p rov ide  a g rea te r 
degree  o f c la rity  as to  the  m ax im um  leve ls  o f cons tra in t th a t non -de roga tin g  o rde rs  cou ld  
law fu lly  im pose  on a con tro lee ’s libe rty .327 A lthough  these  ju dgm en ts  fa ile d  to  p rovoke  any 
am endm en ts  to  the  PTA  itse lf, th e y  d id com pe l som e  im po rtan t changes  to  gove rnm en t 
p rac tice  in re la tion  to  con figu ring  the  ob lig a tio ns  con ta ined  in con tro l o rd e rs ,328 the reby  
ensu ring  tha t th e  reg im e subsequen tly  ope ra ted  in a w ay  tha t w as gene ra lly  con s is ten t w ith  
A rtic le  5. T he  cou rts ’ approach  to  assess ing  con tro l o rde rs ’ com pa tib ility  w ith  th e  righ t to  
libe rty  has, neve rthe less , been critic ised  fo r  p lac ing  e xcess ive  fo cus  ‘on the  idea o f 
res tric tion  o f phys ica l libe rty  ana logous  to  a rre s t’ ,329 and pay ing  in su ffic ien t rega rd  to  ‘the  
long d u ra t io n  o f the  in te rfe rence  w ith  libe rty  in m any  con tro l o rde r c a se s .’330 Indeed , as 
‘d u ra tio n ’ w as one  o f the  fa c to rs  spec ifica lly  iden tified  in G u z z a rd i331 as  be ing  re le van t to  
de te rm in ing  w he the r a dep riva tion  o f libe rty  has o ccu rred ,332 it is a rguab le  th a t it shou ld  have 
rece ived  s ign ifican tly  g rea te r em phas is  from  the  dom estic  cou rts  w hen  cons ide rin g  the  
m a tte r o f a con tro l o rde r’s com p liance  w ith  A rtic le  5, p a rticu la rly  w he re  th e  su sp e c t’s o rde r 
had been renewed  m u ltip le  tim es .333
only being exerc isab le  if a  des ignated  derogation from  the whole or part of A rticle 5 E C H R  w as  in 
place  at the  tim e (PTA , s 4 (3 )(c )).
26 Helen  Fenw ick and Gavin  Phillipson, ‘Covert Derogations and Judicial D e fe rence ’ (n 105 ) 8 77 . S ee  
also Fenw ick, ‘Recalibrating E C HR  R ights’ (n 71 ) 180 .
327 In particular, the House  of Lord’s judgm ent in S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J  
[2007 ] UKHL  45 , and the  Suprem e Court’s decision in S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  
A P [2 0 1 0 ]  UKSC  24 .
328 Most notably in respect of the curfews imposed on contro lees under non -derogating  orders.
329 Helen  Fenw ick  and Gavin  Phillipson, ‘UK  Counter-terro r Law  Post-9 /11 : Initial A ccep tance  of 
Extraordinary M easures  and the Partial Return to Hum an  Rights Norm s’ in V ic to r V  R am ra j et al, 
G lo b a l  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  L a w  a n d  P o l ic y  (2nd edn, Cam bridge  University Press  2012 ) 4 89 .
330 ibid. S ee  also Bates  (n 105 ) 106 .
331 G u z z a r d i  (n 72 ).
332 ibid para  92.
qoo
See  Fenw ick, ‘Recalibrating E CHR  R ights’ (n 71 ) 1 87 -190 ; H elen  Fenw ick and G av in  Phillipson, 
‘Covert Derogations and Judicial D e fe rence ’ (n 105 ) 886 .
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IV. Control O rder Proceedings and Article 6 ECHR
Ano th e r aspec t o f th e  reg im e  tha t w as  heav ily  litiga ted  w as  w he the r ‘con tro l o rde r 
p ro ceed ings ’334 w ere  com p lia n t w ith  the  fa ir tria l re qu irem en ts  o f A rtic le  6 ECHR . T he  righ t to  
a fa ir tria l cons titu tes  ‘a ca rd ina l re qu irem en t o f th e  ru le  o f law ’,335 and is cons ide red , ‘one  o f 
th e  fundam en ta l g ua ran tees  o f human rig h ts ’,336 be ing  essen tia l to  th e  p ro tec tio n  of 
ind iv idua l righ ts  and libe rties  aga ins t abuses  o f s ta te  pow e r.337 Due p rocess  and  the  righ t to  
a fa ir tria l a re  p rin c ip les  w h ich  a re  cen tra l to  bo th  the  comm on  law 338 and  in te rna tiona l 
hum an  righ ts  law .339 Key to  th e  p ro tec tion  o f th e  righ t to  a  fa ir  tria l in the  UK  is A rtic le  6 o f the  
ECHR ,340 wh ich  p rov ides tha t ‘in the  de te rm ina tion  o f h is c iv il righ ts  and ob lig a tio n s  o r o f a ny  
c rim ina l cha rge  aga in s t h im , eve ryone  is en titled  to  a fa ir  and  pub lic  hearin g  w ith in  a 
reasonab le  tim e  by an independen t and im partia l tr ib una l e s tab lished  by law .’341 Due  to  th e  
im po rtance  o f the  p rin c ip les  it e n sh rin es  342 A rtic le  6 is deem ed  to  have  a 'po s itio n  o f p re ­
em inence  w ith in  the  C onven tio n '.343 Indeed, the  EC tHR  has ins is ted  tha t the  r igh t to  a fa ir 
tria l ‘ho lds so  p rom inen t a p lace  in a dem oc ra tic  soc ie ty  th a t th e re  can be no  ju s tifica tio n  fo r  
in te rp re ting  A rtic le  6 (1 ) res tr ic tive ly .’344
334 PTA , s 11 (6 ) provided that, for the purposes of the PTA , ‘control o rder p roceed ings ’ w e re  those  
under ss 3, 5  and 10 of the  Act.
335 Tom  Bingham  (n 28 ) 90 .
336 UNGA , R e p o r t  o f  th e  S p e c ia l  R a p p o r t e u r  o n  th e  P r o m o t io n  a n d  P r o t e c t io n  o f  H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  
F u n d a m e n ta l  F r e e d o m s  W h i le  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m  (A /6 3 /2 2 3 , 2 0 0 8 ) (Fa ir  trial guaran tees  while  
countering terrorism ) para  7. S ee  also Ian Langford, ‘Fa ir Trial: T h e  H istory o f an Id ea ’ (2 0 0 9 ) 8 (1 )  
Journal of Hum an  Rights 37 , 37 .
337 C layton and Tom linson, for exam ple , describe the right to a fa ir trial as the ‘foundation stone for 
substantive protection against state power’: R ichard C layton  and Hugh Tom linson, F a i r  T r ia l  R ig h t s  
(O U P  2 001 ) 2.
38 S ee  the M agna  Carta , chap ter 39  (n 42 ); R  v  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  C a m b r id g e  (1 723 ) 1 S tr 5 57 . S e e  also  
Clayton and Tom linson (n 337 ) 26 -73 ; JU S T IC E , S e c r e t  E v id e n c e  (2 009 ) 14 -31 .
339 S ee  Universal Declara tion of Human  Rights 1948 , A rticle 10; IC C PR  1966 , Art 14 (1 ).
340 HRA , s 1(1 )(a ), sch 1, pt 1.
341 Article 6 (1 ) ECHR . For detailed discussion of the content and imp lem entation of Article 6  of the  
Convention see  N ua la  M ole and Catharina  Harby, T h e  R ig h t  to  a  F a i r  T r ia l :  A  G u id e  to  t h e  
Im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  A r t i c le  6  o f  th e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (2 nd edn , Council of Europe  
2006 ).
342 In S a la b ia k u  v  F r a n c e  (1 991 ) 13  EHRR  379 , for exam ple , the  EC tH R  (para  4 8 ) noted that, in 
protecting the right to a  fair trial, the 'object and purpose1 of Article 6 is 'to enshrine the fundam enta l 
principle of the rule of law.' S ee  also G o ld e r  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 9 75 ) 1 EH RR  524 , para  34 .
43 David  Harris and others, H a r r is ,  O 'B o y le  a n d  W a r b r ic k :  L a w  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o n  
H u m a n  R ig h t s  (2 nd edn, O U P  2 009 ) 201 .
344 P e r e z  v  F r a n c e  (2 005 ) 4 0  EHRR  39 , para 64 . S ee  also D e lc o u r t  v  B e lg iu m  (1 970 ) 1 E H RR  355 , 
para  25.
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A lthough  the  righ t to  a fa ir tria l itse lf is abso lu te , 'the  va rio us  e lem en ts  w h ich  suppo rt [it] ... 
m ay  be qua lified  by p ropo rtio na te  s teps to  m ee t a  le g itim a te  ob je c tive .'345 In te rro rism  cases, 
it is the re fo re  lega lly  pe rm iss ib le  fo r certa in  righ ts  usua lly  a ffo rded  to  suspec ts , fo r exam ple , 
access  to  in cu lpa to ry  e v idence346 and tria l by  ju ry ,347 to  be  cu rta iled  in th e  in te res ts  o f 
na tiona l secu rity . In th is  con tex t, the  p rinc ipa l reasons advanced  to  ju s tify  the  adop tion  o f 
p rocedu res  w h ich  dev ia te  from  comm on ly  app licab le  fa ir  tria l s tanda rds  a re  the  need  to  
p ro tec t w itnesses , ju dges  and  ju rie s  aga ins t in tim ida tion  and  re ta lia tio n ,348 and, o f p a rticu la r 
re levance  to  con tro l o rde rs, the  need  to  ensu re  the  sa fe ty  o f in fo rm an ts , and  p reven t th e  
exposu re  o f su rve illa nce  te chn iques  o r the  ha rm fu l d isc losu re  o f secu rity -sens itive  
in fo rm a tio n .349
/. P ro c e e d in g s  u n d e r  th e  P re v e n t io n  o f  T e rro r ism  A c t  2 0 0 5
Con tro l o rde rs  w e re  im posed  on suspects  based  on an in te llig ence  case  w h ich  typ ica lly  
com prised  a com b ina tion  o f ‘o p en ’ and ‘c lo sed ’ m a te ria l. W h ils t the  ‘open  m a te ria l’ , w h ich  
gene ra lly  cons is ted  o f fa c ts  re la ting  to  th e  suspec t’s m ovem ents , ac tiv ities , and  m ee tings , 
w as revea led  to  th e  in d iv id ua l,350 ‘c losed  m a te ria l’ w as tha t w h ich  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  
‘o b je c te d ] to  d isc lo s in g ’ to  the  con tro lee , th e ir lega l rep resen ta tive , o r  o th e r re le van t 
p a r t ie s 351 In o rde r fo r  c losed  ev idence  - w h ich  cou ld  inc lude  m a te ria l such  as  in te rcep t 
da ta ,352 in te lligence  assessm en ts , and s ta tem ents  from  fo re ign  and dom es tic  secu rity
345 R ichard Stone, T e x tb o o k  o n  C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (1 0 th edn, O U P  2 014 ) 181.
346 S ee , for exam ple , PTA , sch, para  3 and C PR  76 .28 ; T P IM A , sch 4 , para  4  and  C P R  8 0 .2 4 .
347 S ee  Northern Ireland (Em ergency  Provisions) Act 1973 , s 2; Justice and Security (Northern  
Ire land) Act 2 007 , s 5. S ee  also John Jackson, ‘V icious and V irtuous Cycles  in Prosecuting Terrorism : 
The  Diplock Court Experience ’ in F io n n u a la  N f  A o la in  and O ren  G ross (eds), G u a n ta n a m o  a n d  
B e y o n d :  E x c e p t io n a l  C o u r t s  a n d  M i l i t a r y  C o m m is s io n s  in  C o m p a r a t iv e  P e r s p e c t iv e  (C am bridge  
University Press  2 013 ).
348 S ee  Sottiaux (n 7 ) 323; Gus V an  Harten, ‘W eaknesses  of Adjudication in the  F ace  of S ecre t 
Evidence ’ (2 0 09 ) 13 (1 ) In ternational Journal o f Evidence and Proof 1, 4 .
349 S ee  David  Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para 3 .69 .
350 ‘Open  m ateria l’ was defined  by C PR  7 6 .1 (3 )(f)  as ‘any  relevant m aterial that the  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  
[did] not object to disclosing to a relevant party’.
51 According to C PR  76.1 (3 )(b ), ‘closed m ateria l’ w as  ‘any  relevan t material that the S ec re ta ry  of 
S ta te  ob jec ted ] to disclosing to a relevan t party’. PTA , sch, para  11 provided that, in relation to  
control order proceedings, a ‘relevant party’ w as ‘any  party to the proceedings o ther than the  
Secre ta ry  of S ta te ’.
352 PTA , sch, para  9; C P R  7 6 .2 6 (4 ).
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sou rces353 - to  be u tilised  in con tro l o rde r cases, the  A c t’s schedu le , and the  spec ia l ru les o f 
cou rt m ade  pu rsuan t to  it,354 p rov ided  fo r a sys tem  o f ‘c losed  he a rings ’ and Spec ia l 
A dvoca te s  to  be used in p roceed ings  unde r th e  PTA.
T he  cou rt ru les app licab le  to  con tro l o rde r p roceed ings  w e re  con ta ined  in Part 76  o f th e  C ivil 
P rocedu re  R u les 355 In respec t o f PTA  p roceed ings , CPR  76 .2 (2 ) requ ired  the  cou rt, in g iv ing  
e ffe c t to  th e  C PR ’s o ve rrid ing  ob jec tive  o f enab ling  cases  to  be  dea lt w ith  ju s tly ,356 to  ensu re  
tha t in fo rm a tion  w as  no t d isc losed  con tra ry  to  th e  ‘pub lic  in te re s t’.357 W he re  it w as 
cons ide red  necessa ry  to  p reven t such  d isc losu re , o r  ‘fo r a ny  o th e r good  re ason ’ ,358 CPR
76 .22  a llow ed  the  cou rt to  conduc t ‘c lo sed ’ hea rin gs  in p riva te , from  wh ich  the  con tro lee  and 
the ir lega l rep resen ta tive  w ou ld  be exc luded . M od ified  ru les o f e v idence  and  d isc lo su re  a lso  
app lied  to  con tro l o rde r p roceed ings, CPR  76 .26  au tho ris in g  the  cou rt to  rece ive  e v idence  
tha t w ou ld  no t o the rw ise  be adm iss ib le .359 W ith  regard  to  ‘c losed  m a te ria l’ , it w as  spec ified  
by  CPR  76 .28  tha t the  H om e S ec re ta ry  w as requ ired  to  app ly  to  the  cou rt fo r pe rm iss ion  to  
w ithho ld  such m a te ria l from  the  con tro lee  o r  th e ir lega l rep re sen ta tive ,360 and  a lso  file  a  
s ta tem en t exp la in ing  his reasons fo r w ithho ld ing  the  m a te ria l.361 T he  c losed  m a te ria l w ou ld  
then  be cons ide red  by a Specia l A dvoca te , w ho  cou ld  subsequen tly  cha lle nge  the  need  fo r  
all o r a ny  o f th e  m a te ria l to  be w ithhe ld .362
353 W a lker, T e r r o r is m  and  t h e  Law  (n 232 ) 311 .
354 C PR  Part 76: Proceedings under the Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 005 .
355 These  were  introduced using the rule making power con ferred by PTA , sch, paras  1, 3 . S e e  Civil 
Procedure (Am endm ent No 2) Rules 2 005 , S I 2 0 05 /6 56 .
356 C PR  1 .1 (1 ).
357 S ee  also PTA , sch, para 2 (b ). U nder C PR  7 6 .1 (4 ), it w as  specified that d isclosure would be  
considered contrary to the public interest if it w as  m ade ‘contrary to the interests of national security, 
the  international relations of the United K ingdom, the detection and prevention of crim e, o r in any  
other circumstances where  disclosure [would be] likely to harm  the  public in terest.’
358 C PR  76 .2 2 (2 ).
359 C PR  76 .2 6 (4 ).
360 C PR  76 .28 (1  )(a ).
361 C PR  76 .28 (2 )(b ).
362 C PR  76 .29 . W he re  the Special Advocate did challenge the withholding of any  of the closed  
material, the court was required to arrange  a  hearing to determ ine  the m atter (C PR  7 6 .2 9 (2 )) , unless  
the Hom e Secre tary  and Spec ia l Advocate consen ted to the court decid ing the  issue w ithout a  
hearing (C PR  76 .29 (2 )(c )) .
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Spec ia l A dvoca te s  - se cu rity -c lea red  law ye rs363 - w e re  appo in ted  unde r PTA , sch  7  and CPR
76 .23  to  're p re sen t the  in te res ts  o f  con tro lees  in con tro l o rde r p roceed ings .364 A s ide  from  
the ir c ruc ia l ro le  in cha lleng ing  the  H om e S e c re ta ry ’s w ithho ld ing  o f spec ific  m a te ria l from  
the  suspect, th e  Spec ia l A dvoca te ’s fu n c tio n s , as de lin ea ted  by  CPR  76 .24 , inc luded  m aking 
subm iss ions , adduc ing  ev idence , and c ro ss -e xam in ing  w itnesses  in c losed  sess ions , and 
a lso  m ak ing  w ritten  subm iss ions  to  th e  court.
W h ils t th e  S pec ia l A dvoca te 's  invo lvem en t w as in tended  to  m itiga te  th e  po ten tia l un fa irness 
c rea ted  by  ‘the  d ifficu lt c ircum stances  w he re , in the  pub lic  in te res t, m a te ria l canno t be 
d isc lo se d ’365 to  the  suspect, th e ir ab ility  to  do so  w as  s ign ifican tly  im peded  by  the  fa c t tha t 
com m un ica tio n  w ith  the  con tro lee  w as gene ra lly  on ly  a llow ed  p rio r to  th e  S pec ia l A dvoca te  
be ing  se rved  w ith  the  c losed  m a te ria l.366 O nce  they  had seen  th is  m a te ria l, th e  S pec ia l 
A dvoca te  w as  unab le  to  comm un ica te  w ith  o r ta ke  ins tru c tion s  from  the  con tro lee  abou t any 
m a tte r connec ted  w ith  the  p roceed ings un less au tho rized  to  do  so  fo llow ing  an app lica tio n  to  
the  cou rt.367 T hough  des igned  to  p reven t any  inadve rten t d isc losu re  o f sens itive  
in fo rm a tio n ,368 as Fo rcese  and W a ldm an  obse rve , the se  s tr ic t lim ita tions  on comm un ica tio n  
cons titu te  a  'd ram a tic  depa rtu re  from  conven tio na l fa ir  tria l s tanda rd s  and  the  m ost 
con trove rs ia l a spec t o f the  UK  spec ia l a d voca te  s ys tem .’369
363 S ee  A lexander Horne, H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  S t a n d a r d  N o te :  S p e c ia l  A d v o c a t e s  a n d  C lo s e d  M a te r ia l  
P r o c e d u r e s  S N /H A /6 2 8 5  (2012 ).
364 C PR  7 6 .2 3 (3 ). T h e  Specia l Advocate was not, however, responsible to the  contro lee  whose  
in terests they  were  appointed to represent (PTA , sch, para  7 (5 )).
365 H om e O ffice, P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (n 3 2 4 ) para  
64 .
366 C PR  7 6 .2 5 (1 ), (2).
367 C PR  7 6 .2 5 (4 )-(5 ).
368 S ee  Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  th e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  F i f t h  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7855 , 2 010 ) 2 0 -22 .
369 Craig  Forcese and Lom e W aldm an , S e e k in g  J u s t ic e  in  a n  U n f a i r  P r o c e s s :  L e s s o n s  f r o m  C a n a d a ,  
t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  a n d  N e w  Z e a la n d  in  th e  U s e  o f  “S p e c ia l  A d v o c a t e s ”  in  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  
P r o c e e d in g s  (C anad ian  Cen tre  for Intelligence and Security  S tud ies, 2 0 0 7 ) 36 . This v iew  is echoed  by  
McGarrity  and San tow , who state that, ‘the prohibition on communication p laces considerable hurdles  
in the w ay  of a  fair trial, as it m akes  it virtually impossib le for the  appellan t to g ive effective instructions  
regarding the conduct of his or her case ’: N icola M cGarrity  and Edward  San tow , 'Anti-terrorism  Laws: 
Balancing National Security  and a  Fa ir Hearing ' in V ic to r V  Ram ra j et al (eds), G lo b a l  A n t i - T e r r o r is m  
L a w  a n d  P o l i c y  (2 nd edn Cam bridge  University P ress  2 012 ) 146 . S ee  also Constitutional A ffairs  
Comm ittee , T h e  O p e r a t io n  o f  th e  S p e c ia l  Im m ig r a t io n  A p p e a ls  C o m m is s io n  ( S IA C )  a n d  t h e  U s e  o f  
S p e c ia l  A d v o c a t e s  (HC  2 0 04 -0 5 , 3 23 -I) para 52.
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W hethe r, as c la im ed  by the  G overnm en t, the  S pec ia l A dvoca te  schem e  and d isc losu re  
p rocess used in con tro l o rde r p roceed ings p rov ided  con tro lees  w ith  ‘a m easu re  o f p rocedura l 
ju s tic e ’370 su ffic ie n t to  sa tis fy  the  ECHR ’s fa ir  tria l requ irem en ts , is exam ined  in the  fo llow in g  
sec tion , w h ich  cons ide rs  the  lead ing  cases  in w h ich  the  reg im e  w as cha lle nged  on the  
g rounds  of incom pa tib ility  w ith  A rtic le  6.
ii. A r t ic le  6  E C H R  C h a lle n g e s
W hethe r, in d ischa rg ing  its supe rv iso ry  ro le  under PTA , s 3 (10), the  cou rt w as  ab le  to  g ive  
the  con tro lee  a fa ir  hea ring  fo r the  pu rposes  o f A rtic le  6, w as  firs t add re ssed  by  the  H igh 
C ou rt in S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  D e p a r tm e n t v  M B 371 Here , the  m a te ria l d e live red  to  
th e  cou rt inc luded  ‘o p en ’ and ‘c lo sed ’ s ta tem en ts ,372 a long  w ith  an app lica tio n  fo r  pe rm iss ion  
to  w ithho ld  th e  c losed  m a te ria l and  an a ccom pany ing  ou tline  summ a ry  o f th e  reasons  w hy  
the  H om e S ec re ta ry  con tended  tha t the  c losed  m a te ria l shou ld  be  w ithhe ld .373 In th e  open  
s ta tem en t it w as a sse rted  tha t MB w as an Is lam ic  e x trem is t w hom  the  S ecu rity  S e rv ice  
be lie ved  was invo lved  in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ities , it be ing  a lle ged  tha t, p rio r to  the  
au tho ritie s  p reven ting  h im  from  trave lling , MB in tended  to  go  to  Iraq to  fig h t aga in s t the  
coa lition  fo rces .374 A lthough  the  open  s ta tem en t w as  adm itted  to  be  ‘re la tive ly  th in ’,375 it w as  
a ssessed  tha t p rov id ing  MB w ith  even a summ a ry  o f the  c losed  e v idence  aga ins t h im  w ou ld  
be  con tra ry  to  the  pub lic  in te res t.376 Thus, as th e  ju s tifica tio n  fo r  im pos ing  his con tro l o rde r 
w as  based  on ev idence  tha t w as  ‘w ho lly  con ta ined  in the  c losed  m a te ria l’ ,377 S u llivan  J fo und  
tha t, w ithou t access  to  th a t m a te ria l, it w as  ‘d ifficu lt to  see  how  ... [MB ] cou ld  m ake  any
370 Hom e O ffice, P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (n 3 2 4 ) para  
64 . S ee  also para  61.
371 [2006] EW HC  1000  (Adm in).
372 Supporting documents w ere  also provided in respect of both the  open  and closed s tatem en ts .
373 M B  (n 3 71 ) [20].
374 ibid [20]. MB  had been  prevented by the police from  travelling to Syria  on 1 M arch 2 0 0 5 , and  then  
to Y em en  on 2  M arch 2005 .
375 ibid [66] quoting counsel for the Hom e Secretary, M r Burnett.
376 ibid [24]. Having read the closed material, Sullivan J endorsed  counse l’s v iew  that it would not be  
possible to serve  a  summary which would be capab le  of complying with the  requirem en t under C PR  
7 6 .2 9 (6 )(b ) that any such summary must not contain ‘in formation or o ther material the d isclosure of 
which would be contrary to the public interest’.
377 ibid [67].
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e ffec tive  cha lle nge  to  w ha t [was], on the  open  case be fo re  h im , no m ore  than  a bare  
a sse rtio n .’378 In ligh t o f th is, d esp ite  conc lud ing  tha t the  p roceed ings  w ere  ‘c iv il’ ra the r than  
‘c r im in a l’ ,379 and the re fo re  fe ll w ith in  the  ‘less dem and ing  ... lim b  o f A rtic le  6 (1 ) ’ ,380 Su llivan  J 
he ld th a t th e  p rocedure  under PTA , s 3 w as  incom pa tib le  w ith  M B ’s r igh t to  a fa ir  h ea rin g ,381 
issu ing  a dec la ra tion  to  th a t e ffec t u nde r s 4  o f the  HRA.
On appea l, the  H igh C ou rt’s dec is ion  was, however, reve rsed  and the  dec la ra tion  o f 
incom pa tib ility  se t a s ide .382 A ffirm ing  tha t p ro ceed ings  under PTA, s 3 d id no t am oun t to  the  
de te rm ina tio n  o f a  crim ina l cha rge  fo r ECHR  pu rposes ,383 the  C ou rt o f A ppea l found  tha t 
Su llivan  J had e rred  in ho ld ing  tha t the  p ro v is ions  fo r the  rev iew  o f the  m ak ing  o f n on ­
de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  by the  cou rt b reached  A rtic le  6 .384 W h ile  rem ark ing  tha t to  deny  a 
pa rty  to  lega l p roceed ings  the  righ t to  know  the  case  aga ins t them  was, ‘on the  fa ce  o f it, 
fu n dam en ta lly  a t odds w ith  the  requ irem en ts  o f a fa ir  tr ia l’ ,385 the  C ou rt o f A ppea l no ted  tha t 
bo th  S trasbou rg386 and the  UK cou rts387 had neve rthe less  re cogn ised  tha t th e re  w e re  
c ircum s tances  w he re  the  use o f c losed  e v idence  w ou ld  no t necessa rily  con tra vene  A rtic le  
6 .388 In line  w ith  the se  p receden ts , th e  C ou rt de te rm ined  tha t, in con tro l o rde r cases , A rtic le  6 
cou ld  no t be seen  to  au tom a tica lly  requ ire  d isc losu re  o f the  e v idence  o f the  g rounds  fo r  the  
Home S ec re ta ry ’s susp ic ion .389 A s  regards  c losed  m a te ria l,390 Lord  Ph illips  e xp la ined  tha t its
378 ibid.
379 ibid [38].
380 W a lker, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (n 2 32 ) 3 19 . T h e  additional guaran tees  contained in A rticle 6 (2 )  
and  (3) a re  only app licable in respect of crim inal charges . For further discussion of the guaran tees  
contained in parag raphs (2) and (3 ), see  Robin CA  W h ite  and C la re  O vey, J a c o b s ,  W h i te  a n d  O v e y :  
T h e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o n  H u m a n  R ig h ts  (5 th edn, O U P  2 010 ) 2 7 8 -2 9 6 .
381 R e  M B  (n 371 ) [104]. S ee  also [103].
382 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M B  [2006 ] EW CA  C iv 1140 .
383 ibid [53].
384 ibid [87] (Lord Phillips). S ee  also [48].
385 ibid [70] (Lord Phillips).
386 ibid [71 ]-[74 ], citing C h a h a l  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 996 ) 2 3  H ER  413 , paras  131, 144; T in n e l ly  &  S o n s  
L t d  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1998 ) 2 7  E HRR  249 , para  78; R o w e  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 000 ) 3 0  E H RR  1, 
para  61 . S ee  also J a s p e r  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 000 ) 3 0  E HRR  441 , para 52; F i t t  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  
(2 0 00 ) EHRR  480 , para  45 .
87 ibid [75 ]-[77], citing R  v  H  [2004] UKHL  3  [23]; A  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  
[2004] EW CA  C iv 1 202  [57]; A  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  ( N o  2 )  [2004 ] EW CA  
Civ 1123  [51 ]-[52], [235]; R  (R o b e r t s )  v  P a r o le  B o a r d  [2005 ] UKHL  45 .
388 ibid [70]. S ee  also [80].
389 ibid [85]. In justifying this conclusion, it was reasoned  by Lord Phillips that, w ere  this not the case ,
 
the Hom e Secre tary  would be in the ‘invidious position’ of having to choose betw een  disclosing
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use  w as  deem ed  pe rm iss ib le  p rov id ing  ‘a pp rop ria te  sa fegua rd s  aga ins t th e  p re jud ice  tha t 
th is  m ay  cause  to  th e  [con tro lee ]’391 w e re  in p lace. In conc lus ion , the  C ou rt o f A ppea l he ld 
tha t, as  the  A c t’s p rov is ion  fo r  th e  invo lvem en t o f the  S pec ia l A dvoca te  and the  d isc losu re  
ru les con ta ined  in CPR  Pt 76  w e re  cons ide red  app rop ria te  sa fegua rds ,392 the  p rocedure  
unde r the  PTA  fo r th e  cou rt rev iew  o f the  m ak ing  o f non -de roga tin g  o rde rs  w as  the re fo re  
com p lia n t w ith  A rtic le  6 .393
In the  House  o f Lords, the  case  o f M B  w as jo in e d  w ith  th a t o f A F .394 A s  w ith  M B ,395 the  
essence  o f the  Home S ec re ta ry ’s case aga ins t AF , w ho  w as  suspec ted  o f hav ing  links w ith  
th e  p roscribed  L ibyan Is lam ic F igh ting  G roup , lay  in th e  c losed  m a te ria l.396 C on fron tin g  the  
m a tte r o f w he the r con tro l o rde r p ro ceed ings  shou ld  be c la ss ified  as  ‘c iv il’ o r  ‘c r im ina l’ fo r  
A rtic le  6 pu rposes, the  Law  Lo rds  unan im ous ly  he ld th a t non -de roga tin g  con tro l o rde r 
p roceed ings  d id  no t invo lve  the  de te rm ina tio n  o f a crim ina l cha rge , as th e re  w as  ‘no 
a sse rtion  o f crim ina l conduct, on ly  a founda tio n  o f su sp ic ion ’ , and ‘no id en tifica tio n  o f a ny  
spec ific  c rim ina l o ffe n ce ’, the  o rde r itse lf be ing  ‘p re ven ta tive  in pu rpose , no t pun itive  o r 
re tr ibu tive ’.397 It w as  how eve r accep ted  tha t w he re  the  ind iv idua l w as  ‘a t r isk  o f an  o rde r 
con ta in ing  [s tringen t] o b lig a tio n s ’,398 the  app lica tion  o f the  civ il lim b  o f A rtic le  6 (1) en titled  
con tro lees  to  a m easure  o f p rocedura l p ro tec tion  tha t w as ‘com m ensu ra te  w ith  th e  g ra v ity  o f 
th e  po ten tia l consequences ’399 o f th e ir  con tro l o rder.
information which could be damaging to security operations against terrorists, or refraining from  
imposing restrictions on a  suspect which w ere  regarded  as necessary  in order to protect m em bers  of 
the  public from the risk of terrorism  (see  [85]).
390 ibid [70]. T h e  impact of the P TA ’s provisions for the use o f closed m ateria l w as  said  to be the  
aspect of the case  that caused  the Court the most concern.
391 ibid [86].
392 ibid [86] (Lord Phillips).
393 ibid [87].
394 M B  a n d  A F { n 104 ). A F ’s appea l was aga inst the decision o f O use ley  J in S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  
H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A F [2007] EW HC  651 (Adm in).
395 ibid [39 ]-[40].
396 ibid [49]. S ee  also S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A F  [2007] EW H C  651 (Adm in) 
[131], [146].
ibid [24] (Lord B ingham ). S ee  also [48] (Lord Ho ffm ann); [65] (B aroness Ha le ); [79 ] (Lord  
Carswell); [90] (Lord Brown).
398 ibid [24] (Lord B ingham ).
399 ibid. S ee  also  [56] Baroness  Hale; [90] (Lord Brown).
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On the  key  issue  o f w he the r p ro ceed ings  unde r the  PTA  w e re  com pa tib le  w ith  A rtic le  6, 
a lth ough  the  Law  Lo rd s ’ w e re  no t con fid en t th a t the  EC tHR  w ou ld  ho ld th a t e ve ry  con tro l 
o rde r hea ring  in w h ich  the  Spec ia l A dvoca te  p ro cedure  w as used w ou ld  be su ffic ie n t to  
com p ly  w ith  th e  A rtic le ’s requ irem en ts ,400 they  cons ide red  tha t, w ith  ‘s tre nuous  e ffo rts  from  
a ll ’ , it w ou ld  usua lly  be poss ib le  to  acco rd  the  con tro lee  ‘a subs tan tia l m easu re  o f p rocedura l 
ju s tic e .’401 By a m a jority , the  Law  Lo rds  conc luded  tha t it w as poss ib le , u nde r HRA, s 3, to  
in te rp re t - o r  ‘read dow n ’ - the  re levan t p ro v is ions  in th e  P TA ’s schedu le  and in C PR  P t 76  so 
th a t th e y  cou ld  be ope ra ted  com pa tib ly  w ith  the  righ t to  a  fa ir  h ea rin g .402 In o rde r to  ensu re  
com p lian ce  w ith  A rtic le  6, the se  p rov is ions  w e re  the re fo re  to  be read  and  g iven  e ffec t 
‘excep t w he re  to  do  so  w ou ld  be incom pa tib le  w ith  th e  righ t o f a  con tro lle d  pe rson  to  a  fa ir 
tr ia l’ .403
In con firm ing  tha t con tro l o rde r p ro ceed ings  w e re  capab le  o f fun c tio n ing  in an  A rtic le  6 - 
com p lia n t m anner, the  H ouse  o f Lo rd s ’ de c is ion  in M B  a n d  A F  re p resen ted  a ‘qua lified  
endo rsem en t’404 o f the  PTA ’s p rocedura l reg im e. D iffe rences in th e ir L o rd sh ip s ’ re ason in g ,405 
however, m ean t tha t the  gu idance  p rov ided  to  the  low e r cou rts  rega rd ing  the  leve l of 
d isc losu re  requ ired  in o rde r to  sa tis fy  A rtic le  6(1) w as som ew ha t opaque . A s  a resu lt, 
app lica tio n  o f the  ju d gm en t p roved  d ifficu lt, w ith  va ry ing  in te rp re ta tio n s  o f th e  ru ling  be ing
400 ibid [66] (Baroness H a le ). S ee  also [90] (Lord Brown). S ee , however, the less equivocal v iew  of 
Lord Hoffmann on the Specia l Advocate  procedure ’s ability to satisfy the requirem ents of A rticle 6
ibid [66] (B aroness Ha le ). S ee  also [35] (Lord B ingham ); [54] (Lord Hoffmann); [84] (Lord  
Carswell); [90] (Lord Brown).
402 ibid [44] (Lord B ingham ); [72] (Baroness  Hale); [92] (Lord Brown).
403 ibid [72] (Baroness Ha le ). In light of their Lordships’ decision, both cases  w ere  rem itted back to the  
High Court for the  m atter of w hether MB  and AF  had received an  Article 6  compliant hearing  to be  
reconsidered. S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A F  [2008 ] EW HC  4 5 3  (Adm in).
404 John Ip, T h e  Suprem e Court and the House of Lords In the W a r  on Terror: I n t e r  A rm a  S i le n t  
L e g e s ? ’ (2 0 10 -1 1 ) 19 (1 ) M ichigan S ta te  Journal of International Law  1, 2 5 . T h e  G overnm ent,  
however, v iew ed  the decision as confirm ing that the ‘control orders legislation, including the  special 
advocate  system , as supp lem ented by this judgm en t’, w as  there fo re  ‘fully compliant with Article 6 ’: 
Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  th e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  7367 ,  
2008 ) 5.
405 M B  a n d  A F { n 104) [44] (Lord B ingham ); [72 ]-[74] (Baroness Hale); [84] (Lord Carswell); [90] (Lord  
Brown). For a  useful discussion of the app roaches  taken  by each  of the Law  Lords, see  Fenw ick, 
‘Recalibrating E CHR  R ights’ (n 71 ) 2 0 9 -2 12 .
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adop ted  by H igh C ou rt ju d ges  in subsequen t cases .406 D esp ite  cons ide ra tion  by the  C ou rt o f 
A ppea l in S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  D e p a r tm e n t v  A F , A M  a n d  A N ; A E ,407 the  issue  of 
w he the r d isc losu re  to  the  con tro lee  o f an  irreduc ib le  m in im um  of in fo rm a tion  w as  necessa ry  
in o rde r fo r the  p ro ceed ings  to  com p ly  w ith  A rtic le  6 w ou ld  no t be conc lu s ive ly  reso lved  until 
th e  H ouse  o f Lo rds ’ d e c is ion  in S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A F  a n d  o th e rs  
( A F  (N o  3 ) ) 408
In A F  (N o  3), the  H ouse  o f Lo rds  w e re  requ ired  to  rev is it the  m in im um  d isc lo su re  issue  in 
ligh t o f the  EC tHR ’s re cen tly  de live red  ju d gm en t in A  v  U n ite d  K in g d om  409 In A , th e  G rand  
C ham be r he ld tha t w he re  fu ll d isc losu re  w as no t poss ib le  due  to  coun te rva iling  na tiona l 
secu rity  in te res ts , th e re  w ou ld  no t be  a  fa ir  tria l un less  any  d ifficu ltie s  th is  caused  w ere  
coun te rba lanced  in such  a  w ay  tha t th e  app lican t still had the  poss ib ility  o f e ffe c tive ly  
cha lleng ing  the  a llega tions  aga ins t th em .410 W h ils t S pec ia l A dvoca te s  cou ld  p rov ide  an 
im po rtan t sa feguard , ‘coun te rba lanc ing  the  lack o f fu ll d isc lo su re ’ by tes tin g  the  e v idence  
and pu tting  a rgum en ts  on beha lf o f th e  suspec t du ring  c losed  hea rings ,411 they  cou ld  no t 
pe rfo rm  th is  fu nc tion  in any use fu l w ay  un less  the  suspec t w as  g iven  su ffic ie n t in fo rm a tion  
abou t th e  a llega tions  to  enab le  them  to  g ive  e ffec tive  in s tru c tio n s  to  the  S pec ia l A dvo ca te .412 
Though  it w as no t necessa ry  fo r  the  suspec t to  be p rov ided  w ith  the  ‘de ta il o r  sou rces  o f the
406 See , for exam ple , S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A E  [2008 ] EW HC  132  (Adm in); 
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A H  [2 008 ] EW HC  1045 ; S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  
H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A R  [2008] EW HC  2789  (Adm in): S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  
R id e h  [2008] EW HC  1993  (Adm in).
407 [2008] EW CA  C iv 1148 . Here, by a majority, it w as  held that the House  of Lords’ decision in M B  
a n d  A F  had not estab lished the principle that a  hearing would be  unfair in the absence  of d isclosure to  
the contro lee of an irreducible m inimum of information ([64], [91]). S ed ley  J, d issenting, stated  that he  
was unable  to adopt the view  of the majority, as it appeared  ‘to reject the notion that there is an  
irreducible m inimum  of disclosure w ithout which a  control o rder case  cannot p roceed , when  the  
House, as I understand the M B  case , has held o therw ise’ ([120]).
408 [2009] UKHL  28 .
409 (2009 ) 49  EHRR  29 . Th e  11 applicants in this case , who had been  deta ined  under Part 4  of the  
ATCSA , complained of breaches of Articles 3, 5 (1 ), 5 (4 ), 13 and 14 o f the ECHR . Th e  applican ts ’ 
contended that the procedures  under the A TCSA , which allowed  for the use of closed m ateria l, w ere  
incompatib le with Article 5 (4 ) ECHR , which, it w as  claimed, ‘imported the  fa ir trial guaran tees  of 
art.6 (1 ) commensurate  with the gravity of the issue at s take ’ (para 195 ).
410 ibid paras 205 , 218 .
411 ibid para 220 .
4 1 9
ibid. S ee  also para  219 .
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ev idence  w h ich  fo rm ed  the  bas is  o f the  a lle ga tio n s ’ a ga in s t th em ,413 w he re  the  open  m a te ria l 
cons is ted  pu re ly  o f genera l a sse rtio n s  and the  case  aga in s t the  suspec t w as based  so le ly  o r 
to  a  dec is ive  degree  on c losed  m a te ria l, the  requ irem en ts  o f a  fa ir tria l w ou ld  no t be m e t.414
The  G rand  C ham be r’s ju d gm en t in A  w as regarded  by  the  Law  Lords as hav ing  p rov ided  
‘d e fin itive  re so lu tio n ’ o f the  c ritica l ques tion  concern ing  the  m in im um  leve l o f open  d isc losu re  
necessa ry  to  sa tis fy  A rtic le  6 415 In A F  (N o  3), it w as  the re fo re  de te rm ined  tha t, in line w ith  
the  EC tHR ’s dec is ion , the  te s t a pp licab le  in re spec t o f con tro l o rde r p ro ceed ings  w as  tha t, 
no m a tte r how  cogen t the  case  based  on the  c losed  m a te ria ls  m ay  be, the  con tro lee  m us t be 
g iven  su ffic ie n t in fo rm a tion  abou t th e  a llega tio ns  aga in s t h im  to  enab le  h im  to  g ive  e ffec tive  
ins truc tion s  to  the  Spec ia l A dvoca te .416 Th is  w as  ‘th e  co re  irre duc ib le  m in im um ’417 tha t cou ld  
no t be com prom ised  w ithou t v io la tin g  the  con tro lee ’s A rtic le  6 r igh ts .418
Desp ite  s ta ting  tha t the  ru ling  in A F  (N o  3 )  p laced  it in an ‘in v id ious  po s itio n ’419 w he reby  it 
w ou ld  be fo rced  to  ‘ba lance  the  im po rtance  o f p ro tec ting  the  pub lic  from  the  risk posed  by 
the  ind iv idua l aga ins t the  risk o f d isc los ing  sens itive  m a te ria l’,420 the  G ove rnm en t 
neve rthe less m a in ta ined  tha t the  con tro l o rde r reg im e rem a ined  v iab le .421 As a resu lt o f the  
A F  (N o  3 )  d isc losu re  ob liga tio n  the  H om e S ec re ta ry  was, however, fo rced  to  re voke  con tro l
415 A F  (N o  3 )  (n 371 ) [50] (Lord Phillips); [84] (Lord Hope); [96] (Lord Scott); [98] (Lord Rodger); [99] 
(Lord W a lker); [103] (Baroness Hale ); [121] (Lord Brown). W hils t stating that he view ed  the  E C tH R ’s 
decision as ‘w rong ’, Lord Hoffmann nevertheless accep ted  that their Lordships had ‘no choice but to  
subm it’, even  though this m ay entail the destruction o f the control o rder sys tem , which w as  ‘a  
significant part o f the [UK ’s] de fences  aga inst terrorism ’ ([70]).
41 ibid [59] (Lord Phillips). S ee  also [81] (Lord Hope); [166 ] (Lord Brown).
417 ibid [81] (Lord Hope).
418 For a  detailed analysis of the A F  decision, see  A ileen  Kavanagh , ‘Spec ia l Advocates, Control 
Orders  and the R ight to a Fa ir T ria l’ (2 010 ) 7 3 (5 ) M LR  836 .
419 Hom e O ffice, M e m o r a n d u m  to  t h e  H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m it t e e  (n 3 24 ) para  65 .
420 ibid. As the Governm ent exp lained in its M e m o r a n d u m  to the  Hom e A ffairs Comm ittee : disclosing  
this material could ‘potentially  [reduce] the Governm en t’s ability to protect the public from  a risk of  
terrorism . W he re  the disclosure required by the court cannot be m ade  because  the potential d am age  
to the public interest is too high (for exam ple  if d isclosure could put the life of an informant a t risk), w e  
may be  forced to revoke control orders even  w here  we  consider those orders to be necessary  to  
protect the public from  a risk of terrorism ’ (para  66).
421 HC  Deb  16 Sep tem ber 2 009 , vol 4 9 6 , col 153W S  (A lan Johnson). S ee  also H om e  O ffice, 
M e m o r a n d u m  to  t h e  H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m it t e e  (n 3 24 ) para 72 . Th is assessm en t o f the reg im e ’s 
continuing viability was confirmed by Lord Carlile , who concluded tha t the effect of the decision on  
disclosure in A F  (N o  3 )  did not m ake  control orders ‘impossib le’: F i f t h  R e p o r t  (n 2 6 4 ) para  98.
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o rde rs in a t leas t five  cases .422 Fu rthe r, w h ils t it w as a rgued  in S e c re ta r y  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  
H om e  D e p a r tm e n t v  B C  a n d  BE?23 th a t th e  d isc losu re  requ irem en t d id no t app ly  to  con tro l 
o rde rs  im pos ing  ‘ligh t ob lig a tio n s ’,424 th is  con ten tion  w as re jec ted , C o llins  J asse rting  tha t the  
dec is ion  in A F  (N o  3) com pe lled  h im  to  ho ld th a t the  app roach  to  d isc lo su re  w as  the  sam e 
fo r any con tro l o rder, irre spec tive  o f the  s tr in gency  o f the  ob lig a tio n s  it co n ta ined .425
W h ils t th e  A F  (N o  3 )  d isc losu re  ob liga tio n  in e v itab ly  inh ib ited  the  use o f con tro l o rde rs  in 
som e cases ,426 it d id  no t rende r the  sys tem  unsus ta inab le , and  a  num be r o f o rde rs  w ere  
uphe ld  fo llow ing  the  House  o f Lo rds ’ p ivo ta l 2009  ju d gm en t.427 T ha t ‘som e th ing  resem b ling  a 
fa ir lit iga tion  p ro cedu re ’428 w as fash ioned  by the  cou rts  o ve r the  cou rse  o f the  reg im e ’s 
life tim e  is, from  a hum an righ ts  pe rspective , c lea rly  to  be w e lc om ed .429 Indeed , as w as 
obse rved  by Lord B rown in M B  a n d  A F * 30 the  righ t to  a fa ir  tria l en sh rin ed  in A rtic le  6 is ‘one 
of a lto ge the r too  g rea t im po rtance to  be sac rificed  on the  a lta r o f te rro rism  con tro l. ’431
V. O ther Legal Challenges to Control Orders
Con tro l o rders, as ide  from  en ta iling  res tr ic tion s on the  righ ts  con ta ined  in A rtic le s  5 and  6, 
typ ica lly  a lso  im pacted  upon a range  o f o the r C onven tio n  righ ts  and  freedom s . O b lig a tio n s
422 In th ree  of these  cases , the orders w ere  revoked and not rep laced as  the G overnm en t concluded  
that the A F  (N o  3 )  d isclosure obligation could not be m et because  of potential d am age  to the public  
in terest (Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  (n 264 ) para 15). In the other two cases , the  orders aga inst 
controlees BB and BC  w ere  revoked and subsequen tly  rep laced  by orders imposing ‘significantly  
reduced obligations’ (H om e  O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  
F i f t h  R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  
A c t  2 0 0 5  {Cm  7855 , 2 0 10 ) 8).
423 [2009 ] EW HC  2927  (Adm in).
424 It w as  argued by the Hom e Secre tary  that the obligations imposed under these  ‘light touch control 
orders’ w ere  ‘light enough’ not to engage  the contro lees ’ ‘civil rights’ under A rticle 6 (1 ) (ibid [2]).
425 ibid [55].
426 S ee  HC  Deb  16 S ep tem ber 2009 , vol 496 , cols 1 5 2 -1 5 5W S  (A lan Johnson).
427 S ee , for exam ple , S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C D  [2011 ] EW HC  2 0 8 7  (Adm in); 
A M  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2011 ] EW CA  C iv  710 .
428 David  Anderson, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 2 :  F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  th e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  
2 0 1 1  (2 013 ) para  11 .20 . S ee  also David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) para 6 .3 .
429 S ee , for exam ple , JCHR , A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 1 0  (n 96 ) paras  5 2 -5 3 .  
Desp ite criticising the Governm ent for its ‘m inimalist and pass ive ’ approach  to complying with the  
enhanced  disclosure obligation in practice, the JC H R  conc luded that the decision in A F  ( N o  3 )  had  
gone ‘som e w ay  to addressing one of the main sources of unfairness o f the control o rder reg im e ’ 
(pa ra  53 ).
M B  a n d  A F ( n  104).
431 ibid [91].
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s tipu la tin g  tha t con tro lees  w e re  on ly  pe rm itted  to  a ttend  a s ing le , H om e  O ffice  app roved , 
m osque , and cou ld  no t lead g roup  p rayers ,432 fo r exam p le , inh ib ited  a con tro le e ’s e xe rc ise  o f 
th e ir A rtic le  9 righ t to  fre edom  of re lig ion .433 O the r ‘o b lig a tio n s ’ com m on ly  im posed , such  as 
those  bann ing  the  ow ne rsh ip  o r use o f ce rta in  types  o f com m un ica tion s  equ ipm en t,434 
p roh ib iting  a ttendance  a t p re -a rranged  m eetings , and  fo rb idd ing  comm un ica tio n  o r 
a ssoc ia tion  w ith  spec ified  ind iv id ua ls ,435 invo lved  in te rfe rences  w ith  a con tro le e ’s righ ts  to  
fre edom  of exp ress ion  unde r A rtic le  10 ,436 and a ssem b ly  and a ssoc ia tion  unde r A rtic le  11 .437 
W h ils t cha llenges  on these  g rounds  w e re  no t pu rsued ,438 it is like ly  th a t in m os t cases such  
in fr in gem en ts  w ou ld  have  been cons ide red  jus tifie d  as necessary  in a dem oc ra tic  so c ie ty  in 
th e  in te res ts  of na tiona l secu rity  o r pub lic  sa fe ty .439 Howeve r, the  m ain  lega l cha lle nges  to  
con tro l o rde rs  ou ts ide  those  re la ting  to  A rtic les  5 and  6, in s tead  conce rned  th e ir im pact on 
the  righ ts  guaran teed  by A rtic le  8 and A rtic le  3 o f the  ECHR .
432 S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J ,  K K ,  G G , H H , N N , L L  [2006 ] EW H C  1623  
(Adm in) Annex  I, obligation 5  and obligation 10.
33 Article 9 (1 ) E CHR  provides: Everyone has the right to freedom  of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes ... [the] freedom , either alone  or in community w ith others and in public or private, 
to man ifest his religion or belief, in worship, teach ing, practice and observance .
434 Contro lees were  often prohibited from owning or using any  communications equ ipm en t capab le  of
 
connecting to the internet, such as mobile phones, fax  machines, pagers , and computers. S ee  Lord  
Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 98 ) 3 2 -3 3  (obligation 9).
435 S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J ,  K K , G G , H H , N N , L L  [2006 ] EW H C  1623  
(Adm in) Annex  I. S ee  also Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 98 ) 27 -35 : Annex  I: Exam p le  Control O rde r Pro  
Forma.
436 Article 10 (1 ) EC HR  provides: Everyone has the right to freedom  of express ion. This right shall 
include freedom  to hold opinions and to receive  and impart information and ideas  without interference  
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. Further, the EC tHR  has observed  that the  right to  
receive information under Article 10, ‘prohibits a Governm ent from restricting a person from  receiving  
in formation that others wish or m ay be willing to impart to h im ’: L e a n d e r  v  S w e d e n  (1 987 ) 9 EH RR  
433 , para 74 .
437 Article 11 (1 ) EHCR  provides: Everyone  has the right to freedom  of peace fu l assem bly  and to  
freedom  of association with others . . . .
438 C laim s that the restrictions E ’s control order imposed on the communications equ ipm en t 
(computers and telephones [49]) that could be brought into their hom e vio lated his w ife and child ren ’s 
Article 10 rights w ere  included in the skeleton argum en t of the  fam ily ’s legal representa tive, but w ere  
not pursued. S ee  S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2 007 ] EW HC  233  (Adm in) [13].
439 Interferences with the  conditional rights to freedom  of religion, expression, and assem b ly  and  
association, are  perm itted provided that they  are  in acco rdance  with law  and necessary  in a  
democratic society in pursuit of one of the legitimate aim s listed in A rticles 9 (2 ), 10 (2 ), and 11 (2 ).
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V I. A rticle 8 ECHR Challenges
A rtic le  8 ECHR  p rov ides tha t everyone  has the  righ t to  re spec t fo r th e ir p riva te  and fam ily  
life, hom e and co rrespondence .440 Due to  the  na tu re  o f th e  ob lig a tio n s  im posed , con tro l 
o rde rs  no t on ly  cu rta iled  the  con tro lee ’s own righ ts , bu t fre que n tly  a lso  im pacted  upon the  
hum an righ ts  o f th ird  parties, in pa rticu la r, the  con tro lee ’s imm ed ia te  fam ily . A s  a 
consequence , in add ition  to  be ing  invoked  as a bas is  on w h ich  to  cha lle nge  the  p rac tice  o f 
re loca tion ,441 A rtic le  8 issues w ere  o ften  a lso  ra ised  in re la tion  to  th e  co lla te ra l e ffec ts  con tro l 
o rde rs  had upon the  righ ts  o f con tro lees ’ fam ily  m em bers .
During  the  life tim e  o f the  reg im e, th e  im pact o f the  o rde rs  on con tro le es ’ w ives  and ch ild ren  
w as iden tified  as a  m a tte r o f som e  conce rn  by a range  o f pa rties . T he  UN Spec ia l 
R appo rteu r on T e rro rism , fo r  ins tance , rem arked  on the  s ign ifican t ‘d ire c t and ind irec t 
im pac ts ’ o rde rs  had on fam ily  m em be rs ’ hum an righ ts  442 w h ils t th e  JCHR  described  th e ir 
e ffec t as ‘d e vas ta tin g ’,443 and exp ressed  conce rn  tha t con tro l o rde rs  ‘u n ju s tifiab ly  ... 
[in te rfe red ] w ith  the  hum an righ ts  o f o th e r m em be rs  o f th e  [con tro lee ’s] fam ily ’ .444 T he  e ffec t 
o f the  o rde rs  on the  lives o f con tro lees ’ fam ilie s445 w as  a lso  the  sub je c t o f s trong  c ritic ism  
from  a num be r o f p ressu re  g roups, L ibe rty  asse rting  tha t con tro l o rde rs  ‘d e vas ta tin g ly
440 Article 8 (1 ) ECHR . Article 17 of the International C ovenan t on Civil and Political R ights 1966  
sim ilarly provides that, ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful in terference with ... [their] 
privacy, fam ily, hom e or correspondence . . . ’.
441 S ee  the discussion of the Article 8  issues associated with the  forced relocation of contro lees  at pp  
121 -129  above.
442 R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S p e c ia l  R a p p o r t e u r  o n  th e  P r o m o t io n  a n d  P r o t e c t io n  o f  H u m a n  R ig h t s  a n d  
F u n d a m e n ta l  F r e e d o m s  W h i le  C o u n te r in g  T e r r o r is m ,  Martin  Schein in , UN  Doc A /6 4 /2 1 1 , 3  August 
2009 , para  40 .
443 JC HR , A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 1 0  (n 96 ) 3.
444 JC HR , D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  
(n 17) para  85 .
45 For first-hand accounts of the  impact of control orders on the  w ives and children of con tro lees, see: 
Dina Al Jnidi, ‘Life W ith  a Control O rder: A  W ife ’s S to ry ’ T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  (London, 3  July 2 0 09 )  
<www .independen t.co .uk /new s /uk /hom e-new s /life -w ith -a -con tro l-o rder-a -w ifes -s to ry -1729620 .h tm l>  
accessed  6 June 2013 ; Harm it A thwal, ‘Fam ilies S peak  Ou t on Control O rde rs ’ M arch 30  2 0 0 6  
<www .irr.o rg .uk/news/fam ilies-speak-ou t-on -con tro l-o rders />  accessed  6  June 2013 .
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unde rm ined ’ the  righ ts  and freedom s  o f fam ily  m em be rs ,446 and C AM PACC  cha rac te ris ing  
them  as a fo rm  o f ‘co llec tive  pun ishm en t’ .447
The  co lla te ra l e ffec ts  o f con tro l o rde rs  on fam ily  m em be rs ’ A rtic le  8 righ ts  w e re  m ost fu lly  
cons ide red  by the  H igh  C ou rt in S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  th e  H om e  D e p a r tm e n t v  E.448 Here, 
Bea tson  J exam ined  the  im pact of th e  con tro l o rde r on fam ily  life , pay ing  pa rticu la r regard  to  
th e  ex ten t to  w h ich  the  res tric tions  in te rfe red  no t on ly  w ith  the  righ ts  o f E, bu t a lso  those  of 
h is w ife , S, and  the ir fo u r young  ch ild ren .449 S ta tem en ts  w e re  subm itted  de ta iling  the  o rde r ’s 
im pact upon the  fam ily ’s soc ia l ne tw o rks  and the  deg ree  o f iso la tion  e xpe rienced  by S and 
he r ch ild ren ,450 as we ll as the  va rio us  o the r e ffe c ts  the  cond itio n s  im posed  by  the  o rde r had 
upon the  lives o f the  coup le ’s ch ild ren .451 Having  rev iew ed  the  ev idence , B ea tson  J accep ted  
tha t the  con tro l o rde r cons titu ted  a ‘s ign ifican t in te rfe rence  w ith  th e  p riva te  and fam ily  life  of 
E, S  and th e ir ch ild ren .’452 However, in ligh t o f the  r isk  E w as  assessed  to  pose ,453 it w as  
he ld th a t the  w e igh t o f the  s ta te ’s in te re s t in sa fegua rd ing  na tiona l secu rity  and p reven ting  o r 
res tric ting  E ’s in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  w as  such  tha t the  ‘se rio u s  in te rfe rence  
w ith  the  righ ts  o f E ’s innocen t w ife  and ch ild ren ’ w as  ju s tifie d  pu rsuan t to  A rtic le  8 (2 ).454 T he
446 Liberty, F r o m  W a r  to  L a w  (2 010 ) para 15; David  Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 14) paras  3 .3 9 -3 .4 0 .
447 Campaign  Against C rim inalising Communities subm ission to the  Joint C omm ittee  on Hum an  
Rights, Joint Comm ittee  on Human  Rights, C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s :  D r a f t  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  ( C o n t in u a n c e  in  F o r c e  o f  S e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  (2 0 0 5 -0 6 , HL  
122, HC  356 ) 38 . S ee  also Am nesty  International, F iv e  Y e a r s  O n :  T im e  to  E n d  th e  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  
R e g im e  (2 010 ) 10 -11 .
448 E  (n 43 ). T h e  obligations imposed by E ’s control o rder a re  d iscussed in detail on p 116  (above ).
449 It w as argued  on behalf of S  and the  children that the ir Article 8 and Article 3  rights had been  
vio lated. T h e  coup le ’s children w ere  aged  between  seven  years  and 10/11 months at the time.
450 E  (n 43 ) [155]. Th is  social isolation was  in part attributable to  the inhibiting or ‘chilling e ffec t’ 
(Beatson  J [155]) of the requirement that any  visitors to the fam ily  hom e above  the  age  of 10  had to  
obtain prior approva l from  the Hom e O ffice.
451 ibid [133 ]-[149]. For exam ple , due the  curfew , E w as  unable to take  his children to evening  
activities, whilst the obligation prohibiting the use of certain forms o f communications equ ipm ent in E ’s 
residence also m ean t that the children w ere  unable  to access the internet at hom e, which had begun  
to becom e as issue in relation to the children’s ability to do their school homework .
452 ibid [267].
453 ibid [82]. Beatson J found that there w ere  substantial grounds for believing E to be  ‘a senio r 
terrorist recruiter and facilitator, with a w ide  range of contacts’.
454 ibid [280]. Article 8 (2 ) EC HR  provides that any  in terfe rence with the  right to fam ily  life m ust be  
accordance  with law  and necessary  in a  democratic society and must pursue one of the legitim ate
aim s listed in paragraph  (2), which include, i n t e r  a l ia ,  national security, public safe ty, and the  
prevention of crime. S ee  Ursula Kilkelly, T h e  R ig h t  to  R e s p e c t  f o r  P r iv a te  a n d  F a m i ly  L i f e :  A  G u id e  to  
t h e  Im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  A r t ic le  8  o f  th e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t io n  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  (Council of Europe  
Publishing, 2 0 0 3 ) 6, 25 .
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conc lus ion  tha t th e  con tro l o rde r d id no t invo lve  a d isp ropo rtio na te  in te rfe rence  w ith  the  
righ ts  o f E ’s fam ily  w as  subsequen tly  uphe ld  by  the  C ou rt o f A ppea l, w ho  deem ed  Beatson  
J ’s dec is ion  in re spec t o f A rtic le  8 ‘im poss ib le  to  im pugn ’ .455
V II. Article 3 ECHR Challenges
The  d ire c t and co lla te ra l im pact o f con tro l o rde rs  on the  m enta l hea lth  o f con tro lees  and the ir 
fam ily  m em bers , and the  poss ib le  con tra ven tio n  o f th e  A rtic le  3 p roh ib ition  on the  in flic tion  of 
inhum an o r deg rad ing  trea tm en t 456 w as an o the r g round  o f cha lle nge  ra ised  in som e  o f the  
litiga tion  457 T he  po ten tia l psycho log ica l e ffe c ts  o f con tro l o rde rs  w as repea ted ly  h igh ligh ted  
by Lord C a rlile  as be ing  a re levan t cons ide ra tio n  in re la tion  to  the  p ropo rtio na lity  o f the  
ob liga tio ns  im posed ,458 and  w as a lso  em phas ised  by the  JC HR ,459 the  E uropean  C omm ittee  
fo r the  P reven tion  o f T o rtu re ,460 and va rio us  o the r pa rties .461 Fu rthe r, it w as c la im ed  by 
G are th  P e irce462 tha t con tro l o rde rs  had a ‘se rio u s ’ e ffe c t on bo th con tro lees  and the ir 
fam ilies , espec ia lly  ch ild ren ,463 w h ils t D r K o rz insk i464 repo rted  tha t th e ir psycho log ica l im pact
456 ^  ( n 1 4 5 )  [1 2 0 ] .
Article 3  E CHR  provides: No  one shall be subjected  to torture or to inhuman or degrading  
trea tm ent or punishment. In I r e la n d  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (1 978 ) 2  E H RR  25 , it w as  dete rm ined  that 
degrad ing  treatm en t which vio lates Article 3 is that which arouses in its victim , ‘fee lings of fea r, 
anguish and inferiority capab le  of humiliating and debasing them  and possibly breaking  their physical 
or moral resis tance’ (para  167).
457 S ee  E  (n 143); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M a h m o u d  A b u  R id e h  [2007 ] EW H C  
804  (Adm in); M a h m o u d  A b u  R id e h  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2007] EW HC  22 3 7  
(Adm in); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A H  [2008 ] EW HC  1018  (Adm in).
58 S ee  Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 98 ) para 44; S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 176 ) para  41 ; T h i r d  R e p o r t  (n 2 64 )  
para  44 ; F o u r t h  R e p o r t  (n 2 64 ) para  53 .
459 In its 2 0 0 6  report, the JC H R  suggested that, due to the restrictions they  im posed, the ir potentially  
indefinite duration, and the lim ited opportunity to cha llenge  the basis fo r their imposition, control 
orders carried a ‘ve ry  high risk’ o f subjecting contro lees to inhuman or degrad ing  trea tm en t contrary to  
Article 3 ECHR : JCHR , D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  
9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  (n 17) para 84 .
4 0 Comm ittee  for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrad ing  T rea tm en t or Pun ishment, 
R e p o r t  to  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  o n  th e  V is i t  to  th e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  C a r r ie d  o u t  b y  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
C o m m it t e e  f o r  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T o r tu r e  a n d  In h u m a n  o r  D e g r a d in g  T r e a tm e n t  o r  P u n is h m e n t  (C P T )  
f r o m  2 0  to  2 5  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 5 ,  C P T /In f (2 006 ) 28 , paras  4 5 -48 .
461 S ee  Amnesty  International, F iv e  Y e a r s  O n  (n 4 4 7 ) 9; V ictoria Brittain, ‘B esieged in Britain ’ (2 0 0 8 )  
50 (3 ) R ace  and C lass  1.
462 P ierce was the solicitor for a  num ber of the contro lees.
463 JCHR , D r a f t  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  ( C o n t in u a n c e  in  f o r c e  o f  s e c t io n s  1 to  9 )  O r d e r  2 0 0 6  
(n 17): Annex  3: ‘R edacted W itness S ta tem ent by G are th  Pe irce  Explain ing How , in Practice , Control 
Orders  H ave  A ffected H er C lients and O ther W ives  and Fam ilies in S im ila r Positions’, 75  (para 31 ).
464 D r Korzinski, a  traum a and psychosocial expert, w as  co -founder and clinical d irector of the  H e len  
Bam ber Foundation.
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on the  con tro lees  tha t he had w orked  w ith  had been  ‘ca ta s tro ph ic ’.465 Indeed, the  poss ib le  
im pact o f con tro l o rde rs on the  m enta l hea lth  o f con tro lees  and the ir fam ilie s  w as  sa id  to  be 
taken  ‘ex trem e ly  se r io u s ly ’ by  the  gove rnm en t,466 and, in com p lia n ce  w ith  EC tHR  case  
law ,467 w as sub je c t to  regu la r m on ito ring , and  w as  a m a tte r rou tine ly  cons ide red  a t th e  
CO RG ’s qua rte rly  m ee ting s .468
W he the r con tro l o rde rs ’ adverse  im pact on the  m enta l hea lth  o f th e  con tro lee  o r  th e ir 
ch ild ren  w as o f su ffic ie n t seve rity  to  b reach  A rtic le  3 w as  e xam ined  in de ta il by  th e  cou rts  in 
re la tion  to  bo th  E and Abu  R ideh. In E,469 it w as  a ccep ted  by the  C ou rt th a t th e  long -te rm  
e ffec t o f  the  s itua tion  on the  ch ild ren ’s m en ta l hea lth  w as  ‘like ly  to  be s ign ifican t and 
de tr im en ta l’ .470 W h ils t a cknow ledg ing  tha t, acco rd ing  to  S e lm o u n i v  F ra n c e  471 the  ch ild ren ’s 
age  and vu lne rab ility  m ust be  taken  in to  accoun t, B ea tson  J conc luded  tha t A rtic le  3 w as not 
engaged  as the  res tric tions  d id no t pose  such  a  r isk  to  th e ir m enta l hea lth  th a t th e y  w e re  
‘hum ilia ting  and debas ing  them  and ... b reak ing  th e ir m ora l re s is tance ’ .472 T h e  A rtic le  3 
cha lle nges re la ting  to  the  o rde r’s im pact on bo th  the  con tro lee  and h is ch ild ren  w as  a lso  
unsuccessfu l in th e  case  o f R id e h .473 Here , a lthough  the re  w as  ev idence  tha t th e  ch ild ren  
lived  w ith  a  h igh leve l o f an x ie ty ,474 it w as he ld th a t th e ir A rtic le  3 righ ts  had no t been 
b reached  475 S im ila rly, in respec t of th e  con tro lee  h im se lf, the  H igh C ou rt conc luded  tha t 
w h ile  m enta l hea lth  cons ide ra tion s  w e re  im po rtan t and  d id ju s tify  the  cou rts  exe rc is ing
465 PBC  D eb  (Bill 193 ) 21 June 2011 , col 43 .
466 Hom e O ffice, M e m o r a n d u m  to  t h e  H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m it t e e  (n 324 ) para  79 .
467 As Lord Carlile  observed in his 2 0 07  Report: T h e re  is support in case  law  for the  proposition that, 
where  the S ta te  takes  coercive m easu res  that could affect the physical or mental w e ll-be ing  of the  
individual, it is under a duty to monitor effectively the impact o f those m easu res ’: S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 
176) para  41 . S ee , for exam ple , K e e n a n  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 001 ) 33  E HRR  38 .
468 H om e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  th e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  p u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  
7 194 , 2 0 07 ) 3 -4 .
469 E (n 143 ). S ee  E (n  145) [121].
470 E (n  143 ) [155 ].
471 (1999 ) 29  E HRR  403 . In S e lm o u n i,  the  EC tHR  held  that w hether A rticle 3  has  been  vio lated, 
‘depends on all the circumstances of the case , such as  the duration of the trea tm ent, its physical or 
mental effects and, in som e cases, the sex, age  and state of health  o f the victim , etc ’ (para 100 ).
472 E  (n 143 ) [309].




‘p a rticu la rly  c lose  sc ru tin y ’476 o ve r the  ju s tifica tio n  fo r  each  cond ition  im posed , Abu  R ideh ’s 
m en ta l hea lth  p rob lem s  477 desp ite  be ing  exace rba ted  by the  o rder, d id  no t trum p  the  
na tiona l secu rity  case  aga in s t h im .478
Desp ite  th e  seve re  na tu re  o f ob lig a tio ns  they  im posed , no  con tro l o rde r w as  eve r he ld  to  
have crossed  A rtic le  3 ’s ‘h igh  th re sho ld ’.479 T he  UK  cou rts  d id , however, ru le tha t an 
ind iv id ua l’s psycho log ica l s ta te  cou ld  have  a su ffic ie n tly  im po rtan t im pact upon the  seve rity  
o f the  e ffec t o f certa in  con tro l o rde r ob lig a tions  to  necess ita te  th e ir  m od ifica tion  o r 
subs titu tio n .480 Thus, w h ils t m enta l hea lth  conce rns  w ere  a ssessed  not to  obv ia te  the  need 
fo r Abu R ideh to  be sub je c t to  a con tro l o rder, the  H om e S ecre ta ry  w as  neve rthe less  
o rde red  to  lift the  requ irem en ts  th a t he w ea r an e le c tron ic  tag  and  repo rt to  th e  po lice  s ta tion  
due  to  th e  seve re  e ffec ts  the se  ob liga tio ns  had on h is m en ta l s tab ility .481 In add ition , th e  risk 
th a t a su sp ec t’s A rtic le  3 righ ts  cou ld  be in fringed  due  to  th e  poss ib ility  tha t, if iden tified , he 
m ay  be sub je c ted  to  rac is t a buse  and  phys ica l v io lence ,482 w as  a lso  cen tra l to  the  S up rem e  
C ou rt’s dec is ion  to  m a in ta in  a fo rm e r con tro lee ’s anonym ity  in the  case  o f  A P  (N o  2 ) :483
V III. Personal Search Obligations
During  the  reg im e ’s life tim e , lega l cha llenges  w ere  fre que n tly  m ade  in re spec t o f spec ific  
ob liga tio ns  im posed  by con tro l o rde rs .484 O f pa rticu la r no te  w as  the  appea l in G G  and  N N
476 ibid [143 ]. Abu R ideh was reported to suffer from  depress ion and an ‘abnorm ally  ex trem e ’ reaction  
to stress.
477 ibid [177 ].
478 ibid.
479 ibid [143 ] (Beatson J). S ee  also A  v  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  (2 009 ) 4 9  E HRR  29 , para 134 .
480 S ee  E  (n 145) [55]; M a h m o u d  A b u  R id e h  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2007] 
EW HC  2 2 3 7  (Adm in) [60].
481 A b u  R id e h  v  S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2008 ] EW H C  2019  (Adm in) [6]-[7]. [32], 
[42].
82 Th e  town where AP had to live w as one  where  there w ere  cons iderab le  community tensions and  
organised racist activity, and there  had also been previous racist a ttacks aga inst m em bers  of the  
Muslim  community.
483 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A P  (N o  2 )  [2 010 ] UKSC  26  [13 ]-[14].
484 S ee , for exam p le , A E  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2008 ] EW HC  1743  (Adm in); 
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A R  [2008 ] EW HC  3 1 6 4  (Adm in); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  
th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M  [2009] EW HC  572  (Adm in).
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aga ins t a  requ irem en t th a t th e  con tro lee  subm it to  pe rsona l sea rches .485 W h ils t accep ting  
tha t th e  lis t o f o b lig a tions  in s 1 (4) w as  no t de fin itive ,486 C o llins  J neve rthe less  he ld tha t, in 
th e  absence  o f ‘c le a r and unam b iguous  au tho risa tio n ’ in th e  2005  Act, the  H om e S ecre ta ry  
d id no t have  the  pow er to  im pose  such  an ob lig a tio n .487 T h is  dec is ion  w as  a ffirm ed  by the  
C ou rt o f A ppea l,488 w h ich  de te rm ined  tha t s  1(3) cou ld  no t be  read as pe rm itting  the  
inc lus ion  o f a pe rsona l sea rch  ob liga tion  in con tro l o rders, S ed ley  LJ dec la rin g  it to  be 
‘a x iom a tic  th a t the  comm on law  righ ts  o f pe rsona l se cu rity  and pe rsona l libe rty  p reven t any 
o ffic ia l sea rch  o f an ind iv id ua l’s c lo th ing  o r  pe rson  w itho u t e xp lic it s ta tu to ry  au tho rity .’489 
Fo llow ing  these  dec is ions , Lord C a rlile  re comm ended  tha t, ‘as a com p liance  too l and to  
ensure  po lice  and pub lic  sa fe ty ’, a pow e r o f pe rsona l sea rch  shou ld  be added  to  the  
leg is la tion  as soon  as poss ib le .490 S ec tion  7D , p rov id ing  fo r  new  pow ers  o f sea rch  and 
se izu re , w as  the re fo re  subsequen tly  inse rted  in to  the  PTA  by  s 56  o f C rim e  and S ecu rity  A c t 
2010 . W h ils t s 7D  w as  no t comm enced  p rio r to  th e  C oa litio n ’s repea l o f con tro l o rders, 
s im ila r sea rch  powers  a re  now  con ta ined  in Sch 5 o f TP IM A .491
IX. Conclusion
In its P o s t-L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t92 o f the  PTA, it w as p roc la im ed  by the  Labou r 
gove rnm en t th a t ‘va rio us  House  o f Lo rds ’ ju d gm e n ts ’ had con firm ed  tha t th e  2005  A c t
485 G G  a n d  N N  (n 2 75 ). Prior to the decision in this case , control orders routinely included an  
obligation requiring the contro lee to subm it to personal searches  in his res idence.
486 Collins J noted that the words, T h e s e  obligations m ay  include, in particular . . . ’ indicated that the  
list o f obligations in s 1 (4 ) was, ‘c learly  not intended to rep resent a lim itation on w hat m ay  be properly  
included in an order’: ibid [56].
487 ibid [59]. As Collins J expla ined , a t [58], ‘a search  o f the person is a trespass and, unless  
authorised, an unlawful ac t’. T h e  personal search obligation w as  there fore quashed  under the  
Prevention of Terro rism  Act 2 005 , s 10 (7 )(b ).
488 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  G G  [2009 ] EW CA  C iv 786 .
489 ibid [12]. S ee  also B H  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2009] EW HC  2 9 3 8  (Adm in)  
[41.
9 Lord Carlile , F i f t h  R e p o r t  (n 2 64 ) paras 4 , 108, 148 . S ee  also H om e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  
th e  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  C a r l i le  o f  B e r r ie w  Q C :  F i f th  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  
S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  7855 , 2 0 1 0 ) 6.
491 T P IM A , sch 5 confers powers of entry, search , se izu re  and retention on constables in connection  
with the imposition of m easures under T P IM  notices.
492 Hom e O ffice, P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (n 3 2 4 ) para
64 . This assertion was also m ade  by the Coalition governm ent, see  Hom e O ffice, T e r r o r is m
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fu n c tioned  ‘in a m anne r fu lly  com p lia n t w ith  th e  ECHR .’493 W h ils t essen tia lly  true , as 
d iscussed  in th is  chap te r, the  sys tem ’s com pa tib ility  w ith  pa rticu la r ECHR  righ ts  - m ost 
no tab ly A rtic les  5 and 6 - w as on ly  ach ie ved  th rough  the  gove rnm en t s ign ifican tly  m od ify ing  
its  app roach  w ith  respec t to  th e  im pos ition  o f cu rfew s494 and the  leve l o f open  d isc losu re  
m ade  to  con tro lees495 fo llow ing  ce rta in  adve rse  cou rt dec is ions . Indeed , as  David A nde rson  
obse rves, o ve r the  s chem e ’s life tim e  the  cou rts  p roduced  a body  o f ju r isp rud ence  tha t 
‘m ode ra ted  the  lega l c lim a te  in w h ich  con tro l o rde rs  ope ra ted , and reconc iled  th e ir ope ra tion  
w ith  the  requ irem en ts  o f the  [ECHR ] and  [H R A ]’.496 Fu rthe r, the  p rin c ip le s  es tab lished  by the  
case law  on the  PTA  no t on ly  had a cons ide rab le  im pact on the  con tro l o rde rs  reg im e  itse lf, 
but, as  is de ta iled  in th e  fo llow ing  chap te r, a lso  s trong ly  in flu enced  the  des ign  o f the  
C oa litio n ’s rep lacem en t fo r con tro l o rders, T e rro rism  P reven tion  and  In vestiga tion  M easures .
P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  ( T P IM )  B i l l :  E C H R  M e m o r a n d u m  b y  th e  H o m e  O f f ic e  (2 011 )  
para  3.
493 ibid para  61
494 The  imposition of 18-hour curfews under non-derogating  control orders being d iscontinued as  a  
result of the House of Lords’ decision in J J { n 102).
495 The  judgm ent in A F  (N o  3 )  (n 3 7 1 ) compelling the governm en t to d isclose a ‘core irreducib le  
minimum ' of in formation to controlees.
496 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  {n 14) para  1.4
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Chapter 5 
The Counter-Terrorism  Review and Terrorism  Prevention and  
Investigation Measures
I. The Review of Counter-Terrorism  and Security Powers and the Repeal of Control 
Orders
Fo llow ing  the  M ay 2010  gene ra l e lection , the  N ew  Labou r G ove rnm en t, w h ich  had he ld 
pow er s ince  1997, w as rep laced  by the  C onse rva tive -L ibe ra l D em ocra t C oa litio n  
G ove rnm en t.1 W h ils t in oppos ition , bo th  C oa litio n  pa rtie s  had been  h igh ly  c ritica l o f con tro l 
o rde rs, the  L ibera l D em oc ra t’s 2010  e lec tion  m an ifes to  p ledg ing  to  abo lish  th em ,2 and  the  
C onse rva tives  s ta tin g  tha t th e y  w ou ld  rev iew  the  sys tem  w ith  a v iew  to  rep lac ing  it.3 T he  
C oa litio n ’s p rog ramm e fo r gove rnm en t th e re fo re  sub sequen tly  p rom ised  tha t th e re  w ou ld  be 
an u rgen t rev iew  o f con tro l o rde rs  ‘as  pa rt o f a w id e r re v iew  o f cou n te r-te rro ris t leg is la tion , 
m easures  and p rog ramm es .’4
On 13 Ju ly  2010, the  new  H ome Secre ta ry , T he re sa  May, announced  to  P a rliam en t th a t a 
rap id rev iew  o f the  ‘m ost con trove rs ia l and sens itive ’ coun te r-te rro rism  pow ers  w ou ld  be 
ca rried  ou t.5 T he  rev iew  w as ta sked  w ith  exam in ing  issues o f secu rity  and  civ il libe rties  in 
re la tion  to  s ix  key  pow ers ,6 w ith  th e  a im , w he re  poss ib le , o f p rov id ing  ‘a co rrec tion  in fa vo u r 
o f lib e rty .’7 O rig ina lly  due  to  repo rt in N ovem be r 2010 , th e  re v iew ’s pub lica tion  w as,
1 Th e  Coalition Governm ent w as  fo rm ed  on 10 M ay  2010 .
2 Liberal Dem ocra t M anifesto  2010 , 94.
3 The  Conserva tive  Party, A  R e s i l ie n t  N a t io n :  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  G r e e n  P a p e r  (Po licy G reen  P ape r No. 
13) (2 010 ) 23 .
4 HM  Governm en t, T h e  C o a l i t io n :  O u r  P r o g r a m m e  f o r  G o v e r n m e n t  (2 0 10 ) 24 .
5 HC  Deb  13 July 2 010 , vol 513 , col 797 . S ee  also H om e  O ffice, ‘P ress Re lease : Rapid R ev iew  of 
Counter-Terrorism  Powers ’ (13  July 2 0 1 0 ) <www .gov .uk /governm ent/news/rap id -rev iew -o f-coun te r-  
terro rism -powers> accessed  14  June 2 013 .
6 The  powers considered by the rev iew  were: the p re -charge  detention of terrorist suspects; the TA  
2000 , s 4 4  ‘stop and search ’ powers; local authorities ’ use of the R IPA  2 0 0 0  and access  to 
communications data; m easu res  to deal with organisations that promote hatred or vio lence; 
deportation with assurances; and control orders. S ee  H om e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  
S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  R e v ie w  F in d in g s  a n d  R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  (Cm  8004 , 2 0 1 1 )4 .
7 ibid.
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however, re pea ted ly  de layed  due to  ‘po litica l w ra n g lin g ’8 be tw een  the  C oa lition  pa rties  
rega rd ing  the  fa te  o f con tro l o rde rs and  the  fea tu re s  o f th e ir p roposed  rep la cem en t.9 The  
ou tcom e  o f th e  rev iew  w as even tua lly  revea led  on 26  Jan ua ry  2 0 1 1 ,10 the  G ove rnm en t 
issu ing  a  repo rt d e ta iling  its find ings  and  re comm enda tio n s ,11 a long  w ith  an accom pany ing  
report by  Lord  M acdona ld .12 In the  R e v ie w ’s  fo rew o rd , th e  H om e S ec re ta ry  em phas ised  tha t, 
w h ils t na tiona l secu rity  is the  p rim a ry  du ty  o f g ove rnm en t, it w as  necessa ry  to  ‘co rre c t the  
im ba lance  tha t has deve loped  be tw een  the  S ta te ’s secu rity  pow ers  and c iv il libe rties , 
resto ring  those  libe rties  w he reve r poss ib le  and focus ing  those  powers  w he re  necessa ry .’13 
T he  R e v ie w  conc luded  tha t, in som e a reas, th e  U K ’s coun te r-te rro rism  pow ers  w e re  ‘n e ithe r 
p ropo rtiona te  no r necessa ry ’,14 and the re fo re  se t ou t va rio u s  re comm enda tion s  des igned  to 
res to re  c ivil libe rties  and to  rega in  pub lic  con fidence  in the  coun try ’s an ti-te rro rism  law s .15
In re la tion  to  con tro l o rders, the  re v iew  cons ide red  w he th e r th e  reg im e  shou ld  be ‘re ta ined , 
rem oved, re fo rm ed  o r rep laced .’16 It w as repo rted  tha t the  m a jo rity  o f con trib u tio n s  to  the  
rev iew  from  exte rna l pa rties  subm itted  tha t con tro l o rde rs  shou ld  be repea led  on the  bas is 
th a t th e y  w e re  ‘ine ffec tive  and aga ins t open  and fa ir  ju s tic e .’17 Fo r exam p le , JU ST IC E  and 
L ibe rty  bo th  ca lled  fo r con tro l o rde rs  to  be sc rapped , the  fo rm e r s ta ting  th a t th e y  w e re
8 See  ‘Cooper A ttacks ‘Shambolic ’ Counter-Terro ris t R ev iew ’ BBC News (24  January  2 0 1 1 )  
<www .bbc .co .uk /new s /uk -po litics -12267920> accessed  14 June  2 013 . S ee  also HC  D eb  26  January , 
vol 522 , col 3 1 2  (Yvette  Cooper).
9 S ee  A lexander Horne , H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  S t a n d a r d  N o te :  T h e  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  R e v ie w  
SN /H A /5 852  (2 0 11 ) 1. S ee  also N igel Morris, T o r ie s  F ea r ‘C a r C rash ’ O ver Control O rd e rs ’ T h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  (10  Novem ber 2 010 ) <www .independen t.co .uk /news/uk /po litics /to ries -fear-car-crash -  
over-con tro l-o rders -2121835 .h tm l> accessed  15 June 2 013 .
10 HC  Deb  2 5  January  2011 , vol 552 , cols 3 0 6 -3 0 9  (T he resa  M ay).
11 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6 ).
12 Lord M acdona ld , R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  A  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  M a c d o n a ld  
o f  R iv e r  G la v e n  Q C  (Cm  8003 , 2 011 ). Lord M acdonald  was appoin ted by the G overnm en t to provide  
independent oversight of the rev iew  process to ensure  that it w as  ‘conducted properly’ and that its 
recommendations w ere  ‘not only fair but seen  to be fa ir’: HC  Deb  13 July 2 0 10 , vol 5 13 , col 797  
(The resa  May).




17 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  S u m m a r y  o f  R e s p o n s e s  to  t h e  
C o n s u l t a t io n  (Cm  8005 , 2 0 11 ) 14.
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‘u nnecessa ry , ine ffec tive  and o ffens ive  to  bas ic  p rin c ip le ’ ,18 the  la tte r describ ing  them  as a 
‘b lo t on the  [U K ’s] human righ ts  re co rd ’19 and ‘p e rhaps  the  m ost sham e fu l le g is la tive  legacy  
o f B rita in ’s dom es tic  ‘W a r on T e rro r’ .’20 H av ing  exam ined  the  ope ra tion , e ffec tiveness, and 
lega l v ia b ility  o f con tro l o rders, a long  w ith  cons ide rin g  the  p rinc ipa l a rgum en ts  aga ins t 
th em ,21 the  R e v ie w  u ltim a te ly  re comm ended  tha t con tro l o rde rs  shou ld  be repea led .22 It was, 
however, re cogn ised  tha t the re  w as  a ‘con tinu ing  need  to  con tro l the  a c tiv itie s  o f te rro ris ts  
w ho  can ne ith e r be success fu lly  p ro secu ted  no r de po rted ’.23 T h is  conc lus ion  w as  echoed  by 
Lord M acdona ld , w ho  a ccep ted  tha t it w as app rop ria te  fo r such in d iv idua ls  to  be sub je c t to  
s ta te -im posed  res tric tions , p rov id ing  they  w e re  p ropo rtio na te  and, un like  con tro l o rde rs , ‘[d id ] 
no t im pede  o r  d iscou rage  ev idence  ga the ring  w ith  a v iew  to  conven tio na l p ro secu tio n ’ .24 It 
w as  consequen tly  de te rm ined  tha t con tro l o rde rs  shou ld  be rep laced  by  a ‘less  in trus ive , 
m ore  c lea rly  and tig h tly  de fin ed ’ sys tem , th a t w ou ld  e lim ina te  the  use  o f fo rced  re loca tion  
and  leng th y  cu rfew s25 and  be be tte r des igned  to  fa c ilita te  th e  con tinu ing  inves tig a tio n  o f the  
suspect w ith  a v iew  to  p rosecu tion , as we ll as  p reven tin g  them  from  engag ing  in te rro ris t 
ac tiv ity .26 It w as fu r th e r conc luded  tha t th e re  m ay  be c ircum s tances  in the  fu tu re  w he re  m ore  
s tringen t, ‘excep tiona l em e rgency  m easu re s ’, w ou ld  be needed  to  m anage  an e spec ia lly  
se rious  te rro ris t r is k ,27 and tha t the  G ove rnm en t w ou ld  th e re fo re  pub lish , bu t no t in troduce , 
add itiona l d ra ft leg is la tion  to  p repa re  fo r th is  poss ib ility .28
18 JU S T IC E , H o m e  O f f ic e  R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  W r i t t e n  S u b m is s io n s  o f  
J U S T IC E  (2 010 ) 8, 15.
19 Liberty, F r o m  ‘W a r ’ to  L a w :  L ib e r t y ’s  R e s p o n s e  to  t h e  C o a l i t io n  G o v e r n m e n t ’s  R e v ie w  o f  C o u n t e r -  
T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  2 0 1 0  (2 010 ) 11. S ee  also Am nesty  International, U n i t e d  K in g d o m :  
S u b m is s io n  f o r  th e  R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (2 010 ) 11.
20 Liberty, F r o m  ‘W a r ’ to  L a w  (n 19) 11.
21 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 36 -39 .
22 ibid 41 .
23 ibid 39 .
24 Lord Macdonald , R e p o r t  (n 12) 11. Lord M acdonald  observed  that the ev idence  ob ta ined  by the  
Rev iew  ‘plainly dem onstra ted ’ that control orders ac ted  as an imped im en t to prosecution, as  by  
relocating contro lees and banning the ir use of te lephones  and the  internet, they im posed  restrictions  
that ‘precisely prevent those very activities that a re  ap t to result in the d iscovery of ev id ence  fit for 
prosecution, conviction and im prisonment’ (p 9).
5 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 41 .
26 ibid.
27 ibid 43 .
28 ibid. S ee  also HC  Deb  26  January  2 0 11 , vol 522 , col 3 0 9  (The resa  M ay).
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II. Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation Measures
Fo llow ing  the  C oa litio n ’s dec is ion  to  repea l the  con tro l o rde r reg im e, so  as to  ensu re  tha t 
the re  w ou ld  be ‘no gap  in pub lic  p ro te c tio n ’29 pend ing  its rep lacem en t, th e  PTA  powers  w e re  
renewed until 31 D ecem be r 2011 .30 T he  T e rro rism  P reven tion  and  In vestiga tion  M easures  
B ill31 w as in troduced  in the  House  o f C omm ons on 23  M ay 20 11 ,32 and  rece ived  Roya l 
A ssen t on 14 D ecem be r 2011 , a fte r be ing  sub jec ted  to  tho rough , and uncha rac te ris tica lly  
unhurried , pa rliam en ta ry  sc ru tin y .33 T he  PTA  w as sub sequen tly  repea led  by  the  new  A c t,34 
wh ich  abo lished  con tro l o rde rs  and rep laced  them  w ith  a  sys tem  of T e rro rism  P reven tion  
and Inves tiga tion  M easures  (TP IM s).35
The  T e rro rism  P reven tion  and  Inves tiga tion  M easures  A c t 2011 - TP IM A  - com p rise s  31 
sec tions  and e igh t schedu les . P u rsuan t to  s 2 (1) o f th e  Act, a  T P IM  no tice ’ im pos ing  
spec ified  te rro rism  p reven tion  and  in ves tiga tion  m easures  m ay  be m ade  by  the  H om e 
S ec re ta ry  w he re  ce rta in  cond itions , labe lled  A  to  E by s 3 ,36 a re  m e t37 A lthough  pe rm iss ion  
from  the  H igh C ou rt m ust no rm a lly  be ob ta ined  p rio r to  a  TP IM  no tice  be ing  m ade ,38 as the
2 9
Theresa  May , ‘N ew  Reg im e  for Terro rism  Suspects ’ (H om e  O ffice, 2 3  M ay  2 0 1 1 )  
<www .gov.uk/governm ent/news/new -reg im e-fo r-te rro r-suspects> accessed  5 S ep tem ber 2 0 13 . S ee  
also Exp lanatory No tes to Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 0 0 5  (Continuance  in Force  of Sections 1 to 9)  
O rder 2 011 , S I 2 0 1 1 /7 16 , para  7 .10 .
3 0
Prevention of Terro rism  Act 2 0 0 5  (Con tinuance  in Force  of Sections 1 to 9) O rder 2 011 , SI 
20 1 1 /7 1 6 , which cam e  into force on 11 M arch 2 011 . S ee  HC  D eb  1 M arch  2010 , vol 5 06 , col 747 ; HL  
Deb  3  March  2010 , vol 7 17 , col 1546 .
31 Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easures  HC  Bill (2 0 1 0 -1 2 ) [193].
32 HC  D eb  23  M ay  2011 , vol 528 , col 656 .
go
See  C live W a lker, T h e  Reshap ing  o f Control O rders in the Un ited K ingdom: T im e  for a Fa irer Go , 
Austra lia !’ (2 013 ) 37  Me lbourne University Law  R ev iew  143 , 148 . Th is is in contrast with the  
expedited parliamentary  tim etab le  which app lied to the Preven tion  of Terro rism  Bill in 2 0 0 5  (see  
chap ter 2 of this thesis).
34 T P IM A , s 1 .
35 Pursuant to TP IM A , Sch 8, the nine control orders in ex istence at the time o f the A c t’s 
comm encem en t on 15 D ecem ber 2 011 , remained in force for a ‘transitional period’ o f 4 2  days, unless  
revoked or quashed  by the end of that period. All n ine individuals w ere  subsequen tly  m ade  subject to  
TP IM  notices. S ee  HC  Deb  19 D ecem ber 2 011 , vol 537 , col 1 4 3W S  (Theresa  M ay); HC  D eb  26  
March  2012 , vol 542 , col 9 4W S  (Theresa  M ay).
36 TP IM A , ss 3 (1 )-(5 ).
37 ibid s 2 (1 ). Section 2 (2 ) provides that, for the purposes of the Act, ‘terrorism  prevention and  
investigation m easures ’ m eans those 'requirements, restrictions and other provision which m ay  be  
made in relation to an individual by virtue o f Schedu le  1’.
38 TP IM A , ss 3 (5 )(a ), 6. W he re  the H om e Secre tary  reasonab ly  be lieves that it is necessary  for  
measures  to be imposed urgently, s 3 (5 )(b ) perm its a  T P IM  notice to be m ade w ithout first obtain ing
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Home S ecre ta ry  comm ands  the  lead ro le in th e ir issuance , like  con tro l o rders, TP IM s can  be 
c lassed  as ‘e xecu tive ’ m easu re s .39 A lso  like  con tro l o rde rs, TP IM s a re  cons ide red  by the  
G ove rnm en t to  be a m easure  o f ‘las t re so rt’,40 on ly  to  be used  aga ins t ‘suspec ted  te rro ris ts  
w ho  pose a real th re a t’ , bu t w ho  canno t be succe ss fu lly  p rosecu ted , or, in the  case  o f fo re ign  
na tiona ls, d epo rted .41 Fu rthe r s im ila ritie s  be tw een  the  tw o  reg im es  a re  a lso  found  in th e ir 
sha red  de fin ition  o f ‘te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity ’ ,42 the  H ome S ec re ta ry ’s s ta tu to ry  du ty  to  
consu lt the  po lice  rega rd ing  the  p rospects  o f p ro secu ting  the  suspec t in advance  o f e ith e r 
m easu re  be ing im posed ,43 and the  use o f c losed  p ro ceed ings  and  S pec ia l A dvo ca te s .44 In 
add ition , w h ils t th e  2011 A c t p rov ides fo r  a m ore  ‘tig h tly  de fin ed ’ se t o f re s tric tio n s ,45 a 
num be r o f the  m easu res  tha t can  be im posed  under a  TP IM  no tice  s trong ly  resem b le  the  
ob lig a tio ns  tha t w ere  typ ica lly  inc luded  in con tro l o rde rs , w ith  the  sam e  sanction  a lso  be ing 
app licab le  in respec t o f th e ir b reach .46
G iven the ir deg ree  o f s im ila rity , va rio us  c ritics  have  a rgued  tha t TP IM s a re  s im p ly  ‘con tro l 
o rde rs  by ano the r nam e ’.47 Indeed, som e have  sugges ted  tha t the  rep lacem en t o f con tro l 
o rde rs w ith  TP IM s  w as  little  m ore  than  a po litica lly -m o tiva ted  reb rand ing  e xe rc ise .48 T he  
fo llow ing  section  w ill th e re fo re  d iscuss the  key  fea tu re s  o f the  TP IM  Act, and w ill c r itica lly
the High Court’s perm ission. In such cases , perm ission m ay  be obtained retrospectively: see  s 7 and  
Sch 2 of the Act.
39 S ee  chap ter 2 of this thesis.
40 Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  th e  S ix t e e n th  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  
R ig h ts  S e s s io n  2 0 1 0 - 1 2  H L  P a p e r  1 8 0 , H C  1 4 3 2 :  L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  
I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (Cm  8167 , 2 0 11 ) 1.
41 ibid. S ee  also Theresa  May , ‘N ew  Reg im e  for Terrorism  Suspec ts ’ (H om e  O ffice, 2 3  M ay  2 0 1 1 )  
<www .gov.uk/governm ent/news/new -reg im e-fo r-te rro r-suspects> accessed  5 S ep tem ber 2013 .
42 S ee  PTA , s 1(9); T P IM A , s 4 (1 ).
43 S ee  PTA , s 8; T P IM A , s 10.
44 S ee  the Schedu le  to the PTA; T P IM A , sch 4.
45 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6 ) 4 1 . S ee  T P IM A , sch 1.
46 S ee  PTA , s 9; T P IM A , s 23.
47 JU S T IC E , T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  B r ie f in g  f o r  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  
S e c o n d  R e a d in g  (2 011 ) para  6. S ee  also Joshua Rozenburg , ‘R eb rand ing Exerc ise ’ (2 0 1 1 ) 2 2  Law  
Socie ty G aze tte  8, 8; Amnesty  International, T h e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  
B i l l  2 0 1 1 :  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  R e d u x  (2 011 ) 5; HC  D eb  26  January  2 0 11 , vol 522 , col 311 (Y ve tte  
Cooper).
48 S ee  Ben M iddleton, ‘R ebalancing , Rev iew ing  or Reb rand ing  the T rea tm en t of Terrorist Suspects: 
Th e  Counter-Terrorism  Rev iew  2 0 1 1 ’ (2 0 11 ) 7 5 (3 ) Journal o f Crim inal Law  225 , 230 ; Am nesty  
International, T h e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  2 0 1 1 :  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  R e d u x  
(2 0 1 1 )5 .
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com pa re  the  tw o  reg im es in o rde r to  assess  w he the r TP IM s a re  m e re ly  ‘con tro l o rde rs  lite ’,49 
or, as th e  C oa lition  c la im s, th e  new  schem e  rep re sen ts  ‘a fu ndam en ta l cha nge ’50 and 
em bod ies  a ‘b e tte r ba lance  [be tween ] the  p rio rities  o f p rosecu tion  and pub lic  p ro tec tio n ’51 
than  its m uch critic ised  p redecesso r.
III. The TPIM  Regime
A  TP IM  no tice  m ay be m ade by the  H om e S ec re ta ry  w he re  the  five  cond ition s se t ou t in s 3 
a re  sa tis fie d .52 T hese  cond ition s  are:
A : the  H om e S ecre ta ry  reasonab ly  be lieves  tha t th e  ind iv idua l is, o r has
been, invo lved  in ‘te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity ’;53
B: som e o r all o f the  re levan t a c tiv ity  is ‘n ew ’;54
C: the  H om e S ecre ta ry  reasonab ly  cons ide rs  th a t th e  TP IM  no tice  is
necessa ry  fo r pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p ro tec tin g  m em be rs  o f the  
pub lic  from  a  risk o f te rro rism ;55
D: the  Hom e S ecre ta ry  reasonab ly  cons ide rs  th a t it is necessa ry  fo r  the
spec ified  m easu res  to  be im posed  on the  ind iv idua l to  p reven t o r 
res tric t th e ir  in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity ;56
E: e ith e r the  H igh  C ou rt has g iven  its pe rm iss ion  fo r the  TP IM  no tice  to
be im posed , o r  th e  Home S ecre ta ry  reasonab ly  cons ide rs  th a t it is 
necessary  fo r  the  m easures  to  be im posed  u rgen tly  w ith ou t the  
ob ta in ing  such  p rio r pe rm iss ion .57
Under TP IMA , the  ‘re asonab le  su sp ic ion ’ s tanda rd  w h ich  app lied  in re spec t o f n o n ­
de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs58 has thus been rep laced  by a te s t o f ‘rea sonab le  be lie f’ .59
49 Ian Dennis, Te rro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easures  Bill’ (2 0 1 1 ) 10 Crim inal Law  R ev iew  
741 , 741; Liberty, Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res ’ <www .lib erty -hum an -  
rights.org.uk/hum an-rights/te rro rism /con trol-o rders/index.php> accessed  5  S ep tem ber 2 013 .
50 PBC  Deb  (Bill 193 ) 23  June 2011 , col 87  (Jam es Brokenshire).
51 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6 ) 39.
52 TP IM A , s 3.
53 ibid s 3 (1 ). ‘Involvem ent in terrorism -rela ted activity’ is defined under s 4  of the Act.
54 ibid s 3 (2 ). ‘N ew  terro rism -rela ted  activity’, as  defined under s 3 (6 ), is any  te rrorism -rela ted  activity  
which has occurred since the most recent T P IM  notice m ade  against the individual c am e  into force. If 
no T P IM  notice has previously been issued aga inst the individual, then any  te rro rism -rela ted  activity  
will be classed as ‘new ’: s 3 (6 )(a ).
55 ibid s 3 (3 ).
56 ibid s 3 (4 ).
57 ibid s 3 (5 ).
58 PTA , s 2(1 )(a ).
59 TP IM A , s 3 (1 ).
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C omm en ting  on the  d iffe rence  be tw een  these  tw o  s tan da rd s  in /A,60 the  C ou rt o f A ppea l 
exp la ined  tha t, ‘B e lie f and susp ic ion  a re  no t th e  sam e  ... B e lie f is a s ta te  o f m ind by w h ich  
the  pe rson  in ques tion  th in ks  tha t X  is  the  case . S usp ic ion  is a  s ta te  o f m ind  by w h ich  the  
pe rson  in ques tion  th in ks  tha t X  m a y b e  the  ca se .’61
In CD ,62 O use le y  J described  the  ra is ing  o f th e  e v iden tia l th re sho ld  fo r im pos ing  TP IM s  as 
‘the  m ost no tab le  change  in th e  new  leg is la tive  re g im e ’,63 go ing  on to  s ta te  th a t reasonab le  
be lie f is ‘u ndoub ted ly  ... a h ighe r test: be lie f is requ ired , and the  g rounds  m us t reasonab ly  
suppo rt th a t be lie f ra the r than  m e re ly  su sp ic io n .’64 W h ils t re a sonab le  be lie f is the re fo re  
c lea rly  a  m ore  dem and ing  lega l te s t,65 s ince  acco rd ing  to  Lord  C a rlile  all o f th e  con tro l o rde rs 
con firm ed  by the  cou rts  s ince  the  PTA  w as in troduced  w ou ld  have sa tis fie d  th is  h ighe r 
s tanda rd ,66 the  change  m ay m ake  re la tive ly  little  d iffe rence  in p ractice .
T he  ra is ing  o f the  th resho ld  fo r  m ak ing  a TP IM  no tice  to  reasonab le  be lie f w as  in itia lly  
w e lcom ed  by the  JCHR  as one  o f a num be r o f the  new  schem e ’s im p rovem en ts  on  the  
con tro l o rde r reg im e .67 In its S e c o n d  R e p o r t  on the  TP IM  B ill, the  C omm ittee  none the le ss  
a rgued  tha t, in v iew  o f the  in trus ive  m easures  tha t cou ld  be im posed , the  s tanda rd  o f p roo f 
shou ld  be in creased  to  the  ba lance  o f p robab ilit ie s .68 In response , th e  G ove rnm en t a sse rted  
th a t it be lieves  the  reasonab le  be lie f te s t ‘s trike s  the  r igh t ba lance ’ be tw een  p ro tec tin g  the
60 A  a n d  O th e r s  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2 004 ] EW CA  Civ 1123 .
61 ibid [229] (Laws LJ). S ee  also R  v  S a ik  [2004 ] EW CA  Crim  2 9 3 6  [20] (Lord Brown); H M  T r e a s u r y  v  
A h m e d  [2010] UK SC  2 [199] (Lord Brown).
62 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C D  [2012 ] EW H C  30 2 6  (Adm in).
63 ibid [8].
64 ibid. S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B F  [2012 ] EW HC  1718  (Adm in) [15] 
(M cCom be  J); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C C  a n d  C F  [2012] EW HC  2 8 3 7  (Adm in) 
[24] (Lloyd Jones LJ).
5 David  Anderson describes the change from  reasonab le  suspicion under the  PTA  to reasonab le  
belief under s 3 o f T P IM A  as being ‘one o f real s ignificance’: C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  in  2 0 1 1 :  F in a l  R e p o r t  o f  
th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 0 12 ) para  5 .1 1 .
66 Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 0 11 ) para 29 . Lord Carlile ’s successor, David  Anderson, fu rther confirmed  
that his own exam ination  of the relevant files also pointed to ‘a  sim ilar conclusion’ in relation to the  
control orders m ade  in 2011 : F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  5 .12 .
67 JCHR , L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 2 , HL  
180 , HC  1432 ) paras  1 .8 -1 .9 .
68 JCHR , L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  ( S e c o n d  R e p o r t )  
(2 010 -2 0 12 , HL  204 , HC  1571 ) para 1.14.
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pub lic  and ‘ensu rin g  tha t th e re  is an app rop ria te  sa fe gu a rd ’ fo r  the  p rope r use o f the  TP IM  
pow e rs .69 Indeed, im pos ing  a h ighe r th re sho ld  on TP IM s  m ay serve  to  lim it th e ir u tility  as 
p reven tive  m easures , and cou ld  th e re fo re  po ten tia lly  p rove  de tr im en ta l to  na tiona l se cu r ity .70 
David A nde rson , the  independen t re v iew e r o f the  TP IM  A c t’s ope ra tio n ,71 has, however, 
re comm ended  tha t the  feas ib ility  o f requ iring  in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  to  be 
proved  to  th e  c iv il s tanda rd  shou ld  be kep t unde r ca re fu l rev iew , w ith  a v iew  to  poss ib le  
fu tu re  leg is la tive  am endm en t.72
i. S c h e d u le  1: ‘T e rro r ism  P re v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u re s ’
The  G ove rnm en t c la im s  tha t one  o f th e  's ign ifican t im p rovem en ts '73 o f TP IM s o ve r con tro l 
o rde rs is th a t the  new  reg im e  invo lves  a  'c lea rly  de fin ed , less in trus ive  and  m ore  focused ' se t 
o f re s tric tion s.74 PTA , s 1(4) spec ified  16 ob lig a tions  tha t cou ld  be im posed  unde r con tro l 
o rde rs. T h is  list, however, w as  on ly  illus tra tive , and  it w as  repo rted  by Lo rd  C a rlile  th a t up  to  
25  types o f m easures  w e re  a c tua lly  used unde r non -de roga tin g  o rde rs .75 In con tras t, th e  12 
types  o f ‘m easu re ’ th a t can be im posed  by  a TP IM  no tice  a re  e xhaus tive ly  lis ted  in sch  1 to  
the  2011 A ct.76
69 Governm en t response to J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  
P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  ( S e c o n d  R e p o r t )  (2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 2 , HL 204 , HC  1571 ), letter  
from Jam es  Brokenshire to D r Hywel Francis (14  N ovem ber 2 0 1 1 ) 6.
70 For exam ple , in his 2 0 12  Report on the PTA , David  Anderson , stated that it w as  his ‘firm  
impression’ tha t the ba lance  of probabilities tes t would not have  been  m et in all control order cases , 
and that to impose the civil standard on TP IM s  would therefore have  carried ‘a tangible cost in term s  
of dam age  to national security’: F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  5 .1 4 .
71 TP IM A , s 20 .
72 David  Anderson, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 2 :  F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  
2 0 1 1  (2 013 ) 101 and paras  11 .4 7 -1 1 .5 2 . S ee  also H om e  O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  t h e  R e p o r t  
b y  D a v id  A n d e r s o n  Q .C . o n  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 2  (Cm  8614 ,
2013 ) 8; David  Anderson, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 3 :  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  
o f  th e  In d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  
M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  (2 014 ) paras 6 .1 6 -6 .1 8 .
73 Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  S ix t e e n th  R e p o r t  f r o m  t h e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  
R ig h ts  S e s s io n  2 0 1 0 - 1 2  H L  P a p e r  1 8 0 , H C  1 4 3 2 :  L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  
I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (Cm  8167 , 2 011 ) 1.
74 ibid. S ee  also Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 4 1 . .
75 S ee  Lord Carlile , F i f t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 010 ) para  21; Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  (n 66 ) para 19.
76 TP IM A , sch 1, pt 1.
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W hils t th e re  a re  s trong  s im ila ritie s  be tw een  m any o f th e  re s tric tion s con ta ined  in sch  1 and 
those  tha t w ere  no rm a lly  inc luded  in con tro l o rde rs, in respec t o f certa in  key  m easures , th e re  
a re  som e  im po rtan t d iffe rences . T he  firs t no tab le  change  re la tes  to  the  'ove rn igh t res idence  
m easure '.77 T h is  p rov is ion , w h ich  rep laces the  'cu rfew ' pow e r wh ich  ex is ted  unde r the  P TA ,78 
de live rs  on the  C o u n te r -T e rro r ism  R e v ie w 's  p rom ise  to  end  the  use of fo rced  re loca tion  and 
le ng thy  cu rfew s .79 U nder th is  m easure , an  ind iv idua l m ay  be requ ired  to  res ide  a t th e ir ow n  
res idence , or, if th e y  do  no t have  one, p rem ises  in an 'a pp ro p ria te '80 o r 'ag reed '81 loca lity , 
and can be requ ired  to  rem a in the re  'o ve rn ig h t1.82 T he  A c t itse lf does no t s tipu la te  w ha t 
pe riod  'ove rn igh t' ex tends to ,83 however, in BM ,84 C o llin s  J he ld  th a t it w ou ld  be  app rop ria te  
to  tre a t it as be ing  the  hours  be tween  w h ich  m os t peop le  w ou ld  rega rd  it as reasonab le  to  
th in k  tha t peop le  m igh t be  a t home, th u s  'o ve rn igh t' w ou ld  no t s tre tch  beyond  the  pe riod  
21 :00 -07 :00 .85 C on tra ry  to  th is  p ronouncem en t, a  12 :00 -8 :00  re s idence  requ irem en t w as 
subsequen tly  app roved  by M itting  J in A M ,86 sugges tin g  tha t th e re  rem a ins  som e  fle x ib ility  in 
how  ‘o ve rn ig h t’ can  be in te rp re ted  in th is  con te x t.87 T he  case  law  to  da te  the re fo re  in d ica tes  
tha t any  'ove rn igh t res idence  m easu re ' in a TP IM  no tice  m ay  no t exceed  10 hou rs  and  is 
res tric ted  to  the  hours  o f ‘n ig h t’, w he reas  a 16 -hour cu rfew , capab le  of ope ra tin g  in day tim e , 
cou ld  be im posed  unde r a  non -de roga tin g  con tro l o rder. However, as the  a ve rage  con tro l
77 ibid sch 1, para 1.
78 PTA , s 1 (5 ).
7 9
Hom e O ffice , R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 41 .
80 TP IM A , sch 1, para 1(4 ) provides that an ‘app ropriate locality’ is: (a ) a  locality in the United  
Kingdom in which the individual has a  residence; (b) if the individual has no such residence , a  locality  
in the Un ited Kingdom with which the  individual has  a  connection; (c) if the individual has no such  
res idence or connection, any locality in the  United K ingdom  that appears  to the Secre ta ry  of S ta te  to 
be appropriate.
81 ibid Sch 1, para  1(5): An “agreed  locality” is a locality in the Un ited  K ingdom  which is ag reed  by the  
Secre tary  of S ta te  and the individual.
82 TP IM A , sch 1, para 1.
83 During the parliam en tary  debates  on the T P IM  Bill, T h e resa  M ay  stated  that a  period of 8 -1 0  hours  
was considered to be a  'normal overnight residence': HC  D eb  26  January  2011 , vol 522 , col 3 24 .
84 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B M  [2012 ] EW HC  7 1 4  (Adm in).
85 ibid [52]. S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C C  a n d  C F  [2012 ] EW H C  2 8 3 7  
(Adm in) [64] (Lloyd Jones LJ).
6 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A M  [2012 ] EW HC  1854  (Adm in) [26].
87 S ee  S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B F  [2012 ] EW HC  1718  (Adm in). T h e  overnight 
residence m easure  imposed by BM 's T P IM  notice required him to remain at his home betw een  2 3 :0 0 -  
5:20 .
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o rde r cu rfew  in th e  yea rs  2009-2011  w as 12 hours  o r less,88 and no rm a lly  app lied  du ring  
n igh t tim e , and the  a ve rage  fo r o ve rn igh t re s idence  requ irem en ts  unde r TP IM s  in 2012  and 
2013  w ere  9 .4  hours89 and 9 .2  hou rs90 respective ly , the  ac tua l con tras t be tw een  the  reg im es  
in te rm s  o f ‘cu r few s ’ appea rs  to  be qu ite  m odest.
A  m ore  substan tive  d iffe rence  be tween TP IM s and  con tro l o rde rs  resu lts  from  the  
te rm ina tio n  o f the  Home Sec re ta ry 's  pow e r to  fo rc ib ly  re lo ca te  su sp ec ts .91 R e loca tion , 
though  h igh ly  con trove rs ia l, w as sa id  by the  po lice  to  be  one  o f the  m ost use fu l m easu re s  
a va ilab le  fo r m anag ing  the  risk posed  by  suspec ts  unde r con tro l o rde rs ,92 and w as a ssessed  
by David A nde rson  to  have been 'e ffec tive  in d is rup tin g  te rro ris t ne tworks ... and [reduc ing ] 
th e  risk  o f abscond '.93 Hav ing  been  condem ned  b y  Lord  M acdona ld  as 'th o rough ly  
o ffe ns ive '94 and 'u tte rly  in im ica l to  tra d itiona l B ritish  no rm s ',95 the  dec is ion  was taken  on civ il 
libe rties  g rounds  to  exc lude  the  pow er from  the  TP IM  reg im e .96 Ensu ing  conce rns  rega rd ing  
a  poss ib le  inc rease  in risk due  to  th e  loss o f the  ab ility  to  re loca te  w e re ,97 however, pa rtia lly  
a ssuaged  by the  p rom ise  o f subs tan tia l a dd itiona l fu nd ing  fo r  the  po lice  and  secu rity  se rv ice  
to  enhance  th e ir su rve illance  cap ab ilit ie s .98 A no the r no tew o rth y  d iffe rence  be tw een  the  
reg im es re la ting  to  geog raph ica l re s tric tion s  is tha t, w h ils t con tro lees  cou ld  be con fined  to  a 
des igna ted  a rea  th rough  the  im pos ition  o f geog raph ica l bounda rie s  on the ir m ovem en t,99 
unde r a TP IM  no tice , an ind iv idua l can on ly  be e xc luded  from  en te ring  spec ified  p la ces  o r
S ee  chap ter 4  of this thesis.
89 David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para 5 .1 8 . S ee  also Annex  3  (p 114).
90 David Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) 70.
91 TP IM A , sch 1, paras  1 (3 ), (4) and (5).
92 PBC  Deb  (Bill 193 ) 21 June 2 011 , col 6  (D epu ty  Assistant Comm iss ioner, S tuart O sborne).
93 David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para  5 .7 . S e e  also David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  
5 .21 .
94 Lord Macdonald, R e p o r t  (n 12) 12 (para  22 ).
95 ibid .
96 S ee  Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6 ) 39; David  Anderson , 
F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  11 .32 .
97 S ee  PBC  Deb  (Bill 193 ) 21 June 2 011 , cols 9 -1 0  (D eputy  Assistant Comm issioner, S tuart 
Osborne); HL Deb  5  O ctober 2 011 , vol 730 , col 1 176  (Lord Carlile).
98 S ee  HC  Deb  5  Sep tem ber 2 011 , vol 532 , col 57  (Jam es  Brokenshire); David  Anderson , F i r s t  R e p o r t  
(n 72 ) para  5 .10 .
See PTA, ss 1(4)(f), (g).
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areas. An ‘exc lus ion  m easu re ’100 may, fo r  exam p le , im pose  re s tric tion s on an ind iv idua l 
en te rin g  pa rticu la r s tree ts  o r lo ca litie s  w he re  the ir a ssoc ia tes  live, o r types  o f a reas  o r 
p laces, such  as a irpo rts , po rts , and  in te rna tiona l ra ilw ay s ta tions , o r in te rne t ca fes  or 
m osques .101
C erta in  o the r m easures  im posab le  unde r TP IM  no tices  are a lso  som ew ha t less s tr in gen t 
than  the  com parab le  ob lig a tio ns  tha t w e re  a va ila b le  unde r con tro l o rde rs. R es tr ic tions  on 
assoc ia tion  and comm un ica tion  w ith  o the rs , fo r exam p le , a re  re laxed . P u rsuan t to  PTA , s 
1(4)(d), con tac t w ith  all ‘o th e r pe rsons ’ cou ld  be  res tric ted  by  a con tro l o rd e r.102 In p ractice , 
ob lig a tio ns  tended  to  p roh ib it all v is ito rs  to  the  con tro le e ’s home, and all p re -a rranged  
m ee tings w ith  non -app roved  pe rsons ou ts ide  the ir res idence , w ithou t p rio r H om e O ffice  
au tho risa tion . In con trast, u nder an ‘A ssoc ia tio n  m easu re ’ in a TP IM  no tice ,103 requ irem en ts  
fo r  p rio r pe rm iss ion  o r no tifica tion  in re spec t o f an in d iv id ua l’s assoc ia tion  o r  com m un ica tion  
w ith  o the rs  m ust be fo rm u la ted  in m ore  lim ited  te rm s  by re fe rence  to  ‘spec ified  pe rso ns ’ o r 
‘spec ified  desc rip tions  o f p e rsons ’.104
W here  con tro l o rders cou ld  im pose  a ban on all e le c tron ic  comm un ica tion s , con tro lees  o ften  
be ing p roh ib ited  from  us ing  o r possess ing  m ob ile  phones, com pu te rs , o r  any  o the r 
equ ipm en t capab le  o f connec tin g  to  the  in te rne t,105 a  m in im um  leve l o f p e rm itte d  a ccess  is 
m anda to ry  unde r th e  2011 A c t.106 T here fo re , w h ils t an ‘E lec tron ic  comm un ica tio n s  dev ice  
m easu re ’ m ay  res tric t a su sp ec t’s possess ion  o r use o f e le c tron ic  de v ice s ,107 the y  m us t be
100 TP IM A , sch i , para 3.
101 S ee  Exp lanatory No tes to the Terro rism  Prevention and  Investigation M easu res  Act 2 0 1 1 , para  47 ;  
HL  D eb  October 5 2 011 , vol 7 3 0 , col 1201 (Lord H en ley).
102 PTA , s 1 (4 ).
103 TP IM A , sch 1, para  8.
104 ibid sch 1, para 8 (2 ). The  ‘specified descriptions o f persons’ may, however, be defined  in broad  
terms, for exam ple , ‘persons living outside the U K ’. S ee  Exp lanato ry Notes to the Terrorism  
Prevention and Investigation M easu res  2011 , para 53.
105 PTA , s 1 (4 )(a ).
106 TP IM A , sch 1, para 7 (3 ).
107 ibid sch1, para 7 (1 ). Sch 1, para 7 (5 )(a )  provides that an ‘electronic communication d ev ice ’ is (a )  
dev ice that is capab le  of storing, transm itting or receiving im ages, sounds or information by electronic  
means; (b) a  component part of such a  device; or (c) an  article des igned or adap ted  for use with such  
a  device (including any  disc, m em ory stick, film or other separa te  artic le on which images , sound or 
information m ay  be  recorded).
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a llow ed  to  possess and use  a fixed -lin e  te lephone , a com pu te r w ith  access  to  the  in te rne t by 
fixed -line  connec tion , and  a m ob ile  phone  tha t does  no t p rov ide  in te rne t a cce ss .108 A lthough  
it m ay be hoped  tha t th is  change  cou ld  enhance  oppo rtun itie s  fo r e v idence  ga the rin g ,109 as 
W a lke r and H orne  sugges t, it is like ly  th a t ‘su spects  w ill rem a in  c ircum spec t in th e ir 
com m un ica tion s  in th e  e xpec ta tion  o f ongo ing  su rve illa n ce .’110
As rega rds  the  rem a in ing  ‘m easu re s ’ se t ou t in Sch 1 - headed , 'tra ve l1,111 'm ovem en t 
d ire c tio n s ',112 'financ ia l se rv ice s ',113 'p ro pe rty ',114 'w o rk  o r  s tud ie s ',115 're po rt in g ',116 
'p ho tog raphs ',117 and 'm on ito rin g '118 - th e se  p rov ide  fo r re s tric tion s w h ich  are , fo r the  m ost 
pa rt,119 rem arkab ly  s im ila r to  tho se  tha t w e re  o ften  inc luded  in con tro l o rde rs. So, w h ils t 
som e  o f the  m easures  tha t can be app lied  under TP IM  no tices  ap pea r less one rous  than  the  
equ iva len t con tro l o rde r ob liga tio ns , th e re  is neve rthe le ss  cons ide rab le  con tin u ity  be tw een  
the  reg im es in te rm s o f th e  res tra in ts  the  H om e S ec re ta ry  m ay im pose  on a su sp ec t fo r  
pu rposes  connec ted  w ith  p reven ting  o r  res tric ting  th e ir in vo lvem en t in te r ro rism -re la ted  
activ ity .
ii. T h e  ‘In v e s t ig a t io n ’ E le m e n t o f  T P IM s
One  of the  C o u n te r -T e rro r ism  R e v ie w ’s  p r in c ipa l c ritic ism s  o f con tro l o rde rs  w as  th a t th e y  
m ade the  p rospect o f p rosecu ting  and conv ic ting  con tro lees  ‘less no t m ore  like ly ’ .120 Indeed, 
as d iscussed  in chap te r 3, con tro l o rde rs  p roved  to  be  m an ife s tly  ine ffe c tive  as an  a id  to  th e
108 ibid sch 1, para 7 (3 ).
109 S ee  Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 41 (para  24 ).
110 C live W a lke r and A lexander Horne, T h e  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Act 
2011 : O ne  Thing  But Not Much the O ther?1 (2 012 ) 6  C rim inal Law  R ev iew  4 21 , 4 25 . S e e  also PBC  
Deb  (Bill 193 ) 2 3  June  2 011 , col 64  (Tom  Brake).
111 TP IM A , sch 1, para  2.
112 ibid sch 1, para  4.
113 ibid sch 1, para 5.
114 ibid sch 1, para  6.
115 ibid sch 1, para 9.
116 ibid sch 1, para 10.
117 ibid sch 1, para  11.
118 ibid sch 1, para 12.
119 The  financial services m easure, for exam ple , provides for a  g rea te r deg ree  of freedom  in relation  
specified financial services, such as bank  accounts, than was often the case  under control orders. 
See  W a lke r and Horne, T h e  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easures  Act 2 011 ' (n 110 ) 4 2 6 .
120 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6 ) 37 . S ee  also  Lord  
Macdonald , R e p o r t  (n 12) 9.
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inves tiga tion  and  p rosecu tion  o f su spects  fo r te rro ris t o ffe n ces .121 W h ils t re ta in ing  the  
p reven tive  func tio n  o f con tro l o rde rs, th e  TP IM  reg im e  is sa id  to  be m ore  firm ly  ‘based  on 
in ves tiga tio n ’122 than  its p redecesso r. D esp ite  TP IM s be ing  exp ress ly  des igna ted  as 
inves tiga tive  m easures , as W a lke r and Horne  comm en t, ‘the  am endm en ts  in fa vo u r o f 
investiga tio n  in the  TP IM  A c t a re  lim ited .’123
As w ith  con tro l o rde rs ,124 be fo re  im pos ing , o r app ly ing  fo r th e  m ak ing  of, a  TP IM  no tice , the  
Home S ecre ta ry  is unde r a  s ta tu to ry  du ty  to  consu lt the  C h ie f O ffice r o f the  app rop ria te  
po lice  fo rce  abou t the  p rospects  o f p ro secu ting  the  ind iv idua l conce rned  fo r an o ffence  
re la ting  to  te r ro r ism .125 In re la tion  to  th e  consu lta tio n  du ty, the  on ly  no tew o rth y  m od ifica tion  
to  tha t w h ich  ex is ted  unde r th e  PTA  is con ta ined  in s 10(5), w he reby  the  C h ie f O ffic e r is now  
requ ired  to  repo rt to  the  Home S ecre ta ry  on the  ongo ing  rev iew  o f th e  p ro spects  of 
p rosecu ting  the  ind iv id ua l.126 A lte rna tive  schem es  des igned  to  ensu re  a c lo se r link  be tw een  
TP IM s  and c rim ina l in vestiga tion  w e re  pu t fo rw a rd  by  the  Lord  M a cdona ld127 and  the  
JC H R ,128 bo th  o f w hom  exp ressed  conce rn s  tha t the  new  reg im e  d id no t go  fa r  enough  to  
‘b ring the  re s tric tion s back in to  the  dom a in  o f c rim ina l due  p ro cess .’129 T hese  p roposa ls  
were , however, re jec ted  by the  G overnm en t, w h ich  m a in ta ined  tha t the  com m itm en t to
121 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  3 .5 2
122 PBC Deb  (Bill 193 ) 2 3  June  2011 , cols 8 7  (Jam es  Brokenshire). S ee  also H om e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  
C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 41 .
123 W a lke r and Horne, T h e  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easures  Act 2 0 11 ' (n 110 ) 4 2 9 .
124 S ee  PTA , s 8 (2 ).
125 TP IM A , ss 10 (1 ), (2 ). S ee  also ss 10 (4 ), (6).
126 ibid s 10 (5 )(b ). S ee  also Explanatory  Notes to the Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation  
M easures  Act 2 011 , para 25 .
127 S ee  Lord Macdonald , R e p o r t  (n 12) 10-11 (para  12).
128 The  JC HR  recommended  that the preconditions for imposition of T P IM s  should be that ‘the  D PP  
(or relevant prosecuting authority) is satisfied that: (a ) a  crim inal investigation into the individual’s 
involvement in terro rism -related  activity is justified; and  (b) none of the specified terrorism  prevention  
and investigation m easures  to be imposed on the individual will im pede  tha t inves tigation .’ JC H R ,  
L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (2 0 10 -1 2 , H L  180 , HC  
1432 ) para  1 .24 .
129 JCHR , L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (2 0 1 0 -1 2 , HL  
180, HC  1432 ) para 1 .21 . S ee  Lord M acdona ld , R e p o r t  (n 12) 10 -11 .
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prosecu tion  as the  ove rrid ing  p rio rity  w hen  dea ling  w ith  suspec ted  te rro ris ts  w as  ‘p rope rly  
re fle c ted ’ in s 10 o f th e  A c t.130
W h ils t the  g rea te r leve ls  o f fre edom  o f com m un ica tio n  and  assoc ia tion  pe rm itte d  to  
ind iv idua ls  unde r TP IM s  m ay m ean tha t the  po ten tia l fo r e v idence -ga the ring  is s ligh tly  
im proved , the  susp ec t’s aw areness  o f the  fa c t th a t th e ir  ac tio ns  w ill be c lose ly  m on ito red  
m eans tha t th e y  a re  un like ly  to  engage  in any s ign ifican t te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  w h ils t 
sub je c t to  a TP IM  no tice .131 Thus , desp ite  the  pu rpo rted  sh ift in em phas is , as David 
A nde rson  suggests , like  con tro l o rde rs  be fo re  them , ‘it is like ly  tha t th e  ch ie f va lue  o f TP IM s 
... w ill ... lie  in the  “p reven tio n ” ra the r than  the  “ inves tig a tio n ” o f te r ro r ism .’132 Indeed, in its 
2014  report, the  JCHR  conc luded  th a t ‘e p ith e t “TP IM s ” is a m isnom e r’ ,133 the ir in qu iry  hav ing  
fa iled  to  find  any e v idence  tha t, in p rac tice , the  m easures  w e re  ‘in ves tig a tive ’ in any  
m ean ing fu l sense .134
///'. C o u r t P ro c e e d in g s
The  cou rt p roceed ings invo lved  in the  im po s itio n 135 and  re v iew 136 o f TP IM s c lo se ly  m irro r 
th o se  w h ich  app lied  to  non -de roga tin g  con tro l o rde rs. O nce  m ade, TP IM  no tices  becom e the  
sub je c t o f a  rev iew  hearing  unde r s 9 ,137 a t w h ich  the  H om e S ec re ta ry ’s dec is io ns  tha t the  
cond ition s fo r im pos ing  m easures  on the  ind iv idua l w e re  and  con tin ue  to  be m e t a re
130 Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  t h e  S ix t e e n th  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  
R ig h t s  S e s s io n  2 0 1 0 - 1 2  H L  P a p e r  1 8 0 , H C  1 4 3 2 : L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  A n d  
I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (Cm  8167 , 2 0 11 ) 3 -4 .
131 As Deputy  Assistant Comm issioner, S tuart Osborne, explained  in his ev idence  to the  House  of 
Commons ’ Public Bill Comm ittee , ‘individuals who know  they  are  being watched  m ay not readily offer  
up incrim inating ev idence ’: PBC  Deb  (Bill 193 ) 21 June 2 011 , col 13. S ee  also David  Anderson, F i r s t  
R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para 8 .15 .
132 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  3 .5 2 . To  date, other than for b reaches  of certain  
measures  under s 2 3  of the T P IM  Act, no individual has been  prosecuted on the  basis of ev idence  
discovered during the currency of the ir T P IM  notice: S ee  David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para
11.9; S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para 6 .3 .
133 JC HR , P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  
(2 0 13 -1 4 , HL  113 , HC  1014 ) para  35 .
34 ibid. The  Comm ittee consequen tly recommended  that TP IM s  should be referred to as Terro rism  
Prevention O rders ’, so at to ‘reflect the reality  that the ir sole purpose is p reven tive ’ (para  35 ).
135 S ee  TP IM A , ss 6, 8; PTA , ss 3 (1 )-(8 ).
136 S ee  TP IM A , s 9; PTA , ss 3 (1 0 )-(1 2 ).
137 T P IM A , s 9. Pursuant to s 9 (3 ), the rev iew  hearing may, however, be d iscontinued a t the sub ject’s 
request (s 9 (3 )(a )) , or where, afte r hearing represen tations , the court dec ides  to d iscontinue the  
review  (ss 9 (3 )(b ), (4 )).
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rev iewed by the  co u rt.138 In rev iew ing  these  dec is ions , the  cou rt ‘m ust app ly  the  p rinc ip les  
app licab le  on an app lica tio n  fo r ju d ic ia l re v iew .’139 T h is  rep lica tes  the  ‘fo rm u la ’ used in s 3 o f 
th e  PTA ,140 in respec t o f w h ich  it w as  de te rm ined  tha t the  H igh Court, w h ile  pay ing  a ‘deg ree  
o f de fe rence ’141 to  the  Home S ec re ta ry ’s dec is ions , shou ld  g ive  ‘in tense  s c ru tin y ’ to  the  
necess ity  o f the  ob lig a tio ns  im posed  by the  con tro l o rd e r.142 It is th u s  accep ted  tha t th e  sam e 
h igh leve l o f sc ru tin y  w ill be app lied  by the  cou rt w hen  rev iew ing  the  H om e S ec re ta ry ’s 
dec is ions  as to  the  necess ity  fo r TP IM  no tices  and  th e ir cons titu en t m easures  unde r s 9 o f 
th e  2011 A c t.143
As w ith  con tro l o rders, the  dec is ion  to  im pose  a  TP IM  no tice  w ill typ ica lly  be based  on an 
in te llig ence  case  w h ich  inc ludes  bo th  ‘o pen ’ and ‘c lo se d ’ m a te ria l. The  use o f c losed  m a te ria l 
p rocedures  and Spec ia l A dvoca tes  in the  con tex t o f TP IM  p roceed ings  a re  consequen tly  
p rov ided  fo r unde r s 18 and  sch  4  o f th e  A c t,144 and  in th e  a ccom pany ing  p rocedura l ru les 
con ta ined  in CPR  8 0 .145 Though  the  leve l o f d isc losu re  requ ired  to  sa tis fy  the  in d iv id ua l’s 
r igh t to  a  fa ir hea ring  is no t spec ified  by the  A c t,146 it w as acknow ledged  by the  G ove rnm en t 
th a t the  ‘g is tin g ’ re qu irem en t a rticu la ted  in A F  (N o  3 ) u 7 in re la tion  con tro l o rde rs  w ou ld  a lso
138 Section 9 (8 ) specifies that the ‘re levant conditions’ to be reviewed by the court a re  conditions A  to  
D which are  set under s 3  of the Act.
139 TP IM A , s 9 (2 ).
140 PTA , s 3 (11 ). S ee  W a lke r and Horne, T h e  Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Act 
2011 ' (n 1 1 0 )4 3 4 .
141 S e c r e ta r y  f o r  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M B  [2006 ] EW CA  C iv 1140  [64] (Lord Phillips).
142 ibid [65]. S ee  also B M  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2011 ] EW CA  C iv  366 .
143 S ee  Hom e O ffice, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  ( T P IM )  B i l l :  E C H R  
M e m o r a n d u m  (2 011 ) paras 27 -28 ; Explanatory Notes to the Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation  
Measures  Act 2 011 , paras 7 9 -80 .
144 TP IM A , s 18 and sch 4 . T h e  appo in tm en t of a  Spec ia l Advocate  to represent the interests of the
 
suspect in closed proceedings is provided for under sch 4, para  10.
145 Civil Procedure Rules, pt 80: P roceedings Under the Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation  
Measures  Act 2 011 .
146 In their two reports on the T P IM  Bill, it w as  asserted  by the JC HR  that the legislation should be  
am ended  so as to exp ressly provide that the individual on whom  the m easures  are  imposed is entitled  
to be g iven the level of information required by the  A F  (N o  3 )  d isclosure obligation. S ee  JC H R ,  
L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (2 0 10 -12 , HL 180 , HC  
1432) paras 1 .33 -1 .41 ; L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  
( S e c o n d  R e p o r t )  (2 0 10 -2 0 12 , HL 204 , HC  1571 ) paras 1 .1 8 -1 .2 1 .
47 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A F  ( N o  3 )  [2009 ] UKHL  2 8  [59] (Lord Phillips). The  
A F  (N o  3 )  d isclosure obligation is d iscussed in detail in chap te r 4  of this thesis.
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app ly  to  TP IM s .148 T he  app lica tion  o f the  d isc lo su re  ob liga tion  de rived  from  A F  (N o  3 )  to  
de te rm in ing  the  A rtic le  6 com p lia nce  o f TP IM  p ro ceed ings  has subsequen tly  been 
unequ ivoca lly  con firm ed  by the  H igh C ou rt in bo th  B M U9 and  C F 150
iv . T P IM s  a n d  H um a n  R ig h ts
As d iscussed  above , in ce rta in  respects , th e  re s tric tion s  tha t can  be im posed  unde r TP IM  
no tices  a re  app re c iab ly  less seve re  than  those  tha t cou ld  be inc luded  in con tro l o rde rs. In 
the  ECHR  M em o randum 151 w h ich  a ccom pan ied  the  leg is la tion , it is the re fo re  a sse rted  tha t, 
as con tro l o rde rs  ‘ope ra ted  com pa tib ly ’152 w ith  th e  C onven tio n , the  G ove rnm en t a cco rd ing ly  
cons ide rs  the  TP IM  reg im e , w h ich  inc ludes  a  g rea te r range  o f sa fegua rd s  and  p rov ides fo r 
th e  im pos ition  o f less in trus ive  m easu re s ,153 to  be ECHR  com p lia n t.154
W h ile  con tro l o rde rs w e re  fre quen tly  cha lle nged  on the  bas is  th a t th e y  in fr in ged  the  
con tro lee ’s righ t to  liberty , due  to  a re s idence  requ irem en t unde r a TP IM  be ing  lim ited  to  
‘o ve rn igh t’ ,155 it is ve ry  un like ly  to  engage  A rtic le  5 .156 Indeed, in ligh t o f the  case  law  on 
cu rfew s  unde r non -de roga tin g  o rde rs ,157 be ing  con fin ed  to  a  spec ified  re s idence  fo r  a 
m ax im um  of 10 -hours158 w ill, as  the  ECHR  M em orandum  s ta tes , ‘fa ll w e ll sho rt o f th e  “g re y
148 See  Governm ent response to J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  
P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  ( S e c o n d  R e p o r t )  (2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 2 , HL 204 , HC  1571 ), letter 
from Jam es Brokenshire to D r Hywel Francis (1 4  N ovem ber 2 0 11 ) 7 -8 ; HC  D eb  5  S ep tem ber 2 011 ,  
vol 532 , cols 1 0 5 -1 0 6  (Lord Hen ley). S ee  also H om e  O ffice, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  
M e a s u r e s  ( T P IM )  B i l l :  E C H R  M e m o r a n d u m  (2011 ) para  38.
149 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B M  [2 012 ] EW HC  7 1 4  (Adm in) [21] (Collins J).
150 C F  v  S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2 013 ] EW HC  8 4 3  (Adm in) [27] (W ilk ie J).
151 Hom e O ffice, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  ( T P IM )  B i l l :  E C H R  M e m o r a n d u m
(f2011)-ibid para  2.
153 ibid para 2. These  safeguards include a  tim e limit on T P IM s  and also a  h igher thresho ld for  
imposing the  restrictions (para  2 ).
154 ibid paras 2, 18. A  sta tem ent under HRA , s 1 9 (1 )(a ) w as  accordingly signed by the  H om e  
Secre tary  declaring that, in her view , the  provisions conta ined  in the T P IM  Bill w ere  compatib le  with  
the Convention rights.
155 TP IM A , sch 1, para 1.
156 S ee  Hom e O ffice, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  ( T P IM )  B i l l :  E C H R  
M e m o r a n d u m  (2 011 ) para  20 .
157 S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  J J  &  O th e r s  [2007] UKHL  45; S e c r e t a r y  o f  
S ta te  f o r  th e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  E  [2007 ] UKHL  47; S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  
M B  a n d  A F  [2007] UKHL  46; and S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A E  [2008 ] EW HC  
585  (Adm in). For fu rther discussion, see  chap ter 4  of this thesis.
158 S ee  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  B M  [2 012 ] EW H C  7 1 4  (Adm in) [52] (Collins  J).
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a rea ” ... iden tified  in the  con tro l o rde r con te x t’ .159 W h ils t it is poss ib le  th a t the  cum u la tive  
im pact o f an o ve rn igh t re s idence  m easure , a long  w ith  o the r res tra in ts  on m ovem ent, 
a ssoc ia tion  and comm un ica tion , cou ld  am oun t to  a dep riva tion  o f lib e rty ,160 g iven  the  
reduced  s tr in gency  o f the  re s tric tion s ava ila b le  unde r sch  1, it a ppea rs  doub tfu l tha t, even in 
com b ina tion , the  m easures  im posed  by a TP IM  no tice  w ill b reach  A rtic le  5 .161
A lthough  the  G ove rnm en t has e xp ressed  its com m itm en t to  ensu ring  tha t TP IM  p roceed ings 
ope ra te  com pa tib ly  w ith  A rtic le  6 ,162 g iven  the  re g im e ’s re liance  on c losed  ev idence , it is 
a n tic ip a ted  tha t cha llenges  re la ting  to  th e  leve l o f d isc losu re  w ill be  a  p rom inen t fe a tu re  of 
fu tu re  litiga tion  on TP IM s .163 In add ition  to  tho se  concern ing  w he the r the re  has been 
su ffic ie n t ‘g is tin g ’ to  sa tis fy  A rtic le  6, the  na tu re  o f th e  re s tric tion s  tha t can be im posed  unde r 
TP IM s  m eans  tha t cha llenges  focus ing  on th e ir im pact on the  qua lified  righ ts  con ta ined  in 
A rtic les  8-11 ECHR ,164 and the  necess ity  and  p ropo rtio na lity  o f p a rticu la r m ea su re s ,165 a re  
a lso  like ly  to  be ra ised in m any  o f the  cases  tha t a rise  unde r the  reg ime.
159 Hom e O ffice, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  ( T P IM )  B i l l :  E C H R  M e m o r a n d u m  
(2011 ) para  23 . In S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A P  [2010] U K SC  24 , Lord Brown  
explained that, in the context of control orders, a “g rey a re a ” existed between  14 -hour and 18 -hour  
curfew  cases , where restrictions other than m ere  con finem ent a re  to be  taken  into accoun t in 
determ ining whether there is a  deprivation of liberty [2].
160 Pursuant to S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A P  [2010] UK SC  24 , these  restrictions  
may be facto red  into a  holistic evaluation  of w hether a  deprivation of liberty arises .
161 S ee  Hom e O ffice, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  ( T P IM )  B i l l :  E C H R  
M e m o r a n d u m  (2 0 11 ) para 23 . S ee  also David  Bonner, ‘Counter-Terro rism  and Eu ropean  Hum an  
Rights since 9 /11 : Th e  United K ingdom Experience ’ (2 0 1 3 ) 19 (1 ) European  Public Law  97 , 1 1 5 -1 16 .
162 See , for exam ple , Hom e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  t h e  R e p o r t  b y  D a v id  A n d e r s o n  Q C :  
S e v e n th  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  th e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  8443 , 2 0 12 ) 7.
163 W alker, for exam ple , suggests that the level of gisting is likely to constitute ‘a  prim e bone of  
contention’ in relation to TP IM s : W a lke r, T h e  Reshap ing  o f Control O rders  in the  United K ingdom ’ (n 
33 ) 168. S ee  also M o h a m e d  A h m e d  M o h a m e d  a n d  C F  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  
[2014] EW CA  C iv 559 .
64 S ee , for exam ple , B F  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2013 ] EW HC  2 3 2 9  (Adm in) 
[27].
65 S ee  C F  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2013 ] EW HC  843  (Adm in), in which the  
‘association m easu re ’ contained in a T P IM  notice w as  held by W ilk ie  J to be d isproportionate, as  
whilst the restrictions imposed had a ‘chilling effec t’ on C F ’s participation in student life, they  lacked  
‘any, apparent, beneficial effect on national security ’ [97]. S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  
D e p a r tm e n t  v  A M  [2012 ] EW HC  1854  (Adm in) [30].
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v. T P IM s : D u ra t io n  a n d  E x p iry
In con tras t to  con tro l o rd e rs ,166 TP IM  no tices  are sub je c t to  a  m ax im um  tim e -lim it o f tw o  
yea rs .167 A ccord ing  to  the  C o u n te r -T e r ro r ism  R e v iew , th is  lim it is des igned  to  em phas ise  tha t 
th e  m easu res  cons titu te  ‘a sho rt te rm  exp ed ie n t’ ,168 ra the r than  a long te rm  o r adequa te  
a lte rna tive  to  p rosecu tio n .169 P ursuan t to  s 5 ,170 a TP IM  no tice  w ill in itia lly  rem a in  in fo rce  fo r  
a  yea r,171 and can be ex tended  fo r  an add itiona l yea r on ly  o n ce .172 A t the  exp iry  o f th is  tw o  
yea r pe riod , a subsequen t TP IM  no tice  can  be m ade  aga in s t an ind iv idua l on ly  w he re  ‘n ew ’ 
te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity  has occu rred  s in ce  the  im pos ition  o f the  o rig ina l n o tic e .173
The  dec is ion  to  res tric t the  du ra tion  o f TP IM  no tices  to  tw o  yea rs  has rece ived  the  suppo rt o f 
bo th  Lord  C a rlile 174 and David A nde rson ,175 the  la tte r describ ing  th is  lim it as ‘the  bo ldes t and 
m ost s ign ifican t aspec t o f the  change  from  con tro l o rde rs  to  TP IM s ’.176 T he  p rin c ipa l b ene fits  
w h ich  a re  pe rce ived  to  a ccom pany the  tw o -yea r m ax im um  a re  th a t it p rec ludes  the  in de fin ite  
‘w a reho us in g ’ o f suspec ts  unde r p reven tive  o rde rs ,177 and g ive s ‘a num be r o f  hea lthy  
incen tives  to  th e  au tho ritie s  ... to  devo te  se rio u s  and cons tru c tive  thoug h t to  TP IM  ex it 
s tra teg ie s ’,178 such  as p rosecu tion , depo rta tio n  o r de -rad ica lisa tio n .179
166 Although non-derogating control orders lasted for a  period of 12 months (P TA , s 2 (4 )(a )) , providing  
the criteria in s 2 (6 ) of the PTA  w ere  met, there  was no limit on the number of tim es an o rder could be  
renew ed  by the  Hom e Secretary . For fu rther d iscussion, see  chap ters  3  and 4  of this thesis.
167 TP IM A , s 5 (3 )(b ).
168 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 41 (p ara  24 ).
169 ibid.
170 TP IM A , s 5.
171 ibid s 5(1 )(b ).
172 ibid s 5 (3 ). Section 5 (3 )(a ) provides that a  T P IM  notice m ay  be ex tended  for a  second yea r if 
conditions A, C  and D under s 3 of the Act a re  met.
173 ibid ss 3 (2 ), (6 )(c ). S ee  also Explanatory Notes to the Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation  
Measures  Act 2 011 , para 63 .
174 S ee  Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 66 ) para  55.
175 David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para  11 .37 .
176 ibid para 11 .33 .
177 One o f Lord M acdonald ’s main criticisms of control orders was  that contro lees becam e  
‘warehoused fa r  beyond the harsh scrutiny of due process ’, as a result of which, som e terrorist activity  
would ‘undoubtedly’ remain unpunished by the crim inal law: Lord Macdonald , R e p o r t  (n 12) 10 (pa ra  
1 1 ).
178 David  Anderson , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para  11 .37 .
179 S ee  David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para 6 .3 4
177
From  a na tiona l secu rity  pe rspective , however, the  tw o -yea r tim e  lim it m ay be rega rded  as a 
cause  fo r  concern . A s  d iscussed  in C hap te r 4, in re spec t of a t leas t one -th ird  of all 
con tro lees , th e  gove rnm en t rega rded  it as  necessa ry  to  m a in ta in  th e ir con tro l o rde rs  beyond  
tw o  yea rs. D esp ite  the  fa c t tha t TP IM  sub je c ts  a re  like ly  to  pose  an equ iva len t type  and level 
o f r is k ,180 they  canno t be sub je c ted  to  TP IM s fo r m o re  than  tw o  yea rs , even  if it is be lieved  
they  rem a in  a th rea t beyond  tha t pe riod . Further, g iven  the  m ax im um  du ra tion  o f no tices, it 
a ppea rs  un like ly  th a t suspec ts  w ill e ngage  in ‘n ew ’ in c rim ina tin g  a c tiv ity  w h ils t u nde r TP IM s, 
bu t w ill ins tead  ‘keep  th e ir heads dow n ’ ,181 know ing  tha t the  m easures  w ill be  lifted  w ith in  
tw o  yea rs . A lthough  it is expec ted  th a t ind iv id ua ls  w ho  a re  assessed  to  pose  a  con tinu ing  
r isk  a t th e  exp iry  o f th e ir TP IM  no tice  w ill rem a in  the  sub je c t o f su rve illa n ce ,182 th is  ‘beg ins  
and ends w ith  obse rva tio n ’ .183 Indeed , as the  C o u n te r -T e r ro r ism  R e v ie w  conc luded , 
su rve illance  does  no t o f itse lf p reven t o r  d is ru p t a su sp ec t’s ac tiv ities , th e re fo re  it canno t 
m itiga te  risk in the  sam e  m anne r, o r to  th e  sam e  ex ten t, as  m easures  like con tro l o rde rs  o r 
T P IM s .184
W h ils t the  tw o -yea r lim it m ay  be v iew ed  as  'an a ccep tab le  com p rom ise '185 be tw een  libe rty  
and secu rity , it c rea tes  a s itua tion  w he re  in d iv id ua ls  w ho  the  G ove rnm en t is unab le  to 
p rosecu te  o r  depo rt w ith in  th is  tim e -fram e , bu t w ho  rem a in  rad ica lised  and  po ten tia lly  liab le  
to  re -engage  in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity  a t its  exp ira tion , w ill b e com e  fre e  of cons tra in t. 
A lthough  the  G ove rnm en t has s ta ted  tha t ‘com prehens ive  and de ta iled  p lans ’ ha ve  been  
deve loped  fo r m anag ing  fo rm e r TP IM  sub je c ts ,186 the  fa c t th a t the  TP IM  no tices  im posed  on
180
Under T P IM A , s 4 (1 ), the ‘terro rism -rela ted  activity’ upon which the decision to impose a T P IM  
notice is based  is defined  in identical term s to that which justified the making of a  control o rder under  
s 1 (9 ) of the PTA . S ee  also David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para  11 .33 .
181 David  Anderson, O r a l  E v id e n c e  B e fo r e  t h e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  R e v ie w  o f  t h e  
T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  R e g im e  (1 9  M arch 2 013 ) 6. S ee  also David  
Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  6 .33 .
182 S ee  O ral ev idence  of Jam es  Brokenshire, J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  th e  D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  
P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  O r a l  E v id e n c e  (2 0 12 ), answers  to questions 2 3 2 -2 3 7 .
183 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para 6 .3 5
184 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6 ) 3 8  (p ara  13 ).
185 David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para  11 .38 . S ee  also Ben M iddleton, 'Rebalancing, R ev iew ing  
or Rebranding the T rea tm en t of Terrorist Suspects' (n 48 ) 2 30 .
186 H om e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  th e  T e n th  R e p o r t  O f  S e s s io n  2 0 1 3 - 1 4  f r o m  th e  J o in t  
C o m m it t e e  O n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  H L  P a p e r  1 1 3 /H C  1 0 1 4 : P o s t - L e g is la t i v e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n
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seven  suspec ts , inc lud ing  those  aga ins t w hom  the  a lle ga tio n s  ‘a re  a t the  h ighes t end o f 
se riousness, even by the  s tanda rd s  o f in te rna tiona l te rro r ism ’,187 exp ired  be tw een  2 Janua ry  
and  10 Februa ry  20 14 ,188 has unde rs tandab ly  engendered  cons ide rab le  d isq u ie t.189
vi. R e v ie w  a n d  R e n e w a l o f  th e  T P IM  R e g im e
A  fu rthe r d iffe rence  be tween the  reg im es  is tha t, w h ile  the  con tro l o rde r powers  w e re  sub jec t 
to  annua l pa rliam en ta ry  renew a l,190 the  TP IM  powers  requ ire  renewa l on ly  a fte r be ing  in 
opera tion  fo r five  yea rs .191 A lthough  describ ed  as ‘a b it o f a fic tio n ’192 by Lord  C arlile , the  
JCHR  a rgued  tha t the  annua l re v iew  and  renewa l o f con tro l o rde rs  by  P a rliam en t 
rep resen ted  an im po rtan t sa fegua rd ,193 and  the re fo re  exp ressed  its d isappo in tm en t a t the  
G ove rnm en t’s re luc tance to  expose  TP IM s to  ‘th e  r igou rs  o f fo rm a l and regu la r pos t ­
leg is la tive  sc ru tiny  w h ich  annua l renew a l en ta ils .’194 T he  H ouse  o f Lo rds ’ S e le c t C omm ittee  
on the  C onstitu tion , m eanwh ile , q uestio ned  w he th e r it w as  ‘cons titu tio na lly  app rop ria te  to
A n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  (Cm  8844 , 2 0 14 ) 7 . Th ese  p lans a re  said  to include  
consideration by the  police o f ‘P revent interventions . ..  to limit the  impact o f rad icalisation’, identifying  
stabilising factors, including em ploym en t and education , to assist the  individual to m ove  aw ay  from  
extrem ism , and engaging the probation services  to work with subjects in the  final months of their 
TP IM  notices (p 7 ).
187
David Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para  11 .36 . A  profile of each  of the T P IM  subjects, compiled  
from the open court judgments , is provided at para  4 .1 2  of the Report. S ee  also David  Anderson , 
S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) paras  3 .6 -3 .7 .
188 Th e  T P IM  notices against C F , CD , BM , C E , AM , BF  and AY, all expired betw een  these  dates . S ee  
David Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para  4 .20 .
189 S ee  Hom e Affairs Comm ittee , C o u n t e r  T e r r o r is m  (H C  231 , 2 0 1 4 ) para  105; Intelligence and  
Security Comm ittee, A n n u a l  R e p o r t  2 0 1 2 - 2 0 1 3  (H C  2 0 1 2 -1 3 , 5 4 7 ) 17; JC H R , P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  
S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  (2 0 13 -1 4 , HL  113 , HC  1014 ) 79;  
Nigel Morris, ‘Out o f Control: T h e  Verd ic t on M ay ’s Suspect Po licy’ T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  (2 3  January  
2014 ) <www .independent.co .uk/new s/uk/po litics /ou t-of-contro l-the-verd ic t-on -m ays-terror-suspec t- 
po licy -9078159 .h tm l> accessed  25  January  2014 .
190 PTA , s 13.
191 TP IM A , s 2 1 (1 ). Th e  Hom e Secre ta ry ’s T P IM  powers expire five years a fte r the date on which the  
2011 Act was passed , and will there fo re  require renewal in D ecem ber 2016 . Pursuant to s 2 1 (2 )(c ),  
the Hom e Secre tary  may, afte r consulting the Independen t R ev iew er, the Intelligence  Services  
Comm issioner, and the  D irec tor G enera l of the  Security  Serv ice (s 2 1 (3 )) , renew  the powers for a  
period not exceeding  5  years by order m ade  by statutory instrument. T h e  renewal order must also be  
approved by a ffirmative resolution of both parliam en tary Houses  (ss 1 3 (4 )-(6 )) .
192 PBC  Deb  (Bill 193) 21 June 2 011 , col 23 .
193 JCHR , L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (2 0 1 0 -1 2 , HL  
180, HC  1432 ) para 1.44 .
194 ibid para 1 .45 . S ee  also Joint Comm ittee  on Hum an  Rights, L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  
P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  ( S e c o n d  R e p o r t )  (2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 2 , HL  204 , HC  1571 ) para  
1.27.
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p lace  on a pe rm anen t bas is  such  a schem e  o f e x trao rd ina ry  e xecu tive  pow e rs .’195 T he  
G ove rnm en t neve rthe less  m a in ta ined  tha t renewa l e ve ry  five  yea rs  is app rop ria te , as, in line 
w ith  the  F ixed-te rm  P a rliam en ts  A c t 2011 , th is  w ill en su re  tha t ‘each  new  P arliam en t w ill 
have the  oppo rtun ity  to  deba te  ... [TP IM s ] in the  con tex t o f the  s itua tion  a t th e  tim e ’.196
A s ide  from  be ing  one  re spec t in w h ich  the  TP IM  A c t is ‘less lib e ra l’197 than  the  con tro l o rde r 
sys tem  it rep laces, the  absence  o f a  requ irem en t fo r  annua l pa rliam en ta ry  re v iew  and 
renewa l a lso  se rves  to  em phas ise  the  e x ten t to  w h ich  p re ven tive  coun te r-te rro rism  
m easu res  have becom e  no rm a lised  unde r UK  law .198 Indeed, the  Coa lition  G ove rnm en t has 
s ta ted  tha t it be lieves the  TP IM  reg im e  es tab lishes  a fram ew o rk  w h ich  ‘o u gh t to  be ab le  to  
opera te  on a  s tab le  bas is in de fin ite ly .’199 Howeve r, as  w as  the  case w ith  con tro l o rd e rs ,200 
annua l rev iews o f the  A ct w ill be ca rr ied  ou t by  the  Independen t R ev iew er o f T e rro rism  
L e g is la tio n 201 w h ils t s 19 p laces  a du ty  on the  H om e S ec re ta ry  to  m ake  qua rte rly  repo rts  to  
P arliam en t on the  exe rc ise  o f th e  TP IM  pow e rs ,202 thus  ensu ring  tha t the  re g im e ’s opera tion  
rem a ins  sub je c t to  som e  m easure  o f ex te rna l scru tiny .
IV. Enhanced Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation Measures
In con junc tio n  w ith  re comm end ing  tha t con tro l o rde rs  shou ld  be repea led  and  rep laced  by 
less in trus ive  m easures ,203 the  C o u n te r -T e r ro r ism  R e v ie w  conc luded  tha t 'excep tiona l
195 House of Lords Se lec t Comm ittee  on the  Constitution, T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  
M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (2 0 10 -12 , HL  198 ) para  13.
196 G o v e r n m e n t  r e s p o n s e  to  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  
P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  ( S e c o n d  R e p o r t )  (2 0 10 -2 0 12 , H L  204 , HC  1571 ), letter 
from  Jam es  Brokenshire to Dr Hywel Francis (14  N ovem ber 2 011 ) 9.
197 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  5 .9 . S e e  also Liberty, L ib e r t y ’s  S e c o n d  R e a d in g  B r ie f in g  
o n  th e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  ( 2 0 1 1 ) para  29.
198 S ee  Helen  Fenw ick, ‘Designing E TP IM s  Around E C H R  R ev iew  or Normalisation o f ‘P reven tiv e ’ 
Non-Tria l-B ased  Executive  M easu res? ’ (2 0 1 3 ) 7 6 (5 )  Modern  Law  R ev iew  876 , 903 .
199 Security M inister, Baroness  Nev ille-Jones , oral ev idence  before the JC H R , 8  Feb ruary  2011 :  
JCHR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  R e v ie w :  O r a l  E v id e n c e  (2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 2 , HC  797 -i) Q  50 . S e e  also H om e  O ffice, 
G o v e r n m e n t  R e p ly  to  th e  S ix t e e n th  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  S e s s io n  2 0 1 0 -  
1 2  H L  P a p e r  1 8 0 ,  H C  1 4 3 2 : L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  A n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  
B i l l  (Cm  8167 , 2 011 ) 12.
200 S ee  Prevention of Terrorism  Act 2 005 , ss 1 4 (2 )-(6 ).
201 TP IM A , s 20 . S ee  David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) and S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 7 2 ).
202 ibid s 19. T h e  Hom e Secre tary  w as subject to the sam e  duty in respect of control orders under s 
14 (1 ) of the PTA .
203 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 41 (para  23 ).
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c ircum stances ' m ay  a rise  in the  fu tu re  w he re  it cou ld  be necessary  fo r the  G ove rnm en t to  
seek  P a rliam en ta ry  app ro va l204 fo r  m o re  res tric tive  m easu res  205 In o rde r to  p rov ide  fo r  such 
an even tua lity , the  G ove rnm en t the re fo re  p repa red  and pub lished  the  D ra ft Enhanced  
T e rro rism  P reven tion  and In vestiga tion  M easures  B ill.206
The  D ra ft Bill m akes  p rov is ion  fo r  a  separa te , pa ra lle l sys tem  o f Enhanced  T e rro rism  
P reven tion  and Investiga tions  M easures  - ETP IM s - th a t w ou ld  run a longs ide  the  ex is ting  
TP IM  reg im e .207 If enacted , the  ETP IM  pow ers  w ou ld  rem a in  in fo rce  fo r one  yea r,208 bu t 
m ay be renewed fo r up to  a fu r th e r 12 m on ths  by o rde r.209 A s  the re  is ‘subs tan tia l o ve rla p ’210 
be tw een  TP IM s and ETP IM s, and ‘m uch  co rre la tio n ’211 be tw een  the  m anne r in w h ich  the  tw o  
sys tem s  opera te , to  avo id  repe tition , the  fo llow ing  d iscuss ion  w ill the re fo re  fo cus  on ly  on the  
subs tan tive  d iffe rences  be tween  the  tw o  schem es.
T he  firs t key  d is tinc tion  be tw een  TP IM s  and ETP IM s a re  tha t th e  la tte r cons titu te  ‘em e rgency  
m easu re s ’ w h ich  a re  des igned  to  be used in ‘e xcep tiona l c ircum s tan ces ’.212 W h ile  the  
C o u n te r -T e rro r ism  R e v ie w  con tem p la ted  these  m easures  be ing  used on ly  in th e  e ven t o f ‘a
204 The  enac tm en t of these  ‘exceptional em ergency  m easu res ’ would require the ag reem en t of both  
Houses  of Parliament. W hen  Parliam ent is in recess , however, ss 2 6 -2 7  of the  Terro rism  Prevention  
and Investigation M easu res  Act 2011 provide a  power for the Hom e Secre tary  to introduce by order  
( ‘a tem porary  enhanced  T P IM  order’) powers to impose E nhanced -TP IM  notices.
05 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 4 3  (para  28 ).
206 Hom e O ffice, D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l  (Cm  8166 ,  
2011 ), herea fter referred to as the ‘D ra ft Bill’. To  enab le  pre-legis lative  scrutiny, the  D r a f t  B il l ,  which  
consists of 12 clauses  and  2  schedu les, w as  published on 1 S ep tem ber 2 011 . For d iscussion of the  
issues relating to the use of draft em ergency  legislation, see  Joint Comm ittee  on the D ra ft Enhanced  
Terrorism  Prevention and  Investigation M easures  Bill, D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  
I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  R e p o r t  (2 0 12 -1 3 , HL  70 , H C  4 95 ) paras 2 7 -3 8 .
207 E TP IM s  and T P IM s  a re  separa te  entities, and an  individual cannot be subject to both types  of 
notice simultaneously. S ee  Draft Enhanced  Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, cl 
4 (1 ). S ee  also Explanatory  No tes to the Draft Enhanced  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation  
Measures  Bill, para 13.
208 Draft Enhanced Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, cl 9 (1 ). T h e  12 month  
period would run from  the day  on which the Act is passed.
09 ibid cl 9 (2 )(b )(ii) . Before making an order extend ing  the powers beyond the initial 12 months, the  
Hom e Secre tary is required to consult the Independen t R eview er, the Intelligence Serv ices  
Comm issioner, and the D irector G enera l of the Security  Services (cl 9 (3 )).
210 Hom e O ffice, D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  M e m o r a n d u m  
b y  t h e  H o m e  O f f ic e  to  t h e  J C H R  (2 011 ) para  6.
2 1 Joint Comm ittee on the Draft Enhanced  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, 
D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  R e p o r t  (2 0 12 -1 3 , HL  70 , HC  
495 ) para  10.
212 Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 6) 43 .
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ve ry  se rio us  te rro ris t r isk  th a t canno t be m anaged  by o th e r m eans ’,213 the  D ra ft Bill is 
u n fo rtuna te ly  s ilen t on the  c ircum s tances  tha t m ay p rom p t its in troduction . T he  lack o f c la rity  
on th is  c ruc ia l m a tte r w as c ritic ised  by the  Jo in t C omm ittee ,214 wh ich , a lth ough  accep ting  tha t 
it w ou ld  be ‘im poss ib le  to  de fine  a hard  and fa s t “tr ig ge r” ’,215 a sse rted  tha t the  G ove rnm en t 
shou ld  se t ou t in unam b iguous  te rm s  the  types  o f excep tiona l c ircum s tances  tha t w ou ld  lead 
to  th e  D ra ft Bill be ing  in troduced .216 In response , the  G ove rnm en t exp la ined  tha t, w h ils t it 
w as no t poss ib le  to  p rov ide  an e xhaus tive  summ ary , po ten tia l scenario s  cou ld  inc lude , ‘a 
s itua tion  w he re  the re  w as c red ib le  repo rting  po in ting  to  a se rie s  of concu rren t, imm inen t 
a ttack p lo ts ’,217 or, in the  w ake  o f a m a jo r te rro ris t inc iden t, w he re  the re  w as a p ro spec t o f 
fu r the r a ttacks .218 However, w h ile  such  c ircum stances  m ay  be v iew ed  as app rop ria te  
‘tr ig g e rs ’, as  W a lke r suggests , ra the r than  the  na tu re  o f the  th rea t, ‘w ha t rea lly  shou ld  be 
fo cused  upon is ... the  capab ility  o f th e  agenc ie s  dea ling  w ith  it and  w he the r th e y  a re  be ing  
o ve rw he lm ed .’219
C omm ensu ra te  w ith  th e ir m o re  onerous  cha rac te r, a  h ighe r s tanda rd  o f p roo f app lies  to  
ETP IM s than  regu la r TP IM s: th u s  the  H om e S ec re ta ry  m ust be sa tis fie d  ‘on the  ba lance  o f 
p robab ilitie s ’ th a t the  ind iv idua l is, o r has been, invo lved  in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity .220 T he  
on ly  o the r d iffe rence  in the  te s t fo r  im pos ing  an ‘enhanced  TP IM  no tice ’ is th a t som e  o r all o f 
the  m easures  im posed  m ust be ones  tha t cou ld  no t be inc luded  in a s tanda rd  TP IM
213 ibid 4 3  (para 27 ). S e e  also Exp lanatory Notes to the  Draft Enhanced  Terro rism  Prevention  and  
Investigation M easures  Bill, p a ra  6 .
214 Th e  Joint Comm ittee  on the Draft Enhanced Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill w as  
appo inted by the House  of Commons and the House  of Lords to exam ine  the D raft Bill. T h e  
Comm ittee  de livered its Report in N ovem ber 2012 .
215 Joint Comm ittee on the  Dra ft Enhanced  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill,
 
D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  R e p o r t  (2 0 1 2 -1 3 , H L  70 , HC  
495 ) para 23 .
216 ibid. S ee  also HC  D eb  5 S ep tem ber 2 011 , vol 5 32 , cols 1 05 -6  (Jam es Brokenshire).
217 H om e O ffice, G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  th e  R e p o r t  f r o m  th e  J o in t  C o m m it t e e  o n  th e  D r a f t  
E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  S e s s io n  2 0 1 2 - 1 3  H L  7 0 ,  H C  4 9 5  
(Cm  8356 , 2013 ) para 2.
18 ibid.
219 C live W alker, T h e  Reshap ing of Control O rders in the United K ingdom ’ (n 3 3 ) 155.
220 Draft Enhanced Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, cl 2 (1 ). C f Terrorism  
Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Act 2 011 , s 3 (1 ).
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no tice .221 ETP IM s a re  sub je c t to  the  sam e  tw o -yea r lim it as  TP IM s .222 However, as tim e  
spen t on a  TP IM  does no t coun t tow a rds  tha t se rved  on an E TP IM ,223 by  m eans o f 
consecu tive  no tices , m easu res  cou ld  po ten tia lly  be m a in ta ined  aga in s t an in d iv idua l fo r  up to  
fo u r yea rs .224
W h ile  sch  1 o f the  D ra ft Bill re p lica tes  m uch  o f sch  1 to  the  TP IM  Act, a num be r of the  
m easu res  tha t a re  ava ilab le  to  the  H om e S ecre ta ry  unde r ETP IM s a re  cons ide rab ly  m ore  
s tr in gen t than  those  tha t can be im posed  b y  regu la r TP IM s. In con tra s t to  TP IM s, unde r an 
ETP IM  no tice  an ind iv idua l can be requ ired  to  re loca te  to  ‘an y loca lity ’ in the  U K ,225 and can 
be con fined  to  th e ir res idence  be tw een  spec ified  hou rs  o f the  day, th is  pe riod  no t be ing  
lim ited  to  ‘o ve rn igh t’ .226 ETP IM s m ay a lso  in c lude  geog raph ica l b oundarie s  on  m ovem en t 
w h ich  p roh ib it an ind iv idua l from  leav ing  a de fin ed  a re a ;227 to ta l bans on the  possess ion  o r 
use o f e le c tron ic  comm un ica tio n  dev ice s ;228 and  a  requ irem en t no t to  a ssoc ia te  o r 
com m un ica te  w ith  any  pe rson  w ithou t the  Home S ec re ta ry ’s p rio r pe rm iss ion .229
A s is a cknow ledged  in the  H om e O ffice  M em orandum  to  the  JCHR , ‘th e re  a re  s im ila r itie s ’230 
be tween  ETP IM s and  non -de roga tin g  con tro l o rders. A lthough  the  D ra ft B ill e xh aus tive ly  lis ts  
the  types o f m easures  ava ilab le  unde r E TP IM s ,231 these  inc lude  som e  o f th e  ha rshest
221
Draft Enhanced Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, cl 2 (4 )(b ). In all o ther  
respects, cl 2  replicates s 3  of the Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Act 2 0 11 .
222 Draft Enhanced  Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easures  Bill, cl 3(1 )(a ).
223 ibid cl 4 .
224 ibid els 2 (2 ), (6 ). For fu rther discussion, see  He len  Fenw ick , ‘Designing E TP IM s  Around  EC HR  
Review  or Normalisation o f ‘P reven tive ’ Non -T ria l-B ased  Executive  M easu res? ’ (2 0 1 3 ) 7 6 (5 )  Modern  
Law  R ev iew  876 , 8 8 7 -8 88 .
225 Draft Enhanced  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, sch 1, para  1 (3 )(a ). C f 
Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easures  Act 2 011 , sch 1, paras (3 )-(5 ).
226 Draft Enhanced  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, sch 1, para  1 (2 )(c ). C f 
Terrorism  Prevention and Investigations M easu res  Act 2 0 11 , sch 1, para  1 (2 )(c ).
227 Draft Enhanced  Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easures  Bill, sch 1, para 4: ‘M ovem en t 
restrictions m easu re ’. C f Terro rism  Prevention and Investigations M easu res  Act 2 0 11 , s 1 (2 )(c ).
228 Draft Enhanced  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, sch 1, para  8: ‘E lectronic  
communication device  m easu re ’. C f Terrorism  Prevention and Investigations M easu res  Act 2 011 , sch  
1, para  7.
2 2 9
Draft Enhanced Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, sch 1, para 9: ‘Association  
measu re ’. C f Terrorism  Prevention and Investigations M easures  Act 2 0 11 , sch 1, para  8.
230 Hom e O ffice, D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  M e m o r a n d u m  
b y  t h e  H o m e  O f f ic e  to  t h e  J C H R  (2 011 ), para  15.
2 1 D raft Enhanced  Terro rism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, sch 1 .C f Preven tion of 
Terrorism  Act 2 005 , s 1 (4 ).
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cond itio n s  im posed  unde r non -de roga tin g  o rde rs, such  as fo rced  re loca tion  and  cu rfew s of 
up to  16 -hours .232 Further, g iven  the  s tr in gen cy  o f the  m easu res  inc luded  in sch  1, it appea rs  
un like ly  th a t ETP IM s w ill be any less in im ica l to  th e  p ro spects  o f p rosecu ting  suspec ts  than  
con tro l o rde rs w e re  cons ide red  to  be. N eve rthe less , ce rta in  im po rtan t d iffe rences , inc lud ing  
the  ra ised s tanda rd  o f p roo f and the  tw o -yea r tim e  lim it, m ean tha t ETP IM s a re  no t an 
ou tr igh t fa cs im ile  o f non-de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs .233
In 2013 , David A nde rson  repo rted  tha t the  po lice , G ove rnm en t and  agenc ie s  had e xp ressed  
to  him  tha t th e y  w ere , a t p resen t, ‘con ten t w ith  th e  powers  tha t th e y  have ’,234 and  tha t he had 
no t de tec ted  any en thus iasm  fo r  the  D ra ft B ill’s e n ac tm en t.235 W h ils t a  s ign ifican t esca la tion  
in the  te r ro ris t th rea t to  th e  UK  cou ld  e v iden tly  change  th ings , it m ay be hoped  tha t, like 
de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs  be fo re  them ,236 ETP IM s rem a in  ‘con tin gency  pow ers ’ th a t it n eve r 
p roves  necessa ry  to  invoke.
V. TP IMs: Usage to Date
As is c le a r from  the  fo rego ing  ana lys is , th e re  a re  m an ifes t s im ila ritie s  be tw een  the  reg im es 
crea ted  by  the  PTA  and TP IM A . D esp ite  th e se  pa ra lle ls , th e  ra ised  s tanda rd  o f p roo f, less 
ex tens ive  pow ers  re la ting  to  cu rfew s, th e  p rec lus ion  o f in vo lun ta ry  re loca tion , and  th e ir tw o - 
yea r m ax im um  du ra tion , m eans tha t, in ce rta in  respec ts  a t least, TP IM s  m ay ju s tifia b ly  be 
described  as ‘a d iffe ren t an im a l from  con tro l o rd e rs .’237
232 W hilst no maximum  curfew  length is specified in the Dra ft Bill, the  accompanying Explanatory  
Notes indicate that, in acco rdance  with the case  law  on control orders, it would be possible to impose  
a  curfew  of up to 16-hours under ETP IM s : Exp lana to ry  Notes to the Draft Enhanced  Terro rism  
Prevention and Investigation M easures  Bill, p ara  24 .
233 S ee  Joint Comm ittee  on the D raft Enhanced  Terrorism  Prevention and Investigation M easu res  Bill, 
D r a f t  E n h a n c e d  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  B i l l :  R e p o r t  (2 0 12 -1 3 , HL  70 , HC  
495 ) para 15. S ee , however, the contrary assessm en t of Liberty: Sophie Farth ing , ‘Anyone fo r T P IM s  
-  Control O rders W ith  a Tw is t? ’ (2 0 1 1 ) <www .liberty -hum an -righ ts .o rg .uk /new s /2011 /anyone-fo r-  
tp ims-con trol-orders -w ith -a-tw is t-.php> accessed  2 O ctober 2 013 .
2 4 David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para  3 .14 .
235 ibid.
236 S ee  chap ter 3  of this thesis.
237 David  Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 65 ) para  6 .31 .
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To  date, th e re  have  been a  to ta l o f ten  TP IM  sub jec ts , all bu t one  o f th e se  ind iv idua ls  hav ing  
been trans fe rred  d ire c tly  from  a con tro l o rde r in ea rly  2012 .238 Due to  the  s ta tu to rily  
m anda ted  exp iry  o f seven  no tices ,239 the  abscond ing  o f tw o  suspects ,240 BX241 and C C ,242 
and the  im p risonm en t o f DD fo r  b reach  o f h is TP IM  m easu res ,243 no TP IM  no tices  have  been  
in fo rce  s ince  10 Feb rua ry  2014 .244 T he  dearth  o f TP IM  no tices, com b ined  w ith  fa c t tha t 
the re  has a lready  been  tw o  w e ll-p ub lic ised  absconds , led the  JCHR  to  conc lude  in its 2014  
repo rt tha t, T P IM s  m ay  be w ithe ring  on the  v ine  as a coun te r-te rro rism  too l o f p rac tica l 
u tility .’245 In con tras t, w h ils t acknow ledg ing  tha t th e  absconds  e v iden tly  dem ons tra te  tha t 
T P IM s  canno t reduce  the  r isk  from  the ir sub jec ts  to  ze ro ’,246 David A nde rson  subm its  tha t 
the  spa ring  use o f TP IM s, a long  w ith  th e  cu rren t absence  o f e x tan t no tices, shou ld  be 
v iew ed  as ‘a m a tte r o f p ride  ra the r than  reg re t’ ,247 as th is  is, in part, a ttrib u tab le  to  th e  
e ffec tive  dep lo ym en t o f o ther, p re fe rab le , m easures , inc lud ing  p rosecu tion  and 
depo rta tio n .248 However, had these  p re fe rred  m eans  o f dea ling  w ith  te rro ris t suspec ts  
p roven  less success fu l, it is ve ry  poss ib le  th a t add itiona l TP IM  no tices  w ou ld  have  been  
issued. Indeed, M I5 a re  sa id  to  have  cons ide red  the  poss ib ility  o f im pos ing  TP IM  no tices  in 
seve ra l dozen  cases du ring  2012 -13 .249 Thus , desp ite  th e  system  hav ing  ‘reached  a
OQQ
David Anderson , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) 2. DD  was served  with a  T P IM  notice in O ctober 2 0 1 2  
(pa ra  3 .1 ).
9 ibid para 4 .2 0 . T h e  T P IM  notices imposed on C F , CD , BM , C E , AM , BF and A Y  all expired  
between 2 January  and 10 Feb ruary 2 0 1 4  due to reaching their tw o -yea r limit.
240 These , along with the seven  control o rder absconds, a re  d iscussed in C hap ter 6  of this thesis.
241 BX  (Ibrahim  M agag ) absconded  on 2 6  D ecem ber 2 0 12 . B X ’s T P IM  notice w as allowed  to lapse  in 
January  2 0 1 3  at the end of its first year. S ee  David  Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para 4 .16 .
242 CC  (M ohamm ed  M oham ed ) absconded on 1 N ovem ber 2 013 . C C ’s T P IM  notice w as  subsequen tly  
revoked in D ecem ber 2013 . S ee  David  Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para 4 .1 4 .
243 D D ’s T P IM  notice w as  revoked  a fter he w as  imprisoned following conviction for b reaches  o f his 
TP IM  notice. S ee  Dav id  Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) paras 3 .4 , 5 .5 . It is likely that D D ’ T P IM  
notice will be revived upon his re lease  prison in March/April of 2 014 .
244 David  Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) 3. S ee  also HC  D eb  2 7  M arch 2014 , vol 578 , cols 4 9 -5 0  
W S  (Theresa  May).
245 JC HR , P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  
(2 0 1 3 -1 4 , HL  113, HC  1014 ) para  80.
46 David  Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 72 ) para 4 .4 6 .
247 ibid para 4 .7 .
248 ibid para  6 .7 .
249 ibid para  4 .2 .
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pause ’,250 A nde rson  repo rts  th a t he has ‘d e tec ted  no s ign  e ith e r from  M in is te rs  o r from  
in te llig ence  agenc ie s  tha t the  fu tu re  use o f TP IM s  has been  w ritte n  o ff as  un like ly .’251
A lthough  it is p robab le  th a t th e y  w ill con tinue  to  be used spa ring ly , the  G ove rnm en t 
neve rthe less a sse rts  th a t TP IM s  cons titu te  an ‘im po rtan t to o l’ in the  a rm ou ry  o f powers  
ava ilab le  to  the  po lice  and  S ecu rity  Se rv ice s fo r p ro tec tin g  na tiona l se cu rity .252 W he the r, in 
ligh t o f th e  a va ilab le  e v idence  on the  ope ra tion  o f the  tw o  reg imes, it can leg itim a te ly  be sa id  
th a t con tro l o rde rs  w ere , and  TP IM s  are, an e ffec tive  m eans  o f p ro tec tin g  the  pub lic  from  a 
risk  o f te rro rism , w ill th e re fo re  be e xam ined  in th e  fo llow ing  conc lud ing  chap te r.
251 ibid para 6 .7 .
252 Hom e O ffice, T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  R e s p o n s e  to  t h e  T e n th  R e p o r t  o f  S e s s io n  2 0 1 3 - 1 4  f r o m  th e  J o in t  
C o m m it te e  o n  H u m a n  R ig h t s  H L  P a p e r  1 1 3  /  H C  1 0 1 4 : P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  




The  cen tra l a im  o f th is  the s is  w as  to  c ritica lly  exam ine  the  UK  gove rnm en t’s use o f a n ti ­
te rro rism  con tro l o rde rs  under th e  P reven tion  o f T e rro rism  A c t 2005, and to  assess  the  
e ffec tiveness and human righ ts  com pa tib ility  o f the  reg ime. W h ils t con tro l o rde rs  cons titu ted  
a ‘m ore  ra tiona l and  p ropo rtio na te ’1 re sponse  to  the  post-9 /11 te rro ris t th rea t th an  the  
p rev ious  ATCSA , Part 4  de ten tion  schem e ,2 they  w e re  none the less  cons ide red  by  m any  to  
be deep ly  flaw ed  and an a ffron t to  fu ndam en ta l hum an  rig h ts .3 W h ile  the  sys tem  in itia lly  
ope ra ted  a t th e  ou te r lim its  o f th e  righ ts  gua ran teed  by the  ECHR ,4 ce rta in  im po rtan t jud ic ia l 
d e c is ions  se rved  to  tem pe r a  num be r o f its w o rs t e xcesses .5 Though  the  reg im e  rem a ined  
unpopu la r th roughou t its life span ,6 con tro l o rde rs  d id possess th ree  key  advan tages: th e y  
‘had the  po ten tia l to  be ECHR -com p lia n t in a w ay  p re ven ta tive  de ten tion  did no t’ ;7 th e y  w e re  
‘cons ide rab ly  cheape r than  round -the -c lock  su rve illa n ce ’;8 and they  w e re  ‘capab le  o f 
p reven ting  te rro ris t a c tiv ity ’ .9
1 Helen  Fenw ick  and Gavin  Phillipson, ‘Covert Derogations  and Judicial Deference: Redefin ing L iberty  
and Due Process in Counterterrorism  Law  and Beyond ’ (2 0 1 1 ) 5 6 (4 ) McGill Law  Journal 863 , 877 . 
See  also Ed Bates, ‘Anti-Terrorism  Control O rders: L iberty and Security Still in the B a lance ’ (2 0 0 9 )  
2 9 (1 ) Legal S tud ies 9 9 ,1 1 9 .
2 A TCSA , ss 2 1 -23 .
3 S ee , for exam ple , Am nesty  International, F iv e  Y e a r s  O n :  T im e  to  E n d  th e  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  R e g im e  
(2010 ); Liberty, F r o m  ‘W a r ’ to  L a w :  L ib e r t y ’s  R e s p o n s e  to  t h e  C o a l i t io n  G o v e r n m e n t ’s  R e v ie w  o f  
C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  2 0 1 0  (2 0 1 0 ) 11; Keith Ewing, T h e  Futility of the Hum an  
Rights Act -  A  Long Foo tnote’ (2 0 0 5 ) 37  Bracton Law  Journal 4 1 , 4 7 .
4 S ee  Helen  Fenw ick, ‘Recalibrating E C HR  Rights, and the Ro le  o f the Human  Rights Act Post 9 /11 : 
Reasserting International Hum an  R ights Norm s in the  ‘W a r  on Te rro r’ (2 0 10 ) 6 3 (1 ) Current Legal 
Prob lems 153 , 161. S ee  also Susanne  Forster, ‘Control O rders: Borders to the Freedom  of M ovem en t  
or Moving the Borders of F reedom ? ’ in M arianne  W ad e  and A lm ir M aljev ic (eds ) A  W a r  o n  T e r r o r ?  
T h e  E u r o p e a n  S ta n c e  o n  a  N e w  T h re a t ,  C h a n g in g  L a w s  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h ts  Im p l ic a t io n s  (Springer  
2 009 ) 354 , 365 .
5 S ee  chap ter 4  of this thesis.
6 As was  repea ted ly  em phas ised  by Lord Carlile  in his annual reports, ‘nobody, least of all those who  
have to adm inister and en fo rce them , like[d] control orders. In every  case  alte rnatives  [were] sought if 
ava ilab le ’: F i f t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  t o  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 010 ) para  39 . S ee  also HL D eb  3  Feb  2 010 , vol 7 17 , col 194  (Lord W es t).
7 David  Anderson, C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  in  2 0 1 1 :  F in a l  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 012 ) para  2 .13 .
8 ibid. Constan t surveillance is said  to be exceptionally expensive , Lord Carlile  suggesting that 2 4 /7  
surveillance costs be tw een  £11 million and £18  million per sub ject per year: PBC  D eb  (Bill 193 ) 21 
June  2 011 , col 28  (Q  83 ).
9 ibid.
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I. Control Orders: Usage and Effectiveness
Desp ite  p red ic tions  tha t th e y  cou ld  po ten tia lly  a ffe c t ‘h und reds— thousands , w ho  know s ’,10 in 
p ractice , spa ring  use w as  m ade  of con tro l o rde rs, Lord  C arlile  con firm ing  tha t th e y  were  
righ tly  reserved  fo r  ‘ve ry  tro ub lin g  case s ’.11 Be tw een  M arch 2005  and D ecem be r 2011 , a 
to ta l o f 52  suspec ts  w e re  p laced  under non -de roga tin g  o rd e rs ,12 o f w h ich  24  w e re  B ritish  
c itizen s13 and 28  w ere  fo re ign  na tio na ls .14
Table 6.3 Control Orders by Nationality of Controlee15
Year British citizen Foreign
national
Total Number of 
Orders in Force  
at Year End16
2005 1 8 9
2006 7 9 16
2007 8 6 14
2008 4 11 15
2009 9 3 12
2010 8 0 8
2011 9 0 9
10 Conor Gearty , ‘Hum an  Rights in an Age  o f Counter-te rrorism ’ (2 0 05 ) 5 8 (1 ) Curren t Legal Problem s  
25 , 43 .
11 Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 0 11 ) para  43 .
12 David Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7) para  1.1. Profiles of 42  of the 4 5  men who w ere  m ade  sub ject to  
control orders be tw een  March 2 0 0 5  and D ecem ber 2 0 0 9  a re  provided in Robin S imcox, C o n t r o l  
O rd e r s :  S t r e n g th e n in g  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  (C en tre  for Social Cohesion  2010 ).
13 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para  3 .14 . S om e  o f those classified as  ‘British citizens ’ 
possessed dual citizenship.
14 ibid. W a lke r subm its that the total num ber of orders in force 'would have been  higher and  more  
oriented towards foreign fighters w ere  it not for an aggressive policy of deportations after July 2005 ':  
Clive W a lke r, T e r r o r is m  a n d  th e  L a w  (O U P  2 011 ) 325 .
15 The  information in T ab le  6 .3  is compiled from the H om e O ffice statem en ts  to Parliam ent on control 
order powers m ade  pursuant to s 14 (1 ) of the PTA . S ee  HC  D eb  12 D ecem ber 2005 , vol 4 4 0 , col 
131 W S ; HC  Deb  11 D ecem ber 2 006 , vol 4 54 , col 4 1W S ; HC  Deb  12 D ecem ber 2007 , vol 4 6 9 , col 
30W S ; HC  Deb  15 D ecem ber 2008 , vol 4 85 , col 8 3W S ; HC  Deb  15 D ecem ber 2009 , vol 5 02 , col 
109W S ; HC  Deb  16 D ecem ber 2 010 , vol 520 , col 124W S ; HC  Deb  19 D ecem ber 2 011 , vol 5 37 , col 
143W S .
16 In keeping with the reporting periods used in the H om e O ffice statem ents , the ‘Y ea r  E nd ’ figures in 
Tab le  6 .3  are  those which applied  on 10 D ecem ber of each  year.
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A lthough  the  num be r o f o rde rs  in fo rce  rem a ined  re la tive ly  low  th roughou t, as th e  fig u re s  in 
T ab le  6 .3  show , o ve r the  cou rse  o f the  reg im e ’s life tim e  the re  w as  a no tab le  sh ift in the  
gove rnm en t’s use o f con tro l o rde rs. W h ils t in itia lly  m ost o rde rs  w e re  im posed  on 
‘u ndepo rtab le ’ fo re ign  na tiona ls , from  2009  onw ards  they  w e re  inc reas ing ly  used aga ins t 
‘u n triab le ’ B ritish  su spe c ts .17 C onsequen tly , a t th e  tim e  o f the  reg im e ’s exp iry  in 2011 , all 
n ine con tro lees  w ere  B ritish  c it iz en s .18
Though  the  PTA  p rov ided  a 'fram ewo rk  to  dea l w ith  all fo rm s o f te r ro r ism ',19 each  o f th e  52  
men aga ins t w hom  con tro l o rde rs  w ere  m ade  w as  suspec ted  o f invo lvem en t in Is lam is t 
te rro rism .20 A cco rd ing  to  th e  repo rts  o f th e  Independen t R ev iewers , th e  m a jo rity  of 
con tro lees  w e re  've ry  h igh risk '21 suspects  w ho  w e re  though t to  be 'ha rdened  te rro ris ts , 
a c tive ly  invo lved  in ... p lo ts  in the  UK  o r  ab road , o r  in recru iting  fo r  te rro rism , te rro rism  
fac ilita tion  o r  te rro rism  tra in ing .'22 T he  p rinc ipa l a lle ga tio n  aga ins t m ost o the r con tro lees  w as 
tha t th e y  in tended  to  trave l o ve rseas  fo r  te rro ris t pu rposes, such as to  fig h t aga in s t coa lition  
fo rces23 o r undertake  te rro ris t tra in ing .24 In add ition , th e  in fo rm a tion  con ta ined  in th e  open  
cou rt ju d gm en ts  revea ls  th a t non -de roga tin g  o rde rs  w e re  used to  ‘con tro l’ a b road  spec trum  
of a lleged  ac tiv ities , inc lud ing  the  p lann ing  o f m ass -casua lty  a ttacks  in the  UK25 and
17 David Anderson, ‘Shielding the Compass: How  to Fight Terro rism  W ithout Defea ting the  Law ’ 
(2013 ) 3  EHR LR  233 , 239 .
8 T P IM  notices w ere  served upon all n ine of these  individuals in early  2 012 . S ee  David  Anderson , 
T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 2 :  F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  
o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  th e  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  (2 013 ) p a ra  4 .4 .
19 HC  Deb  22  Feb ruary 2005 , vol 4 3 1 , col 165  (Charles  C la rke).
20 S ee  David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para 1.1. According to David  Anderson, no control orders  
were  m ade against individuals suspec ted  of invo lvement in Northern Ire land -re la ted  terrorism  due  to 
'the difficulty of preventing absconding across the  Irish border, together with the  undesirab le  echoes  
of Exclusion O rders  that w ere  controversial in the nationalist community  betw een  the 1970s  and  the  
1990s ' ( F in a l  Report, para  4 .7 ).
21 Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  (n 11) para  60 .
22 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para  3 .1 8 . S ee  also Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 11) para  50 .
23 S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  M B  [2006 ] EW HC  1000  (Adm in).
24 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para  3 .18 . S ee  also Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 11) p a ra  50 .
25 AM  and AY, for exam ple , w ere  suspected of invo lvem ent in the 2 0 0 6  airline liquid bomb plot (the  
Overt plot): S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A M  [2009 ] EW HC  3 0 5 3  (Adm in); S e c r e t a r y  
o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  Y  [2010] EW HC  1860  (Adm in). S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  
t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  G G  a n d  N N  [2009] EW HC  142  (Adm in); C D  v  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  
H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  [2011 ] EW HC  1273  (Adm in).
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ab road ,26 the  p rov is ion  o f financ ia l, m a te ria l o r  log is tica l suppo rt fo r te rro rism -re la ted  
ac tiv ity ,27 and a ttendance  a t te rro ris t tra in ing  cam ps .28
As d iscussed  in chap te r 1, fo r  a va rie ty  o f reasons, a ccu ra te ly  assess ing  the  e ffec tiveness  of 
p reven tive  m easures  like  con tro l o rde rs  is an  excep tio na lly  d ifficu lt u n de rta k ing .29 
Neve rthe less , one  o f the  g rounds  on wh ich  con tro l o rde rs  w e re  frequen tly  dec ried  by the ir 
c ritics  w as tha t th e y  w ere  ‘in e ffe c tive ’30 and  d id little  to  enhance  na tiona l se cu rity .31 T he  m ost 
dam ag ing  p iece  o f e v idence  in re la tion  to  the  e ffica cy  o f con tro l o rde rs  as a m echan ism  fo r  
p ro tec ting  the  pub lic  from  a risk o f te rro rism  is the  fa c t tha t 7  o f th e  52  con tro lees  absconded  
from  the ir o rde rs .32 A s  w as  comm en ted  by Lord  C a rlile  a t the  tim e  o f the  d isappea rances , 
‘ab scond ing  by pe rsons  w ho  [w ere ] o r  p red ic tab ly  abou t to  be con tro lees  is an 
em barrassm en t to  th e  sy s tem .’33 It is, however, im po rtan t to  no te  th a t the  las t o f the se  
absconds occu rred  on 18 June  2007 .34 T he  absence  o f any  fu rthe r absconds  beyond  th is  
da te  appea rs  to  be p rim arily  a ttr ib u tab le  to  inc reased  v ig ila n ce  on the  pa rt o f the  au tho ritie s  
invo lved  in the  m on ito rin g  and en fo rcem en t o f con tro l o rde rs, and a lso  the  ‘tre nd  aw ay ’35 
from  the  use o f ligh t tou ch  o rde rs  w h ich  d id no t inc lude  cu rfew s  o r invo lve  fo rced  re loca tion . 
In his 2011 report, Lo rd  C a rlile  consequen tly  op ined  tha t, w h ils t con tro l o rde rs  w ere  by  no
26 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C C  a n d  C F  [2012 ] EW HC  28 3 7  (Adm in).
27 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A E  [2008 ] EW HC  585  (Adm in); S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  f o r  
t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  A H  [2008] EW HC  1018  (Adm in).
28 S e c r e ta r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v A L  [2007 ] EW HC  1970  (Adm in).
29 S ee  pp 11 -1 7  of this thesis.
30 S ee  JU S T IC E , H o m e  O f f ic e  R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  W r i t t e n  
S u b m is s io n s  o f  J U S T IC E  (2 010 ) 8; Liberty, F r o m  ‘W a r ’ to  L a w  (n 3 ) 11; H om e  O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  
C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  S u m m a r y  o f  R e s p o n s e s  to  t h e  C o n s u l t a t io n  (Cm  8005 , 
2011 ) 14.
31 For exam ple , in L iberty’s subm ission to the R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - t e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  it w as  
asserted  that ending control orders would ‘n o t ... have  any  impact on the security o f us all, particularly  
as the ev idence  demonstra tes that [they] do little to protect us in the first p lace ’: Liberty, F r o m  ‘W a r ’ to  
L a w ( n 3) 11.
32 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para  4 .1 9 . Th is  equates  to a  d isappearance  rate of 13% . Bestun  
Salim  (LL) absconded  in August 2006 ; Zeeshan  Siddiqui (AD ) in O ctober 2006 ; AK  in January  2007 ;  
Ibrahim  Adam  (AC ) and Lam ine Adam  (AB) in M ay  2007 ; and HH  in June 2 007 . C erie  Bullivant (AG ),  
who absconded  from  his control order on 22  M ay  2 007 , subsequently handed himself in to the  police  
on 25  June 2 007 . S ee  S imcox, C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  (n 12).
33 Lord Carlile , T h i r d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  t o  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 0 08 ) para  23.
34 HC  Deb  21 June  2 007 , vol 561 , col 111W S  (Tony McNulty).
35 David Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para  4 .1 6 . In addition, in February  2 0 0 9  new  police powers  of 
search  and en try  designed to aid the  monitoring and en fo rcem ent of control o rders w ere  inserted into 
the PTA  (ss 7A -7C ) by C TA  2 008 , s 78 .
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means  ‘fa ilsa fe  o r  fo o lp ro o f’ ,36 it w as  ‘no t a fa ir  c ritic ism  to  use those  absconds  o f som e 
yea rs  ago  as ev idence  aga in s t th e  [sys tem ’s] cu rren t v ia b ility ’ .37
It is c lear, as w as a cknow ledged  by bo th  the  Labou r38 and  C oa litio n39 gove rnm en ts , th a t 
from  a secu rity  pe rspective , con tro l o rde rs  w e re  an im pe rfec t too l tha t cou ld  no t en tire ly  
e lim ina te  th e  r isk  o f an in d iv id ua l’s in vo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  a c tiv ity .40 However, from  
the  in fo rm a tion  p rov ided  in the  Independen t R ev iew e rs ’ reports , and tha t w h ich  can be 
g leaned  from  the  vo lum inous body  o f case  law , it a ppea rs  tha t in m os t cases they  w e re  
la rge ly  e ffec tive  in e ith e r p reven ting  o r res tric ting  the  con tro lee ’s in vo lvem en t in such 
ac tiv ity .41 Indeed, in h is annua l repo rts  Lord  C a rlile  cons is ten tly  m a in ta ined  tha t con tro l 
o rde rs  rem a ined  ‘a necess ity  fo r  a sm a ll n um be r o f cases, in th e  absence  o f a v iab le  
a lte rna tive ’,42 and tha t th e  sys tem  rep resen ted  a ‘ju s tifia b le  and p ropo rtiona l sa fe ty  va lve  fo r 
the  p rope r p ro tec tion  o f c iv il so c ie ty ’ .43 S im ila rly , in h is ‘end o f te rm  repo rt’ on the  reg ime, 
David  A nde rson  conc luded  tha t th e re  w e re  ‘good  reasons  to  be lie ve ’ th a t con tro l o rde rs  ‘had 
fu lfilled  th e ir p rim a ry  func tion  o f d is rup tin g  te rro ris t a c tiv ity ’,44 and  tha t th e y  w e re  ‘an  e ffe c tive
36 Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  (n 11) para  89 .
37 ibid para  39 . In addition, in his 2 0 0 7  report Lord Carlile  subm itted that the d isappearance  o f ‘a small 
minority’ did not necessarily  underm ine ‘the benefits o f the orders in relation to the majority’: S e c o n d  
R e p o r t  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  t o  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  
2 0 0 5  (2007 ) para  59.
38 S ee  H om e O ffice, M e m o r a n d u m  to  t h e  H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m it t e e  P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  
P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (Cm  7797 , 2 0 10 ) para  55 . S ee  also HC  Deb  21 June  2 0 0 7 , vol 561 , 
col 1 12W S  (Tony  McNulty).
39 S ee  HM  Governm ent, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  R e v ie w  F in d in g s  a n d  
R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  (Cm  8004 , 2 011 ) 38 .
40 For exam ple , according to Lord C arlile ’s 2 0 1 0  report, two contro lees continued to associate with  
extrem ist groups despite being subject to non-derogating  orders: Lord Carlile , F i f t h  R e p o r t  (n 6 ) para  
44 . S ee  also S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r tm e n t  v  C D  [2012 ] EW HC  3026  (Adm in ), in which  
Ouseley  J stated, ‘I believe , and firm ly so, that CD  has been involved in te rrorism -rela ted activity, 
although to a marked ly  reduced ex tent since the imposition of the Control O rder and T P IM ’ [13].
41 As Dav id  Anderson notes, the proposition that m easures  like control orders and T P IM s  prevent  
terrorism -related  activity must, however, be approached  with caution, as it asserts  that ‘but for the  
[control order] or T P IM  notice, the subject would pose  a th reat’: David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) 
para 11 .6 .
42 Lord Carlile , T h i r d  R e p o r t  (n 33 ) para  27 . S ee  also S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 37 ) para  7; F o u r t h  R e p o r t  o f  
th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 009 )  
para  37; F i f t h  R e p o r t  (n 6) para 96; S ix t h  R e p o r t  (n 11) para 90 .
43 Lord Carlile , F i r s t  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  P u r s u a n t  to  S e c t io n  1 4 (3 )  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  
o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2 0 0 5  (2 006 ) para 61; S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 37 ) para  59; T h i r d  R e p o r t  (n 3 3 ) para  76; 
F o u r th  R e p o r t  (n 41 ) para  78; F i f t h  R e p o r t  (n 6 ) para  85; S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 11) 1.
44 David Anderson , F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7) 6. According to Anderson, ev idence  con tained in the  closed  
material indicated that control orders had prevented  suspected terrorists from  ‘travelling ove rseas ,
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means of p ro tec ting  the  pub lic  from  a sm a ll n um be r o f suspec ted  te rro ris ts  w ho  p resen ted  a 
subs tan tia l r isk  to  na tiona l se cu rity ’ ,45 bu t w hom  it w as no t fea s ib le  to  p rosecu te  o r deport. In 
con tras t, due to  th e  na tu re  and s tr in gency  o f th e  ‘o b lig a tio n s ’ th e y  im posed , non -de roga tin g  
o rde rs  d id no t p rove  use fu l as  a  too l fo r ga the ring  ev idence  aga ins t con tro lees ,46 no r w e re  
they  e ffec tive  as an a id to  th e  inves tiga tio n  and p ro secu tion  o f te rro rism -re la ted  c rim es .47
In assess ing  the  ove ra ll e ffe c tiveness  o f con tro l o rde rs  in p ro tec ting  the  pub lic  from  a r isk  of 
te rro rism , it is a lso  necessa ry  to  ta ke  in to  a ccoun t any  coun te rp roduc tive  im pacts  th e y  m ay 
have had. It is we ll d o cum en ted  tha t coun te r-te rro rism  m easures , pa rticu la rly  th o se  w h ich  
in trude  upon ind iv idua l righ ts , have the  capac ity  to  m a rg ina lize  and a lie na te  the  ind iv idua ls  
and  comm un ities  aga ins t w hom  they  a re  ta rge ted .48 A s  Z edne r obse rves, th e re  is a dange r 
th a t coun te r-te rro rism  po lic ies  m ay 'spawn coun te rva iling  r isks '49 by  unde rm in ing  soc ia l 
cohes ion , dam ag ing  comm un ity  re la tions, and  fo s te rin g  d is tru s t o f th e  po lice , the  secu rity  
se rv ice s and the  gove rnm en t. M easu res  des igned  to  enhance  secu rity  m ay  thus  se rve  to  
engende r fee lin gs  o f re sen tm en t and  hostility  in th o se  ta rge ted , th e reby  in c reas ing  the ir 
vu lne rab ility  to  re lig ious  o r po litica l rad ica lisa tio n  and rende ring  them  m ore  suscep tib le  to  
te rro ris t re c ru itm en t.50 W h ile  it w as  sugges ted  by som e  tha t con tro l o rde rs  had undoub ted ly  
con tribu ted  to  th e  po ten tia lly  rad ica lis ing  'fo lk lo re  o f in ju s tice '51 and m ay have  ac ted  as a
maintaining contact with sen io r A l-Q a ida  personnel, providing funds, facilitating the  travel and  train ing  
of others and engaging in terrorist-related activity within the United K ingdom ’ (ibid para  6 .8 ).
45 ibid 6.
46 ibid.
47 ibid para  3 .5 2 . S ee  chap te r 3 of this thesis.
48 S ee , for exam ple , Paddy  Hillyard, S u s p e c t  C o m m u n i t y :  P e o p le ’s  E x p e r ie n c e  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  
T e r r o r is m  A c t s  in  B r i t a in  (P luto  Press 1993); M ark  M cGovern and Angela  Tobin, C o u n t e r in g  T e r r o r is m  
o r  C o u n t e r - P r o d u c t iv e ?  C o m p a r in g  I r is h  a n d  B r i t is h  M u s l im  E x p e r ie n c e s  o f  C o u n t e r - in s u r g e n c y  L a w  
a n d  P r a c t ic e  (Edge  Hill University 2010 ); Christina Pan tazis  and S imon Pemberton, T rad in g  L iberties  
for G rea te r Security?: Th e  Impact on M inority Communities ’ (2 0 0 8 ) 73  Crim inal Justice M atters  12; 
Christina Pan tazis  and S imon Pem berton, ‘From  the ‘O ld ’ to the ‘N ew ’ Suspect Community: 
Exam ining the Impacts of Recen t UK  Counter-Terroris t Leg islation’ (2 0 0 9 ) 4 9  British Journal of  
Crim inology 646 .
49 Lucia Zedner, Terro rism  and Counterterrorism : W ha t is at R isk? ’ in Layla Skinns, M ichae l Sco tt and  
Tony Cox (eds), R is k  (C am bridge University Press, C am bridge  2 0 1 1 ) 118.
50 ibid 109 -121 .
51 Gare th  Peirce , oral ev idence  to the JCHR : JC HR , C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  P o l ic y  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h t s  
( S ix te e n th  R e p o r t ) :  A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 1 0  (2 0 09 -1 0 , HL 64 , H C  3 95 ) Ev
2 .
192
'rec ru iting  se rgean t fo r te rro rism ',52 the re  is a lack o f e v idence  to  support the se  c la im s .53 
A cco rd ing  to  David A nde rson , a lth ough  it w as  conce ivab le  th a t th e y  m igh t have p rom o ted  'a 
degree  o f d isenchan tm en t in th e  w ide r M uslim  com m un ity ',54 such  lim ited  e v idence  as is 
ava ilab le  ind ica tes  tha t con tro l o rde rs, and  the ir rep lacem en t, TP IM s , 'have  no t becom e  a 
m a jo r sou rce  o f g rie vance  am ong  M us lim  peop le  ge ne ra lly .'55
II. The Move from  Control Orders to  TPIMs
The  C oa lition  gove rnm en t’s dec is ion  to  rep lace  con tro l o rde rs  w ith  TP IM s  w as  e ssen tia lly  a 
po litica l one, ‘taken  on civ il libe rties  ra the r than  na tiona l secu rity  g roun ds .’56 To  da te , TP IM s, 
like  con tro l o rde rs  be fo re  them , a re  a ssessed  to  have  been  gene ra lly  e ffec tive  in p reven ting  
o r res tric ting  invo lvem en t in te r ro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity ,57 bu t equa lly  unp roduc tive  in te rm s  o f 
enab ling  the  ga the ring  o f e v idence  aga in s t suspec ts  o r fa c ilita tin g  p ro secu tion .58 By lim iting  
the  use o f cu rfew s,59 in troduc ing  a  tw o -yea r m ax im um  du ra tio n ,60 and end ing  the  p rac tice  o f 
re loca tion , th e  TP IM  reg im e  is, however, cons ide red  to  p rov ide  ‘less ex tens ive  p ro te c t io n ’61 
than  the  con tro l o rde rs  sys tem  did.
52 Liberty, F r o m  ‘W a r ’ t o  L a w  (n 3 ) 18. S ee  also  V icto r Tad ros, 'Controlling Risk' in Andrew  Ashworth, 
Lucia Z edne r and Patrick Tom lin  (eds), P r e v e n t io n  a n d  th e  L im i t s  o f  th e  C r im in a l  L a w  (O U P , 2 0 13 )  
140.
53 S ee  Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 38 ) 39 .
54 David  Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para  6 .20 .
55 David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) para  11 .17 . Fo r exam ple , in a  'm ethodologically w eak ' 2 0 0 7  
study by Muslim  Vo ice  UK , only 10 .3%  of Muslims surveyed  believed  that control orders should be  
abolished. However, 7 1%  thought that con tro lees should be 'put on trial to see  if they  w ere  innocent 
or guilty': H om e O ffice, W h a t  P e r c e p t io n s  D o  th e  U K  P u b l ic  H a v e  C o n c e r n in g  th e  Im p a c t  o f  C o u n t e r ­
t e r r o r is m  L e g is la t io n  S in c e  2 0 0 0 ?  (H om e  O ffice O ccasional P aper 88 , 2 010 ) 22 . As a  source of 
grievance, control orders w ere  said to be 'far outranked' by TA  2000 , s 4 4  stop and search  powers: 
David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7) para  6 .2 1 .
56 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para 6 .3 6 . As Anderson  noted in his F i r s t  R e p o r t  on T P IM A , the  
rep lacem ent of control orders by TP IM s  ‘was  not prompted by any  court judgm en t, e ither from  the  
United K ingdom or from  Strasbourg ’: F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) paras 11 .1 . S ee  chap ter 5  of this thesis.
57 S ee  David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) 6, paras  8 .1 6 , 11 .5 -11 .8 ; T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  
In v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  in  2 0 1 3 :  S e c o n d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v ie w e r  o n  th e  O p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  
T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  2 0 1 1  (2 014 ) 3 , paras 6 .3 -6 .4 .
58 S ee  David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) 6, paras  8 .1 6 , 1 1 .9 -11 .1 0 ; S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 57 ) 3, paras  
6 .3 . S ee  also JC HR , P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y :  T e r r o r is m  P r e v e n t io n  a n d  I n v e s t ig a t io n  M e a s u r e s  A c t  
2 0 1 1  (2 0 13 -14 , HL 113, HC  1014 ) 3, para  35 .
59 T P IM A , sch 1, para 1.
60 ibid s 5 (2 ).
61 David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) para  11 .54 . S e e  also HC  Deb  2 8  January  2013 , vol 5 5 6 , col 
162  (Yvette  Cooper); HC  Deb  6  N ovem ber 2 013 , vol 5 70 , col 2 4 6  (P a t M cFadden ).
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W hils t one o f the  con tro l o rd e r reg im e ’s m ost con trove rs ia l fe a tu re s ,62 the  pow e r to  re loca te  
suspec ts  d id bring ‘s ign ifican t ad van ta ge s ’63 from  a na tiona l secu rity  pe rspective . Indeed, it 
is th ough t th a t the  end ing  o f re loca tion  m ay  have  m ade  it e a s ie r fo r su spec ts  to  abscond , the  
JCHR  no ting  tha t ‘th e  r isk  o f a bscond ing  is h ighe r w hen  a TP IM  sub je c t rem a ins  in the  m ids t 
o f th e ir loca l com m un ity  and ne tw o rk ’ .64 Fo llow ing  the  d isappearances  o f Ibrah im  Magag 
(BX )65 and M ohamm ed  M oham ed  (CC ),66 in h is 2014  report, David A nde rson  s ta ted  tha t he 
be lieved  the  tim e  had com e  to  ‘re v is it the  issue  o f loca tiona l re s tra in ts .’67 W h ile  no t 
advocating  a ‘s im p le  re sto ra tion  o f re lo ca tio n ’68 as it w as p rac tised  unde r the  PTA, A nde rson  
sugges ted  tha t re -in te rp re ting  o r e xpand ing  the  use o f the  ex is ting  e xc lu s ion  m easu re ,69 o r
62 See  JCHR , A n n u a l  R e n e w a l  o f  C o n t r o l  O r d e r s  L e g is la t io n  2 0 1 0  (n 51 ) paras  41 , 45 -46 ; Lord  
Macdonald , R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s :  A  R e p o r t  b y  L o r d  M a c d o n a ld  o f  R iv e r  
G la v e n  Q C  (Cm  8003 , 2 0 11 ) 12; Liberty, F r o m  ‘W a r ’ t o  L a w  (n 3) 12.
63 David  Anderson , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 57 ) para  6 .2 0 . Anderson  subm its that relocation, by taking  
suspects out o f circulation, ‘assisted in the disruption o f networks ’, and is ‘likely also to have  p layed a 
significant part in stemm ing the flow  of absconds’ under control orders (para 20 ).
64 JCHR , P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  S c r u t in y  (n 58 ) 4. S ee  also David  Anderson , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 57 ) para  
4 .48 .
65 M agag  absconded  on 2 6  D ecem ber 2 012 . A fter removing his G PS  tag with scissors, he escaped  by  
getting into a London taxi. S ee  Jam ie  G rierson, T e r ro r  Suspect Ibrahim  M agag  'jum ped into cab' to  
Escape, C laim s Yvette  Cooper’ (8  January  2 0 1 3 ) T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  <www .independen t.co .uk  
/n ew s /uk /c rim e /terro r-suspect-ib rah im -m agag-jum ped-in to -cab -to -escape-c la im s-yvette -cooper-84431
65 .h tm l>  accessed  5  O ctober 2 014 .
66 M oham ed  absconded  on 1 N ovem ber 2 0 13 . It w as  w idely reported in the press that he en te red  An  
Moor m osque in Acton, removed  his G SP  tag, and then left disguised as a  wom an  w earing a  burqa. 
See  A lan Trav is  and Benn Quinn, ‘M issing Terro r Suspect: T he resa  M ay  to M ake  Urgen t S ta tem en t’ 
(4  N ovem ber 2 013 ) T h e  G u a r d ia n  < www .theguard ian .com /uk -new s /2013 /nov /04 /m iss ing -te rro r-  
suspect-theresa -m ay-s ta tem en t> accessed  5  O ctober 2 014 .
67 David Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 57 ) para 6 .2 3 . In its 2 0 1 4  report on coun ter-terro rism , the  
House of Commons Hom e A ffairs Comm ittee  stated that, ‘it is deep ly  worrying that anyone w ho  is 
subject to a TP IM , or those who w ere  subject to control orders, can abscond with such e a s e ’. The  
Comm ittee  consequently recommended  that the type of m easures  imposed on subjects under T P IM  
notices should be rev iewed ‘to ensu re  that enough is being done to preven t abscons ion ’: C o u n t e r ­
t e r r o r is m  (H C  2 0 13 -1 4 , 231 ) para  109.
68 David  Anderson , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 57 ) para 6 .2 4
69 TP IM A , sch 1, para  3. It was suggested that this pow er could be  used to require a  T P IM  sub ject to  
obtain Hom e O ffice  perm ission before entering a  particular town or London Borough, or to im pose  a  
‘doughnut-shaped  exclusion zone  encircling the a rea  of the subjec t’s res idence ’: David  Anderson , 
S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 57 ) para 6 .2 5 .
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in troduc ing  a  new  pow e r to  e ffec t in vo lun ta ry  re lo ca tio n ,70 cou ld  he lp to  reduce  the  r isk  of 
fu tu re  absconds, low er th e  su rve illa nce  budge t, and a lso  rebu ild  con fidence  in TP IM s .71
David A nde rso n ’s asse rtion  tha t ‘to  rem a in  fu lly  c red ib le ’72 TP IM s  m ust be s treng thened  has 
been im p lic itly  o r e xp lic itly  endo rsed  by a range  o f pa rties , inc lud ing  Lord C a rlile ,73 the  C h ie f 
C onstab le  o f the  M e tropo litan  Police, S ir B erna rd  H ogan -H owe ,74 and  va rio u s  
C onse rva tive75 and  Labou r76 po litic ians . In a s ta tem en t to  th e  House o f C omm ons  on 1 
S ep tem be r 2014 , David C am e ron  announced  tha t it w as the  G ove rnm en t’s  in ten tion  to  
in troduce ‘new  pow ers ’ to  add to  th o se  cu rren tly  a va ilab le  unde r TP IM s, inc lud ing  the  pow e r 
to  im pose  ‘s tro nge r loca tiona l cons tra in ts  on suspects  ... e ith e r th rough  [the ] enhanced  use 
o f exc lus ion  zones  o r  th rough  re lo ca tio n ’ .77 T h is  p ledge  to  ‘s treng then ’ TP IM s  w as  
subsequen tly  re ite ra ted  by  T he re sa  M ay a t the  C onse rva tive  P arty  C on fe rence  in O ctobe r,
70 Anderson proposed that, as  under the PTA , the subject, and potentially his fam ily, could  be  m oved  
to a town ‘som e hours’ d istant from  his associa tes’, but that he could be gran ted considerably more  
freedom  to travel w ithout perm ission, for exam p le , within an entire county, rather than  a  lim ited a rea  
of a  city or town (as  w as the  case  under control orders): David  Anderson , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 5 7 ) para  
6 .25 . S ee  also 5 7  (R ecomm endation  4 ).
71 ibid para 6 .2 3 . In addition to the  recommendations m ade  in respect of locational restraints, 
Anderson also adv ised that when  the occasion next arises to am end  TP IM A , ‘thought m ight usefully  
be given to cutting ... down ’ the very broad definition of invo lvem ent in terrorism -rela ted activity under  
s 4  of the Act: paras 6 .1 2 -6 .1 5 , 5 7  (R ecomm endation  2 ).
72 ibid 4.
73 Following the news o f the US  journalist Jam es  Fo ley’s behead ing  by IS IS , Lord Carlile  stated  that  
the G overnm en t could m ake  a legislative response  to the growing terro r th rea t ‘by reintroducing  
control orders -  or beefed -up  T P IM s ’, going on to state that the forced relocation of suspects w as  
‘very effec tive ’: M atthew  Ho lehouse , ‘Isil: Call to Bring Back Blair's Control O rders  for Te rro r S uspec ts ’ 
(22  August 2 0 1 4 ) T h e  T e le g r a p h  <www .te leg raph .co .u k /new s /w o rldnew s /m idd leeas t/iraq /11050330 / 
ls il-ca ll-to -bring-back-B lairs-Contro l-O rders-fo r-terror-suspects.htm l> accessed  7  O ctober 2 0 14 .
74 In an interview  with LBC, H ogan -How e  stated that “something like” control orders should be re ­
introduced to address the increased th reat from  ‘homegrown jihad is ’: Josh Halliday, ‘M e t C h ie f Calls  
for N ew  Anti-terror Powers  and Backs  'Presumption of Guilt" (27  August 2 014 ) T h e  G u a r d ia n  
<www .theguard ian .com /uk-new s/2014 /aug /27 /po lice -ch ie f-says-uk-jihad is -shou ld -be-s tripped -o f-  
passports> accessed  7  O ctober 2 014 .
5 For exam ple , Lord Howard  (S teven  Swinford, ‘Lord Howard: Bring Back Control O rders to M ake  
Britain S a fe r ’ (2 2  August 2 0 14 ) T h e  T e le g r a p h  <www .te leg raph .co .uk /new s /w orldnew s/m idd leeast/ 
iraq /11051460/Lord -Howard -B ring -back-con tro l-o rders -to -m ake-B rita in -safer.h tm l> accessed  7  
October 2 0 1 4 ) and Boris Johnson ( ‘Do  Nothing, and W e  Invite the T id e  of Terro r to  O u r Front Door’ 
(24  August 2 0 1 4 ) T h e  T e le g r a p h  <www .te leg raph .co .u k /n ew s /uknew s /d e fence /11054093 /D o -no th ing -  
and-w e-invite -the-tide-of-terro r-to -our-fron t-door.h tm l> accessed  7  O ctober 2014 ).
76 For exam p le , Ed M iliband (HC  Deb  1 S ep tem ber 2 0 14 , vol 5 85 , col 28 ), Y vette  C ooper (H C  D eb  10  
Sep tem ber 2014 , vol 585 , col 1009 ), and Pat M cFadden , who ‘w e lcom ed ’ the ‘at least partial U -tu rn ’ 
on relocation (H C  Deb  1 Sep tem ber 2014 , vol 585 , col 41 ).
77 HC  Deb  1 S ep tem ber 2014 , vol 585 , col 26 .
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th e  Home S ec re ta ry  con firm ing  tha t a  new  C oun te r-T e rro rism  Bill w ill be in troduced  in the  
near fu tu re  to  fu r th e r ‘to ughen  up ’ the  U K ’s secu rity  pow e rs .78
W h ils t it is accep ted  tha t m od ify ing  the  e x ten t o r  use o f th e  ex is ting  exc lus ion  m easure  unde r 
sch  1 ,79 o r am end ing  TP IM A  so tha t re loca tion  requ irem en ts  can be im posed  on suspec ts , 
cou ld  im prove  the  p re ven tive  e ff ica cy  o f TP IM  no tices , the  use o f such m easures  shou ld  no t 
becom e a m a tte r o f ro u tine .80 Due to  th e ir in trus ive  na tu re , it is subm itte d  tha t s tr in gen t 
loca tiona l cons tra in ts  shou ld  be im posed  on suspec ts  on ly  w he re  the  na tu re  o f the  th rea t 
th e y  a re  pe rce ived  to  pose  rende rs  it ne cessa ry  and  p ropo rtiona te  to  do  so .81
III. The Continuing Primacy of Prosecution and Ongoing Need for Executive  
Counter-Terrorism  Measures
In respond ing  to  the  th rea t o f te rro rism , as Lady Jus tice  A rden , w riting  e x tra -cu ria lly , 
observes , ‘us ing  the  c rim ina l p rocess is the  bes t w ay  o f ensu rin g  tha t righ ts  and  freedom s  
are  no t w h ittled  aw ay .’82 D esp ite  recou rse  to  e xecu tive  m easures  - m ost no tab ly  de ten tion  
w ithou t tria l, con tro l o rde rs , and  TP IM s83 - in a  m ino rity  o f cases, s ta tis tic s  dem ons tra te  th a t 
s ince  9/11 the  p rosecu tion  o f suspec ted  te rro ris ts  has rem a ined  the  UK  go ve rnm en t’s 
p rinc ipa l m eans o f dea ling  w ith  tho se  w ho  engage  in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity .84 A cco rd ing  to  
Home O ffice  da ta , be tw een  11 S ep tem be r 2001 and 14 M arch 2014, 637  peop le  have  been
78
The resa  May, ‘Speech  to Conservative Party  Conference  2 0 1 4 ’ (30  S ep tem ber 2 0 1 4 )  
< h ttp ://p ress .conserva tives .com /post/98799073410 /theresa -m ay-speech -to -conserva tive -party -  
con fe rence> accessed  1 O ctober 2 014 .
79 T P IM A , sch 1, para 3.
80 S ee  David  Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 57 ) para 6 .2 6 .
81 S ee  chap ter 4  (pp 121 -1 30 ).
82 Lady Justice M ary  Arden , ‘Meeting  the Cha llenge  o f Terrorism : The  Experience of the English and  
O ther Courts ’ (2 0 06 ) 80  Australian Law  Journal 818 , 836 .
83 In the counter-terrorism  context, other executive  m easures  used to avert threats to national security  
include: proscription under TA  2000 , Pt II; asset freez ing under the Terrorist A sse t-F reez ing  e tc  Act 
2010 , Pt I; the use of entry, immigration and nationality controls to deport, exc lude, or dep rive  
suspects of British citizenship; and  the use of the Royal Prerogative to refuse or w ithdraw  passports.
84 For further d iscussion, see  chap ter 2  of this thesis.
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cha rged  w ith  te rro rism -re la ted  o ffences , 405  o f w hom  have been  con v ic ted .85 In con trast, 
d u ring  th is  tim e fram e , s ix teen  fo re ign  te rro r suspec ts  w e re  de ta ined  fo r  va ry ing  pe riods  
unde r th e  A TC SA ’s P art 4  pow e rs ,86 and  a  to ta l o f 53  ind iv idua ls  have  been m ade  sub je c t to  
con tro l o rde rs and /o r TP IM s .87
O ve r th e  cou rse  o f the  las t th irteen  yea rs , it has fre quen tly  been  asse rted  by o rgan isa tion s  
such  as JU ST IC E 88 and L ibe rty89 tha t rem ov ing  the  s ta tu to ry  ba r90 on the  adm iss ib ility  o f 
in te rcep t m a te ria l as  ev idence  in c rim ina l p roceed ings  w ou ld  fac ilita te  the  p rosecu tion  of 
m ore  te rro ris t suspec ts  and  the re fo re  obv ia te  the  need  fo r  m easures  like con tro l o rde rs  and  
TP IM s. A lthough  Labou r91 and  the  C oa litio n92 have  s ta ted  tha t th e y  a re  comm itted  to  fin d ing  
a w ay  to  a llow  in te rcep t e v idence  to  be used in c rim ina l tria ls , both neverthe less  m a in ta ined  
tha t do ing  so w ou ld  no t rem ove the  need  fo r execu tive  coun te r-te rro rism  m easu res .93 T h is  
v iew  echoes  tha t o f the  C h ilco t R ev iew ,94 and  a lso  concu rs  w ith  the  conc lu s ions  reached  by 
bo th  Lord  C a rlile95 and David A nde rson .96 Thus , w h ils t a  re laxa tion  o f th e  ban m ay  p roduce  a
85 Hom e O ffice, ‘Operation o f Police Powers  under the Terro rism  Act 2 0 0 0  and Subsequen t 
Legislation: A rrests, Ou tcom es and Stops and S earches ’ (2 0 1 4 ) para 2 .6  <www .gov .uk /governm en t/  
pub lica tions /operation -o f-po lice-powers-under-the-terro rism -act-2000 -financial-year-end ing -m arch - 
2014 /opera tion-o f-po lice -powers -under-the-te rro rism -act-2000-and -subsequent-leg is la tion -arres ts -  
outcom es-and -s tops -and -searches-g reat-b rita in -financ ia l> accessed  10 O ctober 2 0 14 . O f this 4 05 ,  
220  w ere  convicted for offences  under terrorism  legislation and 185  w ere  convicted for non-terrorism  
legislation offences. S ee  also para 2 .7 .
86 HC  Deb  18 Novem ber 2 003 , vol 4 13 , col 2 7W S  (David  B lunkett). Those  deta ined  under A TCSA , 
Part 4  w ere  held for periods of betw een  3  days and 38  months. Following their re lease , n ine of these  
individuals w ere  m ade  sub ject to non-derogating control orders in M arch  2 005 .
87 As detailed above, non-derogating  control orders w ere  m ade against 52  suspects betw een  March  
2005  and D ecem ber 2 011 . T h e  nine individuals under control orders at the expiry of the regim e w ere  
subsequently m ade subject to T P IM  notices in early  2 0 12 , the tenth T P IM  notice being issued in 
October 2 012 . B etween  D ecem ber 2001 and March 2014 , the detention without trial, control order, 
and T P IM  powers have therefore  collectively been  used aga inst 4 4  d i f f e r e n t  suspects.
88 S ee  JU S T IC E , I n t e r c e p t  E v id e n c e :  L i f t in g  t h e  B a n  (2006 ) para 89 -97 ; JU S T IC E  (n 30 ) para  14.
89 Liberty, F r o m  ‘W a r ' t o  L a w  (n 3) 7, 2 7 -28 .
90 R IPA  2000 , s 17.
91 Hom e O ffice, I n t e r c e p t  a s  E v id e n c e :  A  R e p o r t  (Cm  7760 , 2 009 ) para  25 .
92 HM  Governm en t, T h e  C o a l i t io n :  O u r  P r o g r a m m e  f o r  G o v e r n m e n t  (2 010 ) 24 .
93 Hom e O ffice, P o s t - L e g is la t iv e  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  P r e v e n t io n  o f  T e r r o r is m  A c t  2005  (n 38 ) p a ra  48;  
Hom e O ffice, R e v ie w  o f  C o u n te r - T e r r o r is m  a n d  S e c u r i t y  P o w e r s  (n 3 9 ) 3 7 -38 .
94 Privy Council (Chilcot) Review , I n t e r c e p t  a s  E v id e n c e :  R e p o r t  (Cm  7324 , 2 0 08 ). T h e  Privy  
Counsellors reported that they ‘had not seen  any  evidence  that the introduction of intercept as  
ev idence  would [have] enab le[d] prosecutions’ in any  o f the cases  being dealt with through control 
orders at the tim e of the review  (para  59 ). S ee  also paras 58 , 210 .
95 In his 2011  report on the PTA , for exam ple , Lord Carlile  averred that it w as  ‘unrealistic  in the  
ex trem e, and unhelpfully m isleading to suggest that ... the adm ission of intercept ev id ence  would
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modes t inc rease  in te rro ris t p ro secu tio n s ,97 pe rm itting  the  ev iden tia l use o f in te rcep t w ou ld  
‘no t ... on its own be su ffic ie n t to  rende r TP IM s  re dundan t’ ,98 no r w ou ld  it have m easu rab ly  
in creased  the  p rospects  o f success fu lly  p ro secu ting  any o f tho se  ind iv idua ls  w ho  w ere  
p laced  unde r non -de roga ting  con tro l o rde rs .99
Though  incon tes tab ly  the  ‘e th ica lly  supe rio r pa thw ay ’100 fo r dea ling  w ith  tho se  w ho  a re  
suspec ted  o f invo lvem en t in te rro rism -re la ted  ac tiv ity , in a lim ited  num be r o f cases  
p rosecu tion  is no t a v iab le  op tio n .101 W here  a  suspec t canno t be p rosecu ted , or, if th e y  a re  
a fo re ign  na tiona l, deported , con tro l o rde rs  w ere , and TP IM s  are, an im po rtan t ‘ta rge ted  too l 
o f last re so rt’102 wh ich  can  be used  to  p ro tec t the  pub lic  from  a  risk o f te rro rism . Such  
m easures , w h ile  ve ry  m uch  a ‘se co nd -bes t so lu tio n ’ ,103 a re  consequen tly  seen  to  o ccu py  ‘a 
sm a ll bu t im po rtan t n iche  in th e  [U K ’s] coun te r-te rro rism  a rm ou ry ’.104
The  p rognos is  th a t ‘the  r isk  o f te rro rism  from  one  sou rce  o r an o the r is p robab ly  
ine rad icab le ,’105 w h ils t reg re ttab le , is un fo rtuna te ly  w e ll g rounded . Indeed, on  29  A ugus t 
2014, the  th rea t leve l to  th e  UK  from  in te rna tiona l te rro rism  w as  ra ised  from  ‘su bs tan tia l’106 to  
‘seve re ’ ,107 David C am e ron  p ro c la im ing  in an accom pany ing  s ta tem en t th a t ‘w e  a re  
[cu rren tly ] in the  m idd le  o f a  gene ra tiona l s trugg le  aga ins t a  po isonous  and  ex trem is t
increase m easurab ly  the  prospects of successful prosecution of individuals currently subject to control 
orders ’: Lord Carlile , S ix t h  R e p o r t  (n 11) para  6 . S e e  also paras  66 , 72 .
96 David Anderson , F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) paras 7 .1 3 -7 .1 6 .
97 S ee  Privy Council (Chilcot) R ev iew  (n 93 ) para  59.
98 David Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) para  7 .15 . S ee  also David  Anderson , S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 56 )  
para  4 .10 .
9 Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 11) para  6.
100 W a lke r (n 14) 328 .
101 S ee  chap ter 2 of this thesis.
102 Lord Carlile , S ix th  R e p o r t  (n 11) para  61 S ee  also David  Anderson, F i r s t  R e p o r t  (n 18) para  1 .3 0 .
103 David Anderson, F in a l  R e p o r t  (n 7 ) para  3 .1 9 .
104 ibid para 6 .2 .
105 Lucia Zedner, Te rro rism  and Counterterrorism : W ha t is at R isk? ’ (n 4 9 )  118 . S ee  also Charles  W  
Kegley, Jr. (ed ), T h e  Characteristics, C auses , and Controls of the N ew  G lobal Terro rism : An  
Introduction’ in Charles W  Kegley, Jr. (ed ), T h e  N e w  G lo b a l  T e r r o r is m :  C h a r a c te r is t ic s ,  C a u s e s ,  
C o n t r o ls  (Pren tice Hall 2 0 0 2 ) 91.
106 Which  m eans that the possibility o f a terrorist attack  is assessed  to be ‘a strong possibility’: M I5 , 
‘W ha t A re  Th rea t Levels? ’ <www .m i5 .gov .uk /hom e/the-th reats /te rro rism /th reat-leve ls /the-uks-th rea t-  
leve l-sys tem /what-a re -th reat-leve ls .h tm l> accessed  10 October 2 014 .
107 W hich m eans  that the possibility of a terrorist attack is assessed  to be ‘highly likely’: ibid. S ee  
Hom e O ffice, ‘Th rea t-leve l From  International Terrorism  Increased ’ (29  August 2 0 1 4 )  
<www .gov .uk /governm en t/new s/th reat-leve l-from -in ternational-terro rism -increased> accessed  10  
October 2 014 .
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ideo logy tha t ... w e  w ill be fig h tin g  fo r  yea rs  and p robab ly  decades ’ to  com e .108 G iven  the ir 
po ten tia l u tility  in add re ss ing  con tem po ra ry  and  fu tu re  th rea ts  posed by ‘hom e g row n ’ and 
pe ripa te tic  fo re ign  te rro r  suspec ts , th e re  is, as  David A nde rson  conc luded  in his 2014  report, 
‘a s trong  case  fo r  re ta in ing  the  op tion  o f TP IM s, o r  TP IM -like  m easures , as pa rt o f the  too lk it 
fo r d is rup ting  te rro ris ts  w ho  th rea ten  the  UK  o r w es te rn  in te res ts  ab roa d ’.109
108 David C am eron , T h re a t  level from  international terrorism  raised: PM  press s ta tem en t’ 2 9  August  
20 1 4  <www .gov .uk /governm ent/speeches /th reat-leve l-from -in ternationa l-te rro rism -ra ised -pm -p ress-  
con fe rence> accessed 10 October 2 014 . As the House  of Commons Hom e Affairs C omm ittee  
observed  in its 2 0 1 4  report: fa r from  a  more benign th reat picture, which we might have  been  hoped  
for afte r th irteen years of intensive counter-terrorism  operations, the situation today  seem s  more  
complex. T h e  th reat from  terrorism  has dram atically changed since 2 001 . Today  there  a re  m ore  Al 
Q a ’ida inspired terrorist groups than in 2 0 01 , sp read across a  w ider geography, with a  m ore  d iverse  
and evolving set of capabilities ((n 6 7 ) para  2 ).
109 David  Anderson, S e c o n d  R e p o r t  (n 57 ) para 6 .7 .
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